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ABSTRACT
The thesis examines developments in the processed food trade 
through stores in Ivory Coast from 1956 to 1990. Quantitative and 
qualitative methods are applied to data drawn from a range of 
sources, notably government reports, company archives, fieldwork 
observation and store surveys. The performances of European 
operated stores are contrasted with those run by Lebanese and 
African traders by using an adapted interpretation of Hart’s 
(1971) informal sector theory. The thesis examines the often 
negative views expressed on informal sector activities in the 
literature and points to previously ignored weaknesses of Western 
style distribution techniques. It is shown that foreign domination 
relates not so much to exploitation by Western countries as to the 
preponderance of Lebanese and foreign African traders.
In addition the thesis examines the marketing strategies pursued 
by processed food im porters and m anufacturers: regional
differences in distribution: the importance of price and brand to 
product success: and the effects of the media, western culture and 
economic conditions on consumption. These issues are related not 
only to the general framework but also to more specific theories 
and examined through case studies on stock cube and milk 
product distribution.
The thesis concludes that virtually all traders influenced by 
Western techniques have failed because of inflexible operating 
methods, excessive overheads and m iscalculations on store 
location and consumer outreach. The advantages to Lebanese and 
African traders of community networks and their knowledge of 
consumers have been greatly underestimated. Attempts by the 
state and private interests to stimulate processed food demand 
and increase Ivorian participation in distribution have largely 
foundered on a failure to acknowledge the contrasting fortunes of 
these two sectors. Finally, these conclusions are related to other 
sectors in the Ivorian economy and the issue of inappropriate 
technology in other developing economies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The processed food trade in Ivory Coast is a neglected topic. This 
thesis focuses on two main issues in the development of the trade: 
the history of Western and non-Western distribution techniques, 
and the foreign domination of store ownership. Although only a 
small proportion of goods traded, the processed - food sector 
provides a revealing example of the most controversial issue in 
Ivorian studies, the role of foreigners in the economy. In so far as 
many other developing countries play host to a variety of foreign 
interests, this thesis may also prove significant as a study that will 
hopefully prompt a re-evaluation of the role and effects of foreign 
traders, technologies and products in general.
1956 rather than 1960, the date of independence, was chosen as 
the starting point for the thesis. Unlike many other African states, 
Ivory Coast did not change the direction of economic policy 
dramatically upon achieving independence. In fact, continuity was 
the key theme and this stretched into the political arena as well. 
Consequently, there was not the upheaval in the commercial 
sector experienced by many other African countries. There was 
therefore no good reason for choosing 1960 as the starting point. 
1956, on the other hand, was the year that most accurately 
represented the beginning of a new era in the commercial sector; 
the first supermarket and the first chain stores appeared, while 
the diversification of trading company interests gathered pace.
For the purpose of this thesis, a store was defined as possessing 
the following features. First, it had a permanent physical structure 
which could not be transported from one area to another from day 
to day, i.e. it had walls, a roof and shelving (usually made of wood, 
concrete and/or corrugated sheeting). Second, its primary or at 
least equal function was to sell goods as opposed to meals or 
snacks prepared on the premises. Finally, the outlet stocked a 
reasonable quantity of processed foods as defined below, 
reasonable meaning more than just one or two tins of a couple of
15
items. Generally speaking, there was little  d ifficulty  in 
distinguishing these outlets in the field. For the rest, market 
traders, stall owners, traders using tables (hereafter referred to as 
ta b lie rs ), restaurants, hotels, bars and m aqu is  (restaurant-bars) 
were not part of the thesis. Nor, for the most part, were kiosks as 
the vast majority served only meals.
There were two basic reasons for confining the study to the 
outlets as defined above. The first was that, whilst much attention
had been paid to West African market traders and hawkers by
Polly Hill and others,1 relatively little had been written about 
stores. This seemed a particularly glaring academic omission in 
the light of the second reason which was that, of all types of
traders, the African component of stores was more directly faced 
by European and Lebanese competition than any other group of 
traders and thus provided an illuminating case study of the 
respective advantages and disadvantages of the different cultural 
groups.
The processed foods discussed were mostly sold either in plastic 
or glass containers, tins or packets (e.g. biscuits, tea). Excluded 
were all items not sold to the consumer in some form of packaging 
even if, as was often the case with flour, sugar, salt, cooking oil 
and rice, the retailer bought the product packaged. Also excluded 
were raw materials imported as inputs for local manufacturing 
(e.g. milk powder in sacks) and ‘ready to drink’ beverages such as 
coca-cola, wine, spirits and beer because these items were often 
distributed to different types of outlets through different channels 
of distribution and could not adequately be studied within the 
confines of this thesis.
The definition of processed food was thus fairly narrow for a 
number of reasons. A discussion of all processed food would have 
enlarged the scope of the thesis to unmanageable proportions and 
goods such as rice and flour were already the object of close
1 P.Hill, 'Markets in Africa', JM A S . 1, 4 (1963), pp.441-453; P.Bohannan and 
G.Dalton (eds.), Markets in Africa (Northwestern University Press,
Evanston, 1962); M.Ford, ‘Kola Production and Settlement M obility Among 
the Dan of Nimba, Liberia’, AEH . 20 (1992), pp.51-63.
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scrutiny by both the academic community and by national and 
international bodies. Processed food as defined above, whilst 
increasingly discussed in terms of local manufacture, was an 
almost totally neglected area when it came to marketing and non­
elite consumption patterns. For local production to succeed, it is 
essential to know how to satisfy and increase demand to levels 
which make manufacturing viable in Ivory Coast.
Foreign domination was discussed in relation to stores, processed 
food and distribution techniques. It was also an important theme 
in the theoretical frameworks discussed below as well as in 
virtually every book or article ever written about the Ivorian 
economy. This most controversial of issues was as evident in the 
processed food trade as anywhere but had not yet been dealt with 
in any depth in relation to this trade. In mentioning the foreign 
presence in outlet ownership, government and other sources 
rarely failed to emphasise its extent but at the same time rarely 
provided answers as to why there was such an extensive foreign 
dominance. This lack of analysis was most evident in searching for 
the colonial and especially precolonial origins of this phenomenon, 
an omission which Chapter Two seeks to address.
The rest of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first 
presents a general picture of Ivorian political, economic and 
demographic development, focusing on the period 1956 to 1990. 
This is followed by the presentation of certain conceptual 
frameworks through which the material presented in the thesis 
can be related to issues of wider interest. These include the 
formal-informal sector debate, the problem of distribution, the 
development of entrepreneurship, foreign taste acquisition and 
various theories used for Chapter Two, the background chapter, 
many of which were still relevant in 1990. The third section 
concerns the methodology and sources used whilst the final 
section outlines the contents of the chapters which follow.
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1.1 INTRODUCTION TO IVORY COAST
Declared a colony of France in 1893, Ivory Coast had long been a 
sparsely populated territory inhabited by some sixty ethnic 
groups in two different vegetation zones, the southern forest and 
northern savannah.2 French expansion into the colony was slow at 
first but the outbreak of the Second World War meant France 
required the resources of her overseas territories. This led to a 
more effective exploitation of the colony during which coffee and 
cocoa emerged as the principal exports. Whilst most production 
came from Ivorian small-holders, the powerful French settlers, 
who had exploited opportunities presented by the limited spread 
of an indigenous commercial class, were favoured with supplies of 
forced labour from the administration. The role of the future 
President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, a planter himself, and his Parti 
Democratique de Cote d’Ivoire (PDCI) in the abolition of this 
widely hated measure in 1946 greatly assisted their rise to power. 
Since 1950, the Ivorian political elite has pursued a path of close 
co-operation with France, symbolised by the decision to remain in 
the French franc zone after independence in I960.3
The political stability provided by the one party system and the 
president's paternalistic style enabled a coherent and continuous 
economic policy based on export led growth and, from the early 
1970s, import substitution and diversification. Economic success in 
turn helped to maintain political stability even into the 1980s 
when the economy went into a recession from which, by 1990, it 
had yet to emerge despite a brief recovery in the mid 1980s. This 
dual policy was pursed with the help of large-scale foreign 
investm ent encouraged by generous incentives and liberal 
controls on such areas as the repatriation of profits. At the same
2 D.Bollinger, Le marketing en Afrique. tome 1: la Cote d'Ivoire. (CEDA, 
Abidjan, 1977), pp.13-19.
3 S.Amin, Le developpement du capitalism en Cote d'Ivoire (Minuit, Paris, 
1967), pp.58-60; M.Gbetibouo and C.Delgado, 'Lessons and Constraints o f  
Export Crop-led Growth; Cocoa in Ivory Coast'. In I.Zartman and C.Delgado 
(eds.), The Political Economy o f Ivorv Coast (Praeger, New York, 1984),
p. 123; J.Cartwright, Political Leadership in Africa (Croom Helm, 
Beckenham, 1983), pp.99-109; R.Mundt, Historical Dictionary o f the Ivory 
C oast (Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, 1987), pp82-86.
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time as opting for a capitalist path to development, the state also 
played a major role through the agricultural marketing board, the 
Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Produits Agricoles 
(CSSPA) as well the parastatals which were run with the 
assistance of French personnel. Ties with France remained close at 
all levels: the CFA franc continued to be tied to the French franc, 
private French investors predominated in the formal sector, there 
was a French military base and French cultural influences were 
evident in most walks of life, especially amongst the political and 
economic urban elite.4
The most visible result of these policies was the remarkable 
growth rate of the economy, an average of 7.7% per annum from 
1960 to the end of the 1970s.5 The rapid population growth, from 
under three million in 1950 to over twelve million in 1990,6 was 
partly due to migrants from neighbouring territories attracted by 
the booming economy. At the same time, the urbanisation level 
rose to nearly 50% by 19907 and investments made in linking 
Ivory Coast’s rapidly growing towns with all-weather roads (see 
Maps 1,2 and 3). When compared to other African economies and 
especially the faltering ones of neighbouring Ghana and Guinea, 
the economic growth statistics are undoubtedly im pressive.8 
However, the growth rate for most of the 1980s was negative,9 
and indeed the deterioration of the economy's health dated back 
to the mid 1970s with the oil price shock and financial
4 M.A.Cohen, Urban Policy and Political Conflict in Africa (University o f  
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1974), pp.24-28; H.S.Marcussen, T he Ivory Coast 
Facing the Economic Crisis'. In J.Carlsson (ed.), R ecession in Africa 
(Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 1983), pp. 1-27; B. Campbell, 'State and 
Capitalist Development in the Ivory Coast'. In P.Lubeck (ed.), The African 
B o u rg e io s ie  (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1987), pp.281-300; L.K.Mytelka, 
'Foreign Business and Economic Development', pp. 149-173, and I.W.Zartman 
and C.Delgado (eds.), ‘Introduction*, p. 13. Both in Zartman and Delgado, 
Political Econom y.
5 Marcussen, 'Economic Crisis', p.2.
6 World Bank, World Tables 1983. vol 2, p.47; EIU, Cote d’Ivoire Country
Report (No.3, 1991), p.3.
7 EIU, Report (No.3, 1991), p.3.
8 For comparisons, see World Bank, World Tables 1987.
9 Ibid: EIU, Report (N o .l, 1991),p.3.
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MAP 1: TOWNS WITH A POPULATION OVER 10,000 AND PRINCIPAL ROADS,
IVORY COAST 1965
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MAP 2: TOWNS WITH A POPULATION OVER 10,000 AND PRINCIPAL ROADS,
IVORY COAST 1975.
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MAP 3: TOWNS WITH A POPULATION OVER 10,000 AND PRINCIPAL ROADS,
IVORY COAST 1988.
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miscalculations in the 1976-80 five year plan.10 The evolution of 
GDP and GDP per capita respectively (1977 constant values) 
showed that the former grew up to 1980 whilst the 1990 per 
capita figures indicated that the average Ivorian was worse off 
than his counterpart in 1965.11 The increase in population and, 
until 1980, per capita GDP combined to stimulate large increases 
in imports which rose from CFA 265 billion in 1966 to CFA 549 
billion in 1976 and CFA 789 billion in 1986 (1985 constant 
v a lu e s ) .12 For the same years exports amounted to CFA 320 
billion, CFA 600 billion and CFA 1,269 billion respectively, leaving 
a substantial balance of payments surplus.13 Coffee and cocoa, the 
two principal exports, generally accounted for around 60% of the 
total whilst imports were dominated by food, construction 
materials, vehicles and machinery and petroleum. Ivory Coast's 
principal trading partner since 1945 has been France, especially 
with respect to imports though the proportion has declined over 
the years to 31 % of imports and 16% of exports (the latter figure 
equal with Holland) in 1988.14
The government blamed international speculators for the decline 
in world prices of coffee and cocoa from 1978 to 1981 and since 
1985 which sent the economy into a deep recession. With farmers 
being paid less, cocoa production levelled off after doubling 
between 1972 and 1982. At the same time as export revenues 
began to decline, extensive borrowing to finance industrialisation 
and other projects such as sugar complexes occurred just after 
the oil boom when interest rates were low (long term loans
10 Zartman and Delgado 'Introduction', pp. 14-18; Marcussen, 'Economic 
Crisis', pp.4-6; Y.Faure, 'Cote d'Ivoire: Analysing the Crisis'. In D.B.Cruise 
O'Brien, J.Dunn and R.Rathbone (eds.), Contemporary W est African States 
(CUP, Cambridge, 1989), p.59.
11 Calculated from IMF, International Statistics Yearbook 1990 ; EIU, (N o .l, 
1991); B.A.den Tuinder, Ivorv Coast: The Challenge o f Success (World Bank, 
New York, 1978); UN, Demographic Yearbook: Historical Supplement (UN, 
1979); World Bank, World Tables 1987.: EIU, Cote d'Ivoire Country Profile 
1991-92 . p.2.
12 Calculated from import and exchange rate figures in World Bank, W orld  
Tables 1987. pp.l 14-115; UN, African Statistical Yearbook 1977: EIU, P rofile  
1991-92 . p.2.
13 Ib id .
14 EIU, Report (No.2, 1991), p.3.
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quadrupled between 1973 and 1981). With the failure to 
promptly rein in spending plans, and spiralling interest rate 
increases, the ratio of debt service to exports increased from 
10.6% in 1977 to 29.1% in 1981 and 48.5% in 1986. The decline of 
the country's economic fortunes led to increasing political 
instability and, in October 1990, multiparty elections were held 
after 30 years of one party state.15
The path to development adopted by the Ivorian government has 
been the subject of much theoretical and empirical debate 
between two broad schools of thought, the liberal and the
ra d ic a l.16 Prominent in the latter, and the earliest major critic of 
Ivorian development strategy, was Samir Amin whose prediction 
that the country would reach a crisis point because of limitations 
in economic policy17 has proved correct though much later than 
he predicted and not for the reasons he envisaged. Bonnie 
Campbell, in numerous publications, and Lynn K Mytelka were 
other prominent radical critics, the former writing on the
dominant class18 and the latter about what she saw as inadequate 
intersectoral linkages and excessive foreign investment.19
Mytelka assembled an impressive array of statistics to illustrate 
the extent of foreign involvement and to prove her point that, in
the words of Woods, "past patterns of accumulation have run their
gam ut".20 She concluded that,
the interests o f international capital, . . . the fluctuations o f world 
prices and the contraction or expansion o f  external markets 
continue to be d ec is iv e  in shaping the pattern o f  Ivorian  
econom ic grow th .2 1
15 EIU, Profile 1991-92. p.4; EIU, Report (various issues 1989-92); Marcussen, 
'Economic Crisis', pp.4-6; Faur6, 'Analysing', pp.59-73; Zartman and Delgado, 
'Introduction', p. 17.
16 D.Woods, 'State Action and Class Interests in the Ivory Coast', A S R . 31, 1 
(1988), pp.93-94.
17 Amin, C ap italism , pp.265-281.
18 In, for example, Campbell, 'Development', pp.281-300.
19 Mytelka, 'Business’, pp.149-173.
20 Woods, 'Action', p. 101.
21 Mytelka, 'Business', p. 172.
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Whilst 'the interests of international capital' were very evident in 
internal distribution, latter chapters show that their influence on 
this sector was far from decisive.
Campbell, like Amin, stressed the 'continuing dominance of the 
metropole' which, in the Ivorian case, principally meant France. 
This involved not only private interests but also the currency link 
between the CFA franc and the French franc and also defence and 
aid agreements which were "favourable to the perpetuation of a 
particular orientation to economic growth and, to this end, the 
reinforcement of a certain group of local interests,"22 i.e. the ruling 
elite. Whilst the evidence for this interpretation regarding the 
economy in general is strong, it will be shown that such an 
interpretation is more difficult to apply to the distributive trades.
Campbell's critical interpretation of the French role was not
shared by Faure and Medard's 'liberal' interpretation. They 
contended that Ivory Coast has benefited from its dependent 
relationship with France and that Ivorian interests were not 
necessarily sacrificed in the interests of foreign capital. Their view 
was that: “si Vexpansion a beneficie en premiere lieu a la strate 
superieur des revenus, elle a produit un enrichessement absolu de 
I'ensemble des couches sociales .”23 This partly contradicted 
Campbell who stated that "the Ivory Coast state has not 
undertaken any measures that would displace monopolies enjoyed 
by foreign capital,"24 a claim she backed up convincingly with 
statistical evidence regarding lack of Ivorianisation in the
commercial and industrial sectors. The state has long claimed that
Ivorianisation was a key issue in the distributive trade but later
chapters indicate that little effective progress was made.
W hilst the 'liberal' interpretation was more favourable to the 
Ivorian strategy, there was much criticism of the inequitable
22 Campbell, 'Development', p.284.
23 J-A.Faure and J-F.Medard, 'Classe dominante ou classe dirigeante?'. In J- 
A.Faure and J-F.Medard (eds.), Etat et bourgeoisie en Cote d'Ivoire (Karthala, 
Paris, 1982), pp.139-140.
24 Campbell, 'Development', p.287.
25
distribution of income.25 Further, den Tuinder's report for the 
World Bank in 197826 pointed to potential problems regarding the 
country's overtly favourable attitude towards foreign capital and 
Faure27 correctly criticised the sugar fiasco which involved foreign 
expertise which he admitted "clearly represents the kind of risk 
engendered by the basic orientations of the Ivorian system".28 In 
summary, there is a wide range of interpretations regarding the 
Ivorian 'miracle'. At first glance, foreign domination of the 
internal trade sector appeared to reflect the economy as a whole 
but on closer inspection the thesis will show that neither the 
liberal nor radical schools suffice to explain many of its 
characteristics.
1.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS
1.2.1 The Formal-Informal Sector Debate
The formal-informal sector literature holds many attractions for 
the study of entrepreneurs for it is both flexible and practically 
inclined. The distinction between these sectors may be applied to 
general economic activity or to a specific area, such as trade. The 
following paragraphs will first outline the main points of the 
debate and then refine it for the purposes of this study but it 
should be borne in mind that, possibly other than western-style 
training in commercial practices, there was no one factor which 
distinguished all traders in one sector from all those in another. 
Various other terms have been used by different writers, such as 
organised vs. independent and modern vs. traditional, but all 
proved, on closer inspection, essentially inappropriate. It 
therefore seemed easier and more profitable to use Hart’s outline 
as a starting point from which a more specific terminology could 
be developed in relation to stores.
25 See, for example, M.Cohen, P o licy , pp.26-27.
26 den Tuinder, C h a llen ge, pp. 190-193.
27 Faure, ’Analysing’, p.68.
28 Ib id .
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The idea of the informal sector was first put forward in 1971 by 
the anthropologist Keith Hart in his study of urban employment in 
one Accra slum .29 For Hart, the most important difference 
between the two sectors was “that between wage-earning and 
se lf-em p loym en t” .30 He characterised the formal sector as being 
large scale in operation with formally acquired skills, market 
protection, difficult entry, corporate ownership, the use of capital 
intensive technology and a considerable reliance on overseas 
resources. This definition encompassed such activities as large 
scale industries, government and administrative employment and 
other regular salaried occupations.
The informal sector Hart characterised as being small scale with 
informally aquired skills, no market protection, easy entry, family 
or individual ownership, use of local technology and dependence 
on local resources. Their activities included small scale 
manufacturing, street hawking, shoe shining and prostitution. 
Hinderink and Sterkenburg’s observations of Cape Coast in Ghana 
were very similar though they distinguished more between small 
scale African traders and larger operators, pointing to such 
differences as the latter sometimes having cash registers, lorries 
and some bookkeeping.31
The view of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was that 
the informal sector was of considerable benefit as it provided the 
opportunity to acquire skills and accumulate capital whilst not 
needing overseas investment. Thus the ILO wanted governments 
to encourage this sector as a potential catalyst for autonomous 
growth. Clearly, in this view, the relationship between the two 
sectors is benign:32 the informal sector is complementary to the 
economy as a whole as well as integrated into it. If this was true, 
wholesalers and retailers should, over time, have accumulated
29 K.Hart, ‘Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in 
Ghana’, JM A S. 11, 1 (1973), pp.61-89.
30 Ibid. p.68.
31 J.Hinderink and J.J.Sterkenburg, ‘Income Inequality under Changing 
Urban Conditions in Tropical Africa’, TE SG . 69, 1/2 (1978), p.60.
32 S.V.Sethuraman, T h e Urban Informal Sector and Developm ent Policy'.
In S.V.Sethuraman (ed.), The Urban Informal Sector in Developing  
C ountries. (ILO, Geneva, 1981), pp.28-47.
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enough capital to turn them selves into more pow erful 
entrepreneurs with a more dominant position in the distribution 
trade, thus giving them greater leverage over importers and 
manufacturers. Alternatively, some should have made their way 
into the formal sector perhaps as employees of foreign firms or 
owners of their own legally registered manufacturing concerns.
One important aspect given less attention than it merits is kinship. 
Kennedy saw this as putting constraints on indigenous activities in 
the informal sector. He argued that low capital requirements and 
ease of entry, two advantages of the informal sector which 
assistance from relatives may further ease when setting up an 
enterprise, may create difficulties for the more dynamic 
businessmen because of labour instability and com petition.3 3 
Kennedy, like Frankman and Charle and Cohen, also pointed to 
some advantages of kinship like easy access to advice and 
cred it.34
There is also the political dimension. It has been suggested that 
governments have little to fear from the informal sector because 
its extreme diversity and informal structure make political 
organisation and trade unionism very unlikely. Rita Cruise O’Brien 
suggested that, in Senegal, politicians seemed content to give the 
informal sector Lebanese a fairly free rein as an alternative to a 
more demanding interest group in the form of an organised local 
b o u r g e o is i e .35 Given the Ivorian governm ent’s repressive 
attitudes to opposition to the ruling PDCI and its attempts strictly 
to control unions in the formal sector,36 the relevance of this 
theory may well be considerable but, equally, it is difficult to 
prove.
33 P.Kennedy, African Capitalism (CUP, Cambridge, 1988), pp. 136-147; 
P.K ennedy, ‘Cultural Factors A ffecting Entrepreneurship and D evelopm ent 
in the Informal Economy in Ghana’, IDS B ulletin. 8, 2 (1976), pp. 17-21.
34 M.Frankman and E.Charle, ‘Employment in the Service Sector in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, JM A S. 11, 2 (1973), pp.201-210; A.Cohen, Custom and Politics 
in Urban Africa (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp.7-20.
35 R.Cruise O’Brien, ‘Lebanese Entrepreneurs in Senegal: Economic 
Integration and the Politics o f Protection’, C E A . 15, 57 (1975), p.112.
36 M.Cohen, P o lic y , p. 107.
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Bates, in writing about the role played by African governments in 
the agricultural sector, has argued that organised political 
interests such as labour, industry and government agencies were 
the beneficiaries of government intervention and favouritism at 
the expense of small scale farmers whilst large farmers, often 
politically organised and well connected, were ‘neutralised’ by 
subsid ies.37 Taking the organised interests to be the formal sector, 
Lebanese traders to be the counterparts of the large farmers, and 
informal sector retailers to correspond to small farmers, the thesis 
exam ines the relevance of this argument to the Ivorian 
commercial sector. More recently, and relating specifically to the 
Ivorian commercial sector, Boone has asserted that the state 
ignored established African traders in favour of promoting the 
interests of the political elite.38 She argued that the principal 
beneficiaries of state intervention were the "politically-powerful 
Ivorian r e n t i e r s  and the managers of state-owned trading 
com panies."39 Assessing the arguments of Boone, Cruise O’Brien 
and Bates should help to throw light upon the thinking behind 
government policy and the ways in which patronage, influence 
peddling and favouritism operate in the commercial sector as well 
as the economy in general.
On the basis of Hart's sectoral definitions, traders were placed into 
one of two groups. Here, the form al sector com prised 
supermarkets, wholesale and retail chain stores owned and/or 
provided with technical assistance by foreign firms or the state. 
The informal sector comprised the rest, which was also to say the 
vast majority, of outlets. In these the state took no official interest 
and made little effort to either encourage or hinder. The main 
problem with this theory was Hart’s emphasis on the distinction 
between formal and informal income opportunities with the other 
characteristics more secondary. This thesis will show that, for
37 R.H.Bates, ’Governments and Agricultural Markets in Africa.’ In
R.H.Bates (ed.), Toward a Political Economy o f Development (University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1988), pp.331-358.
38 C.Boone, ’Commerce in Cote d'Ivoire: Ivorianisation without Ivorian 
Traders’, JM AS. 31, 1 (1993), pp.67-92.
39 Ibid. p.91.
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stores, it was the “secondary” characteristics which were the more 
relevant and accurate distinction.
From the above, two new terms were adopted, Western Style 
Establishments or WSEs and Non-Western Style Establishments or 
NSEs. WSEs were outlets managed or operated by traders who 
sought to imitate trading practices and theories in Europe and 
America as closely as they could. NSEs, on the other hand, whilst 
perhaps imitating some superficial characteristics of WSEs, 
evolved either in the trading environment in which they operated 
or one where western commercial practices had little influence on 
them. This thesis will compare and contrast the two categories of 
outlets and seek to determine, amongst other things, which outlets 
best weathered the decline in the country's economic fortunes 
during the 1980s.
1.2.2 The Problem of Distribution
Distribution has been frequently singled out as a major factor 
holding back economic development in Third World countries, the 
argument basically being that demand is hampered by the high 
cost of distribution which holds back growth. This view regards 
indigenous distribution channels as long, fragm ented and 
inefficient and sees a need for the implementation of modern 
marketing techniques in Third World countries.40 For example, 
storage facilities are poor partly due to lack of capital. Further, it 
has been frequently  argued that there are too many 
intermediaries between the manufacturer or importer and the 
consumer, each intermediary adding to the final price as he seeks 
to cover his costs and make a profit. Hence the theory that the
40 G.H.Wadinambiarartchi, ‘Theories o f Retail Developm ent’, Social and 
Econom ic Studies. 21,4 (1972), pp.391-401; E.Anderson, ‘ “Retail Pull”: a 
Source o f Economic Stability and Growth for Developing Nations’, Journal 
of Retailing. 46, 4 (1970-71), pp.24-30; E.Kaynak and S.Cavusgil, ‘The 
Evolution o f Food Retailing Systems: Contrasting the Experiences o f  
Developed and Developing Countries’, Journal o f the Association o f  
Marketing Studies. 10, 3 (1982), pp.249-267; J.Kinsey, Marketing in 
D eveloping Countries (Macmillan, 1988), p.44; E.W .Cundiff and M.Hilger, 
‘The Consumption Function: Marketing’s Role in Economic D evelopm ent’, 
Management D ecision s. 20, 4 (1982).
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modernisation of retail and wholesale structures and practices will 
stimulate demand by increasing efficiency and thereby lowering 
prices, as well as increasing consumer awareness of available 
products. Many of these beliefs are typified by Anderson’s 
contention that:
The m erchandising and prom otional effort introduced by an 
a g g ress iv e  reta ilin g  firm  w ould augm ent the dem and for 
traditional as well as new products and stimulate higher levels o f  
consum ption spending.4 1
Mittendorf, in ‘The Challenge of Organising Food Marketing 
Systems in Developing C ountries’,42 offered a model of the 
changing patterns of retailing during the course of economic 
development. His three stages of low, medium and high levels of 
development show public retail markets and neighbourhood shops 
equally dominant in the first stage with supermarket chains 
barely in the picture. The second stage, that of medium level 
development, shows the importance of the role of neighbourhood 
shops unchanged with supermarket chains gaining at the expense 
of public retail markets. In the final stage hypermarkets and 
integrated and associated chains are as important as the other two 
sectors combined with retail markets now of little significance and 
neighbourhood shops declining for the first time. On wholesalers, 
Mittendorf sees wholesaling and retailing functions done by one 
merchant in the first stage (giving Tropical Africa as an example) 
whilst the second stage sees the rise in importance and number of 
wholesalers and the third their decline. This three stages of 
development theory can be examined for its validity as a 
predictor for what patterns of Ivorian distribution will emerge in 
the future by examining, amongst other things, the closeness of 
the fit between the theoretical first and second stages and Ivorian 
reality over the past forty years.
W hilst accepting that inadequate distribution adversely affects 
economic development, other writers, mostly more recent, have
41 Anderson, ’Retail Puli', p.28.
42 Explained in Kaynak and Cavusgil, 'Food Retailing', pp.257-258, and 
E.Kaynak, Marketing and Developm ent. (Praeger, New York, 1986), pp. 100- 
102 .
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been more inclined to acknowledge the problems arising from 
attempts to transfer technology developed for one environment 
into what is often a very different third world situation. Savitt’s 
summary of the above arguments as “change is regarded as 
positive, especially when the innovation comes from western 
e c o n o m ie s”43 may over simplify a little but nonetheless neatly 
highlights their central theme. In the case of supermarkets it has 
been pointed out that this particular technology is inappropriate 
in many areas because of low outreach i.e. consumers are often 
not prepared to travel long distances to make food purchases.44 
Samiee argued that:
Elem ents that contributed to the popularity o f  supermarkets in 
develop ing nations are either non-existent or unim portant in
developing countries  Small retail shops are generally fam ily
owned  Labour costs which are very high in developed countries
can be negligible for these retailers.4 5
In Ivory Coast, the rapid growth in population, urbanisation and, 
until 1980, income per head in real terms was a powerful 
m otivating force behind efforts to "modernise" distribution 
channels. Western interests doubtless hoped to capture the lion’s 
share of the retail and wholesale sectors and the state joined them 
in believing that modern distribution technologies would increase 
efficiency in the channels of distribution and achieve price 
uniformity throughout the country. The results of these efforts 
and their consequences on the internal trade sector in general are 
assessed through the theories presented above.
I.2.3 Theories on the Development of Entrepreneurship
The theories presented in this section deal with the advantages 
held by some commercial groups and why they emerged as 
successful traders whilst others failed to develop a significant role
43 R.Savitt, ‘Retail Change and Economic DevelopmentM n A.Findlay, 
R.Paddison and J.Dawson (eds.), Retailing Environments in D eveloping  
C ountries (Routledge, 1990), p. 17.
44 A.Goldman, ‘Outreach o f  Consumers and the Modernisation o f Urban Food 
Retailing in Developing Countries’, Journal o f  Marketing. 38 (1974), pp.9-
I I .
4 5 S.Sam iee, ‘Impediments to Progress in Retailing in Developing Nations’. 
In Findlay et al (eds.), R e ta ilin g , p.32.
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in this tertiary activity. The issues explored by Akeredolu-Ale 
and Cohen are relevant to the precolonial, colonial and 
postcolonial eras whilst those of Hopkins, Bauer and Kennedy 
concentrate on the colonial and postcolonial periods.
Cohen, in his study of the Hausa, remarked that the domination of 
particular trading groups in certain areas has long been a common 
p h e n o m e n o n .46 The Mande Islamic traders in Ivory Coast, the 
Dioula, are one such example. He argued that
the trade involves d ifficu lt technical problems which, in the 
pre-industrial conditions prevailing in these areas, have been  
most successfu lly  overcom e when men from the same ethnic
group controlled all, or most, o f  the stages o f  the trade in
specific  com m odities.47
Cohen cited three technical problems in trade: information, speed 
and trust. Using the examples of cattle and kola ,48 he 
demonstrated how "securing the continuous and rapid exchange of 
inform ation between traders in the various centres about
conditions of supply and demand" 49 were essential to successful 
trading. Similarly, speed in transport and transactions was also 
crucial because of the perishable nature of many goods whilst 
trust was necessary for arranging credit facilities.50
A three point model developed by Akeredolu-Ale,51 although 
intended to explain the prominence of the Ijebu in Nigerian trade 
during the colonial and post colonial eras, may also be usefully 
applied to explaining the absence of indigenous Ivorian traders 
from the precolonial years onwards. On the first point, most 
opportune location, the Ijebus* geographical location made them 
ideal for the role of middlemen between the coast and the
hinterland. Their position was further enhanced in this respect by
46 A.Cohen, Custom , p. 191.
47 IMxL P-7-
48 Ibid. pp .17-19.
49 Bud., p.17.
50 Ibid. pp. 19-20.
51 E.O.Akeredolu-Ale, ‘A Sociohistorical Study o f the Development o f  
Entrepreneurship among the Ijebu o f Western Nigeria’, A S R . 16, 3 (1973), 
p p .347 -364 .
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the location of three of the four European trading posts in their 
region.
The second point, economic necessity, was that the Ijebu saw 
trade as their only real chance of achieving prominence in an 
economic sphere and as the best means of making a living. The 
Ijebu "have never enjoyed a high reputation as farmers", "were 
not favourably placed with regard to the business in cash crops"52 
and were not well placed to gain employment in the colonial 
administration in Lagos. Thus their motivation to succeed in trade 
was greater than that of other Nigerians who had more options, 
especially cash-crop farming. Although circum stances have 
changed over the years, the Ijebu have remained prominent as a 
result of cumulative advantages, Akeredolu-Ale’s third point.
Cumulative advantages came in two forms. The first, socio­
cultural, concerns the socialisation favouring young Ijebus in an 
environment of the pursuit of business success. This he saw as 
providing them with motivation:
At least three generations o f Ijebu men have hitherto been raised 
in a social context where clerical employment enjoys little respect, 
where many people were already deeply involved in comm erce.5 5
Consequently, successful businessmen were held in high esteem. 
The second, operational advantages, were seen as even more 
important by Akeredolu-Ale:
Over the years, there has developed in the various comm ercial 
centres a rich network o f  business link s in v o lv in g  Ijebu  
businessm en and from which newcomers have benefited.5 4
In addition, the Ijebu were well known for closing ranks in the 
face of competition and consequently were seen as an interest 
group by other members of the business community. However, 
they did compete amongst themselves.
52 Ibid. p .359.
53 Ibid . p.360.
54 Ib id .
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Hopkins’ observation that dry season activities such as pottery 
and weaving meant that subsistence farmers provided for much 
of their own non-agricultural demand is of considerable relevance 
in explaining the paucity of trading activities amongst certain 
Ivorian ethnic groups.55 Moving on to the colonial era, Hopkins 
advanced the concept of the open economy. He saw it as having 
five main characteristics: the export of a few primary products in 
exchange for manufactures, foreign dominance of one or more 
sectors of the economy, external power control of economic policy, 
minimal colonial power fiscal input towards a balanced budget 
and “a monetary system which is an appendage of that of the 
major power” with the banks principally there for the benefit of 
foreign companies and settlers.56
Bauer’s analysis of the competitive advantages and disadvantages 
of European trading companies and Lebanese and African traders 
was also important in analysing the performances of these 
respective groups of traders. In addition, this proves particularly 
informative when applied to trader performances in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Bauer’s arguments concerning oligopolies and vertical 
integration in trade57 are also examined and, further, are related 
to Hopkins’ theory of the open economy in Chapter Two.
Relating both to competitive advantages and to kinship, Kennedy’s 
findings on Ghanaian businessmen may usefully be compared 
with the evidence about Ivorian traders. He disputed the widely 
held belief that family and kin were little more than a burden 
upon en trep reneu ria l ac tiv ities . F urther, regard ing  the 
employment of relatives, he pointed to such advantages as trust in 
money transactions.58 Finally, Kennedy showed that substantial 
starting up capital "had not necessarily been a very important
55 A.G.Hopkins, An Economic History o f West Africa (Longman, 1973), 
p p .168-170 .
56Ihid. pp .168-169.
57 P.T.Bauer, West African Trade (Routlege and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp.89- 
191.
58 P.Kennedy, Ghanaian B usinessm en (Weltforum Verlag, Munich, 1980), 
p p .107-113 .
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ingredient of business success."59 These points prove useful when 
looking at the comparative strengths and weaknesses of WSE and 
NSE stores and when assessing the effectiveness of government 
programmes aimed at augmenting the number of Ivorians in 
trade.
1 .2 .4  F ore ign  T aste  A cq u is itio n
The final major framework used in the thesis concerns the 
acquisition of foreign tastes by Ivorian consumers and the 
economic implications of the changing of consumer tastes towards 
western-type products and away from indigenous foods. The main 
argument is that advertising and marketing techniques have 
encouraged inappropriate consumption patterns which may 
involve either the introduction of a new product or the 
substitution of non-local manufactures for cheaper indigenous 
products. The adverse consequences may relate to health and/or 
financial cost.60 The most oft cited examples are those of infant 
milk formulas, much of the criticism here being aimed at Nestle,61 
and the so-called ‘wheat trap* (dependency on bread) in Nigeria.62 
The criticism s have been aimed primarily at m ultinationals 
(MNCs) but, as Vernon argued, they are not the only ones who 
‘d istort’ consumption patterns.63 The United Nations Centre on 
Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) pointed to other factors such 
as rapid communications, foreign travel, the employment of
59 Ib id . p.45.
60 UNCTC, Transnational Corporations in the World Developm ent. 3rd 
survey (UN, New York, 1983), pp.227-229; G.Andre and B.Beckman, T he  
Wheat Trap. (Zed Books, 1985); K.P.Sauvant, 'Multinational Enterprises and 
the Transmission o f Culture: the International Supply o f  Advertsing
Services and Business Education', Journal o f  Peace Research. 13, 1 (1976),
pp.49-65; A.Mattlelart, Transnationals and the Third World (Bergin and 
Garvey, South Hadley, Massachusetts, 1983); S.J.Kobrin, 'Multinational 
Corporations, Sociocultural Dependence and Industrialisation: Needs 
Satisfaction or Want Creation ?'. In P.K.Ghosh (ed.), M u ltin ation a l 
Corporations and Third World Development (Greenwood Press, Westport,
1984); A .A .Akinsanya, M ultinationals in a Changing Environment (Praeger, 
New York, 1984), pp.145-154.
61 See J-C.Buffe, Dossier N . . . comme Nestle (Alain Moreau, Paris, 1986).
62 Andre and Beckman, W h eat.
63 As interpreted by T.J.Biesteker, Distortion or Development ? (MIT,
Cambridge, M assachusetts, 1978), pp.39-41.
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expatriates and television programmes. Governments were also 
criticised by the UNCTC for not taking more action to curb what 
they saw as damaging consumption developments by raising taxes 
or restricting import licenses on luxury products. The assertion 
th a t
w ith the grow ing num ber o f  jo in t  ventures and other  
arrangem ents b etw een  transnational corporations and h o st  
countries, developing countries have increasingly becom e direct 
parties to the activities which result in the transformation o f  
consum ption patterns**4
may well prove particularly poignant in assessing the role that 
the Ivorian government has played.
1.3 METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES
1.3.1 The National Archives of Ivory Coast and France 
Given that the main part of the thesis is devoted to the post­
independence era and that archive material in Ivory Coast has 
only been classified up to 1945 in most cases, the uses of this 
material were confined almost exclusively to the chapter dealing 
with the pre-1956 years. The Archives National de Cote d ’Ivoire 
(A N C P in Abidjan, visited in November and December 1990 were, 
unfortunately , in decline through lack of funding. The 
classification of material, however, was adequate and the staff 
extremely co-operative though some files could not be found. The 
material obtained covered most of the period 1910-51 though 
there was very little between 1947 and 1951. Among the 
documents used were the Fiches de Renseignements on trading 
com panies, population data, invoices, telegram s, le tte rs , 
memoranda, import proformas and legal transcripts. These 
documents either concerned or mentioned in passing processed 
foods, rationing, trader debts, consumption habits, Lebanese 
activities and trading company outlets and their stocks.
The French overseas archives or Archives National de France 
Section Outre-Mer (ANF SO-M). located in Aix-en-Provence and
64 UNCTC, Transnational, p.229.
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visited in February 1992, were rather less productive. The
classification of much of the material was poor (minute hand 
written photocopied sheets with files listed in no particular order) 
whilst some of the descriptions of file contents were inaccurate. It 
also took up to two hours to obtain some documents (compared to 
ten or twenty minutes in Ivory Coast). Very little was found here 
other than customs’ tariff books covering the years 1925 to 1950.
1 .3 .2  O ffic ia l and G overn m en t C om m ission ed  P u b lic a tio n s
These publications consisted of statistical sources, the five year 
plans, commissioned reports on six regions and a variety of glossy 
publications aimed at promoting the image of the country. Import 
statistics were fairly detailed and, for more recent years, easy to 
acquire from the customs office in Abidjan or the Chambre de 
Commerce. These were used extensively to assess the importance 
of processed foods to consumers and the changes that occurred 
over time. Population and consumption figures were also useful in 
this respect though the reliability of the latter may well be 
suspect. The government also regularly published figures on the 
number of traders, most of which, with the exception of multiple 
retail chains, were no more than 'guestimates'.
Government sources not always being the easiest to obtain, 
extensive use was made of statistics published by the various 
international organisations. The World Bank was a good source for 
Gross Domestic Product figures which, in combination with 
population data, were used to assess purchasing power. 
Breakdowns of income distribution enabled a more thorough 
analysis of the likely buyers of different types of processed food
as well as helping to explain why some goods failed. In addition,
data on the evolution of television and radio set ownership 
assisted in gauging the extent and effectiveness of media 
advertising whilst figures on levels of education helped to explain 
the degree of penetration of products, especially when used in 
conjunction with the government’s consumer survey statistics.
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Government commissioned reports from the early to mid 1960s 
were found at ORSTOM (Petit Bassam) in Abidjan. Most related to 
regional economic and social surveys. These regional reports were 
written by Paris-based research institutes for the state and 
provided a wealth of information which, unfortunately, was often 
poorly presented. Further, definitions of the types of enterprises 
enumerated were either poor or non-existent. Consequently, most 
of the data were used with care. As far as was possible, the data 
were used to trace the evolution of the numbers of traders in 
different regions of the country as well as the changing proportion 
of ethnic ownership, trader margins and regional price variations.
In addition to the regional surveys, a number of five year plan 
preparatory reports, also at ORSTOM, were commissioned on the 
functioning of the distribution system in the 1960s and 1970s. 
These outlined the different types of outlets in Ivory Coast, their 
methods of operation and their role in the distributive network as 
a whole. The factual information proved invaluable in assessing 
changes in the principal characteristics of outlets over the years.
1 .3 .3  C om pany A rch ive  M ater ia l
Obtaining material from company archives proved difficult for a 
number of reasons. First, many small and medium sized firms had 
ceased to exist by 1990, generally leaving no trace and no 
indication as to who to contact to gain access to archives. Second, a 
handful either refused any access to archives (Nestle, SODIREP) or 
would only extract specified material upon request (CODIS, Scoa- 
Paris) for reasons of confidentiality. Many surviving companies 
had cut down on staff levels and had neither the time nor desire 
to help a researcher; recent cases of heavy fines by the state for 
irregularities meant none were prepared to allow unsupervised 
access. The information obtained from some of these archives was 
nonetheless useful. CODIS archives provided records of dairy 
products sold, price structures and their distribution methods. 
Scoa-Paris archives made available company reports from the mid 
1970s to 1991. Third, some companies had destroyed, or claimed 
to have destroyed, their records (Scoa-Ivory Coast, CDCI, CICA).
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These claims could only be partially true as the law requires that 
some records be kept for a certain period. For example, invoices to 
customers must be available for inspection for at least five years. 
Finally, the vast majority of African and Lebanese traders kept no 
written records.
In this somewhat unfavourable climate, a heavy reliance was 
placed on the archives of two companies, both subsidiaries of the 
Jersey based West Africa Holdings company. Access was due to 
the fact that the researcher used to work for one of the 
subsidiaries, the Danish Africa Company (DANAFCOL an import- 
export firm. The other was the Societe Africain de Fabrication 
Alimentaire (SAFA), a manufacturer of stock cubes. Whilst these 
archives were poorly organised and had been partially destroyed, 
a large amount of information was obtained. Especially valuable 
were market surveys and reports for cubes and Quaker oats, the 
sales and stock ledgers, reports and memoranda on the activities 
of other import-export companies (including items written by 
other companies), store surveys and credit client records.
1 .3 .4  I n te r v ie w s
In terv iew s were the main source of information on the activities 
of importing companies and their attitudes to other firms and to 
the state. Useful information was also obtained from some NSE 
sector traders on their operating methods and the problems they 
faced, from trade organisation employees on retail chains and 
buying houses, and from company salesmen, some of whom had 
been travelling the country for ten or more years. Some 
interviews were taped but it was felt that in some cases taping 
would have resulted in the interviewee being much less 
forthcoming. Some individuals specifically requested that the tape 
be removed from the recorder.
Most interviews were conducted in French, a few in English. As 
far as was possible, the reliability of interviewees was tested by 
‘planting’ a number of factual questions which could be verified 
through alternative sources. This, it is hoped, enabled a better
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judgement of which interviewees possessed the greatest capacity 
for accurately recalling information and with the least bias. Also 
helpful was the fact that many of the subjects were well known to 
the author. One interview was done by an assistant under special 
circumstances but was not used except when confirmed by 
another source.65
1.3.5 Fieldwork Questionnaires, Store Surveys, Discussions and 
O b s e r v a t i o n
Two hundred and eighty q u e s tio n n a ire s  were used to obtain 
mostly factual answers from mostly NSE traders. The sample took 
in equal numbers of four categories of traders (Lebanese, 
Mauritanians, Ivorians and Non-Ivorian Black Africans) to enable 
comparisons between the groups. Three assistants were trained 
over a three week period and four pilot surveys were conducted 
but a number of problems could not be overcome. Chief amongst 
these was language for many traders had a poor grasp of French 
which sometimes meant that questions and answers had to be 
translated. As any survey methodologist knows, this leads to 
serious problems about reliability, especially in relation to opinion 
questions. In addition, whilst no attempt was made at achieving a 
sample with proportionate numbers of the different ethnic 
categories of traders (which would have required over a thousand 
questionnaires in total to achieve an adequate number of 
Lebanese), other aspects of the sample were unsatisfactory. Given 
the available resources and the lack of a reliable data base, it was 
impossible to guarantee an accurate balance between wholesalers 
and retailers or between different regions of the country.
Given the above problems, the opinion question results were 
largely ignored in the thesis except where they were confirmed 
by other sources. The factual questions were also generally only 
used under the same conditions but should not have been greatly 
affected by the language problem. This left the possibility of
65 Most interviews were conducted and most archives consulted during the 
fieldwork period in Ivory Coast in 1990 but, for ease o f reference, are 
footnoted separately from the fieldwork described in the follow ing section.
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respondents lying out of fear (e.g. of deportation, as was believed 
to be the case on at least two occasions concerning the nationality 
question) or a desire to appear generous (e.g. as sometimes may 
have been the case concerning remittances sent to the family) or 
for other unknown reasons. This is always a problem for a 
researcher and if a respondent is determined to lie and is good at 
it, there is little to be done. However, analysis of the results of the 
questions in the light of other sources seemed to indicate that the 
reliability of the survey was better than might have been 
expected. But the data nonetheless were treated with caution 
throughout.
Far less problematic were the three store surveys. The first of 
these, the brand range survey, assessed the number of product 
items available for selected categories of products (e.g. hot 
chocolate drinks, breakfast cereals) in different classes of outlets. 
This assisted in the differentiation between outlets and gave a 
better idea of the type of consumer the store attracted. The
survey was conducted simply by walking into shops and counting
the number of different items on the shelves. The second, the 
product range survey, involved listing all the processed foods 
found in a store to determine how many items were stocked 
altogether in different types of outlets in different regions. These 
data were compared to earlier sources on product range.
The third survey, the regional distribution survey, involved 
visiting every processed food store in seven interior towns and 
three districts of Abidjan and ticking off the availability of 
selected products as well as noting the store type, the proprietor's 
nationality and ethnic group, and how long he had traded from 
the establishment. Two assistants were trained for this mostly 
mundane work. The products surveyed included most of the big 
selling items plus a selection of less widely distributed items. The
data were compared with the outlet surveys found in the
DANAFCO archives to assess changes during the 1980s and also 
served as the basis for regional comparisons.
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During the conduct of the questionnaires and surveys, numerous 
opportunities arose for o b se rv a tio n  and brief d isc u ss io n s  with 
traders. Observation involved visual impressions of such things as 
store size (some outlets were also measured), where cash was
kept, shelving facilities, location of the store and anything else 
that drew the attention. Conversations naturally arose during the 
fieldwork and were useful for asking questions about the busiest 
hours of business, types of consumers, opening hours, attitudes 
towards other traders, em ployment of family and friends, 
frequency of promotion or sales van visits, methods of payment 
for goods and so on. Much unsolicited information was also
obtained, especially relating to attitudes towards traders of 
different ethnic groups and the general economic climate. For the 
most part, specific information obtained this way was not used in 
the thesis unless backed up by other sources. But these 
conversations provided general impressions of trader attitudes 
which were invaluable in that they often encouraged a more 
questioning approach to the theories and assumptions about 
African environments found in western academic literature.
1.3.6 Personal Experience 1983*1986
One of the most important sources for the thesis was p e rso n a l 
experience . From January 1983 to November 1985 and from June 
to September 1986 the author worked for DANAFCO in various 
capacities, starting as a Salesman and odd job man, moving on to 
Sales Manager in late 1984, M arketing Manager and Credit 
Controller in mid 1985, and Product Manager in 1986. This 
experience provided many invaluable insights as well as being the
inspiration for the thesis. Observation and hundreds of hours of
often idle conversations with traders of all descriptions as well as 
salesmen and other personnel from many different distribution 
companies provided a pool of ideas and information without 
which the thesis would have been much the poorer.
There was, of course, a problem concerning the footnoting for the 
author could not interview himself and prove that the information 
had not been invented. Consequently, personal experience is 
generally used in conjunction with other sources, to either confirm
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or elaborate slightly on them. On occasion, personal experience is 
given as the only source but generally the information can be 
verified by someone visiting the country. On the rare occasion 
where verification is all but impossible, a degree of trust on the 
part of the reader is requested but not essential as there are no 
instances where the elimination of this source would fatally 
undermine any argument. As far as was possible, details on where 
and when the information came from were given in the footnotes. 
A list of the principal sources is provided in the bibliography and 
most can be contacted for verification.
1.3.7 Books, Journals and Periodicals
There being very few publications directly relating to Ivory Coast 
internal trade, most of these sources were used for ideas and 
theories covered in the frameworks section. Among the handful of 
books which were about Ivory Coast is D.Bollinger's Le marketing 
en Afrique. tome 1: La Cote d T v o ire . This text is a mine of 
information from the time of the Atlantic slave trade to 1977 
though it does not cover the earlier years in any detail. There are 
useful sections on the retail multiples, consumers and advertising 
but little is said about small or medium sized importers, wholesale 
chains, the Lebanese or other NSE traders. What analysis there is 
superficial at best and the book is mainly useful as a source for 
facts. D.Bigo’s ‘The Lebanese Community in Ivory Coast’ and 
C.Boone’s ‘Commerce in Cote d’Ivoire’ also proved useful in many 
of the chapters.
The chapter on the pre-1950 years would have been much the 
poorer without P.Kipre's Villes de Cote dTvoire (two volumes). 
Kipre consulted the ANCI at a time when they were obviously 
better organised than in 1990 and his detailing of the numbers 
and locations of trading establishments proved very useful, as did 
much of the material on the origins and growth of Ivorian towns. 
One text referred to throughout the thesis is R.Mundt’s H isto rical 
Dictionary of the Ivory Coast which, quite apart from providing all 
those simple facts of which one can never remember the original 
source, has an extensive bibliography.
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The Ivory Coast state owned Fraternite M atin also proved useful 
with features on the local milk industry, the Lebanese and alleged 
price fraud amongst traders. That much of what appears in this 
daily publication ('newspaper' would be stretching the definition a 
little) makes the London tabloid The Sun seem informed and 
balanced is in itself a useful indicator of government attitudes 
towards the commercial sector. Finally, the Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s Cote d ’Ivoire Country Report, published quarterly, proved 
useful for the most recent statistics, various incidents concerning 
the Lebanese community and political events affecting the 
commercial sector.
1.4 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS
The remainder of the thesis is divided into seven chapters, some 
presenting general perspectives and others focusing on key areas. 
The next chapter deals with internal trade to circa 1956. This 
provides background essential to understanding developments in 
later years. A number of themes are explored as partial 
explanations for the dominance of foreigners in trade and the 
origins of western style trading practices in Ivory Coast.
This is followed by two chapters on stores since 1956, one on NSE 
outlets, the other on WSE outlets. Both examine developments in 
the two sectors, explore their differences and establish the 
reasons for the failure of WSE stores. Among the relevant factors 
discussed are commercial overheads and operating costs, culture, 
trading practices, store location, consumer outreach (the distance 
from which stores can attract customers), regional variations and 
products stocked. Chapter Five looks at suppliers and products, 
the relationship between importers, manufacturers and stores and 
the factors behind the success of some products and the demise of 
others.
Chapter Six examines consumers. Import data, population, income 
per capita and consumer surveys are used to establish the size of
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the market. Income distribution, education levels, media access 
and advertising are used to explain consumer preferences. The 
controversial topic of foreign taste acquisition is pursued further 
in Chapter Seven which consists of cases studies on the markets 
for milk and stock cubes. Here, also, a more comprehensive insight 
into the operating methods of traders is gained. Marketing 
techniques used by importers and manufacturers are compared 
and contrasted and the role of WSE outlets is shown to be 
peripheral in the case of the most widely distributed product in 
Ivory Coast, the stock cube. Finally, Chapter Eight, the conclusion, 
summarises the main points of the thesis and relates them to 
wider issues in development.
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CHAPTER 2
TRADERS. PRODUCTS AND CONSUMERS BEFORE 1956
The chapter aims to explain how trading patterns during the 
period with which this thesis is primarily concerned (1956-90) 
were heavily influenced by preceding events from the late 
sixteenth century up to 1956. The chapter is divided into nine 
sections. The first outlines the chronology of the period under 
discussion, identifying key continuities and changes. The following 
four sections examine the evolution of African commercial 
interests to the early colonial period. In particular, these sections 
analyse the determinants of the types, functions and location of 
stores; and why Ivorians were relatively marginal in the running 
of these outlets. W hilst many authors have made valuable 
contributions towards an understanding of precolonial trade in the 
territory, there does not appear to have been an attempt to bring 
these different strands of thought and research together. 
Therefore these sections seek to provide a synthesis as a first step 
towards encouraging other researchers to seek a more 
comprehensive and penetrating analysis of Ivorians in precolonial 
and early colonial trade. Sections six to eight discuss the evolution 
of European and Lebanese commercial interests within Ivory 
Coast during the colonial period, and their impact on African 
traders. It will be argued that the location of European and, to a 
lesser extent, Lebanese and African commercial activity was 
determied by three main factors: security, access to sources of 
supply of local produce and transport availability.
2.1 OUTLINE
Periodisations are usually arbitrary and this is so for Ivory Coast 
before 1956. However, the economic and political trends are so 
complex as to make the task a necessity rather than an option. 
The starting point is the latter part of the sixteenth century for it 
sees the beginning of a period of shifting populations and, later, 
temporary European settlements and large scale exporting of
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slaves. Pinning exact dates on migratory populations is futile. The 
settlement of Mande speaking Islamic traders, the Dioula, in Ivory 
Coast began around the end of the sixteenth century and the 
migrations continue to this day.1 The timing of Baoule migrations 
into Ivory Coast is disputed, but it was probably also a gradual 
process during the eighteenth century. Both this migration and 
that of the Abron to the Bondoukou region around the same time 
were a consequence of the expanding Asante em pire.2 The 
locations of the five main ethnic groups have remained largely 
unaltered since the late eighteenth century (see Map 4), the main 
change being the heavy migration into some, mostly southern, 
areas, effectively making them mixed communities.3
The next date is more specific though again not altogether 
satisfactory. 1807 was the year Britain made it illegal for her 
subjects to participate in slave trading, an event which hastened 
the decline, though did not immediately end, the 'Atlantic slave 
trade' and heralded the beginning of 'legitimate' commerce i.e. 
non-slave trade with the west. These terms are somewhat 
unsatisfactory though for the trading of slaves by Africans within 
Africa continued whilst the use of 'legitimate' commerce ignores 
the internal trade between Africans. It has been argued that this 
was far larger scale than that involving Europeans and it included 
slaves.4 Further, trading in human 'merchandise' was not the only
1 B.Lewis, T he Dioula in the Ivory Coast', pp.273-289, and R.R.Griffeth, 'The 
Dyula Impact on the Peoples o f the West Volta Region', pp.167-181. Both 
papers are in C.T.Hodge (ed.), Papers on the Manding. (Indiana University, 
Bloomington, 1971); RCI, Population de la Cote dTvoire. (Ministere de 
l'Economie, Abidjan, 1984).
2 T.C.Weiskel, French Colonial Rule and the Baule Peoples. (OUP, Oxford, 
1980), pp.5-9; R.Handloff, 'Trade and Politics on the Asante Periphery: 
Gyaman, 1818-1900.' In E.Schildkraut (ed.), The Golden Stool: Studies o f the 
Asante Center and Periphery. Anthropological Papers o f the American 
Museum o f Natural History, vol. 65 part 1 (New York, 1987), pp.252-259.
3 RCI, P o p u la tio n : J-P.Duchemin and J-P.Trouchaud, 'Donnees 
demographiques sur la croissance des villes en Cote d'Ivoire', O R ST O M  
ser.Sci.hum, 6, 1 (1969) pp.71-82.
4 A.G.Hopkins, An Economic History o f West Africa. (Longman, 1973),
pp .112-113, 124; D.Eltis and L.C.Jennings, 'Trade Between Western Africa and 
the Atlantic World in the Precolonial Era', American Historical R eview . 93,
4 (1988), pp.936-959.
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European act iv i ty  during the 'Atlantic  s lave  trade' era: go ld  and
ivory were also traded in this p er iod .5
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Source: RCI. Populaiion de la Cote d'Ivoire (Ministere de l'Economie, Abidjan, 1984).
5 M.Johnson.  Ivory and the Nineteenth Century Transformat ion in Africa'.  
In G.Liesegang.  H.Paseh and A.Jones (eds.).  Figuring African Trade.
(Dietrich Reimer Verlag. Berlin, 1986),  pp.97-99;  Weiske l ,  P e o p l e s , pp.9-15;  
Hltis and Jennings.  'Atlantic', pp.936-959;  S.T.Achen,  S .C.Bech and M.Rud  
(eds.).  Danmarkshis toriens:  Hvornar Skete P e t  (Poli t ikens  Forlag,
Kobenhavn.  1972).  p. 183.
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The next watershed was 1893, when France formally declared 
Ivory Coast its colony though the borders of the territory were not 
finalised until 1914.6 It took the French until 1918 to finish 
’pacifying' the indigenous peoples, unashamedly employing brutal 
and barbarous methods in their so called mission civilatrice.1 For 
Ivorians, these years were ones of repression, taxation and forced 
labour to which was added forced recruitment during the First 
World War.
From 1918 until 1940 Ivory Coast experienced what Crowder 
termed "colonial rule proper".8 Commercial activities, particularly 
those of the main European trading companies (henceforth ETCs) 
after 1930, expanded rapidly. France made only limited efforts to 
develop the infrastructure of the colony. The inter-war years also 
saw the development of a French settler community, the 
emergence of Lebanese traders as serious competitors in internal 
trade to Europeans, and the hindrance of African enterprises.
The years 1940 to 1946, covering the Second World War and its 
immediate aftermath, saw Africans once again the hardest hit due 
to war requisitions, a trade embargo during the Vichy period from 
July 1940 to November 1942, rationing and the continuing 
practice of forced labour. European concerns, whilst also affected 
by war conditions, found their relative position strengthened, 
partly due to favouritism from the colonial administration.
The final period, 1946 to 1956, saw profound change. The 
abolition of forced labour in 1946 greatly improved the lot of 
African planters and plantation labourers alike. This was a large
6 R.J.Mundt, Historical Dictionary o f the Ivorv Coast. (Scarecrow Press, 
Metuchen, 1987), p.7.
7 Ibid. pp.23-24, 128; Y.Person, Samori: la rennaissance de I'empire 
M andingue. (NEA, Abidjan, 1983), pp.20-21; Weiskel, P eop les, pp.33-210;
J.D.Hargreaves, West Africa Partitioned, vol.2 (Macmillan, Basingstoke,
1985), p.53; P.Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1880-1985 (CUP, 
Cambridge, 1988), pp.64-65; G.Cangah and S-P.Ekanza, La Cote d'Ivoire par 
les textes (NEA, Abidjan, 1978), pp.105-108; ANCI, 1QQ8/V-11-275, Chambre de 
Commerce, proces-verbal de la seance du 13 fevrier 1911.
8 M.Crowder, West Africa under Colonial Rule. (Hutchinson, 1968), p. 19.
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step in the fortunes of the future President Houphouet-Boigny, a 
planter himself and the force behind the abolition movement. The 
post-war resurgence led to record profits for the big European 
commercial interests in the early 1950s, spurred by the Korean 
war boom, investments to develop the economy, and the abolition 
of rationing after ten years in 1950. Lebanese and African 
interests also benefited from these developments. But for the ETCs 
a variety of factors meant the good times were short lived. By 
1956 the end of the two-way trade (exports of local merchandise, 
imports of manufactured goods) was clearly in sight and most 
ETCs began implementing a phased withdrawal of trading posts, a 
process not completed until the early 1960s. With this withdrawal 
came a diversification of activities into industry, specialised trade 
and, most importantly for this thesis, supermarkets and retail and 
wholesale multiple chains.
2.2  R E SO U R C ES AND THE M AR K ET: TH E SIX T E E N T H  TO TH E  
NINETEENTH CENTURY
This section argues that sparse population, communication and 
transport problems, and the self-sufficiency of rural communities 
hindered the spread of commercial activity, particularly long­
distance trade, in many areas. Low population density often 
means low market demand for goods unless there is considerable 
purchasing power. It also implies that, assuming a reasonably 
fertile terrain, there was adequate land for subsistance farming 
which in turn implies a degree of self-sufficiency, and less need to 
trade both for agricultural produce and to supplement income. 
There was also the dry season during which agriculturalists often 
had time to spare. As Hopkins noted, this meant people had time 
for crafts such as weaving and pottery, thereby supplying their 
own demand for such items and lessening the need for 
m a n u fa c tu r in g  c e n t r e s .9 F inally , poor transport and 
communication meant a lack of knowledge of market conditions 
and would have greatly increased the price of goods in areas with
9 Hopkins, Econom ic History, pp.28, 48-51.
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no concentrations of population as is still sometimes the case even 
today .10
Boutillier has categorised towns involved in long distance trade 
into three zones according to latitude, role and environment. The 
first category concerns the great centres to the north of Ivorian 
territory from which trans-Saharan trade caravans departed 
northwards, the second comprises those between the forest and 
the Sahel (termed 'transitional' by Arhin)11 and the third the 
coastal centres.12 However, unlike Gold Coast,13 towns did not 
exist in the coastal zone of Ivory Coast.
In the sixteenth century the territory comprised two very 
different regions, the northern savannah and the southern forest. 
In both, the household14 was the principal unit of production and 
trade as well as of the transmission of accumulated wealth.15 On 
the eve of colonisation, the forest zone had few important 
concentrations of population and certainly no great towns. The 
largest, according to Verdier's agent Pierre Grisard, was Tiassale 
which he estimated at five thousand inhabitants in 189116 but the 
forest zone peoples mainly lived in small villages. Whilst this was 
also true of the north, there existed several large towns such as 
Kong (fifteen thousand inhabitants in 1888) and Bouna (ten 
thousand around 1890).17 There was nothing comparable to these 
great cites marchands in the south.
^  See, for example, IDET-CEGOS, 'Region Odienne-Seguela' (Ministfcre du 
Plan, Puteaux, 1968).
11 See K.Arhin, West African Traders in Ghana in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries (Longman, 1979), p.2.
12 J-L.Boutillier, ‘La cite marchand de Bouna dans l ’ensemble economique 
Ouest - Africaine pre-colonial’. In C.M eillassoux (ed.), The Developm ent o f  
Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa (OUP, 1971), p.241.
13 See Arhin, G hana, pp. 1-20.
14 For a discussion on the various meanings o f ‘household’, see S.Marks and 
R.Rathbone, ‘The History o f the Family in Africa: Introduction’, JA H . 24, 2 
(1983), pp .149-150.
15 D.Bollinger, Le marketing en Afrique. tome 1: La Cote d’Ivoire (CEDA, 
Abidjan, 1977), pp. 13-19; Hopkins, Econom ic History, pp.21-22; P.Kipre,
Villes de Cote d’Ivoire, tome 1 (NEA, Abidjan, 1985) pp.47-82.
16 Kipre, V ille s . tome 1, p.69.
17 Ib id . p.61.
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Compared to rural areas, traders would have found it more 
profitable in towns where there were many potential consumers 
within a small radius, rather than travelling greater distances 
through often hostile territory in order to bring goods to scattered 
potential consumers. For the rural consumer, travelling maybe 
hundreds of miles to acquire goods was rather a different 
proposition to the situation of the urban consumer who could find 
a trader no more than a few hundred yards away from his home.
In the south, the plentiful supply of land meant that most basic 
necessities were amply provided for and other requirements were 
generally satisfied by inter-village exchange or Dioula traders18 
and, to a more limited but gradually increasing extent, by 
Europeans via coastal traders. To the north there were not only 
great commercial centres but also markets in small towns and 
large villages like Korhogo, Seguela, Odienne and M adinani.19 
Trade was an important activity for many people and the region 
possessed extensive and well worn trade routes which the south 
largely lacked. Many northerners made substantial fortunes 
trading in a vast and expanding area which stretched from the 
fringes of the forest zone in the south to the great commercial 
centres like Timbuktu and Djenne in the steppe and dry savannah 
in the north.20
The most sparsely populated region was the south western corner, 
inhabited by the Krou21 people who also stretch into Liberia. 
There was little purely inland trade in this region beyond the local 
level in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From the 
sixteenth century, the Krou supplied slaves to the Portuguese and 
later to British, Dutch and French traders.22 Statistics compiled by
18 C.M eillassoux ‘Social and Economic Factors Affecting Markets in Guro 
Land’. In P.Bohannan and G.Dalton (eds.), Markets in Africa (Northwestern  
University Press, Evanston, 1962), pp.279-297.
19 Ib id , p.286; Kipre, V ille s . tome 1, pp.50-65.
20 Hopkins, Econom ic History, pp.58-65.
21 Krou here refers to the s u b - g r o u p .  The Krou g r o u p  embraces the Krou, 
Bete and other sub-groups.
22 G.Courreges 'Sassandra'. In G.Courreges, Grand Bassam et les comptoirs de 
la cote (LTnstant Durable, Clermond-Fr, 1987).
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C u rtin 23 indicate that 11.6% of slaves exported by the English 
slave trade from 1690 to 1807 came from the Windward coast 
(Liberia and Ivory Coast). He stated that "the pattern of trade 
there, however, suggests that the supply of slaves was not drawn 
from the distant hinterland, but from sources close to the coast".24 
This may be one reason why this region is underpopulated.
Jones and Johnson claimed the volume of slaves taken from the 
Windward Coast has been overestimated and argued that this area 
was already sparsely populated at the tim e.25 An additional 
reason could be war in the region caused at least in part by Krou 
slave gathering. Inikori stated that "slaves were the commodity 
for which by far the largest number of firearm s were 
ex ch an g ed " ,26 and that "firearms . . . were used mainly for slave 
gathering and the wars largely stimulated by the latter".27 The 
resulting instability could thus have led to migrations to other 
regions, as happened with French recruitment drives in the Guiglo 
region during World War One.28 To summarise, commercial 
activity in Ivory Coast, the north excepted, was largely limited to 
local exchange. The following sections will add to some of the 
issues raised here, most especially the roles played by Dioula 
traders and French rule in stiffling the growth of an indigenous 
commercial class in southern Ivory Coast.
23 P.D.Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade (University o f  W isconsin Press, 
Madison, 1969), p. 150.
24 Ibid. p.226.
25 A.Jones and M.Johnson, ’Slaves from the Windward Coast', JAH . 21, 1 
(1980), pp .17-34.
26 J.E.Inikori, 'The Import o f Firearms into West Africa, 1750 to 1807: a 
Quantitative Analysis'. In J.E.Inikori (ed.), Forced M igration (Hutchinson, 
1982), p.137.
27 Ibid . p. 146.
28 J.J.Lauer, 'Economic Innovations among the Doo o f  Western Ivory Coast, 
1900-1960’ (University o f W isconsin Ph.D., Madison, 1973), pp.92-95.
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2.3 DIOULA TRADERS AND INDIGENOUS IVORIANS BEFORE SAMORI
The single most important group of traders before colonisation 
were the Dioula. This section describes their activities and seeks to 
explain why this minority group enjoyed a dominant position for 
so long and how this affected the peoples amongst whom they 
settled. 'Dioula' is a Mande word which may be taken to describe 
those Mande speaking peoples who, on the decline of the Mali 
empire, gradually dispersed and migrated from the end of the 
sixteenth century and whose primary activity was trade.29 Their 
penetration into other areas did not occur in one mass movement 
but over several centuries and initially most of their activity in 
Ivory Coast was confined to northern towns like Odienne and 
Bouna. Despite preserving their cultural, linguistic and religious 
characteristics, the Dioula were not generally treated with 
hostility by the people among whom they settled as the 
commercial benefits of their activities were recognised.30
The Dioula spread gradually into towns where they lived in small 
communities, maintaining contact with the communities they had 
just left. The maintenance and development of their links was 
aided by kinship ties and shared religion. The result was the 
creation of a cross-regional trading network and a degree of 
commercial organisation which was central to their success as 
trad e rs .31 Cohen's observation that the domination of particular 
trading groups in certain areas has long been a common 
p h en o m en o n 32 relates well to the Dioula. Overcoming the three 
technical problems in trade - information, speed and trust - was 
facilitated by traders of the same ethnic and religious background 
controlling most of the stages of trade in certain commodities.33
29 There are many definitions o f ‘Dioula’. Southern Ivorians regard all 
northern Muslims as Dioula, be they Malinke, Hausa or Senoufo. Here the 
term is restricted to Malinke, Maraka and Bambara Islamic traders as they, 
unlike the Hausa, Senoufo and others, were part o f the dispersion on the 
decline o f the Mali empire.
30 B.Lewis, ‘Dioula ’, pp.273-289; R.R.Griffeth, ‘Dyula', pp.167-181.
31 R.Launay, Traders without Trade (CUP, Cambridge, 1982), p.23; Boutillier, 
'Cite', pp.243-244. See also Arhin, G hana, pp.3-4.
32 A.Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1969), p .191.
33 Ibid. pp.7-20.
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From the north the Dioula brought salt, iron goods, cattle and 
slaves which were traded primarily for kola nuts from the south. 
Collection points for goods from forest zone people like the Gouro 
and, later, the Baoule were located along the edges of the forest 
zone and, as the goods moved further north along a chain of towns 
like Touba, Mankono, Seguela and Odienne the quantities would 
gradually become larger, requiring caravans of up to 2,000 men to 
carry and guard the merchandise to the middle Niger. Maraka 
caravans tended to be smaller (thirty or forty traders) but better 
armed than Malinke ones and made fewer stops between the 
points of departure and arrival.34
Boutillier characterised this as network trade, that is that the
goods were controlled by a single trader from the time of
purchase to their eventual destination.35 In the course of this 
journey, the trader and his goods would pass through the two
zones where "the openness of the vegetation facilitated the 
passage of the beasts of burden of the northern caravans . . . .  and 
permitted easy diversion of direction in districts hostile to 
trave llers."36 The forest zone, however, was unsuited to caravans. 
The trader may have controlled this directly or through one or 
more representatives. These representatives were often involved 
on their own account in relay trade, the second of Boutillier's 
categories, this being typical of the forest zone. This involved 
goods changing hands several times or else a trader would
exchange merchandise as he progressed along the route.37
W hilst the Dioula were in no position to prevent their host 
communities from becoming involved in trade, their position was 
such that their hosts could not compete with their experience and 
contacts and were consequently happy to remain as political
34 Lewis, 'Dioula', pp.273-289; Griffeth, 'Dyula', pp.167-181; Launay, Traders. 
pp.39-47; R.Roberts, Warriors. Merchants, and Slaves (Stanford University  
Press, Stanford, 1987), pp.58-68.
35 Boutillier, 'Cite', p.241.
36Arhin, G h an a , p.2.
37 Boutillier, 'Cite', p.241.
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overlords primarily engaged in agricultural activities38 (a partial 
exception to this was the Gyaman kingdom which is dealt with 
latter). The Gouro and Dan peoples from whom the Dioula collected 
kola in the northern forest zone had not the means to compete 
with Dioula traders and were primarily engaged in production. 
Thus, when it came to trading with the European commercial 
houses during the colonial era and, later still, setting up shops, the 
Dan and Gouro lacked both trading experience and contacts. Lauer 
argued that the Doo in the west were disadvantaged. because they 
had "no professional trading class, and this might explain their 
failure in later competition with outsiders".39 The Baoule, as will 
be shown later, were in a better position because of their
comparatively extensive trading activities to the east and south40 
but the Dioula nonetheless performed many trading functions 
which might otherwise have been in Baoule hands.
2.4 THE EFFECTS OF THE COAST AND COASTAL SOCIETIES ON TRADE
The theme of this section is that there was a relatively small
indigenous involvement in maritime trade. During the initial 
contact with Europeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, Europeans rarely went ashore because of the
treacherous currents and complex system of lagoons.41 Instead,
local traders, principally the Alladian, would row out in their 
canoes and trade on board the (mostly English) ships. 
Consequently, this section of the coast is referred to as a 'ship 
coast' as opposed to a 'fort coast', like Gold Coast, where there 
were permanent European settlements.42
38 Launay, Traders, pp. 14-24; Kipre, V il le s . tome 1, pp.70-71.
39 Lauer, ’Doo', p.67.
40 Weiskel, P eo p le s , pp.5-32.
41 J.K.Fynn, Asante and its Neighbours 1700-1807 (Longman, 1971), p .10; 
W eiskel, P eop les, p.5.
42 Kipre, V ille s . tome 1, p.85; Weiskel, P eop les, p.35; M .Auge, 'L'organisation 
du commerce pre-colonial en Basse Cote d'Ivoire et ses effets sur 
l'organisation sociale des populations coti&res'. In M eillassox (ed.), 
In d igen ou s, pp.153-156; J.Hargreaves, France and West Africa (M acm illan, 
1969), pp.60-61.
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The Quaqua coast was not totally devoid of trading forts during 
the legitim ate commerce era but their presence was not 
permanent. The French merchant house Victor Regis had posts at 
Assinie, Grand Bassam (est.1843) and Dabou (est.1854) but these 
were all withdrawn in 1857.43 Others were more permanent, such 
as Verdier and Swanzy who each had around ten trading posts or 
'factories’ in 1871 in places like Toupah, Alepe and Tiagba but 
these were mostly run by Fanti, Sierra Leoneans and Liberians as 
Swanzy had long used these peoples elsewhere, meaning they 
already had experience of European commercial operations.44 
Thus local groups, with the exception of the eastern Nzima, were 
deprived of the commercial experience of running stores. This 
might not have happened had the coast been more hospitable to 
navigate, enabling European traders to settle much earlier and 
before they had alternative non-local experienced agents.
Marriage alliances by the Baoule were important in explaining the 
west-east extension of trading routes as opposed to north-south 
routes to and from the coast. According to research done by 
M e illa s so u x ,45 trade with the neighbouring Gouro was via an 
"intermediary area between the Baule and the Guro . . . populated 
by several groups of Baule origin, but assimilated to Guro culture". 
Here, trade was affected by social considerations whereby 
matrimonial compensation and prestige were important, but the 
issue of whether trade was for profit or not will be returned to 
later. Weiskel argued that Baoule marriage alliances with "local 
populations in the context of asymmetrical power relations of the 
slave trade probably did as much to consolidate Akan hegemony 
in this region [west of the Comoe] as any act of forceful 
conquest".46
The expansion of Akan influence and the difficulties of trading 
along the Quaqua coast meant that trade networks running in an
43 Kipre, V ille s . tome 1, pp.84-85.
44 Ib id : G.Niangoran-Bouah, 'Historique . du nom de Grand Bassam1. In 
Courreges, C om pto irs.
43 M eillassoux, 'Social', pp.289.
46 T.C.W eiskel, 'Asante and the Akan Periphery: the Baule on the Western 
Akan Frontier'. In Schildkraut (ed.), G o ld e n , p.265.
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east-west direction were more important than north-south ones, 
especially after the abolition of the (external) slave trade. This 
argument was reaffirmed by Person who contended that the 
Baoule expansion in the interior from east to west in the mid 
eighteenth century may have all but ended north-south routes 
which had existed until then.47 As can be seen from the map, 
European goods moved up from Cape Coast to Kumasi before
either passing west via Agni territory or north-w est via
Bondoukou or Bouna. Thus, a combination of political and 
geographical factors meant that southern Ivory Coast was 
circumvented by the major trade routes for much of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
From the 1830s, with new sources of trade being sought for 
'legitim ate' commerce, the previously ignored Ivorian coast 
between Fresco in the west and Assinie in the east began to
develop its own economic activities. This was based on palm oil 
production by local chieftains, traded offshore with mainly British 
ships. This opened up opportunities for local traders, especially 
among the eastern Nzima (who had already come into extensive 
contact with the British along the Gold Coast) and the Alladian 
(who dominated production). Thus palm oil was exchanged for 
European goods which were then exchanged for slaves from the
Baoule on the southern fringes of Baoule territory at places like 
Tiassale.48
Even then, the coastal societies did not develop into major 
commercial peoples like the Dioula. This is explained by the lack 
of a common culture, and religion like Islam, which decreased the 
chances of them coming together into trading communities. Given 
time, this may have happened - after all, the Dioula network 
evolved over a considerable period of time - but the 
establishment of French customs posts and other restrictions 
(detailed later) towards the end of the century did not give them 
that time.
47 W eiskel, P e o p le s , pp.6-8.
48Ib id . pp.30, 82-83; Auge, 'Organisation', pp.153-156.
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To summarise, a variety of factors, although individually perhaps 
not very important, collectively provide considerable evidence 
that the nature of the coast and coastal socities siginificantly 
delayed, diluted and diverted the penetration of commercial 
influences. The physically hostile nature of the coast meant there 
was little trade until the mid nineteenth century and the short 
period between then and French colonisation towards the end of 
the century was not time enough for a group of indigenous traders 
to establish themselves, with the exception of the Nzima whom, as 
detailed later, were suppressed by the French. At the same time, 
Baoule contacts with the Asante made trade in an east-west 
direction more likely anyway.
2.5 THE ASANTE AND SAMORI EMPIRES AS AN INFLUENCE ON 
TRADE
The empire of the Asante to the east and later that of Samori 
Toure to the north had mostly negative effects on Ivorian trade 
but were at the same time ultimately responsible for the eastern 
and northern areas of Ivory Coast being more exposed to 
commercial influences than western and south western areas. 
Kense has asserted that "the impact of the Asante on the peoples 
of the Black and White Volta river region was minimal".49 This 
conclusion seems unsustainable considering the evidence from the 
Kingdom of Gyaman, founded at the end of the seventeenth 
century by the Abron, an Akan group fleeing from Asante 
domination. Around 1740 the Asante absorbed Gyaman and, 
despite several Abron uprisings, maintained their control until the 
British intervention at Kumasi in 1874. W hilst this military 
hegemony did not mean formal occupation of Gyaman, the Abron 
were nonetheless subject to restraints. Among these was Asante 
restriction on the Abron trading directly with coastal factories. In 
1818, an attempt by the Abron to break this Asante control ended 
in military defeat.50
49 F.J.Kense, T he Impact o f the Asante on the Trade Patterns o f Northern 
Ghana and Ivory Coast'. In Schildkraut (ed.), G o ld e n , p.29.
50 Handloff, 'Gyaman', pp.252-259.
60
In addition to control over Gyaman, Asante sought to monopolise 
the growing kola trade of the early nineteenth century from 
which the Abron in Bondoukou were ill placed to benefit as they 
had no control over any of the major kola producing areas.51 Until 
then, Bondoukou had been well located as it lay on a major trade 
route from Kumasi to the Niger basin and another which linked 
Kong with Hausa land. Goods passing along these routes included 
kola, gold, guns, slaves, textiles and salt,52 and the Dioula 
dominated much of this trade. For the Dioula, trade with Asante 
was far more important than with the Abron who applied 
restrictions on the trading of Gyaman gold whilst the exchange of 
slaves for Kola was on a smaller scale. Thus a combination of 
Dioula self-interest, geographical location and Asante power 
conspired against Abron interests in trade. Further, the Dioula 
consistently opposed Abron resistance to Asante dominance 
fearing that trade routes would be disrupted, whilst Asante 
protection of the trading centre of Bouna to the north foiled Abron 
attempts to eliminate it as a competitor to Bondoukou.53
As already illustrated, east-west networks rather than north- 
south ones predominated in the forest zone prior to the early 
eighteenth century. European goods came from the Gold Coast and 
then up to Kumasi from where they went westward into the 
interior of what is now Ivory Coast, this penetration reaching 
further westward during the eighteenth century as the Asante 
empire expanded with the Baoule on the periphery. Because of the 
direction of trade, these new Baoule migrants were effectively 
dependent on the Asante empire centred at Kumasi. At the same 
time, Baoule commercial links with the Asante enabled them to 
gain both political and military ascendancy over the Gouro and 
Dida peoples into whose land they were gradually moving.54
51 Ib id .
52 E.Terray, 'Long-Distance Exchange and the Formation o f  the State: the 
Case o f the Abron Kingdom of Gyaman', Economy and Society. 3, 3 (1974), 
p .320.
53 Handloff, 'Gyaman', pp.252-259.
54 W eiskel, P e o p le s , pp.5-9.
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Weiskel attributed this Baoule dominance to "a combination of 
outright conquest and manipulation of local marriage alliances and 
advantageous trading connections with the Akan commercial 
s y s te m ” .55 The advantageous trading connections W eiskel 
attributed to language (Akan) and familiarity with Akan trade 
routes and supply sources.56 Presumably this would have meant 
the Baoule had superior access to arms which the Asante 
purchased from the British, but Weiskel asserted that "the Baule 
hegemony in the area can be explained more convincingly as the 
result of a much more gradual process of economic change and 
social stratification following the progressive integration of the 
territory into the Akan commercial network" than by extensive 
military conquests.57
The effects of Samori Toure’s expansionist military activities had a 
more dramatic effect on Ivorian trade. A Malinke chief from Mali, 
he conquered large areas of Mali, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Upper 
Volta from the 1870s to his final capture by the French in 1898. 
Increasingly under pressure from French forces, he was several 
times forced to abandon or partially abandon empires to seek new 
ones beyond French power until making what proved to be his 
last conquest, northern Ivory Coast.58 His destruction of the 
commercial centres of Kong, Dabakala and Bouna in the 1890s, 
together with the increasing French penetration, forever changed 
the patterns of trade. From being at the hub of West African trade 
before and during the nineteenth century, these northern centres 
rapidly became the commercial and political backwaters which 
they remain to this day. Their decline is most clearly illustrated 
by population figures: Bouna had a population of around ten 
thousand in 1885,59 but had declined to around one thousand by 
1904.60 The destruction of these towns also meant the destruction
55 Ib id . p.6.
56 W eiskel, ’Frontier', pp.265-268.
57 Weiskel, P eop les, p.7.
58 Person, Sam ori. pp.20-21; Mundt, Dictionary, p. 128.
59 J. Boutillier, 'Notes preliminaires a l'6tude de la ville de Bouna', Les petits 
villes de Cote d'Ivoire. ORSTOM, 1, 1 (Abidjan, 1968), p. 104.
60 Ib id .
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of Dioula political and, to a lesser extent, commercial power 
though the latter was not solely a result of Samori's conquests.
The other main effect of Samori's conquests on Ivorian trade was 
the large number of slaves these generated. This boost to the 
internal slave trade was especially beneficial to the Dioula and 
was the principal link in trade between the northern and southern 
fringes of the forest zone and beyond for much of the latter half of 
the nineteenth century. Slaves from the north were exchanged for 
kola, guns and other European goods coming from the forest zone 
peoples, especially the Baoule, and Asante.61 Thus, whilst Samori’s 
empire to the north initially boosted Ivorian trade as slaves 
became readily available and guns much demanded, the long term 
effects were negative because of the destruction of three of the 
four major commercial centres in northern Ivory Coast. The 
fourth, Bondoukou, also declined as it depended on the trade 
routes which passed through the north-east which Samori 
destroyed.
In summary, the combined effects of the Samori and Asante 
empires were largely detrimental to the interests of potential 
Ivorian traders. The region subjected to Samori's scorched earth 
policy has never really recovered as the ruins of the cities of Kong 
and Dabakala testify62 though had this region been of the same 
fertility  as southern and central Ivory Coast which have 
prospered from coffee and cocoa plantations, its economy would 
have recovered some of its former vitality. The Asante influence 
had mixed results: on the one hand, potential Ivorian traders were 
suppressed lest they challenged Asante commercial interests. On 
the other, Baoule links with the Akan trading network played an 
important part in their becoming involved in trade. For much of 
the period between the initial Baoule migrations and the mid 
nineteenth century when the Quaqua coast began to open up to 
external commercial demands, the only means the Baoule had of 
obtaining European goods was through Asante.
61 Weiskel, P e o p les , pp.86-87; Griffeth, ‘Dyula’, pp. 170, 175.
62 Griffeth, ‘Dyula’, p. 170.
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2 .6  TR A D ER S AND THE C O N SEQ U EN C E S OF “ P A C IF IC A T IO N ” : 
W INNERS AND LO SERS, 1893-1918
This section traces the decline of African commercial fortunes and 
the slow growth of French commercial interests during the 
‘pacification’ years. ETCs arrived relatively late in Ivory Coast 
compared to other territories in West Africa. In the seventeenth 
century trading forts were doing brisk business on the Gold 
C o a s t63 and French interests were established in Senegal.64 In 
Ivory Coast, it was not until the 1870s that Verdier’s Compagnie 
Francaise de Kong and the British company Swanzy were firmly 
established. Verdier controlled most of the European trade and, as 
official resident from 1878 to 1885, the political scene as well. By 
successfully delaying direct colonial rule, Verdier was able to use 
his political power locally to limit competition from African 
traders. Additionally, he could handle conflicts between chiefs to 
his own benefit and to the detriment of the interests of his 
European competitors.65
As can be seen from Map 5, the first area of the new colony to be 
‘pacified’ was the coastal region. Where possible, agreements were 
struck with local chieftains allowing customs posts to be set up 
peacefully, as happened at Grand Bassam and Assinie in 1889.66 
However, villagers further west were less receptive and it was 
only after the use of a gunboat and the imposition of heavy fines 
that posts were installed at Grand Jack and Half Jack (now 
Jacqueville) in 1890. Later that year, fifteen locals were killed 
resisting the French at Grand Lahou67 but by the end of 1891, the
63 K.Y.Daaku, 'Trade and Trading Patterns o f  the Akan in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth centuries'. In M eillassoux (ed), In d ig e n o u s , pp. 168-181.
64 Hargreaves, France, pp.73-86; R.E.Handloff (ed.), Mauritania: a Country 
Study (US Government, Department o f the Army, Washington DC, 2nd 
edition, 1990), p . l l .
65 S. Cooney, 'Overseas Companies as Transnational Actors during the 
European Conquest o f Africa’, Bristish Journal o f International Studies. 6 
(1980), p. 173; P.Atger, La France en Cote d’Ivoire de 1843 k 1893 (Universit6  
de Dakar, Dakar, 1962), pp.80-96.
66 Weiskel, P e o p le s , p .35; Niangon-Bouah, ‘Historique’.
67 Weiskel, P e o p le s , pp.35-38.
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French had secured fiscal control of the coast through seven 
customs posts.68
The declaration of Ivory Coast as a French territory in 1893 also 
presented the new Governor, Binger, with the opportunity to 
squeeze out Anglophone influences - British companies, Sierra 
Leoneans and Liberians - along the coast from Tabou to 
S a s s a n d r a . 69 Prior to this, during Verdier's r e s i d e n c e , 
discrim inatory measures had been taken against non-French 
European companies and many Anglophone blacks were also 
expelled from the territory.70 Among those to suffer were English- 
speaking Nzima traders from western Gold Coast who had 
expanded their activities into every major town in the area by the 
late nineteenth century. Their dominance in the distribution of 
European and other goods in the interior of the coastal region was 
opposed by the French as a hindrance to the expansion of French 
traders and because of the Nzima's British connection at a time of 
intense imperial rivalry.71
With a customs post at Jacqueville, trade between the local 
Alladians and the British, Liberian and Sierra Leonean interests 
suffered, largely to the detriment of the prosperity of indigenous 
Ivorians who lost their trading partners.72 A decline in the price 
of palm oil around the same time further undermined Alladian 
p rosperity73 as did the establishment of ETCs which dealt directly 
with local producers or through chiefs, thereby cutting out 
in te rm e d ia r ie s .74 At Grand Lahou, the local Avikam rubber 
producers suffered because of the imposition of French customs, 
the arrival of first Nzima and then French and Senegalese 
intermediaries and finally the collapse of rubber prices in 1913.75
68 Hargreaves, P artitioned , p.53.
69 Kipre, V ille s . tome 1, pp.89-95.
70 Niangoran-Bouah, ‘H istorique’.
71 Weiskel, P eop les, pp.83-84.
72 G.Courreges, 'Jacqueville'. In Courreges, C om p to irs.
73 Weiskel, P e o p les , pp.35-36.
74 Auge, ‘Organisation’, p .156.
75 G.Courreges, 'Grand Lahou'. In Courreges, C om p to irs: Lauer, ‘D oo’, p.89.
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The eventual establishment of customs posts in key towns like 
Tiassale near the end of the century spelt the end of the 
dominance of the African trader. In 1891, three French missions 
from Grand Lahou into the Baoule interior failed.76 This was but 
the beginning of over twenty years of Baoule resistance.77 Further 
north, the supply of slaves was cut off by the French at Bouake in 
1898. The effects of this were felt not only by the Dioula but also 
by their trading partners, the northern Baoule chiefs who, short 
on slaves to trade, could not repay their debts for European goods 
purchased through the exchange of slaves with the southern 
Baoule. Thus the economic situation of both the Dioula and the 
Baoule was weakened.78
But the French attitude towards the Dioula was not detrimental in 
all contexts. Dioula interests in the south were promoted by the 
French above those of the Anglophone Nzima. They were seen by 
the French as a vital link between European commercial interests 
and the mass of potential African consumers. One example of this 
was the way they integrated European goods into African trade by 
purchasing rubber, coffee and cocoa from indigenous producers to 
sell to European trading houses and peddling European goods to 
the producers of these primary products. Hence Lewis described 
the French view of the Dioula as "a catalyst, an agent de change, 
inducing an upward spiral of economic growth ultim ately 
beneficial to the indigenes as well as the colonial power”.79 Their 
decline, when it came, was rapid and due to a combination of 
factors.
The already mentioned restrictions on the slave trade were 
followed in 1908 by the outlawing of slave ownership. The French 
also imposed a head tax from 1910 and restricted the trade in 
g u n s .80 These factors, combined with the increasing volume of 
cheap manufactured cloth from Europe which led to a fall in prices
76 Hargreaves, P artition ed , pp.53-54; Auge, ‘Organisation’, p. 156.
77 Weiskel, P eop les, pp.33-210.
78 Ibid. pp.86-91, 109-110.
79 Lewis, ‘Dioula’, p.288.
80 W eiskel, P e o p le s , pp. 178-182; Launay, Traders, p.80. In some areas the tax 
was imposed earlier. See Mundt, D iction ary , pp.81-82.
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for Dioula weavers situated predominantly in the north ,8 1 
deprived the Dioula of both labour (slaves were used for 
porterage) and capital. In 1913 the government barred them from 
trading in Gouro areas. This was ostensibly to avoid hostility from 
the local population but, Meillassoux claimed, the real reason was 
to remove competition to European concerns. The Gouro were now 
obliged to sell their produce to Europeans in Dimbokro or
Bouake.82
Although the north remained relatively calm throughout these 
years,83 the Senoufo, Malinke and others still had to pay taxes and 
supply labour like the rest of the territory.84 Others like the Dan 
in the west and the Abe in the south east were less inclined to do 
so without a fight. In 1908 five Dan villages were burnt and the 
people fined. In 1910 the Abe rebelled and, true to Governor
Angoulvant’s form, were brutally suppressed with severed heads 
displayed on pikes in villages and railway stations.85 In 1911 the 
Chambre de Commerce expressed concern at the effects on trade 
of the migration of eastern Ivorians to Gold Coast to escape the 
harsh French head tax.86 The years up to 1914 were thus ones of 
repression, taxation and forced labour for Ivorians.
As the French imposed their rule so they were able to introduce
the franc at the expense of local currencies such as gold dust, 
cowries and manilles  (iron rods weighing about 140 grams), as
well as English currency, widely used in the east from the 1890s.
The diffusion of the franc in the territory was aided by
administrative restrictions on the use of local currencies, the
81 Launay, T raders, p.83.
82 C.M eillassoux, Anthropologic economique des Guro de Cote dTvoire 
(Mouton, Paris, 1964), p.300.
83 The reasons for this are probably in part related to the Samori wars, the 
politics o f the Senoufo chief Gbon Coulibaly and the terrain. See Launay, 
Traders, pp. 13-47; Mundt, D ictionary, p.47; Foreign Office, Ivorv Coast 
(Handbooks prepared under the direction o f the Historical Section o f  the 
Foreign Office - No 117, 1919), pp.9-10; Lewis, ‘Dioula’, pp.273-307.
84 J.B.Webster, A.Adu Boahen and M.Tidy, West Africa since 1800 (Longman, 
new edition, 1980), pp. 187-188; Mundt, D iction ary , pp.68-69.
85 Manning, Francophone, pp.64-65; Cangah and Ekanza, T ex tes. pp. 105-108.
86 ANCI, carton 1QQ8 / file V -l 1-275: Chambre de Commerce, Proc&s-verbal 
de la ler seance du 13 fevrier 1911, .
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presence of troops with money to spend and, most significantly, 
its rapid adoption by indigenous traders, especially the Dioula.87 
Africans found "they were no longer tied to the firm which bought 
their produce"88 and thus "embraced the new system willingly 
because it gave them the means of striking a better bargain".89
Nonetheless, it is likely that some lost out on conversion as
happened in southern N igeria.90 European firms were not so
enthusiastic though: Verdier was amongst those who opposed it91 
because "as long as barter and transitional currencies remained 
firmly entrenched, newcomers were at a severe disadvantage, for 
they had to master the complexities of a pre-industrial monetary 
system, itself a serious barrier to entry".92
Even by the first world war there were no European trading
stations in the west and centre west regions of the territory9 3
probably in part because ‘pacification’ was not yet complete94 and 
in part because many of what are now large or medium sized
towns were then little more than villages.95 There were also no
railways and few if any all-weather roads. There was thus a
marked concentration of trading outlets in regions which had been 
'pacified' and/or had some form of transport. Among the 
companies represented in the various towns were Erbe Freres, 
Compagnie Bordelaise des Comptoires Africaines, Seguir et Goux, 
Compagnie Commerciale de la Cote d’Afrique (CICA),96 Compagnie
87 Y.d'Alepe, 'L'imposition de la monnaie francaise en Cote d'Ivoire au ddbut 
du XXeme siecle', IH A A A . 10 (juin 1988), pp.81-99; Hopkins, E con om ic  
H istory , pp .150-151.
88 Hopkins, Econom ic H istory, p .150.
89 Ibid , p.151.
9® See J.S.Hogendorn and H.A.Gemery, ‘Continuity in W est African 
Monetary History? An Outline o f Monetary Development’, A E H . 17 (1988), 
pp. 138-139 .
91 d'Alepe, ‘M onnaie’, pp.94-97; Hopkins, Economic H istory, p. 151.
92 Hopkins, Econom ic History, p. 151.
93 Kipre, V ille s . tome 2, p.40.
94 ORSTOM and IGT, Atlas de Cote d'Ivoire (Ministfcre du Plan, Abidjan, 1979), 
section D la .
95 Kipre, V ille s . tome 1, pp.69-82.
96 ANCI, 1QQ2/V-4-211: letter (1910): letter from Compagnie Bordelaise des
Comptoirs Africains (1910): letter from Seguier et Goux (1910): letter from 
Compagnie Commerciale de la Cote d'Afrique (1910).
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Francaise de la Cote d'Ivoire (CFCI)97 and Compagnie Francaise de 
l'Afrique Occidentale (CFAO, which had bought out Swanzy’s
in terests).98
T A B L E  1: N UM BER OF EUROPEAN TRADING OUTLETS IN IVORY CO AST TO W N S, 
1 9 1 4 -1 5
TOWN REGION NUMBER OF OUTLETS
A B ID JA N SOUTHEAST betw een  10 and 14
AGBOVILLE SOUTHEAST b etw een  1 and 4
ALEPE SOUTHEAST b etw een  1 and 4
A S S IN IE SOUTHEAST b etw een  5 and 9
BONDOUKOU EAST betw een  1 and 4
BOUAKE CENTRE betw een  10 and 14
D A BA K A LA NORTH betw een  5 and 9
DABOU SOUTHEAST betw een  1 and 4
DIMBOKRO CENTRE b etw een  10 and 14
G RAND BA SSA M SOUTHEAST 15 or m ore
GRAND LAHOU SOUTHW EST betw een  10 and 14
KORHOGO NORTH betw een  5 and 9
ODIENNE NORTH betw een  1 and 4
SA SSA N D R A SOUTHW EST betw een  10 and 14
SOUBRE SOUTHW EST betw een  1 and 4
TABOU SOUTHW EST betw een  1 and 4
TIA SSA LE SOUTHEAST betw een  5 and 9
TOUMODI CENTRE betw een  5 and 9
Source: Kipre, V i l l e s .  tome 2, p.40 .
However, this European presence was uncertain and impermanent 
in the early years and some companies seem to have been taken 
over by others. For example, in Korhogo there was subsequently a 
decline in outlets for by 1923 there were only three left.99 At 
Tiassale in 1906 there were 49 trading interests, owned by French 
and British as well as Senegalese, Guinean, Sierra Leonean, Fanti 
and others,100 but the outbreak of war in 1914 caused many of 
the European concerns to withdraw. Similarly, in 1914, there were 
five ETCs at Zuenuela, two at Sinfra and six at Bouafle but by the 
beginning of 1915 all had left due to the economic effects of the
97 A N C I, 5356 /Q Q -X V -23-9: 'A ctiv ites de la CFCI en C ote d'Ivoire' (1939).
98 M undt, D ic t io n a r y , p .44.
99 A N C I, 1Q Q 82/X X 1-12-4: report, 'Cercle de Kong' (1923).
1 0 0  W eisk el, P e o p le s , p. 157.
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war. In 1919 there was only one shop in the region at Sinfra.101 
Even Dimbokro, reaping the benefits of the newly constructed 
railway line with thirteen commercial houses opening up between 
1910 and 1915, did not emerge unscathed as many had departed 
by 1920.102 Where there was a trading station there was also an 
administrative or military post but the presence of one or the 
other of the latter did not necessarily imply the presence of the 
former. For example, in 1914-15, there were administrative or 
military posts at Man, Toulepleu, San Pedro, Daloa, Guiglo, Seguela, 
Ferkessedougou, Bouna and Abengourou but none of these towns 
had a European trading company presence.103
Another major problem for trading firms was transport. As van 
der Laan observed “While the rate of advance of an army depends 
on the ability of the quartermaster to send supplies up, the 
advance of the firms was restricted by the opportunities to send 
supplies back”.104 These opportunities were limited up to the First 
World War, apparently because "the firms were unwilling to buy 
and store produce unless it could be carried to the coast by 
European transport."105 The dense forest in areas not yet ’pacified’ 
might well have made the possibility of African transport both too 
dangerous and uneconomic as fleeing villagers often took off for 
the forest with their guns.106 Consequently, trading posts were 
located where there were roads, railways or navigable rivers.107 
The late colonisation of Ivory Coast entailed the late development 
of roads and railways which meant that transport by rivers and 
lagoons was at first the only means of meeting European 
requirements. The lagoons were invaluable in this respect for they 
stretched some 400 Kms from beyond Grand Lahou to Assinie,108 
hence the concentration of outlets in this south coastal region.
101 M eillassoux, A n th rop o log ie . p.300.
102 S.Bredeloup, Negociants au long cours (l'Harmattan, Paris, 1989), p .39.
103 Kipre, V ille s . tome 1, p .l 19; Kipre, V illes . tome 2, p.40.
104 H.L.van der Laan, 'Modern Inland Transport and the European Trading 
Firms in Colonial West Africa', C E A . 21, 84 (1981), p.548.
105 Ib id .
106 See, for example, Lauer, ‘Doo’, pp.75-97.
107 van der Laan, ’Transport', p.548.
108 G.Rougerie, 'Le port d'Abidjan’, Bulletin de l'lnstitut Francaise d'Afrique 
N oir. 12, 3 (1950), pp.762-763.
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However, though Ivory Coast has three major rivers, transport by 
this means was restricted, for the Comoe and the Bandama were 
navigable for only 60 and 70 kms respectively.109 Whilst trading 
between towns like Grand Bassam and Bingerville in 1910 proved 
feas ib le ,110 operations with the interior beyond these limits meant 
African traders coming south to the Europeans rather than 
Europeans venturing further north. Railway construction did not 
begin until 1903, ten years after formal colonisation, and it took a 
further nine years for it to reach Bouake. The 1914-18 war put a 
halt to construction.111 The railway also opened up the Baoule 
interior for the trading houses, greatly stimulating those towns 
through which it passed - Agboville, Dimbokro and Bouake - as is 
proven by the number of trading concerns which had installed 
themselves there by 1915.112 All-weather roads were virtually 
non-existent north of Abengourou or west of Dabou before 
1920 .113
The final major factor in determining the location of factories 
concerned the sources of goods for export. During the first decade 
of the twentieth century the principal exports were palm oil, 
timber, rubber, gold dust and palm kernels. These came almost 
exclusively from the south and especially the south east, hence 
the early concentration of trading interests in this area.114 Supply 
sources become an increasingly im portant consideration as 
transport and especially security become more minor factors in 
the inter-war years (on which more later).
The First World War setback French trade in Ivory Coast. French 
personnel were in short supply. The Governor General of the AOF, 
van Vollenhoven, noted that 75% of those employed by the French 
companies had left by 1917. This exodus also brought a halt to
109 L.Gbagbo, 'Notes sur la mise en place des structures coloniales 
d'exploitation economique de la Cote d'Ivoire (1899-1908)', IH A A A . 7 (1981),
p .12.
110 ANCI, 1QQ2/V-4-211: letter, CFAO to Lt.Gov of Ivory Coast (January 5 
1910).
111 ORSTOM and IGT, Atlas, section D2a’
112 Kipre, V ille s . tome 2, pp.39-40.
J13 Bollinger, M ark etin g , p.49.
114 Gbagbo, 'Notes', pp.23-30.
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most public works,115 slowing the penetration of the territory by 
European concerns. At the same time, foreign companies gained at 
the expense of French ones as British personnel, unlike their 
French counterparts, were not mobilised.116 Overall, the war led to 
a decline in the barter terms of trade in addition to a fall in 
v o lu m e .117 Conditions for Africans also worsened. Already 
sparsely populated and under pressure to produce more food for 
the war effort, young Africans were recruited into the army, 
thereby further depleting the labour force. Just under seven 
thousand able bodied men were recruited in 1915-16, mostly 
against their will. Many evaded recruitment by fleeing from 
villages into the bush.118 Others rebelled and "the wide-scale 
revolts provoked by the recruitment reduced trade in many areas 
of the Federation".119 Crowder and Osuntokun also quote the 
Administrator of the Cercle  of Ouagadougou as saying "A new 
exodus of men would be disastrous for the economy".120 Even the 
repressive Angoulvant, near the end of his stint in Ivory Coast, 
warned the Governor-General of the consequences of forced 
re c ru itm e n t.121 In summary, African traders were in a weaker 
position than ever because of ‘pacification’ whilst European 
interests, although not always prospering, gradually began to 
establish their dominance in the commercial sector.
2.7 TRADERS AND THE EXPORT ECONOM Y, 1919-1939
The period 1919 to 1939 covers the years when the two-way 
trade of primary produce exports and manufactured imports 
became the most influential factor in the economic life of 
indigenous Ivorians. ETCs, the dominant traders in the Ivorian
115 M.Crowder and J.Osuntokun, 'The First World War and Africa1. In 
J.F.A.Ajayi and M.Crowder (eds.), History of West Africa, volume 2 
(Longman, 2nd edition, 1987), p.569.
116 Ib id . pp.569-570; Crowder, R ule, p.263.
117 Hopkins, Econom ic H istory, p. 184.
118 Crowder and Osuntokun, ‘First’, pp.558-566; Cangah and Ekanza, T ex tes. 
pp. 112-113; Lauer, ‘D oo’, pp.92-95.
119 Crowder and Osuntokun, ‘First’, p.569.
120 Ib id .
121 Crowder, R u le , pp.260-261.
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export-import economy, were typified by large capital resources, 
access to overseas credit, operations frequently stretching over 
several colonies and their organised, hierarchical structure.122 The 
headquarters were located in a major city of the metropole such 
as Paris, Bordeaux or London. The next most senior person in the 
chain of command was usually located in Dakar and had control 
over his company’s operations in French West Africa. Immediately 
answerable to the Dakar agent were the senior local agents in the 
colonial capitals. Beneath him were regional agents who in turn 
controlled perhaps three or four factories in local small towns and 
villages where produce was bought.123 Regional agents were 
E uropean124 usually living in accommodation close by the store.125 
Factory agents were usually Africans, mostly Senegalese, Fanti or 
N zim a,126 a legacy of some of the issues tackled in earlier sections.
For much of this period almost the only consumers of most 
processed foods were Europeans. Food was never a major trading 
item between Europe and West Africa before colonisation.127 
Initially, such a trade would have been impractical given the 
problems of preserving and carrying enough food for a ship’s crew 
from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. By the early twentieth 
century, if not before, items such as tinned meat were available in 
the territory.128 The war of 1914-18 led to a decline in processed 
food im ports because of British and French factories 
manufacturing for war and a lack of sea transport.129 By the 
1920s though there was a fair range available in Ivory Coast,
122 Gbagbo, 'Notes', p.30.
123 Ib id : T.R.Young, W est African Agent (Heath Cranton, 1942), pp.25, 38; 
A.L.Bonnefonds, 'La transformation du commerce de traite en Cote d'Ivoire 
depuis la dernier guerre mondial et l'independance', Cahiers d'Outre Mer.
21, 84 (1968), pp.396-397.
124 ANCI, 5356/QQ-XV-23-9: 'Activites de la CFCI en Cote d’Ivoire’ (1939).
125 Young, A g en t, p.74.
126 Gbagbo, 'Notes’, p .30.
127 W.O.Jones and C.Merat, 'Consumption of Exotic Consumer Goods as an 
Indicator o f Economic Achievement in Ten Countries o f Tropical Africa’, 
Food Research Institute Studies. 3, 1 (Febuary 1962), p.38; Hopkins,
Econom ic History, p. 129; Eltis and Jennings, ‘Atlantic’, pp.936-959.
128 ANCI, IQQ7/V-37-81: AOF, 'Cahier des charges speciales' (1909); ANCI, 
1QQ2/V-4-211: invoice, CFAO to Le Service des Travaux Publics (March 1909).
129 ANCI, IQQ8/V-11-275: letter, AOF to Chambre de Commerce (July 31 1915).
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mostly imported by the major companies though some delicacies 
were brought by travellers from Europe and, probably, company
and government officials returning from leave. A British agent for 
Woodins in Ivory Coast in the late 1920s and early 1930s 
mentions such items as tea, tinned lobster, pickles, macaroni, 
sausages, sardines and even Olivers' strawberry jelly .130
Whilst the years between the war and the depression saw an
expansion in the economy, a brief but sharp slump in 1920-21
heralded the dominance of a few large companies in the import- 
export business.131 According to Cangah and Ekanza there were 
eighteen 'principal' import-export firms in 1931, down from thirty 
two in 1920.132 Despite this dominance of the large companies in 
external trade, the twenties boom, modest though it was, allowed 
the creation of new small enterprises. Of the 237 businesses 
registered at the Chambre de Commerce in Grand Bassam (the 
colonial capital) between 1898 and 1930, 83% were founded
between 1920 and 1930.133 Whilst the depression of 1929 put an 
end to many of smaller operators,134 the number of companies 
continued to increase but the big ones became even bigger, partly 
through takeovers of rivals.135
In 1930 the principal companies possessed around 200 trading 
posts in Ivory Coast.136 Numbers of the big three (CFAO, Societe 
Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain, or SCOA, and CFCI) rose very 
rapidly in the years leading up to the war for by 1938 CFCI alone
130 Young, A gent, pp.31, 101, 120, 133, 156, 157; ANCI, 1457/X-54-14: Fiche de 
Renseignements (1936); ANCI, 5294/111-28-25: court notes, divorce case Aka 
vs. Agba, Abidjan (November 3 1928).
131 Crowder, R u le, p.287; J.F.A.Ajayi and M.Crowder, ' West Africa 1919-1939: 
the Colonial Situation'. In Ajayi and Crowder (eds.), H isto ry , p.594; Hopkins, 
Econom ic H istory, p. 184.
132 Cangah and Ekanza, T e x te s . p.139. The authors failed to define 
'principal' but were probably referring to companies which imported 
and/or exported regularly as opposed to those which did so perhaps just 
once or twice a year.
133 Kipre, V ille s . tome 2, p.36.
134 Ibid. pp.36-37, 88.
135 Ib id . p .84.
136 Ib id . p.41.
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had 117 outlets.137 CFAO also expanded, the company's number of 
factories in West Africa as a whole approximately doubling to 411 
between 1930 and 1939.138 The only figures available for Ivory 
Coast show CFAO and SCOA's outlets increasing between 1914 and 
1929 from six and seven to 25 and 24 respectively.139 It was not 
until after 1931 that the big three really expanded into the 
northern region,140 perhaps partly due to the demise or takeover 
of smaller companies during the depression. Those that survived 
included Escarre, Trabucato and Commercial du Nord de Cote 
d'Ivoire (CNCI).141
The dominance of imports and exports by the largest companies 
was a common pattern throughout West Africa: in 1939, seven 
firms controlled two thirds of external trade.142 In Ivory Coast in 
1938 five firms (Africain Francaise, CFCI, CFAO, SCOA and CICA) 
handled 68% of exports and 75% of imports (in weight).143 One 
important factor in this dominance was the role played by the 
administration in the early 1930s when the government, under 
considerable pressure from metropolitan business interests linked 
to the companies, reduced some export taxes. The reasoning 
behind this was that the efficient evacuation of resources from 
overseas territories would be beneficial to the metropole. Whilst 
all companies benefitted from this, for some it was not enough to 
stave off liquidation or a takeover and the administartion did 
nothing to prevent the increasing dominance of a few big firms.144 
However, not all colonial administrators were sympathetic to the
137 ANCI, 5356/QQ-XV-23-9: 'Activites de la CFCI en Cote d'Ivoire’ (1939)
138 E. Assidon, Le commerce captif (L'Harmattan, Paris, 1989), p.21.
139 P.Braibant, 'L’administration coloniale et le profit commercial en Cote 
d'Ivoire pendant la crise de 1929’, Revue Francaise d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer.
63, 232-233 (1976), p.558.
140 SEDES, 'Region de Korhogo. Etude de developpement socio-dconomique' 
(Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, 1965).
141 Ibid; BDPA, 'Etude de la region d'Odienne-Boundiali: tome 3' (Ministfcre 
du Plan, Abidjan, n.d. circa 1963); Fieldwork: discussion with CNCI manager 
(Nov 1990).
142 Cangah and Ekanza, T extes. pp. 136-137.
143 P. Kipre, 'Grandes societes et entreprises individuelles dans la ville  
coloniale en Cote d'Ivoire a la veille de la seconde guerre mondial'. In 
Laboratoire ‘Connaissance du Tiers-M onde’, Entreprises et entrepreneurs 
en Afrique xix et xx sifecles. tome 2 (L'Harmattan, Paris, 1983), pp.229-230.
144 Braibant, ‘Profit’, pp.555-574.
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firms' 'plight' and the companies themselves were mindful that if 
producers were squeezed too much on the prices they were paid, 
consumption of imports would be adversely affected. Nonetheless, 
SCOA and CFAO profits for West Africa as a whole remained 
healthy until the Second World W ar.145 This position of strength 
was aided by the colonial administration's system of export 
subsidies from 1935 which favoured the big firms.146
Transport in the interwar years became increasingly less of a 
consideration in firms' decisions where to locate stations. By 1928 
the railway had reached Ferkessedougou147 but by then the lorry 
was already in use. The European companies' greater capital 
resources initially enabled them to compete more vigorously with 
African and Lebanese traders and led to increased penetration of 
the in terior.148 By 1923 there were 56 vehicules utilitaires  in 
Ivory Coast, a figure which rose by 1,118 to 1929 and by 3,180 
between 1930 and 1938.149
With the increasing using of lorries the road network began to 
expand but it was not until the 1930s that the northern and 
w estern areas became more accessible, aided by other 
improvements in communications such as the telegraph.150 Thus 
the pattern of distribution of trading factories and warehouses in 
1929-30 showed a higher than ever concentration  of 
establishments in the south east and along the railway. In the 
north, Bondoukou, Odienne, Dabakala and Korhogo also declined, 
their distance from Abidjan and lack of exportable produce 
probably being crucial. The old trading crossword town of 
Tiassale, located away from the railway, declined whilst towns in
145 Hopkins, Econom ic History, pp. 172-184; C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'L'impact 
des interets coloniaux: SCOA et CFAO dans l'ouest Africain, 1910-1965', JAH.
16, 4 (1975), p.596-609.
146 Kipre, ’Grandes’, pp.229-230.
147 ORSTOM and IGT, Atlas, section D2a!
148 M eillassoux, A n thropolog ie . p.301.
149 Kipre, V ille s . tome 2, p.24.
150 Bollinger, M ark etin g , p.49.
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the centre west and west like Man, Daloa, Gagnoa, Bouafle151 and 
L ak o ta152 were limited to a few outlets.
Supply sources were also important. The four main producing 
regions by 1948 were the lagoon areas and the districts of 
A gbov ille , D im bokro and A b en g o u ro u .153 The gradual 
diversification of supply sources, combined with improved 
transport facilities, saw a dispersion of trading houses. The 
distribution of commercial enterprises in 1936 showed that, 
although the Akan areas were still dominant, the west was fast 
developing major commercial centres with increased exploitation 
of the region.154
Competing with ETCs were independent operators. These were 
small scale with low capital resources, often family owned, and 
run by Europeans, Lebanese or other Arabs. They generally acted 
as intermediaries between African producers and small traders 
and big trading houses.155 The main advantages which 
independents, particularly the Lebanese, had over the trading 
houses were flexibility, lower operational costs through the use of 
family labour, and better knowledge of market conditions and 
African traders.156 Compared to other territories such as Senegal 
and Guinea, the arrival of large numbers of Lebanese in Ivory 
Coast occurred relatively late.157 In 1909 there were four,158 in 
1923, 56,159 and in 1940, 777.16<>
151 Kipre, V ille s . tome 2, p.41.
152 D.J.Daligou, 'La penetration francaise dans le pays Dida' (Thfcse de 
Doctorat, Universite Nationale de Cote d’Ivoire, 1982) pp.90, 92.
153 Rougerie, ‘Port’, p.754.
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Early Lebanese migrated principally because of economic 
conditions in Lebanon where land was in short supply whilst 
agriculture, industry and commerce were in recession. For some 
the destination was West Africa. But many who had originally 
intended to go to America never made it because, on reaching 
Marseilles for an America bound ship, they found the fare beyond 
their resources, or were tricked into believing that they were 
heading across the Atlantic but instead found themselves bound 
for West Africa. Some failed to satisfy U.S. health requirements. A 
further reason was that W est Africa provided plenty of 
opportunity for self-advancem ent,161 where "business offered a 
challenge to their courage and integrity" and "would enable them 
to become independent and establish a sense of importance".162
Arriving in Ivory Coast, the Lebanese migrant had few options. 
The administration and agriculture were beyond his reach, the 
former because of nationality and sometimes illiteracy163 and the 
latter for financial reasons. This left them with little option but 
commerce as it required little starting capital. Beginning as 
penniless hawkers, many gradually built up enough capital to 
acquire a business premises, and to bring over relatives from 
Lebanon. Lebanese outlets were independent in that, unlike the 
commercial houses, they were rarely financed or directed from 
outside the territory. Nor were they vertically integrated like 
ETCs. By the 1930s they were important intermediaries between 
the trading houses and African producers and traders.164
161 Kaniki, ‘Psychology’, pp.139-140; Tirefort, ‘Baudit’, p.65, Crowder, R ule. 
p.294; R.B.Winder, T he Lebanese in W est Africa', Comparative Studies in 
Society and History. 4, 3 (1962), pp.296-298; D.Bigo, T he Lebanese 
Community in the Ivory Coast: a Non-native Network at the Heart o f  
Power?'. In A.Hourani and N.Shehadi (eds.), The Lebanese in the World: a 
Century o f Emigration (Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1992), pp.511-512.
162 Kaniki, ‘Psychology’, p .140.
163 Winder, ‘Lebanese’, p .308.
164 Bigo, 'Network', pp.511-513; Winder, ‘Lebanese’, p .307-310; Tirefort, 
‘Baudit’, pp.65-69; J. Binet, 'Les libanais en Afrique francophone', K ron iek  
van Afrika. 6, 3 (1975), pp.259-262.
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The success of Lebanese traders had much to do with the way 
they organised their enterprises, giving them some important 
advantages over their rivals. They used family labour to cut costs 
whilst money was also saved because of a lower personal 
consumption rate. This meant the Lebanese could trade with 
lower prices, thereby increasing the number of customers and 
turnover. A further inducement to African customers was the 
greater willingness of the Lebanese to grant credit, aided by their 
ability to judge clients' creditworthiness because of the closer 
contact they had with Africans than did Europeans.165
Another advantage of the Lebanese over trading houses was 
flexibility. The independent trader did not have to wait for orders 
from above to raise or cut prices and thus he was better able to 
adapt to rapidly changing market conditions.166 The Lebanese 
were also willing to locate enterprises in small towns as yet
commercially unexploited by Europeans, being afraid neither of 
the harsh living conditions nor the financial risk involved.167 In 
term s of cum ulative advantages, second and subsequent
generations of Lebanese were well placed. Many were brought 
over by relatives who had made good168 and the obvious career 
after working for the relative was one where the experience
gained could be used.
According to 1940 census figures, there was a marked 
concentration of Lebanese in the south east and centre of the
territory. Bondoukou excepted, there were no Lebanese north of a
line running from Abengourou to Bouake to Man.169 This pattern
corresponds to the main produce gathering areas and is probably
an indication of the emphasis they placed on acting as
intermediaries between buyers and producers. The majority of 
other Lebanese worked with coffee and cocoa in the Gagnoa-Daloa 
reg ion .170
165 Ib id : Bauer, Trade, pp .115-118.
166 Ibid.
167 Bigo, 'Network', p.512; Kipre, ’Grandes’, pp.231-232.
168 Bigo, 'Network', p.512; Winder, ‘Lebanese’, p .301.
169 ANCI, 2990/V 1-37-103: untitled, population by Cercle (1940).
170 Bigo, 'Network', p.512.
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Since the early colonial years African traders operated under the 
most difficult conditions. Few owned stores: most were involved 
either in long distance trade, hawking or as intermediaries during 
the colonial period171 but some had substantial resources.172 As in 
the precolonial years, the Ivorian trader remained almost a 
stranger in his own country when dealing with fellow 
’professionals'. W hilst elements of the indigenous population
undoubtedly benefited from the colonial export economy, the
majority found life difficult under the dual burdens of the head 
tax and forced labour which had first been imposed before the
1914-1918 war. Witness the continuing migration from eastern 
Ivory Coast into Ghana: estimates of the numbers involved run 
into the tens of thousands seeking the more liberal British rule.173 
The immediate post war period saw few gains for Africans except 
perhaps in one area: the departure of many French administrative 
and commercial personnel during the war had necessitated 
training Africans for jobs previously held by Europeans.174 
However, in 1918-19 there were only 50 Ivorians attending
colonial schools as against 72 from the much smaller colony of 
D ahom ey.175
During the 1920 slump it was African commercial interests that 
suffered the most as their capital reserves were inadequate to see 
them through difficult times. Once the Great Depression hit, few 
survived in the import-export business.176 In internal trade, 
Africans faced increasing competition from the Lebanese who 
began to replace them as the principal intermediaries between 
producers and ex p o rte rs .177 They also suffered from the
171 Weiskel, P eop les, p .157; Kipre, V ille s . tome 1, pp.143-148; Kipre, V ille s . 
tome 2, pp.95, 118; Bredeloup, N e g o c ia n ts . p.40; Bollinger, M arketing , pp.55- 
56.
172 Kipre, V ille s . tome 1, p. 161 cites the Fanti trader Morgan Dougan at 
Tiassale who, in 1903, was wealthy enough to purchase a steam boat.
173 A.I.Asiwaju, 'Migrations as Revolt: the Example o f the Ivory Coast and 
the Upper Volta Before 1945', JA H . 17, 4 (1976), pp.577-594.
174 Crowder, R u le, pp.262-263.
175 See Cangah and Ekanza, T extes. pp.157-158.
176 Ajayi and Crowder, ‘Situation’, p.594.
177 Ib id . pp.594-595; Crowder, R ule, p.294.
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increasing competition of European outlets in interior towns which 
would have stifled any emergence of African wholesalers of 
processed food. All that was left was the trade in such items as 
kola and dried fish: even the trans-Saharan trade no longer 
offered the chance to make fortunes as coastal sources were now a 
cheaper alternative.178
With a few exceptions, it was not until the early 1930s that 
Africans acquired interests in motorised transport,179 by which 
time it can be argued that ETCs and the Lebanese were too firmly 
entrenched to be dislodged easily. Given that Ivory Coast was a 
settler economy with African plantation owners discriminated 
against, especially concerning forced labour, the inability to 
accumulate the necessary starting capital probably dictated the 
late development of African transporters. Even after World War 
Two most were involved in carrying passengers rather than 
g o o d s ,180 African traders and planters not having the resources to 
compete with the Lebanese. The settlers presence thus appears to 
have been crucial, their moving to Ivory Coast influenced perhaps 
by the lack of production for the market during the precolonial 
period. The use of forced labour would have reinforced the settler 
dominance over indigenous planters.
The Depression that began in 1929 saw tax rates for Francophone 
Africans effectively double by 1934 due to the fall in export 
p r ic e s .181 This left less to spend on non-essential goods which in 
turn meant a decline in internal trade and fewer opportunities for 
Africans as well as others in trade.182 The pattern of the location 
of African establishments in 1936 showed some interesting 
variations from those of the Lebanese and ETCs. For Africans, 
three of the four towns with over twenty outlets were in the west 
or centre west (Daloa, Guiglo and Danane). Some western towns 
had no European presence but between 11 and 20 African outlets
178 Crowder, R u le , p.294.
179 Ibid, p.44.
180 C.Boone, 'Commerce in Cote d'Ivoire: Ivorianisation without Ivorian 
Traders’, JM A S. 31, 1 (1993), p.76.
181 Manning, F ran cop h on e, p.51.
182 Ajayi and Crowder, ‘Situation’, pp.596-597.
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(Toulepleu, Tai).183 The probable explanation for this was that the 
isolated location of these towns meant there was less competition.
Of the African traders in the territory many were non-Ivorians. 
These included Senegalese, Nzima, Mossi, Fanti, Dahomeans and 
Togolese in addition to Ivorian Alladians and D ioula.184 For 
Ivorians the export economy was probably a more attractive 
option. The smallholder could earn more than a d istric t 
commissioner in the 1920s185 and they were more likely to own 
land than foreign Africans. However, the decline in export prices 
in the 1930s meant they had to work harder for less reward186 
whilst, at the same time, the administration continued to provide 
forced labour to French competitors.187 There would thus have 
been less time for Ivorians to trade on the side. In summary, the 
years 1919 to 1939 saw the dominance of a few big ETCs in the 
two-way trade, the continued undermining of African commercial 
interests and a steady increase in the influence of Lebanese 
traders .
2.8 TRADERS, ECONOM IC DIVERSIFICATION AND NEW COM M ERCIAL  
OPPORTUNITIES, 1940 TO CIRCA 1956
The theme of this section is the diversification of the economy and 
the mixed implications this had for European, Lebanese and 
African traders. The Second World War had a similar impact on 
Ivory Coast as in other Francophone territories. Until the fall of 
France, the colony was required to supply goods for the 
metropole. However, maritime transport was restricted: only 50% 
of the banana crop for the first half of 1940 was exported. 
Additionally, the increased price of petrol made internal transport
183 Kipre, V ille s . tome 2, p.91.
184 Weiskel, P eop les, p.157; Kipre, V ille s . tome 1, pp.143-148; Kipre, V il le s . 
tome 2, pp.95, 118; Bredeloup, N egocian ts. p.40.
185 M.Gbetibouo and C.Delgado, ‘Lessons and Constraints o f Export Crop-Led 
Growth: Cocoa in Ivory Coast’. In I.W.Zartman and C.Delgado (eds.), T he  
Political Economy o f Ivorv Coast (Praeger, New York, 1984), p. 121.
186 Manning, F ran cop h on e, p.51.
187 Hopkins, Econom ic History, p.220.
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more expensive and other items also saw sharp price increases. 
For example a machete which cost five or six francs in 1939 cost 
15 or 20 francs in 1940.188 Disruption to peoples’ daily lives was 
inevitable as extra demands were made. But almost before the 
mobilisation of resources had begun, France fell to the German 
onslaught.189
From July 1940 to November 1942, Ivory Coast was under Vichy 
control and thus blockaded by Allied forces.190 Exports fell from 
173,600 tonnes in 1939 to 47,100 tonnes in 1943 and imports 
from 105,200 tonnes to 18,400 tonnes for the same years.191 
Rationing was imposed and distribution controlled through the 
trading houses, much to the ire of elite Africans who found they 
were not among the priority recipients of concentrated milk and 
other processed foods.192 For the non-elite, rationing probably 
meant little as the demise of export crops meant less cash income 
and because the French territories were self-sufficient in essential 
fo o d s tu ffs .193 Needless to say, African traders in manufactured 
imports became even more marginalised whilst African producers 
were overtly discriminated against. For example, African planters 
had to pay 75 francs for a machete during Vichy whilst the 
favoured European planters paid only 25 francs.194
188 L.Gbagbo, La Cote d'Ivoire: economie et societe a la veille de 
l'independance (1940-1960) (Harmattan, Paris, 1982), pp.8-14.
189 Crowder, R u le , p.496; P.Anyang’ Nyong'o, T he Development o f  Agrarian 
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With the switch to Free French rule, conditions for Africans 
worsened as rationing continued and Cercle  administrators were 
given unrealistic production targets for goods like rice which also 
meant heavier labour burdens on Africans. One C e r c l e  
administrator, on being ordered to supply honey and perhaps 
impatient with his superiors' ignorance of local resources, replied 
with a telegram reading "Agreed Honey Stop Send Bees."195 Efforts 
to control the rice trade angered trading houses and Africans alike 
as artificially low prices were imposed. African -traders were 
better off in Gold Coast where imported goods were more 
abundant and cheaper as rationing was less strictly enforced.196 
Perhaps the best summary of this period for Africans is provided 
by Lawler: "low [producer] prices, scarce imports, groups
uninvolved in cash markets, and poor working conditions."197
The political and social reforms which were to occur over the next 
fifteen years had little direct effect on commercial activities 
except in two, albeit very important, areas. The first was the 
increasing likelihood of independence, a reality which helped lead 
to changes in ETC commercial strategies. The other area was the 
abolition of forced labour in 1946,198 an event which proved an 
enormous boon to Ivorian peasants who were now well placed to 
abandon any needs or desires to engage in less financially secure 
tertiary activities.
From 1903 to 1946 public investment in French West Africa 
amounted to an estimated CFA 46 billion (1956 values). Between 
1947 to 1956 CFA 170 billion was pumped into the colonies under 
the Fonds d’Investissement pour le Developpement Economique et 
Social (FID ES).199 As Suret-Canale remarked, “circumstances 
(France and Europe were in ruins) led to plans for a more
195 Lawler, ‘Reform’, p.94.
196 Ibid. pp.95-96; M.Crowder, The 1939-45 War and West Africa'. In Ajayi 
and Crowder, H istory , p.677.
197 Lawler, ‘Reform’, p.96.
198 J.Suret-Canale, ’French Tropical Africa: the Economic Background.' In 
P.Gifford and W.R.Louis (eds.), The Transfer o f Power in Africa. (Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1982), pp.450-451.
199 E.J.Berg, 'The Economic Basis o f Political Choice in French W est Africa', 
American Political Science Review. 54, 2 (1960), pp.394-395.
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systematic and rational development of resources which the trade 
economy had theretofore left fallow ” .200 This expense was 
justified  because "The metropole decided to make capital 
investments . . .  to foster an economic development by which it 
would profit".201 Further, with increasing agitations for greater 
indigenous political participation, the French were doubtless
aware that "political choice is conditioned by the nature of
econom ic developm ent".202 There was little industry and the
infrastructure was underdeveloped, largely because Ivory Coast 
as “a ‘national’ economy has never developed. The productive 
coastal regions have been tied to the world market rather than to 
their own hinterlands”.203 Berg illustrated this point well when he 
stated that
In 1951 the littoral fringe o f F.W .A grouped about 7 m illion
people in 500,000 square kilometres. From this region came 91 
per cent o f the value o f exports in that year; the ‘continental 
sector’ o f around 12 m illion people and four m illion square
kilometres produced the rest204
As private capital was only forthcoming when profits were 
“immediate, assured, and high”, it was left to public resources to
be used to develop and modernise transport and communication
facilities to create a national market. There was also a perceived
need for planning as initiated in Europe.205
Of the funds made available for investment in production, much 
went into agriculture but little directly to industry. More 
im portant were the results of the large investm ents in 
in fra s tru c tu re .206 The Vridi canal was opened in 1950, the road 
network increased substantially (634 km of tarmac was laid down 
between 1948 and 1961) and investm ents were made in
200 Suret-Canale, ‘Background’, p.451.
2 0 1 Y.Person, 'French West Africa and Decolonisation.' In Gifford and
Lewis, P ow er, p. 144.
202 Berg, ‘Choice’, p.391
203 Ibid. p.400.
204 Ibid. p.399.
205 Suret-Canale, ‘Background’, p.451.
206 Ib id . pp.452-453; Berg, ‘Choice’, p.392; Gbetibouo and Delgado, 'Lessons’,
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improving lagoon transport.207 Ivory Coast and the other colonies 
became even more dependent on France economically (which 
partly explains most African leaders hesitancy in pursuing 
independence). The m etropole dom inated external trade, 
subsidised some exports, had created the not unbeneficial but 
dependency re-inforcing Franc zone and effectively ran the 
economy and administration because of a lack of Africanisation of 
managerial posts. Sudden withdrawal of these ‘facilities’ would 
have been severely disruptive economically, politically and 
socially (as Guinea found out to its cost).208 Such an environment 
held considerable benefits for foreign commercial interests. As 
Suret-Canale remarked,
The m echanism s o f the franc econom ic zone and a general 
regulation o f markets turned the French-ruled parts o f  black  
Africa into the equivalent o f a licensed game park for French 
com panies and econom ic institutions.209
The years 1946-52 proved to be profitable for the established 
European commercial concerns as a variety of circumstances 
combined in their favour, one of these being rationing. Rationing, 
with the exception of milk, was abandoned in September 1949 but 
not before much discontent over the handling of the distribution 
of rationed goods. According to Thompson and Adloff the 
government first allocated the importation of "goods to traders on 
the basis of seniority".210 The exact meaning of this phrase is not 
made clear but it may be reasonable to assume that seniority was 
judged on the basis of either the oldest established firms or size of 
operation or else a combination of both. Any of these criteria 
would have favoured the big ETCs. Objections to this system were 
so strong that in 1949 half of the goods were allocated according 
to demand to traders who did not qualify through ’seniority’. 
Shortly after, the 'seniority' system was dropped altogether.211
207 ORSTOM and IGT, Atlas, section D2a.
208 Suret-Canale, ‘Background’ pp.445-481; Berg, ‘Choice’, pp .401-405; 
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210 V.Thompson and R.Adloff, French W est Africa (Allen and Unwin, 1958),
pp.4 3 6 -4 3 7 .
211 Ibid. p.436.
87
The shortage of consumer goods in the territory may have caused 
discontent amongst elite Africans but the situation proved 
advantageous to some traders who made large profits out of the 
black market by forcing small retailers to purchase goods (and 
thus sell) at grossly inflated prices.212 Such steep rises in prices 
meant that even if non-elite Africans could obtain ration 
vouchers, their financial resources would have been severely 
stretched by such purchases. One may therefore conclude that the 
development of African consumption of processed foods was set 
back a number of years as a result of the war.
W orld-w ide demand for prim ary produce, stim ulated by 
reconstruction in Europe and then the Korean war (1950-53), 
boosted the terms of trade as prices for coffee (from 89.2 cents 
per kg in 1950 to 120 cents in 1954) and cocoa rose.213 As ETCs 
were dominant in exports, they were the principal beneficiaries 
and their profits showed it, SCOA's reaching an all time high in 
1950 and CFAO’s in 1952.214
The monopoly control of ETCs was largely down to "their long 
experience in French Black Africa, their strong financial position, 
and the agreements between themselves and with potential 
com petito rs ."215 To this may be added their overseas contacts and 
the fact that the administration, unlike in British territories, 
bought all capital goods through the companies. With the 
launching of the FIDES plan, the ETCs were once again in the right 
place at the right time and with the right contacts (and contracts). 
Other advantages included a "virtual monopoly" on sea transport 
between France and her colonies and favouritism in the allocation 
of foreign exchange resources (which also mitigated against non- 
French European concerns).216 Well though things were going for 
the ETCs, others were not doing badly either. The Lebanese were
212 Anyang' Nyong'o, 'Agrarian', p. 188.
213 Hopkins, Econom ic H istory, pp. 181, 185; Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'Impact', 
p.611; Zolberg, One Party, p. 165.
214 Coquery-Vidrovitch, ‘Impact’, pp.597-598.
215 Thompson and Adloff, F rench , p.435.
216 Ib id . p.436.
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well placed as intermediaries in the produce collection business 
and the plantation owners also benefited from higher prices and 
increased demand as well as the abolition of forced labour.217 For 
many though, these heady days were shortly to come to end.
In the years 1947 to 1952 CFAO and SCOA reached the peak of 
their success, after which their profits steadily declined.218 The 
decline of the trading company factories has been fairly well 
documented in many parts of West Africa. Most sources deal with 
the region in general or else with French West Africa as a whole 
and there is little doubt that the number factories did decline in 
the region in the 1950s.219 However, the decline in some areas of 
Ivory Coast was slower due to the rapid increase in export crop 
p ro d u c tio n :220 CFAO actually increased the number of outlets 
between 1948 and 1954 from 44 to 47221 although by the early 
1960s the withdrawal was almost complete.222
The motives behind the withdrawal of up-country stations are 
still disputed. Bauer, referring to the Anglophone territories, said 
it occurred partly because of political pressure and partly because 
of falling turnover and narrowing profit m argins.223 Rising 
salaries for expatriate personnel and indigenous employees also 
contributed to declining profits. The companies blamed this 
principally on the Loi Cadre and increasing social benefits for 
w orkers.224 Introduced in 1956, the Loi Cadre gave administrative
217 Ibid. pp.430-431, 438-439; Berg, ‘Choice’, pp.392-393; Hopkins, E con om ic  
H istory, pp.218-219; Boone, 'Commerce', p.70.
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57.
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221 H.Bonin, CFAO: cent ans de competition (Economica, Paris, 1987), p.307.
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personnel the most generous salaries in French West Africa.225 
There was also a rash of politically agitated strikes by unions 
which had been set up since 1945.226 These two factors would 
have effected salaries and employment conditions in the private 
sector. CFAO estimated that average salaries were 220% higher in 
1959 than in 1952.227 The apparent drift towards independence 
may have caused some trepidation in the boardrooms of the major 
companies who feared increasing restrictions on the activities of 
foreign concerns as well as rising social and economic aspirations 
of Africans. If properties were seized, as happened to CFAO in 
Guinea in 1959,228 heavy losses could be incurred even with 
compensation. However, it would be wrong to assume that the 
companies were solely concerned about the general political 
climate. CFAO was already moving to diversify into industry by 
1942, deciding that "le repli de I'Afrique Noire sur elle-meme 
favorise la transformation sur place de certains Produits ".229
Another important factor was the closure of up-country stations 
during the war years due to staff shortages. This further distanced 
the companies from suppliers of agricultural produce and allowed 
in an increasing number of Lebanese, African and even small 
European interm ediaries.230 As Boone explained, many Lebanese 
“had been recruited by the European companies during the inter- 
war period as sales agents and crop purchasers. . . .  by the 1950s 
many Lebanese traders were w ell-established, independent 
com m ercial in te rm ed ia ries.”231 With the closure of some up- 
country stations during the war, the recruitm ent of crop 
purchasers probably intensified. In other words, the increased 
competition from the Lebanese and others was partly due to 
commercial opportunuties presented to them by ETCs.
225 M .A.Cohen, Urban Policy and Political Conflict in Africa (University o f  
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The end of the two-way system of trade was thus very much in 
sight by the 1950s. The functions of up-country outlets 
increasingly began to change from the purchase of local produce 
and the retail of imported merchandise to the wholesaling (and 
retailing in the case of SCOA's Chaine Avion) of imported 
m e rc h a n d is e .232 Between 1954/55 and 1959/60, dealings in 
African produce declined from 23.5% of the share of SCOA's 
turnover to 15%233 and by 1969/70 this figure was just 3%.234
As subsequent chapters will show, the companies began to 
concentrate on importing, specialised distribution and, in co­
operation with metropolitan manufacturers, on industry. SCOA 
opened its first Chaine Avion stores at the end of 1955. CFAO was 
also involved in chain stores by the early 1960s as well as 
s u p e r m a r k e ts .235 Interest in local manufacturing had been 
stimulated partly by the blockade of Vichy French West Africa 
during the war.236 The first food industries were reconditioning 
industries where all of the materials required were imported.237 
However, there was no local production of any kind of canned 
meat, canned fish or even wheat flour in 1957.238 This was in no 
small part due to opposition from metropolitan manufacturers 
worried at loosing their m arket.239 In summary, changing 
economic circumstances and new opportunities arising from 
government spending, as well as the increasing power of Lebanese 
traders, encouraged the big trading companies to diversify their 
interests. Africans, meanwhile, remained excluded from the 
import-export trade despite increasing political awareness and 
perhaps because of the greater attractions of export crop 
production following the abolition of forced labour.
232 Bonnefonds, 'Traite’, pp.399-400.
233 Coquery-Vidrovitch, ‘Impact’, p .617.
234 Assidon, C aptif. p.95.
235 R.E.Grupp, 'Transposition en Afrique noire de methodes commerciales 
modernes: l'entreprise succursaliste "Chaine Avion" en Cote d'Ivoire'. In 
Laboratoire, A fr iq u e . p.354 (footnote 1); Assidon, C aptif. pp.69-72.
236 Suret-Canale, ‘Background’, p.457.
237 Interview: Mr. Fofana Coulibaly, Director o f the Ecole de Commerce, 
Abidjan (December 4 1990); Gbagbo, 'Coloniales’, p.483.
238 Jones and Merat, 'Exotic’, p.51.
239 Suret-Canale, ‘Background’ p.458.
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2.9 CONCLUSION
Many of the points raised in this chapter can be summarised by 
reversing the three point model developed by E.O.Akeredolu-Ale 
in his explanation of why the Ijebu Yoruba are disproportionately 
represented in trade in N igeria.240 He argued that the Ijebu 
achieved prominance because of economic necessity, cumulative 
advantages (sociocultural and operational) and most opportune 
location. One of the main themes in this chapter has been the lack 
of economic factors which might have forced indigenous Ivorians 
into trade. Whilst the Ijebu saw trade as their last chance of
economic survival, most Ivorian ethnic groups had the land option 
(Dida, Baoule, Krou, Agni, Gouro and Bete) and/or had to some 
degree relied on mining (Abron, Agni and Kokumbo gold) or 
production (lagoon peoples and palm oil, Baoule cloth). Plantations 
in the colonial era, especially after the abolition of forced labour, 
were an attractive alternative to trade.
The second point concerned comparative advantages, of which
there were two. The first, sociocultural, again did not apply to 
non-Dioula Ivorians for they were not ’’raised in a social context . . 
. where many people were already deeply involved in commerce"
241 as were many young Ijebus who consequently held the
successful trader businessman in high esteem. Nor did the second, 
operational, apply to Ivorians though it is highly significant when 
discussing the Dioula who did have a trading network similar to
the Ijebu. The final point raised by Akeredolu-Ale was location.
Again, especially concerning the coastal Krou and Abron, it has 
been demonstrated that many Ivorian groups were, for differing
reasons, disadvantageously located when it came to trade.
The coming of French rule saw a change in the location of
commercial centres and an increasingly complex trade network. 
Previously small towns like Bouafle, Toumodi and Bouake began 
to grow rapidly whilst old trade centres such as Kong, Bouna and
240 E.O.Akeredolu-Ale, 'A Sociohistorical Study o f the Development o f  
Entrepreneurship among the Ijebu o f Western Nigeria', A S R . 16, 3 
(December 1973), pp.358-361.
241 IMd, p.360.
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Odienne declined in importance and wealth. The new towns were 
the locations of both trading companies and the administration, 
and were the centres where agricultural produce was gathered. 
The result of these changes was the dominance a north-south 
pattern of trade when previously it had been east-west. The 
problems faced by the Ivorian trader during the colonial years 
reinforced their difficulties, especially regarding cumulative 
advantages. Economic necessity, given the opportunities of the 
export economy, the need for a stable income to pay taxes and the 
stiff competition from Europeans and Lebanese alike, was simply 
not a realistic reason for entering trade, let alone a necessity, for 
all but a few.
Colonial Ivory Coast fits almost perfectly into the open economy 
model proposed by Hopkins and all of its five major 
characteristics are directly related to one or more of the outlet 
categories. First, all traders were intricately involved in primary 
production for export overseas and/or selling m anufactured 
imports. Second, European trading companies dominated the 
im port-export sector and African traders often found their 
activities restricted in the early years as, third, an external power 
controlled economic policy. Fourth, the imposition of the franc in 
place of local forms of currency was crucial to the taxation of 
traders and other workers alike which in turn was crucial if, fifth, 
a balanced budget was to be achieved with minimal coloinial 
power fiscal input but it would be wrong to interpret the 
imposition of the franc as having wholly negative effects for 
Africans.
The development of ETCs was closely linked to the development of 
the colonial economy as a whole. The companies were the main 
beneficiaries of improved transport and communications and their 
fortunes mirrored those of the export economy. Economic 
downturns enabled the larger companies to gain at the expense of 
smaller operators as they had the necessary capital to weather the 
financial storms. The ETCs' process of vertical integration 
combined with an extensive range of goods made them formidable 
competitors and ensured both a regular supply of customers and
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goods. At the same time, the Lebanese also fared better when 
times were hard due to their greater efficiency and flexibility in 
the face of adverse economic conditions. Turning again to 
A keredolu-A le's m odel, geographical location was hardly 
applicable to the Lebanese but economic necessity and cumulative 
advantages were important. In the 1950s and early 1960s ETCs 
were faced with a rapidly changing political and commercial 
environment and their adaption to it through diversification of 
their interests maintained their position as major players in 
Ivorian trade.
This and subsequent chapters will show that certain trends 
discouraging Ivorians from trade and providing favourable 
conditions for foreigners were evident from the precolonial period 
and continued into the colonial and postcolonial eras. Alternative 
means of income, external political and/or economic control and 
organised non-indigenous trading groups all mitigated against 
Ivorian interests in trade. From Dioula traders to European trading 
companies to Lebanese entrepreneurs, foreigners have played 
prominant roles in internal distribution since the sixteenth 
century. The fiercest competition between commercial groups 
almost has always involved one foreign interest versus another. 
Rarely have Ivorians entered into the picture.
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CHAPTER 3
NON-WESTERN STYLE ENTERPRISES AND THE DOMINANCE
OF FOREIGN TRADERS
This chapter seeks to explain the predominance of Non-western 
Style Enetrprise (NSE) stores and the dominance of foreign 
Africans and Lebanese in internal distribution. The majority of 
outlets in this category are owned by individuals or by families, 
have few financial resources and rely on local technology and 
capital, and on informally aquired skills. Few employ regular 
salaried personel and for most entry into the sector has few 
restrictions. They include Ivorian and other African small 
retailers, sem i-w holesalers and w holesalers and Lebanese 
wholesalers, semi-wholesalers and, until the late 1960s, small 
retailers. Many grocery stores were owned by Lebanese and 
Ivorians but were run according to western techniques and are 
thus discussed in the following chapter with other WSE traders.
For analysis, it is useful to divide NSE traders into four categories: 
Ivorians, Lebanese, Mauritanians and Non-Ivorian Black Africans 
(hereafter NIBAs). The latter group, by far the largest, includes 
traders from Mali, Benin, Togo, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Guinea and 
other West African countries. It was between these groups that 
the questionnaires discussed in the Introduction were equally 
divided. Given the problems previously mentioned concerning 
proprietors and managers and the unavoidable inclusion of some 
WSE grocery stores in the Lebanese sample, the data are used to 
support and complement other sources rather than being the sole 
basis for the analysis. Given that there are no published sources 
on M auritanian traders in Ivory Coast, this supplementary 
information is at times invaluable. All percentages in the tables 
are to the nearest 0.5%.
The main body of the chapter is organised in five sections. The 
first looks at the evolution in the numbers of stores over the 
period 1956-90. The second examines the origins and background 
of immigrant traders in Ivory Coast. This is followed by a brief
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section on the physical appearance of these NSE stores and the 
kinds of processed foods they stocked. The fourth section 
examines the responsibilities of traders towards family and 
community and the importance of kinsmen in the starting up and 
sustaining of a private enterprise. The final section assesses 
relations between the foreign trading communities and the
Ivorian state as well as the European trading community and 
individual Ivorians.
3.1 DEVELOPM ENTS IN STORE NUM BERS
The temporary nature of many stores, their sheer numbers, and a 
lack of consistant criteria for enumeration over the years have 
made accurate assessments of the growth of the NSE sector a
thankless but not impossible task. The earliest figures available 
are for commercial licences held by Lebanese-Syrian nationals 
which increased from 515 in 1948 to 666 in 1951 and 1,062 in 
1 9 5 4 1 i.e. the number doubled in the space of just six years.
However, no more than a handful were likely to have been stores
involved in the processed food trade as in 1961-62 of 2,545
'independent' stores (i.e. not company or co-operative stores)2 
2 2 .6 % 3 or 575 were Lebanese. Further, a 1962-63 survey of the 
Bouake region found that ten out of 68 outlets dealt only in
te x ti le s 4 whilst others would have been involved in produce
buying to sell to the European trading companies.5 Winder stated
that the Lebanese in West African cities typically specialised in 
cloth.6
1 AOF, Inventaire economique de la Cote d'Ivoire 1947-56 (Ministere du 
Plan, Clichy, 1958).
2 IDET-CEGOS, 'La distribution en Cote d'Ivoire' (Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, 
1963), p.47.
3 L.Fabiani, 'Circuits de distribution en Cote d'Ivoire' (Memoire d'entree, 
Centre des Hautes Etudes sur l'Afrique et l’A sie Modernes, Paris, 1967).
4 BCCEER, 'Etude regionale de Bouake' (Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, 1963).
5 D.Bigo, 'The Lebanese Community in the Ivory Coast: a Non-native 
Network at the Heart o f Power?'. In A.Hourani and N.Shehadi (eds.), T h e  
Lebanese in the World: a Century o f Emigration (Centre for Lebanese 
Studies, 1992), pp.512-514.
6 R.B.Winder, 'The Lebanese in West Africa’, Comparative Studies in Society  
and History. 4, 3 (1962), p.254.
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Given the at times innaccurate or hazy definitions of what
constitutes a store in some of the sources (on which more later),
the numerical evolution of African stores is not always easy to
trace. However, there was probably a growth in numbers
throughout the 1950s given that the economy in general was 
expanding. According to the number of commercial licenses
issued, there were 5,590 retail outlets in 1953. This figure
excludes bakers, jewelers, produce buyers, hawkers, butchers and 
im port-export com panies. This leaves us w ith general 
merchandise stores, textile outlets, hardware stores and other 
non-food specialist retailers.7 It has already been shown that the 
Lebanese held 1,062 commercial licenses in 1954 so this leaves 
around 4,600. However, it is imposible deduce anything further
from the figures without the use of much speculation. The biggest 
problem comes in deducing what percentage of these were 
general merchandise stores. The answer is, probably, most of
them: but it is impossible to make any further deductions because 
neither the number of European owned stores is known nor 
whether all these licenses were held for stores (unlikely) nor 
whether all African stores had a licence (most unlikely).
The figures for 1961-62 are also inadequate because they appear 
to define a store too strictly. The statistic given is 2,545 
independent traders, these being defined as stores averaging 20 
m 2 and owned by the Lebanese or by Africans. Of these 27.1% 
were Ivorian and 46.4% were owned by non-Ivorian Africans,8 
which works out at 1,870 African stores. If it is assumed, as with 
the Lebanese, that 70% were general merchandise or food traders, 
the final figure for African stores in 1961-62 was around 1,300. 
However, the real figure was probably at least double that for 
many stores were no more than a few square metres in surface 
area and the average of 20 m2 given in the source seems to imply 
that stores beneath a certain size were excluded.
7 AOF, Inventaire. p. 131.
8 IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution', pp.46-48.
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By around 1969 there were 1,087 Lebanese and 13,488 African 
sto res9 of which probably about 575 and 9,500 respectively dealt 
in processed foods. These figures may be deduced by the fact that 
most, perhaps 70%, of the Lebanese in the interior had general 
s to re s 10 whilst most of those in Abidjan (60%) were specialist 
textile s to res .11 From these figures one can thus tentatively 
conclude that the number of Lebanese processed food stores 
increased by between 175 and 275 in the space of seven or eight 
years. For African stores one can only assume once again that 70% 
were general merchandise or food stores. Again, the precise 
definition of stores is unclear, as is the precise date for these 
statistics.
By 1976 the Lebanese figure appears to have increased only 
marginally to around 600 although this estimate is rather 
laboriously arrived at. According to a 1976 census of stores in 
urban areas with a population of at least 10,000 (see Table 2 
below), there were 1,001 stores owned by middle easterners (57% 
were in Abidjan), all but a handful of whom were Lebanese. 
Whilst it is possible to calculate the likely number of stores 
dealing in processed foods for all traders, it is not possible to do 
this by national group.12 Therefore, for the interior, the same 
figure as used before, 70%, will have to suffice. For Abidjan, the 
percentage used, 40%, is based on Diambra-Hauhouot's 1972 
s u rv e y .13 This gives a figure of 515 Lebanese processed food 
stores. To this must be added Lebanese traders in smaller urban 
areas. Judging by the early 1980s, towns of between four and ten 
thousand usually had two to three Lebanese general merchandise
9 CEGOS-ECONOMIE, 'Survey o f Investment Opportunities in the Republic 
Ivory Coast’ (Report realised for the Gillette Group, Puteaux, 1971), p.24.
10 This was the case, Abidjan excepted, in the early 1960s. In the mid 1970s, 
the general impression gained from the sources indicates that, again 
Abidjan excepted, this was also true. It seems unlikely therefore that the 
same should not also be true for 1969. See BCCEER, 'Bouake'; SEC-OBM,
'Region de Daloa-Gagnoa. Etude socio-economique' (M inistere du Plan, 
Abidjan, n.d. circa 1964); BDPA, 'Etude general de la region de Man', 
(Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, 1976).
11 A.Diambra-Hauhouot, 'Le commerce de detail dans l'agglomeration 
d'Abidjan' (IGT, University d'Abidjan, janvier 1973), p. 14.
12 J.Chateau, 'Recensement general des activit£s en m ilieu urbain 1976' 
(Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, 1977).
13 Diambra-Hauhouot, 'Agglomeration', p. 14.
98
stores which is roughly the same as many much larger towns, 
probably because they faced no competion from European 
o u tle ts .14 Further, the large majority of these outlets were long 
established i.e. at least five years.15 In 1975 there were 23 towns 
with a population of between four and ten thousand16 which, with 
an average of say 2.5 Lebanese stores per town, gives an extra 58 
outlets. In addition, there were probably a number of Lebanese in 
smaller towns, especially in the east because of the border trade, 
and they may have numbered as many as 30. The total number of 
Lebanese processed food stores in 1976 is thus estimated to be 
about 600, a marginal increase since 1969.
TABLE 2: NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGE OF ALL STORE TYPES BY  
ETHNIC/NATIONAL GROUPS IN TOWNS WITH A POPULATION OF 10,000 AND 
OVER, 1976.
GROUP ABIDJAN BOUAKE OTHER ALL % OF
TOWNS TOTAL
S e n e g a le s e 175 25 233 433 3.6
G u in ean 201 93 430 724 6.1
B u rk in a b es 662 96 485 1,243 10.5
M a lien s 753 303 1,229 2,285 19.3
N ig e r ie n s 786 83 325 1,194 10.1
Other N.I.B.A. 355 19 254 628 5.3
M a u r ita n ia n s 561 21 420 1,002 8.4
I VO - Akan 449 109 473 1,031 8.7
IVO - Malinke 185 65 484 734 6.2
IVO - Senoufo 124 26 252 402 3.4
IVO - other 245 42 327 614 5.2
L e v a n t in e 562 44 380 987 8.3
o th e r s 385 57 156 598 5.0
TOTAL 5,442 974 5,448 11,864 100
NIBA = Non-Ivoriani Black Africans. IVO = Ivorians
Source: D .B ollinger, Le marketing en Afrique. tome 1: La Cote d'Ivoire. (CEDA, 
Abidjan, 1977), p p .126-127.
14 DSA: internal report, L.Bosteen, ’Survey o f Distribution Outlets and 
Ethnic/National Groups - Bush Sector o f Abidjan' (1985); Personal 
experience: observation. All further references to personal experience are 
for all o f the periods 1983-85 and 1986 unless otherwise stated.
15 Personal Experience: discussions with traders and salesmen; DSA: credit 
client sheets (1980-87).
16 Chateau, 'Recensement'; RCI, Population de la Cote dTvoire (Ministere de 
l'Economie et des Finances, Abidjan, 1984), pp.37-38.
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The split between food sellers and non-food sellers in 1976 was 
not the same for all of the ethnic or national groups. In 1990, 
many Nigerians dealt in cosmetics only17 and the same may have 
been true in 1976. Also, a disproportionate number of Ivorians 
sold only textiles18 whilst the Senegalese were known for their 
jewelry stores as well as general trade.19 On the other hand, 
virtually all M auritanians have long operated virtually only 
general merchandise stores,20 as in Senegal.21 Of the 6,612 of the 
11,864 total that did sell food, 6,000 were African stores.22 To this 
figure must be added stores in urban areas of less than 10,000 
and in rural areas. On the basis of at least one store per 300 
p eo p le ,23 this produces around 15,000 stores of which, as above, 
half sold processed foods. This gives a grand total of around 
13,500 African general merchandise and processed food stores in 
Ivory Coast.
Calculating the number of processed food stores after 1976 is 
even more problematic, especially regarding the Lebanese, as data 
for 1983 (Abidjan), 1984 (Bouake)24 and 198525 conflict sharply 
with that for 1989-90, shown in Table 2.26 The earlier surveys 
dealt specifically with food stores but did not cover the entire
17 Fieldwork: observation. This was especially true in Adjame where most of 
them were located. All further references to fieldwork are for all the 
period July-Decem ber 1990 unless otherwise indicated.
18 Chateau, 'Recensement'.
19 S.F.Lo, 'Les "Gorguis" de Cote d’Ivoire’, Ivoire Dim anche. 950 (April 23
1989).
20 Personal experience: discussions with salesmen; Fieldwork: observation.
21 C.J.Santoir, 'L'emigration Maure: une vocation comm erciale affirmee', 
Cahiers ORSTOM. ser. sci. hum, 12, 2 (1975), pp.137-159.
22 D.Bollinger, Le marketing en Afrique. tome 1: La Cote dTvoire (CEDA, 
Abidjan, 1977), pp. 123-126; Chateau, 'Recensement'.
23 This rather speculative estimate is based on the 1975 rural population in 
RCI, Population and figures in SEDES, 'Region du sud-est: 6tude socio- 
economique' (Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, 1967); SEC-OBM, 'Daloa-Gagnoa'; 
BCCEER, 'Bouake'. The figure o f three hundred is probably an 
u n d er e stim a te .
24 DSA: internal report, J.Ayrebi, 'Survey o f  Distribution Outlets, Abidjan'
(1983): internal report, J.Ayrebi, 'Survey o f  Distribution Outlets, Bouake'
(1984 ).
25 DSA: internal report, L.Bosteen, 'Survey o f Distribution Outlets and 
Ethnic/National Groups, Abidjan Town' (1985): internal report, L.Bosteen, 
'Bush Sector'.
26 Fieldwork: unpublished survey by the PNCI (1989-90).
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country whilst the latter survey covered the entire country but 
appears to include non-food outlets. The number of Lebanese food 
stores in Abidjan in 1985 was just 120, which seems extremely 
low given the data from 1976. However, the 1985 figure of 1,545 
food stores in all in Abidjan is similar to the number found in 
1983. Whilst both surveys were done for the same company, 
different people were involved and the same regions of the capital 
(including one of the largest, Adjame) were double checked by 
different people in the 1985 survey. Therefore it seems difficult 
to question the figure of 120.
TABLE 3: NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF STORES OWNED BY THE PRINCIPAL 
NATIONAL GROUPS, 1989-90.
NATIONALITY NUMBER % OF TOTAL
Iv o r ia n s 2,833 21.67
G u in ean s 1,217 9 .30
S e n e g a le s e 830 6 .34
B u rk in a b es 1,224 9 .96
M alian s 1,198 9.17
N ig e r ia n s 675 5.16
other Black Africans 348 2.06
M a u r ita n ia n s 2,557 19.56
L e b a n ese 2,193 16.78
TOTAL 13,075 100.00
Source: Fieldwork: unpublished PNCI survey (1989-■90).
The 1989-90 survey found 2,193 Lebanese general merchandise 
stores in all but there is no indication as to the split between the 
interior and Abidjan. However, it is difficult to imagine that less 
than 30% of Lebanese enterprises were in Abidjan and the figure 
is more likely to be the 40% or 875 stores given the 1976 survey 
and data from the DSA surveys. This is a huge increase for 
Abidjan in four years, especially at the time of a recession. The 
most likely explanation is that the 2,193 figure includes all kinds 
of stores, i.e. the words 'general merchandise’ has been misused. 
Thus the large numbers of Lebanese import-export depots, textile, 
electrical and other hardware goods stores must have been 
included.
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For the interior, the 1985 data cover a limited number of towns 
but the difference is probably smaller. A total of 156 Lebanese 
processed food stores were found in 38 (including the 30 largest) 
towns in the southern, western and eastern areas of the country. 
Probably these constituted around half of all Lebanese interior 
food stores at the time27 giving 300 or so, plus the 120 in Abidjan. 
Thus the final sums look like 420 in 1985 versus 2,193 in 1989- 
90. Even taking the aforementioned problems into account, this is 
too large a discrepency and both figures must therefore be 
regarded as highly suspect.
The data for African stores are slightly less problematic though 
the only real comparisons that can be made between 1985 and 
1989-90 are for Mauritanians. The total for 1989-90 was 2,557. 
For 1985, there were 588 stores in Abidjan and 340 in the 
interior areas surveyed, giving a total of 928. Given that the vast 
majority of Mauritanians were located within the area surveyed, 
Bouake excepted,28 the overall total for 1985 was probably no 
more than 1,300 or roughly half that of 1989-90. This still 
substantial difference cannot be explained away by faulty 
definition of store types for virtually all Mauritanians sell 
processed foods.29 However, the outlet surveys of selected towns 
and districts30 indicate that both the number of Mauritanians and 
their proportion of all traders increased substantially between 
1985 and 1990. In Attiecoube for example, their numbers 
increased from 20 to 46, in Marcory from 51 to 79 and in Aboisso 
from eight to 20. It therefore seems fair to conclude that both the 
1985 and 1989-90 Mauritanian figures are reasonably accurate.
It is impossible to determine with the same accuracy the number 
of processed food stores for other African traders in 1989-90 if 
'general m erchandise' includes non-food stores. Many non-
27 Personal experience: observation: discussions with salesm en and 
Lebanese traders.
28 Ibid; DSA: internal reports, L.Bosteen, 'Abidjan Town' and 'Bush Sector'; 
Fieldwork: regional distribution survey.
29 Peronal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation: discussions 
with salesmen; Interview: Mr. Jacques La Rue, Chef de M ission PNCI 
(Abidjan, December 10 1990).
30 Fieldwork: regional distribution survey.
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Mauritanian African traders deal in textiles, cosmetics and 
hardware. However, Table 2, even allowing for 70% of African 
outlets as selling processed food, indicates that store numbers 
were less or at best equal to the 1969 figure.
Whilst precise (or at times even vaguely accurate) figures are 
impossible to establish, there is less doubt about the general trend 
in the number of stores in the country as a whole. One 
experienced salesman estimates that the number of stores 
increased fairly slowly in the 1970s (after rapid increases in the 
previous decade) and that since around 1978 the numbers have 
steadily decreased overall.31 This makes sense if two other pieces 
of circumstantial evidence are considered. First, the slower than 
before increases during the 1970s could well have been due to 
WSE store competition during these years. Second, even though 
most of these WSE stores disappeared during the early 1980s, the 
economic climate, and particularly average income per head, 
declined to the extent that all stores were affected, even though 
there were fewer of them. It is also probably no coincidence that 
the most rapid growth in the increase in store numbers, the 
1960s, occured during the period of the most rapid growth in 
income per head.
3.2 BACKGROUND OF IM M IGRANT TRADERS
Evidence presented in the previous chapter and the two tables 
above indicates clearly that foreign traders have long dominated 
internal trade in Ivory Coast. This section looks at traders' 
countries of origin, years spent in Ivory Coast, motives for 
migration, and previous occupations.
Malians, Burkinabes, Senegalese, Guineans and Lebanese migrated 
to Ivory Coast almost throughout the period 1956-1990 but the 
countries of origin of many immigrant traders has changed 
considerably. There is no indication as to when Dahomeans and
31 Interview: Mr. Bernadin Doh Gilles, Salesman at Blohorn and DANAFCO  
(Abidjan, 2nd. interview, October 2 1990).
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Togolese first arrived but it was probably at least since before 
World War Two.32 By the early 1960s most had departed. The 
Anongo or Nago,33 collective names used by Ivorians for mainly 
Yoruba traders from Nigeria, first migrated in significant numbers 
from around 1955 and remained important until the early 
19 7 0 s.34 Figures for around 1962 (certainly no later) show that 
foreign Africans owned 63% of African stores.35 Around the late 
1960s the first Mauritanian stores appeared36 and since at least 
the early 1980s they were the numerically dominant store owners 
in Ivory Coast. Table 4 confirms that Mauritanians were, on 
average, the most recent arrivals in Ivory Coast. Figures presented 
in Table 3 showed that the NIB A category constituted around 42% 
of all stores (including non-food outlets) in 1989-90 with 
Mauritanians at around 20% and Lebanese at almost 17%.37
32 M.Cohen, Urban Policy and Political Conflict in Africa (University o f  
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1974), p.72. Cohen stated that the Togolese and 
Dahomeans were brought over by the colonial administration to fill white- 
collar jobs but gives no date as to when this began.
33 The term ‘Nago’ comes from ‘Anago’, a Yoruba sub-group. They are 
described by Afolabi as having ‘no defined [geographical] lim its’. ‘Anago’ 
has also been used by Dahomeans and ‘Nago’ or ‘Nagot’ by the Fon and then 
French administrators to describe the Yoruba in Dahomey and Togo (but 
apparently not in Ivory Coast). ‘Anongo’ was possibly derived from a 
combination o f ‘Anago’ and ‘Zongo’ (meaning Test station' in Hausa), the 
latter being the northern Togolese and Ghanaian word for urban foreigner 
quarters. ‘Anongo’ possibly was used by Togolese Yoruba in Ivory Coast to 
distinguish them selves from the ‘foreign’ Nigerian Yoruba. See S.D ecalo, 
Historical Dictionary o f Togo (Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, 1987), pp.28, 212; 
R.Smith, Kingdoms o f the Yoruba 3rd. ed. (James Currey, 1988), pp.7-9, p55; 
G.J.Afolabi Ojo, Yoruba Culture (University o f London Press, 1966), p. 17.
34 Diambra-Hauhouot, ‘Agglom eration’, pp.25-29.
35 IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution'.
36 ORSTOM and IGT , Atlas de Cote d'Ivoire (Ministere du Plan, Abidjan,
1975), section D3a; Diambra-Hauhouot, ‘Agglom eration’, pp.27-29. W hilst 
both o f these sources are for Abidjan only, later sections will show that the 
first Mauritanians came to the capital. Further, they are not mentioned in 
any other source covering the 1960s in the interior.
37 Fieldwork: unpublished PNCI store survey (1989-90).
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TABLE 4: AVERAGE NUMBER OF YEARS TRADERS HAVE LIVED IN IVORY 
COAST, 1990.
ABJ INT ABJ INT ABJ INT
DESIGNATION NIBA NIBA MAU MAU LEB LEB
Proprietors: years in I.C. 11.4 16.0 9.9 9.7 14.9 18.7
Managers: years in I.C. 7.5 12.7 6.9 5.9 7.7 4.5
SAMPLE SIZE: Proprietors 18 23 10 17 18 32
: Managers 12 17 20 23 12 8
Source: Fieldwork: questionnaires (1990).
Table 4 also reveals that though there were marked differences in 
years resident in Ivory Coast for proprietors, these differences 
were less for managers. This probably indicates that the NIBA and 
Lebanese communities, although long established, continued to 
expand in the late 1980s. Less easy to explain is why Abidjan 
Lebanese and NIBA proprietors had on average been resident for 
a shorter period than their counterparts in the interior whilst for 
M auritanians there was little diference. The m ost likely 
explanation is probably that competition in Abidjan was more 
vigorous, leading to a faster 'turnover' of traders and that this had 
yet to show amongst Mauritanians either because of their stronger 
com m ercial organisation (explored below) or because, as 
previously observed, the first immigrants settled in Abidjan or 
because of a combination of both.
The vast majority of traders surveyed came to Ivory Coast 
directly from their own country. However, this tendency was less 
evident among the Lebanese with some born in Ivory Coast and 
others migrating from third countries to join relatives. Third 
countries were as diverse as Brazil, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Canada 
and Liberia. Most traders of all groups who did not come from 
their country of origin migrated from Senegal. Political and racial 
disturbances (Mauritanians) and a declining economy would have 
been strong motivating factors for leaving Senegal in favour of 
Ivory Coast where the linguistic setting was similar. The next few 
paragraphs deal with motives for migrations in and out of Ivory 
Coast in more detail.
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Table 5 below shows reasons why traders left their previous 
country. Many traders were likely to have had several motives, 
all but a few of which would be related to 'the bottom line', i.e. 
survival. Subsequent paragraphs show that the motives of earlier 
traders were little different. Many Lebanese came to join their 
family. Most of these came as children with their parents, which 
helps explain the high average number of years lived in Ivory 
Coast shown in Table 4. For NIB As, all the those citing political 
reasons were Guineans whilst the Mauritanians a l l . came from 
Senegal.
TABLE 5: TRADERS’ REASONS FOR LEAVING PREVIOUS COUNTRY, 
PERCENTAGES, 1990.
REASON ABJ INT ABJ INT ABJ INT
NIBA NIBA MAU MAU LEB LEB
Financial /  to work 50.0 55.0 73.5 80.0 13.5 20.0
Political / war 10.0 5.0 6.5 2.5 40 .0 35.0
Join fam ily 6.5 15.0 10.0 5.0 36.5 17.5
Personal / no reply 0 .0 2.5 0.0 0.0 0 .0 15.0
O ther 33.5 12.5 10.0 12.5 3.5 5.0
Not Applicable 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 7.5
SAMPLE SIZE 30 40 30 40 30 40
Not Applicable = Interviewees born in Ivory Coast.
Source: Fielwork: questionnaires (1990).
Much has already been said on the Lebanese, their historical 
involvement in commerce and the reasons why they migrated in 
the first half of the twentieth century. During this period most 
Lebanese in Ivory Coast were probably Shi’ite Muslims though 
Binet claims that Maronite Christians were the more numerous.38 
By 1960 in the Francophone territories 66% were Muslim and 34% 
C hristian39 and Winder also states that most were Shi'ites.40 Data 
for 1990 revealed that 31 out of 40 Lebanese questioned in the 
interior and 26 out of 30 in Abidjan were Muslim. For those who 
arrived in or before 1976, seven out of 16 in the interior and 10
38 Bigo, ‘Network’, p.511; J.Binet, 'Les libanais en Afrique francophone', 
Kroniek van Afrika. 6, 3 (1975), p.259.
39 Winder, ‘Lebanese’, p .305.
Winder, ‘Lebanese’, p .305.
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out of 11 in Abidjan were Muslim. What is virtually indisputable 
is that, by 1990, the majority were Muslims. Since the 1950s, the 
political situation in Lebanon has become increasingly unstable 
with the economy descending into greater chaos, especially in 
southern Lebanon where Shi'ites are predominant. This seems the 
most likely explanation for the influx of Lebanese Shi'ites into 
Ivory Coast since the 1970s if not earlier.41
Dahomeans and Togolese in Ivory Coast worked primarily in white 
collar jobs, including trading companies. Some were also street 
traders, possibly relatives of white collar workers or migrants 
who failed to find such employment. Whilst their motives for 
coming may be obscure, their reasons for departing were not. In 
October 1958, attacks on foreign Africans in Abidjan, mainly 
Togolese and Dahomeans42 but also Yorubas and others,43 led to 
more than 25,000 leaving the country over the next two months. 
Whilst Ivorians' anger was directed mainly at foreigners in white 
collar jobs traders were also affected and some had their property 
destroyed .44
Among those attracted by increasing commercial opportunities in 
1950s Ivory Coast were the Anongo.45 Anongo traders had 
possibly reached their peak by 1968 when they were numerically 
the largest store trading group in the country.46 The likely reasons 
for this were improving prospects back home with the oil boom47 
and the re-emergence of racial tension in Ivory Coast in that year. 
This followed the death of a young Baoule at the hands of an 
Anongo in Abidjan’s Treichville district.48 Fighting broke out and
41 Bigo, ‘Network’, p.515; D. Gilmour, Lebanon: The Fractured Country. 
(Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1983), pp. 10-11.
42 A.R.Zolberg, One Party Government in the Ivorv Coast (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, revised edition 1969), p.245.
43 E.Skinner, 'Strangers in West African Societies', A fr ica . 33, 4 (1963), 
p .314.
44 Zolberg, One Party, p.245.
45 Diam bra-Hauhouot,’A gglom eration’, p .27.
46 Interview: Doh Gilles (2nd.): La Rue; ORSTOM and IGT, A tlas, section D3a; 
Diambra-Hauhouot, ‘A gglom eration’, p.29.
47 O.Oculi 'Green Capitalism in Nigeria'. In P.Lubeck (ed.), The African 
B o u rg e o is ie  (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1987), p. 173.
48 Interview: Doh Gilles (2nd.).
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many Anongo outlets were pillaged or destroyed, first in Abidjan 
and then, as word spread of the spark which had lit the fuse, in 
the interior.49
The violence of 1968 cannot be explained entirely by this one 
incident. Resentment towards the Anongo had been evident for 
some time because of their success and consequent wealth. As this 
wealth began to show in the form of luxurious cars etc (in marked 
con trast to the extrem e m odesty of the ir com m ercial 
establishments), poorer urban Ivorians became resentful.50 These 
circumstances would have done nothing to encourage other 
Anongo to migrate to Ivory Coast and probably caused a few to 
leave. Perhaps more important though were increasing prosperity 
in Nigeria through the oil boom and the Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion Decree in 1972 which might have persuaded Nigerians 
that prospects were now more favourable back home.51
At the time of the 1975 census, Burkinabes (mostly Mossi) and 
Malians (mostly Dioula) were the two largest foreign groups in 
Ivory Coast and apparently had been for some time.52 Whilst 
many Malians were traders from the 1950s onwards, few Mossi 
were at first.53 The increases in the numbers of Mossi and Malians 
may well have had something to do with the large numbers of 
these peoples migrating to work on Ivorian plantations and, 
perhaps failing to find such work, entering into trade rather than 
returning home empty handed. Whilst plantation work paid very 
little and was regarded by Ivorians at least as an undesirable
49 Interview: La Rue: Doh Gilles (2nd.); Diambra-Hauhouot, 
‘A gglom eration’, p .27.
50 Diambra-Hauhouot, ‘A gglom eration’, p .28.
51 P.Kennedy, African Capitalism (CUP, Cambridge, 1988), p. 145; 
T.Biersteker, 'Indigenization and the Nigerian Bourgeoisie: Dependent 
Development in an African Context'. In Lubeck (ed.), B o u r g e o is ie , pp.259- 
261.
52 RCI, P o p u la t io n .
53 Interview: Doh Gilles (2nd.): Mr. Seydou Drabo, Storekeeper and 
Nightwatchman at DANAFCO (Abidjan, July 24 1990): La Rue; Diambra- 
Hauhouot, ‘Agglomeration’, p.29; ORSTOM and IGT, Atlas, section D3a.
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occupation ,54 many migrants would have seen it as a more secure 
source of income than trading.
Whilst Malians, Burkinabes and even Ivorian Dioulas in the south 
were commonly victims of racial attacks in the 1950s,55 it appears 
that few left either then, like the Togolese, or later, like the 
Anongo. Their motives for staying put were probably financial for 
work opportunities back home were almost certainly worse than 
they were for Nigerians and Togolese. On the motives of Guineans 
and Senegalese, the two other principal foreign trading groups 
present since at least the 1960s, there is little information. Like 
other foreigners, many were undoubtedly attracted by the 
prosperous economic climate compared to their own countries. 
Additionally, a small number of Guineans interviewed for the 
questionnaire survey gave political repression as a reason for 
m igrating.
Migration of Mauritanians towards the Senegal river valley was 
common during much of the colonial period and since. But they 
rarely travelled further afield on the African continent until 
around the mid 1970s, when Ivory Coast became the third most 
common destination after Senegal and the G am bia.56 A 
combination of economic and climatic factors have been largely 
responsible for this steady exodus and by 1976 an estimated 
110,000 M auritanians (7.8% of the population) were living 
ab ro ad .57 Climatic pressure became particularly important from 
the 1970s as severe droughts hit the nomadic population. This
54 B.Lewis, T he Dioula in the Ivory Coast'. In C.T.Hodge (ed.), Papers on the 
M anding (Indiana University, Bloomington, 1971), p.289; Zolberg, O n e  
Party, pp.41-42; S.Amin, Le developpement du capitalism en Cote d'Ivoire 
(Minuit, Paris, 1967), pp.32-33.
55 Skinner, ‘Starngers’, p .315; Zolberg, One Party, pp.202-203.
56 Santoir, ‘Maure’, pp .137-149; Interview: El Jilani Ould Boubakar, 
Mauritanian wholesaler at Koumassi since 1970 (Abidjan, December 8 1990): 
Mr. Ould Mohammed, Mauritanian retailer at Attiecoube (Abidjan, July
1990). This retailer was a personal friend o f Mr. Raymond Guei, a student at 
the Universite Nationale in Abidjan. Given the reluctance o f most 
Mauritanians to be interviewed, R.Guei offered to interview the trader on 
my behalf in the hope that he would be able to obtain more information 
without the presence o f  a stranger.
57 Santoir, ‘Maure’, pp.137-149; J. Conde, P.S.Diagne, N.G.Ouaidou, K.Boye 
and A.Kader, South-North International Migration. (OECD, Paris, 1986), p.97.
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coincided with the heaviest migrations towards Ivory Coast, 
although the first Mauritanians arrived around the mid 1960s.58 
Since then their numbers appear to have increased virtually 
every year, even well into the 1980s.59 The first traders settled in 
the southern towns and most have followed their relatives there 
in subsequent years, a pattern similar to that of migrants to 
Senegal.60
On the subject of traders’ occupations prior to their arrival in 
Ivory Coast, there are few sources other than the questionnaire 
survey results shown in Table 6 below.
TABLE 6: OCCUPATION PRIOR TO ARRIVAL IN IVORY COAST, PERCENTAGES, 
1990.
OCCUPATION ABJ INT ABJ INT ABJ INT
NIBA NIBA MAU MAU LEB LEB
Trade 46.5 35.0 63.5 62.5 20.0 30.0
Student / school 6.5 17.5 13.5 2.5 63.5 40.0
A g r ic u ltu r e 13.5 22.5 13.5 22.5 0.0 0.0
O ther 33.5 15.0 10.0 12.5 10.0 17.5
Not Applicable 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 7.5
No response 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0
SAMPLE SIZE 30 40 30 40 30 40
Not Applicable = Interviewees born in Ivory Coast.
Source: Fieldwork: questionnaires (1990).
Mauritanians were the most likely to have been in trade prior to 
their arrival in Ivory Coast and this was the response given by all 
those who left Senegal, again consistent with other sources. 
Agriculture was also important for non-Lebanese migrants with 
many stating drought at home (Mauritanians) and failure to find 
work on plantations (NIBAs) as reasons why they ended up in 
trade. It seems likely that much the same was true for most of the 
period 1956-90. All but one of the Mauritanians had never done
58 ORSTOM and IGT, Atlas, section D3a; Conde et al, South-North, p.94; EIU, 
Guinea. Mali. Mauritania Country Profile 1992 - 93. p .62; Interview: Doh 
G illes (2nd.); Chateau, ‘Recensem ent’.
59 Interview: La Rue.
60 Interview: Ould Boubakar: Ould Mohammed; Santoir, ‘Maure’, p. 148.
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anything but trade in Ivory Coast and the same was true for the 
majority of NIBAs and Lebanese. There was a high proportion of 
Lebanese entering trade directly from school or university. Other 
occupations of Lebanese included carpenters, teachers, a manual 
worker and a soldier. The pattern of previous occupations of the 
Lebanese was most likely different 30 or even 20 years earlier. 
Pre World War Two migrants were mostly small farmers, 
labourers, tenants or small tradesmen yet none of those 
interviewed in 1990 had an agricultural background.
3.3 PH YSIC AL APPEARANCE OF STORES AND PRO CESSED FO ODS  
D IST R IB U T E D
The first NSE traders seriously to compete with European interests 
in processed food distribution were the Lebanese. By the early 
1950s, the threat which the Lebanese had been perceived as 
posing to European traders since before the war was very much a 
re a lity .61 Whilst the trading companies remained very much in 
ice for years to come, small independent French traders 
to have declined in importance during this period without 
comment in available sources. Data from some regional 
fs (others, because of the way their data are presented, do 
ermit an analysis) in the early 1960s reveal far fewer French 
Lebanese traders at both the wholesale or retail levels.62
lescriptions of Lebanese stores in the early 1960s indicate 
like African traders, they were none too concerned with 
:al appearances. Once the basics were there, walls, roof and 
;s, "le commercant ne pratique aucun investissement dans 
uctivite professionnelle ". The average size of a general 
merchandise store was about 20m2 (textile stores appear to have 
been larger). Shelves consisted of "caisses et de planches 
assemblies " whilst "Un grand desordre regne partout Traders 
did not often keep much stock; what was found in the store was
61 Binet, ’Libanais’, pp.261-262; Bigo, ‘Network’, pp.512-513.
62 SEDES, 'Sud-est' [Figures are 1964]; BDPA, ’Man' [figures are 1963].
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usually all there was,63 hence the crowded shelves which reached 
from the ceiling to the floor.64
The role of the Lebanese as distributors of processed foods in the 
1950s appears to have been principally confined to that of 
retailers though they did act as semi-wholesalers and wholesalers 
for some products, and had done so since the 1930s.65 The reason 
for this apparently slow progress in processed food distribution 
can be attributed to the low demand for such products. Even in 
the 1980s Ivory Coast, the number of processed food product 
types wholesaled by the Lebanese did not stretch much beyond 
bouillon cubes, concentrated milk, sardines, tinned tomatoes and
three or four other, mainly Nestle, brands.66
As well as displacing many European concerns in the 1950s and
1960s, it has been argued that African traders also suffered.67
According to Thompson and Adloff the Lebanese "have been 
displacing the indigenous traders as intermediaries between the
exporting firms and African producers".68 W hilst this was 
undoubtedly true to a certain extent, the same accusation of 
usurpation could equally well have been levelled at European 
interests but few of the earlier European sources consulted, least 
of all official ones, seem to be aware of their hypocricy.
From the mid 1960s, the Lebanese moved increasingly from retail
stores to semi-wholesaling.69 By the early 1970s, if not before,
most semi - wholesalers were Lebanese.70 Of the 1,087 Lebanese 
stores of all kinds around 1969, 325 were semi-wholesale and
63 IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution', p.48.
64 A.L.Bonnefonds, 'La transformation du commerce de traite en Cote 
d'Ivoire depuis la dernier guerre mondiale et l'independance', C a h ie r s  
d'Outre Mer. 21, 84 (octobre-decembre 1968, Bordeux), p .398; Interview: 
Drabo: Doh Gilles (2nd.).
65 Bigo, ‘Network’, p.512.
66 Fieldwork: regional distribution survey: observation; DSA: internal 
reports, L.Bosteen, 'Abidjan Town' and 'Bush Sector’.
67 Winder, ‘Lebanese’, p.309-310; V.Thompson and R.Adloff, French W est 
A frica (Allen and Unwin, 1958), p.430.
68 Thompson and Adloff, F rench , p.430.
69 Bonnefonds, ‘Traite’, p.408.
70 CCCI, Bulletin Mensuel. 6 (juin 1973), p.92.
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762 retail outlets.71 However, the distinction between a semi­
wholesale and a retail store depended on the client. Many stores 
which retailed to all levels of Africans and Europeans alike acted 
as semi-wholesalers for itinerant traders.72 What appears to have 
happened in practice is an expansion in the stock range, and 
probably physical size of the store as well, and the taking on of 
the function of semi-wholesaling without abandoning the retail 
function. There thus appears to have been a fairly natural 
evolution from small to gradually larger outlets: profits invested 
in more stock and then a larger store and more stock, but with 
little attention paid to superficial appearances.
It can be assumed that, by the mid 1970s, grocery stores apart,
the vast majority of Lebanese traders were semi-wholesalers with 
retailing relegated to a minor portion of the turnover. Some
Lebanese were also involved in produce buying with some African 
traders obtaining goods on the strength of their produce which
they sold to the semi-wholesaler.73 The Lebanese, as before, still 
obtained their goods from the European companies, sometimes on 
credit, either from up-country stations or in Abidjan which would 
have often meant them transporting the merchandise themselves 
into the interior.74
The evolution of the physical appearance of Lebanese stores
already outlined seems to have continued up to 1985 with stores 
increasing their product range and some moving from semi­
wholesaling to wholesaling and even importing.75 After 1985, the
71 CEGOS-ECONOMIE, ‘Survey’, p.24.
72 H.P.White and M.P.GIeave, An Economic Geography o f West Africa (Bell 
and Sons, 1971), p.203.
73 I b i d .
74 CCCI, B u lle tin . 6, p.92; SIGES, 'Etude regionale de la sous-prefecture de 
Bondoukou: commerce et transports' (Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, 1971); 
BDPA, ‘Man’.
75 Interview: Doh Gilles (2nd.): Mr. Claude Assouan, Directeur d'Achats at 
CDCI (Abidjan, December 4 1990): Mr. Merhouet, Junior Partner o f SABIMEX  
(Abidjan, November 13 1990); DSA: internal reports, Ayeribi, 'Abidjan' and 
'Interior': internal reports, L.Bosteen, ‘Abidjan Town’ and ‘Bush Sector’; 
Personal experience: observation (1983-85).
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range of produce seems to have declined76 but the physical 
structure of stores remained the same. Many Lebanese occupied 
the same stores they did ten, twenty or even thirty years ago, the 
best example of this being the bloc libanaise in Treichville.77 The 
main change over these five years seems to have been the
entrance of a large number of Lebanese into the import trade, a
function usually taken on in addition to rather than instead of 
w holesaling.78
Whilst African outlets, compared to those of the Lebanese and 
Europeans, were the most numerous by the early 1960s if not 
before, their limited involvement in processed foods in early
years made them somewhat peripheral to this trade. Further, 
their turnover was comparatively low.79 The most important
consumers of processed foods would have been Europeans who, in 
all likelihood, would have shopped at a European store if possible.
It was only in the early 1950s that African stores began to pose a 
serious com petitive threat to the European and Lebanese 
dominance of the retail store sector.80 But proper stores do not 
appear to have been the principal type of African controlled outlet 
for processed foods until the mid or even late 1960s.81 Instead, 
less permanent structures were more prolific. Although many of 
the sources appear to include them in their definition of mag as in 
or b o u tiq u e , these outlets were not in fact proper shops or stores. 
They did however sell some processed foods in small quantities, 
for example a few spoons of coffee, a handful of sweets, one or 
two biscuits.82 These would probably have been purchased from
76 Interview: Doh Gilles (2nd.); Fieldwork: brand range survey: product 
range survey; DSA: internal reports, L.Bosteen, ‘Abidjan Tow n’ and ‘Bush 
S e c to r ’ .
77 Fieldwork: observation: discussions with Lebanese traders; Personal 
experience: observation; Diambra-Hauhouot, ‘A gglom eration’, p. 17.
78 Interview: Assouan: Mr. Eric Bosteen, Chairman o f W est Africa Holdings, 
parent company o f  SAFA and DANAFCO (Cahors, France, 2nd. interview, 
Febuary 9 1992); Fieldwork: discussions with Lebanese traders: observation.
79 IDET-CEGOS, ’Distribution’.
80 Thompson and Adloff, French, p.439; Winder, ‘Lebanese, p .310.
81 Interview: Doh Gilles (2nd.); White and Gleave, Econom ic G eography, 
pp.200-201; Bonnefonds, ‘Traite’, pp.398-399.
82 SEC-OBM, 'Daloa-Gagnoa'; Bollinger, M arketing, p. 138; Interview: Drabo.
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Lebanese stores, at least in areas where there were no European 
ones.
There were three kinds of these 'sem i-stores'. The most 
rudimentary was the eta lage  or 'display' with which the Dioula 
were most associated. This seems to have been a large scale 
tab lier  with goods piled high on a table which may or may not 
have been covered. Slightly more permanent were the e c h o p e  
which were booths or covered street stalls. These were run 
predominantly by Anongo men, sold a fairly wide variety of 
goods, and seem to have had some sort of rudimentary shelving. 
Finally, there were a large number of mainly Anongo women 
selling general merchandise from the back of their houses. These
outlets varied from a table in front of the house to a room at the
back with shelving.83
The riots of 1968 referred to above may have discouraged the 
semi-store type of outlet. By their vary nature - goods 
unprotected on the side of the street - these outlets would have 
been particularly vulnerable to looting and the stalls easy to 
destroy. A proper store, on the other hand, was protected by its 
walls and could be locked up in the event of trouble, making it a 
less tempting target. It may well be that Anongo men, who owned 
proper stores with metal bars and grills in front of the counter 
(thereby making only a small part of the store accessable to the
custom er)84 only did so after the rioting in 1968.
At the same time as these semi-stores existed, there were also a 
number of proper African shops, similar to those owned by 
Lebanese retailers.85 Thus, in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s 
there was a wide range of African retail outlets: to the ones 
already mentioned must be added market traders, tab liers  and 
hawkers but it was by and large the former which sold processed 
foods. The types and physical appearances of African-owned retail 
outlets continued to evolve up to the early or mid 1970s. Since
83 Ib id .
84 Interview: Doh Gilles (2nd.).
85 IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution', .
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then they have changed very little. The eta lages , echoppes  and 
back-of-the-house outlets evolved into small retail stores often 
with a surface area of as little as 4m2 86 and a number of them 
eventually became wholesalers.87 The market traders (who by the 
1980s were selling some processed foods), hawkers and tabliers  
appear to have changed very little in their working practices over 
all these years.88
By the 1960s increasing numbers of Africans were consuming 
processed foods and for them the local (i.e. African) store was 
invariably the most convenient point for purchase. Concentrated 
milk, biscuits, sweets, sardines, tinned tomatoes, coffee, cigarettes, 
chocolate powder drink, chicory and tomato puree could all be 
found in African outlets by the mid to late 1960s. Other products 
available included sugar, petrol, matches, some pharmacy goods 
(illegal now), cooking oil, beer, wine and soap.89
This range of products continued to increase until at least 1980 
and probably up to 1985. By 1990 there was a decline in range, 
specifically in the percentage of stores stocking non-basic but 
commonly consumed items (e.g. coffee, oats, chocolate powder).90 
As the chapter on consumers shows, the decline in income per 
head was the main reason for this. However, it is important to re­
emphasise what was said in the previous chapter: that there were 
significant regional variations in products stocked by African 
stores.
86 Interview: Doh Gilles (2nd.); Fieldwork: observation.
87 IDET-CEGOS, ’Distribution’.
88 Ibid; Bonnefonds, ‘Traite’, pp.398-399; White and Gleave, E co n o m ic  
G eography, pp. 197-201 ; Interview: Doh Gilles (2nd.); Fieldwork: 
o b se r v a tio n .
89 Interview: Doh Gilles (2nd.); SEDES, 'Region de Korhogo. Etude de 
developm ent socio-econom ique' (M inistere du Plan, Abidjan, 1965); 
Bonnefonds, ‘Traite’, p.399. Bonnefonds does not actually say any o f these 
products were in the stores but it seems likely if  they were in the 'semi­
stores'.
90 Fieldwork: product range survey: regional distribution survey; DSA: 
internal report, Ayirebi, 'Abidjan': internal report, L.Bosteen, 'Abidjan 
Town' and 'Bush Sector'. A comparison between these three surveys reveals 
that the percentage o f stores stocking certain food items increased and 
then decreased which would imply that the product range follow ed the 
same trend.
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The physical structure and size of Mauritanian stores from the 
time of their arrival in the early 1970s was not much different 
from that of other small retailers.91 It also appears that, as in 
Senegal, Mauritanians paid little attention to physical appearance 
and invested very little in the upkeep of the store.92 For goods 
stocked, the range in 1985 and in 1990 was little different from 
that of other small African outlets except that the few which 
existed in the west tended to vary their product range less than 
other African stores.93 However, as will become evident in the 
next section, their purchasing methods and general organisation 
were unique.
In summarising this section, attention should be drawn to the 
small number of changes in the physical structure of stores of 
groups of traders since the early 1970s. As far as function was 
concerned, Lebanese stores evolved in that the majority used 
primarily to be small retail outlets and by 1990 were primarily 
semi-wholesale or wholesale stores. African and M auritanian 
stores remained predominantly retailers with respect to processed 
foods. The most significant changes concerned the scale of 
operations i.e. turnover for Lebanese stores and the greatly 
expanded product range for African outlets.
3.4 THE STR EN G TH S AND W EAKNESSES FO R NSE TR AD ER S OF 
FAM ILY AND ETHNIC LINKS
One of the key features of NSE traders, Lebanese or African, was 
the importance of family and community to trading activities. No 
store owner or manager was independent of his relatives or 
members of his ethnic group. Numerous sources have remarked 
upon this and have generally concluded that these ties hindered
91 Fieldwork: observation; Interview: La Rue; Personal experience: 
discussions with traders.
92 Fieldwork: observation; Personal experience: observation; Santoir, 
‘Maure’, p.157.
93 DSA: internal reports, L.Bosteen, 'Abidjan Town' and 'Bush Sector': 
internal report, Ayirebi, 'Abidjan'; Fieldwork: regional distribution survey.
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the advancement of enterprises in the Third World.94 At the same 
time though, family and community have often proved essential
to starting up enterprises and Chapter 2 has already illustrated 
the vital role played by trading networks and connections in the 
success of Dioula and other traders during the precolonial and 
colonial years. This section will show that these connections 
remained an important part of commercial success despite the 
burdens which they often placed upon traders.
The most visible sign of family/community involvement was the 
employment of relatives in stores and the well known practice of 
established Lebanese bringing over relatives from Lebanon.95 
Khuri, who studied Lebanese communities in what was then
Upper Volta, claimed that this was common amongst the Lebanese
in the late 1950s and early 1960s throughout West Africa.96 In 
1980s Ivory Coast there were many examples of relatives and
people from the same village working in the proprietor's store.97 
Mauritanians have also employed family members since they first 
c a m e ,98 much as they did in Senegal in the 1970s and earlier.99 
For other Africans the practice has also long been widespread as 
many authors have observed.100 Many also employed people who 
were not relatives but came from the same region or ethnic
94 For example, J.Kinsey, Marketing in Developing Countries (M acm illan, 
Basingstoke, 1988), pp.273-275; G.Hunter, The New Societies o f Tropical 
Africa (OUP, 1962), pp.139-140.
95 Bigo, ‘Network’, p.514; A.Tirefort, 'Le "Baudit Libanais" ou le mal-aime - 
approche de la communaute Lybano-Syrienne en Basse-Cote d'Ivoire 
pendant l'entre-deux-guerres’, IH A A A . 7 (1981), p.65.
96 F.I.Khuri, 'Kinship, Emigration and Trade Partnership Among the 
Lebanese o f West Africa', A frica . 35, 4 (1965), p.394.
97 Personal experience: discussions with Lebanese traders; Interview: Mr. 
Reda Fakhry, Lebanese wholesaler (Lakota, November 24 1990); Fieldwork: 
discussions with Lebanese traders. Examples include Fakhry Reda and 
family in Lakota since the early 1960s, Chouman Abbas and his four sons in 
Agnibilekro in the 1980s and Kabbani Bassam and his cousin in Treichville  
from 1984 to 1988.
98 Interview: Ould Boubakar.
99 Santoir, ‘Maure’, pp.155-156.
100 por example, E.O.Akeredolu-Ale, 'A Sociohistorical Study o f  the 
Developm ent o f Entrepreneurship among the Ijebu o f Western Nigeria', 
A S R . 16, 3 (1973), pp.360-361; Kennedy, Capitalism , p.154.
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g r o u p .101 The data on family employment in Table 7 are 
consistant with these observations
TABLE 7: EMPLOYMENT OF FAMILY MEMBERS, PERCENTAGES, 1990.
ABJ INT ABJ INT ABJ INT ABJ INT
NIBA NIBA MAU MAU LEB LEB IVO IVO
F am ily 39.0 78.5 100.0 88.0 94.5 69.0 71.5 74.0
SAMPLE SIZE 18 23 10 17 18 32 14 23
Source: Fieldwork: questionnaires (1990).
Whilst the samples are small, the figures do show that stores were 
very much family enterprises. Most stores which did not employ 
family members employed someone from their own ethnic group. 
This was particularly true of NIBA traders. Most of those who 
employed non-family Ivorians did so in addition to family 
members. The Ivorian sample included former Chaine Avion 
outlets and a few grocery stores which often employed non-family 
Ivorians. Questioning of the managers revealed that virtually all 
were of the same ethnic group as their proprietors and many 
were also family members in 1976 as well.102 As Kennedy found 
in Ghana,103 one strength of these employment practices was that 
proprietors could trust relatives more than strangers, especially 
where money was concerned.
Employment of relatives usually served as an apprenticeship for 
that relative. From the proprietor they gained trading experience 
and were perhaps paid a small sum in cash or kind which they 
could save towards purshasing their own store. Santoir observed 
this in the Mauritanian community in Senegal in the early 
19 7 0 s104 and much the same was true later in Ivory Coast. Here, 
newly arrived immigrants were employed in an elder's store and
101 Personal experience: discussions with traders; Fieldwork: discussions  
with traders. Examples include Iboudou Ablasse who, until 1985, employed 
his brother Nana Rasmane in Adjame, and Diarra Samba o f Yopougon who 
employed a large assortment o f relatives and kinsmen since the late 1970s.
102 Chateau, 'Recensement'.
103 P.Kennedy, Ghanaian B usinessm en (Weltforum Verlag, Munich, 1980), 
p .109.
104 Santoir, ‘Maure’, pp.155-156.
119
accumulated their pay until they had enough money to start their 
own outlet or else take over from the elder. This apprenticeship 
lasted up to ten years or more.105 Khuri stated that with the
Lebanese in West Africa, newly arrived immigrants wishing to set 
up in trade were sponsored by an established trader for whom he
worked until he had ’proven’ himself (the definition of which
could be contested for the sponsor may see the new trader as
cheap la b o u r) .106 The same patterns of employment and 
apprenticeship have long been evident amongst many other 
African groups, especially the Dioula and the Hausa as illustrated 
in the previous chapter.107 Table 8, showing the ages and length 
of time spent in stores of proprietors and mangers, can be related 
to these observations.
TABLE 8: AVERAGES OF AGE AND TIME SPENT IN CURRENT STORE BY TRADER 
PROPRIETORS AND MANAGERS, 1990.
DESIGNATION ABJ INT ABJ INT ABJ INT ABJ INT
NIBA NIBA MAU MAU LEB LEB IVO IVO
Proprietors: age 35.4 39.6 36.2 39.0 32.1 39.6 33.4 36.9
Managers: age 30.0 29.9 29.6 27.9 23.8 28.1 24.7 26.5
Props: years in store 4.4 6.5 6.9 4.6 8.7 9.9 3.0 6.3
Mans: years in store 0.8 2.4 3.4 0.8 2.3 3.6 1.9 3.2
SAMPLE SIZE: Props 18 23 10 17 18 32 14 23
: Mans 12 17 20 23 12 8 16 17
Source: Fieldwork: questionnaires (19900.
In 1976, over 75% of proprietors of all kinds of establishments 
were under forty years of age and Ivorians were found to be the 
youngest on average.108 By 1990 this appeared to have changed 
little. Ivorian ages were similar to those of the NIBAs but, as in 
1976, they were the youngest. Less easy to explain is why 
Abidjan traders were on average younger than their counterparts
105 Ib id . pp. 150, 155-156; Interview: Ould Boubakar: Ould Mohammed: La 
R ue.
106 Khuri, 'Kinship1, p .394-395.
107 Fieldwork: observation: discussions with traders; Personal experience: 
observation: discussions with traders.
108 Chateau, 'Recensement'. All information subsequently quoted from this 
source is for towns with a population o f ten thousand plus, unless otherwise 
stated.
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in the interior but of a number of possible reasons one of the most 
likely was that the bright lights and seemingly greater 
opportunities of Abidjan appealed more to less experienced 
traders who perhaps failed to consider that competition was also 
stiffer there. Managers and proprietors in Abidjan appeared to be 
less durable than in the interior, possibly because competition was 
far tougher even though, paradoxically, it was easier to get started 
t h e r e . 109 The difference in time spent in stores between 
proprietors and managers of around four years might indicate 
that this was the average length of the apprenticeship. If so, this 
practical experience should have proven to be a significant 
advantage to NSE traders.
Another advantage of the apprenticeship system was that it 
allowed many Mauritanian and Black African stores to open for 
long hours without the proprietor needing to be around 
constantly. For Mauritanians in Senegal ”la boutique est ouverte 
pratiquement douze mois sur douze, et ju squa  vingt heures sur 
vingt-quatre. Un system de relais s'etablit entre le patron et ses 
aides" .  110 Much the same was observed in Ivory Coast where 
Mauritanian stores tended to stay open later than other small 
retailers as many were located in residential areas rather than in 
commercial districts. Traders usually slept in a room at the back 
of the store. Some stores had three or four traders.111 Black 
Africans operated in a similar manner: stores near crossroads such 
as Yabayo (where the Man-San Pedro road meets the Gagnoa 
road) were often open all night to cater for lorry drivers hauling 
timber from the Man-Guiglo regions down to the ports of Abidjan
109 This is consistant with research done by Paul Kennedy in Accra. He 
argued that the ease o f entry into the informal sector creates hightened 
competition and labour instability for Ghanaian enterprises. He concluded  
that "These, in turn, may either drive them out o f  the sector altogether or 
severely restrain them from generating new wealth through greater 
productivity, beyind a certain point". See P.Kennedy, ‘Cultural Factors 
A ffecting Entrepreneurship and Developm ent in the Informal Econom y in 
Ghana’, IDS Bulletin. 8, 2 (1976), p. 19.
110 Santoir, ‘Maure’, p .156.
111 Fieldwork: observation; Interview: La Rue; Personal experience: 
discussions with traders.
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or San Pedro.112 However, Lebanese stores had much shorter 
hours and did not use a relay system like Africans.113 With most 
Lebanese stores located in commercial districts and with most 
wholesale and semi-wholesale transactions taking place between 
six in the morning and noon, there was little to be gained from 
evening trading.
Once an assistant had served the apprenticeship the next step was 
owning a store though some Mauritanians in Senegal returned 
home without desiring to become proprietors114 and this may also 
have been true for Ivory Coast. For Mauritanians it appears that 
the community was as important as the family with religious
leaders perhaps playing a central role. Accounts varied as to the 
degree of control and organisation but this probably reflected 
differing practices in some communities. Some traders in Ivory 
Coast appeared to assist relatives and people from their home
region in much the same way as they did in Senegal. In Ivory
Coast at least, the elder may also have assisted them when they 
set up their own store. This might have included commercial 
advice, helping to find a store and providing some financing and 
c re d i t .115 The extent to which elders exercised authority over
newcomers who requested help doubtless varied between 
com m unities.
Goods purchasing was sometimes done on credit with the 
assistance of the elder or religious leader who acted as 
intermediary between the traders in his area and the Lebanese or 
WSE suppliers. For this service each trader paid a small fee but 
the goods were purchased in their name. As Cohen observed with 
the Hausa in Nigeria,116 the Mauritanian was provided with a 
ready line of credit and was in a supportive environment, factors 
which greatly increased his chances of overcoming ’teething’
112 Personal experience: discussions with salesmen; Fieldwork: 
observation: discussions with traders.
113 Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation.
114 Santoir, ‘Maure’, p.156.
115 Ibid . pp.150, 155-156; Interview: Ould Boubakar: Ould Mohammed: La 
Rue; Personal experience: discussions with salesm en.
116 A.Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1969), pp. 19-20.
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problems. The installation of grills in front of counters was also a 
result of organisation, the purchases having been made in bulk.117 
However, not all Mauritanians operated as a group in this manner. 
Some managed their affairs fairly independently of one another 
though that did not preclude some form of co-operation.118
For other African traders there is little published information
directly relating to Ivory Coast though it would appear that the 
Dioula network was important for store owners starting up. 
Amongst other groups, support may also have been forthcoming 
but was perhaps less widespread and less organised than with 
either Mauritanians or Lebanese traders. That so many African 
small retailers purchased goods independently is consistant with 
these observations.119 Transactions between retailers were, for 
reasons not difficult to fathom, fairly rare. Between wholesalers 
and retailers the pattern appeared to be not much different from 
transactions with the Lebanese unless the traders were of the 
same group, especially the Dioula. In this respect, Islam was of 
great importance among the Dioula.120 NIBA traders interviewed 
in 1990 were, the Lebanese apart, the most likely to have
obtained financial assistance from family or friends when setting 
up their business. Ivorians, on the other hand, were the least
likely. That most of the former were Muslims and most of the 
latter Christians (see Table 9 below) might well account for this 
difference. However, there is no ready explanation for differences 
observed between interior and Abidjan proprietors regarding
sources of finance.121
117 Interview: La Rue.
118 Interview: Ould Boubakar: Ould Mohammed; Personal experience: 
o b se r v a tio n .
119 Fieldwork: observation: discussion with Senegalese trader in Adjame 
(Decem ber 1990); Personal experience: observation: d iscussions with 
trad ers.
120 Lewis, ‘Dioula’, pp.272-302; Personal experience: two Jumbo cube semi - 
wholesalers, one in Yopougon, the other in Anyama, had financial 
difficulties 1985-86 and their debts were paid o ff by members o f  the local 
Dioula community. See DSA: credit client sheets (1985-86). See also Kennedy, 
C apita lism , pp .141-146.
121 Fieldwork: questionnaires.
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Commercial transactions of Black African retailers appear to have 
changed little since the 1950s, except in aggregate size. Traders 
have long obtained most of their supplies from the Lebanese with 
those supplied by European trading companies increasingly on the 
decline since the early 1960s. However, as illustrated in the 
previous chapter, they were still important as suppliers in some 
areas well into the 1980s. Terms of payment usually depended on 
the supplier's knowledge of the client with credit periods ranging 
from a few days to a month. This gave the Lebanese a distinct 
advantage as they were closer to African traders than were the 
E uropeans.122 The ability of African traders to obtain credit might 
well have been hampered if they were without the support of a 
trade network.
From the late 1970s, but less so since 1985, small retailers could 
also obtain supplies from travelling salesmen of Abidjan based 
import companies. Conditions of payment would again depend on 
knowledge of the client but credit was rarely granted to small 
retailers. This weakness was partly compensated for by travelling 
salesmen frequently giving small retailers a few days unofficial 
credit, this being possible when a salestrip involved returning to 
Abidjan along the same route.123
For example, a salesman on a trip to San Pedro would travel up 
the motorway to N'Douci and from there follow the road west, 
passing through to sell at Tiassale, Divo, Gagnoa and possibly 
Lakota on the way. After Gagnoa, the salesman might also stop at 
Soubre on the way to San Pedro. Traders in San Pedro could only 
get unofficial credit for as long as the salesman was there, usually 
a day or two. At Soubre, the trader might get three days of 
unofficial credit and in towns thereafter tho period was longer 
with maybe six days at N'Douci. The saleman was thus depositing 
goods on the way to San Pedro and cashing in the bills on the
122 CCCI, Bulletin. 6, p.92; IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution'; Winder, ‘Lebanese,
p.310; Personal experience: discussions with Lebanese and African traders; 
Fieldwork: d iscussions with traders; Interview: Merhouet.
123 Interview: Doh Gilles (2nd.); Personal experience: from 1984 to 1985 I 
was responsible for organising salestrips at DANAFCO. Salesmen o f  other 
companies also practiced the same system o f unofficial credit with the 
traders they trusted.
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return journey. For the few African sem i-wholesalers and 
wholesalers, official credit was usually the norm. Many such 
wholesalers were Hausa or Dioula and instances of non-payment 
were rare.124
On African processed food semi-wholesalers and wholesalers, little 
has been said so far because there were very few of them, even in 
1985 when product range appeared to have reached its maximum. 
The Lebanese had already cornered this area of the market and 
whilst there were some notable exceptions to the rule,125 African 
traders have either been content to leave it that way to 
concentrate on local basic foodstuffs or have been unable to 
compete, or a combination of both. The only significant activity in 
this area was the role African stores played as semi-wholesalers 
to market traders, a role which is assessed in some detail in 
Chapter 7 on the cube trade.
Since at least the late 1950s, when a new Lebanese trader set up 
on his own he was financed by other traders in the town or 
district who supplied him with goods. This was his loan but there 
were no formal transactions so he was 'advised' to stay in the 
same town. Upon achieving self-suffiency, the traders who loaned 
the goods demanded repayment i.e. he was now a competitor and 
they could not afford to grant him such a favour any longer. The 
new trader was thus fully independent once the loans had been 
repaid and there were very few who returned to Lebanon without 
succeeding. This system was most common amongst brothers, in­
laws and cousins but never between husband and wife and rarely 
between father and son.126 Thus, as Binet remarked, "La solidite 
des families et le controle social sont bien marques "127 with the 
family often living above the store128 and sons of traders 
frequently locating close to their parents.129
124 Ibid; DSA: internal reports, L.Bosteen, 'Abidjan Town' and 'Bush Sector'.
125 DSA: internal report, Ayirebi, 'Abidjan': internal reports, L.Bosteen, 
'Abidjan Town' and 'Bush Sector'.
126 Khuri, 'Kinship', p.394-395.
127 Binet, ‘Libanais’, p.261.
128 Ib id : White and Gleave, Econom ic Geography, p.203; Fieldwork:
observation, e.g. the Ali family in N'Douci; Personal experience:
125
Family members in the Lebanese community, be they in different 
sectors of the economy or regions of the country, have provided 
information, credit and other financial assistance to one another 
since before independence.130 There is little doubt that this 
occured in the 1980s131 and trader interviews in 1990 revealed 
that around half of the proprietors questioned had received 
financial assistance from family or friends.132 Cruise O'Brien has 
noted that in Senegal "Small-scale Lebanese * traders and 
entrepreneurs have always depended on community networks to 
relay information and facilitate credit".133 Such support would 
have helped to give them the financial security which had 
previously been considered to be a major advantage of the big 
trading companies over their competitors (and which still was 
concerning major investments).134
From  personal experience from 1983-85 and fieldw ork 
conversations, it was evident that many Lebanese traded with 
each other, the larger ones wholesaling to semi-wholesalers and 
retailers and semi-wholesalers selling to retailers. Transactions 
between two wholesalers or two semi-wholesalers also occured 
and often involved an exchange of goods in addition to or instead 
of cash transactions. It appears that these advantageous 
commercial links did not extend beyond family and friends and 
transactions were mostly on credit terms of between twenty and 
thirty days, sometimes more, sometimes less.135
observation, e.g. the Bejani family in Divo until 1985 when they left the 
c o u n tr y .
!29 Fieldwork: observation, e.g. the Zabads in Dabou; White and Gleave, 
Econom ic Geography, p.203.
130 A.R.Zolberg, One Party, p. 118.
131 Fieldwork: discussion with Merhouet Ali, sem i-wholesaler in Port Bouet
(October 1990); Personal experience: discussions with Lebanese traders, e.g.
Fakhry Reda o f Lakota (1984).
132 Fieldwork: questionnaires.
133 R.Cruise O'Brien, ’Lebanese Entrepreneurs in Senegal: Econom ic 
Integration and the Politics o f Protection', C E A . 15, 57 (1975), p.111.
134 Ib id . The financial power o f the trading companies is perhaps best 
explained in P.Bauer, West African Trade (CUP, Cambridge, 1954), pp.89-191.
135 Personal experience: discussions with Lebanese traders; Fieldwork:
discussions with Lebanese traders.
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Whilst no instances of trade between Muslims and Christians were 
known except between w holesalers and im porters or 
manufacturers, the reasons for this were probably little to do with 
religion per se . Rather it was family and people from the same 
town, village or area in Lebanon that was important.136 For many 
African traders, religion, as already observed, has long been a 
crucial part of trade relations, being tied up with trust and access 
to credit and information. Chapter 7 shows that this was especially 
true with the Dioula in more recent times as well as during the 
period covered by Chapter 2. Table 9 below shows the 
percentages of traders according to their religion.
TABLE 9: TRADERS' RELIGION, PERCENTAGES, 1990.
ABJ INT ABJ INT ABJ INT ABJ INT
RELIGION NIBA NIBA MAU MAU LEB LEB IVO IVO
Isla m 93.5 87.5 100.0 100.0 86.5 77.5 30.0 30.0
C h r is tia n ity 6.5 12.5 13.5 20.0 60.0 62.5
A n im ism 10.0 7.5
I s la m /C h r is t ia n 2.5
SAMPLE SIZE 30 40 30 40 30 40 30 40
Source: Fieldwork: questionnaires.
The contrast between Ivorians and Black Africans is marked but 
easily enough explained. The high proportion of Christians 
amongst Ivorians can be partially attributed to the number of 
former PAC and Chaine Avion traders among their number. Most 
of these gerants  were from the Baoule and Agni groups137 which 
was where most of the stores were located and the proportion of 
Christians amongst the Akan was higher than the national 
a v e r a g e .138 Additionally, the Akan had a higher standard of 
education than the predominantly Muslim northern groups139 and 
both PAC and Avion required a certain level of educational
136 Gilmour, Fractured, chapter 2; Bigo, ‘Network’, p.517.
137 DSA: credit client files (1980-90).
138 Mundt, Historical Dictionary o f Ivorv Coast (Scarecrow Press, 
Metuchen, 1987), pp.24, 37-38, 98, 120.
139 ORSTOM and IGT, Atlas, section B3a.
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attainment amongst those they recruited.140 Although they had 
the advantage of a formal education (discussed in Chapter 4), 
Christians did not have the benefit of a trade network. This would 
be a key weakness for non-Dioula Ivorians. As far as the NIBAs 
were concerned, most were from predominantly Islamic countries 
(Mali, Burkina).
The final area, remittances to relatives, was a widespread practice 
and a weakness for most NSE traders. It was not uncommon for 
Lebanese families or individuals to send some money to their 
relatives in Lebanon141 though the data in Table 10 below 
indicates that they were the least likely to do so. The reasons for 
this probably had much to do with the fact that many Lebanese 
had been in Ivory Coast so long that either they had no relatives 
left in Lebanon or else the passing of time had lessened the 
obligation to provide support. With reference to the table, the 
figures may be distorted downwards due to concern about the 
legality of remittances.
TABLE 10: FOREIGN TRADERS SENDING FAMILY REMITTANCES ABROAD AND  
IVORIANS SENDING FAMILY REMITTANCES, PERCENTAGES, 1990.
ABJ INT ABJ INT ABJ INT ABJ INT
REMITTANCES NIBA NIBA MAU MAU LEB LEB IVO IVO
Y es
No response
73.5 62.5 66.5
3.5
50.0 33.5 32.5 66.5 57.5
SAMPLE SIZE 30 40 30 40 30 40 30 40
Source: Fieldwork: questionnaires.
Most Mauritanians sent remittances even though probably many 
were saving to obtain their own store. Mauritanians in Senegal 
sent money to their families back home142 whilst this was also 
common practice for those working in France. There it was found 
that 84.4% sent money at least once a quarter and virtually all of
140 RCI, ’Le Programme d'Action Commerciale' (Ministere de l'Economie et 
des Finances, Abidjan, 1971), pp.6-8.
141 Binet, ‘Libanais’, p.262.
142 Santoir, ‘Maure’, pp.155-158.
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this was to support the family.143 That fewer in Ivory Coast sent 
money was probably related in part to the small amount they 
earned. The proportionately fewer Mauritanian traders in the 
interior sending money abroad could be due to their having been 
established for a shorter period than those in Abidjan. The Ivorian 
government estimated that, in 1987, some twenty billion CFA was 
sent to Mauritania.144
This section has shown the importance of family and community 
to NSE traders, particularly amongst Lebanese, Mauritanian and 
other Islamic entrepreneurs. Ethnic and family links meant 
information, labour, financial and other benefits both for new 
traders and established businessmen. Many Ivorian traders, 
actual and potential, lacked both organisation and a common 
religion and consequently were disadvantaged compared to most 
immigrant groups.
3.5 FOREIGN COMMUNITIES: ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
CONTROVERSIES
Despite the evident problems of the European trading companies 
and the successes of the Lebanese from the middle of the 1950s, 
as well as many African traders, the earliest comprehensive 
investigation of distribution activities in Ivory Coast (1963)145 
remained blinded by its (French) authors’ own biases. Many of the 
views expressed range from the simplistic to the rascist to the 
unbelievably short sighted. The most ironic of all the statements 
made about the Lebanese was that "sa recherche est souvent a 
courte vue et son point de vue egocentrique". Another gem is 
" Curieusement le Libanais, commercant depuis des generations, au 
contact des grandes compagnies europeennes n'a pas le sens du 
commerce moderne". Finally, the authors stated that the Lebanese 
had no measure of the social functions of traders, of "service au 
clien t". This, they concluded, was typified by "par example face a
143 Conde et al, South -N orth , pp. 108-109.
144 Interview: La Rue.
145 IDET-CEGOS, ’Distribution'.
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notre enquete, il est reste mefiant et non concerned'146 Most of 
these comments about the Lebanese have also been related to 
African traders. Sadly, many of the above views have been 
frequently reiterated since and at times have re-emerged in 
recent state attacks against the NSE sector. As most of the 
controversies for much of the period bar recent years have
concerned Lebanese activities, it is on this community that this 
section will concentrate.
Complaints have been frequent about the lack of employment 
creation for Ivorians by Lebanese traders. The principal reason 
for this has always been that the Lebanese work on a family 
b a s i s .147 The Lebanese, as was the case elsewhere,148 were 
accused of employing too few people at too low a wage.149 In 
1976, only 10% of tertiary sector Lebanese enterprises employed 
more than five people, the average being 3.2 per enterprise 
(compared to 28.3 for both the primary and secondary sectors).
Nonetheless, these figures compared reasonably with other
tertiary sector enterprises as the Lebanese represented 6.2% of 
outlets but employed 8.1% of the personnel.150 If turnover were 
taken into account, the picture would not look so positive but 
Table 11 below clearly shows that the Lebanese were the most 
likely NSE store owners to employ Ivorians. Particularly
noticeable was how few NIBA and Mauritanian stores used 
Ivorians.
146 Ibid, p.54.
147 Winder, ‘Lebanese’,p.309.
148 For example, in Senegal. See R.Cruise O'Brien, ‘Protection’, p .103.
149 Winder, ‘Lebanese’, pp.313-314; EIU, Report. (No.2, 1990), p. 11.
150 Interview: Mr. Fofana Coulibaly, Director o f the Ecole de Commerce 
(Abidjan, December 4 1990).
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TABLE 11: EMPLOYMENT OF NON-FAMILY IVORIANS BY PROPRIETORS, 
PERCENTAGES, 1990.
ABJ INT ABJ INT ABJ INT ABJ INT
NIBA NIBA MAU MAU LEB LEB IVO IVO
I v o r ia n s 0.0 8.5 0.0 6.0 61.0 78.0 43.0 35.0
SAMPLE SIZE 18 23 10 17 18 32 14 23
Source: Fieldwork: questionnaires.
The Lebanese also invested heavily in property and played a 
major role in transport as well as owning many petrol stations, 
cinemas, hotels, dress shops, taxis and hairdressers. Controversies 
about their activities extended into these areas.151 In 1976 there 
were 98 secondary sector enterprises with at least 50% Lebanese 
participation, employing 2,777 people.152 By 1984 Lebanese 
interests controlled over half of the units of production of local 
in d u stry .153
TABLE 12: PROPRIETORS’ OTHER INTERESTS, PERCENTAGES, 1990.
ABJ INT ABJ INT ABJ INT ABJ INT
INTERESTS NIBA NIBA MAU MAU LEB LEB IVO IVO
H o u sin g 5.5 4.5 10.0 6.0 5.5 3.0 14.5 4.5
Video club 11.0
K iosk 5.5
H otel 8.5
R e sta u r a n t 11.0
L a u n d re tte 5.5 7 .0
T ran sp ort 4.5 4 .5
Not specified 4.5 10.0 6.0 11.0 12.5 13.0
O ther 5.5 14.5
N o n e 83.5 91.5 80.0 88.0 66.5 84.5 64.5 69.5
SAMPLE SIZE 18 23 10 17 18 32 14 23
Source: Fieldwork: questionnaires.
151 Binet, ‘Libanais’, p.261; P.Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa  
1880-1985 (CUP, Cambridge, 1988); Winder, ‘Lebanese’, pp.307-317; EIU, 
Report (No.2, 1990), pp. 11-12; Bigo, ‘Network’, pp.525-526.
152 A.Coulibaly, 'L'emploi dans les entreprises libano-syriennes de Cote 
d'Ivoire' (O ffice National de Formation Professionel, Abidjan, 1978).
153 I.Kone, 'Le pouvoir libanais', Afrique N ouvelle. 1846 (novembre 1984), 
p. 14.
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The Lebanese position on salaries is harder to defend when 
compared to European employers. In June 1990 employees of 
Lebanese entrepreneurs went on strike. Many claimed low pay at 
irregular dates and without payslips and there were also 
complaints over the general lack of workers’ rights.154 Salesmen in 
1990 received 10 to 25,000 CFA per month and managers 
5 0 ,0 0 0 .155 A junior salesman in the formal sector could expect to 
receive around 55,000 per month.156 However, the sums paid by 
the Lebanese were probably no less than those paid one way or 
another in other areas of the NSE sector and WSE sector 
employees would probably receive much lower pay were it not 
for strict government regulations on minimum wages.
Lebanese traders have also been criticised for their ’flexible’ 
attitude to granting credit and the importing and pricing of goods. 
Of all traders, the Lebanese were regarded as the least likely to 
observe sem i-wholesale or retail prices recom mended by 
suppliers. Among the products which suffered from this tendency 
to cut prices for quick turnover were Maggi cubes and Prima skin 
cream. Adnan Ajani of Lakota was cut off by the suppliers of 
Wonder batteries (1983) and Jumbo (1984) for this reason.157 
However, whilst suppliers may see retail price cutting as being 
against their interests, consumers do benefit. This issue is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.
Unlike in the early 1960s, prices varied little from store to store 
in the 1980s for processed foods in urban areas, whether the store 
was in Abidjan or Odienne.158 This was despite the impression one 
m ight have got from reading the governm ent newspaper 
F ratern ite  Matin which, in conjunction with the Ministry of 
Commerce, decided to wage war on traders who passed on to
154 EIU, R eport. (No.2, 1990), p. 11; P.M.Abiali, 'De nombreux magasins 
libanais restes fermes', Fraternite" M atin. 7705 (juin 12 1990).
155 Abiali, ‘M agasins’.
156 Fieldwork: discussions with salesmen.
157 Personal experience: discussion with Abdoul Mourad, DANAFCO  
Marketing Manager (1984); DSA: internal reports, Ayeribi, 'Abidjan' and 
'Bouake'.
158 Fieldwork: observation; IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution'.
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consumers a new 5% sales tax on most goods.159 Fines were 
imposed and lists published with names of traders who had so 
erred. However, with headlines such as "La guerre continue "160 
one gained the impression that the initiative was essentially 
politically motivated and aimed at diverting criticism from what 
was an immensely unpopular measure with all sectors of the 
econom y.161
The Lebanese have also long been accused of fraud in their 
import-export activities. Thompson and Adloff noted in the mid 
1950s that "the Levantines are blamed for a decline in the quality 
of certain French West African exports, notably that of Ivory 
Coast's cocoa and coffee".162 Further, "the Syrian-Lebanese in 
French West Africa have shown themselves adept at evading 
foreign exchange regulations and sabotaging the government’s 
programme to reduce the cost of living and raise producer's 
in c o m es ."163 Again, there may well have been some truth in the 
accusation but European interests were probably no less guilty in 
many respects. In fact, a commission set up in 1964-65 to 
investigate fraud and other irregularities in trade in Ghana found 
cases against Ghanaians and Indians but none against the 
L ebanese.164
In thinly veiled attacks on the Lebanese, WSE interests have 
decried the "concurrence deloyale"  by w holesalers165 and 
demanded that "les operations de dumping destinees a fa ire  
craquer un concurrent soient reprimes par les autorites " ,166 In 
1989 the W orld Bank claim ed that there was serious 
underinvoicing of goods and extensive fraud but did not blame
159 See various editions o f Fraternite Matin for July 1990.
1611 Fraternite Matin (July 14 1990), p.6.
161 Fieldwork: observation: discussions with traders and company people.
162 Thompson and Adloff, F rench , p.431.
163 Ibid. p.430.
164 Binet, ‘Libanais’, p .261.
165 SCIMPEX, ’Commission grandes surfaces et superettes: reunion du 
3 /5 /8 5 ’.
166 SCIMPEX, M.Esmail 'Rapport de la commission 9 "Grandes Surfaces" ' 
(May 28 1985).
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any particular g roup.167 In effect, it seems likely that both 
European and Lebanese intersts were to blame.168
Concerning credit, the Lebanese have, justifiably in many cases, 
been accused of either delaying payment or not paying their bills 
at all. Tactics used include bouncing cheques and owning a bank 
account in one name and a store in another to avoid prosecution 
for bounced cheques (it was virtually impossible to take legal 
action for unpaid bills where there was no bounced cheque).169 As 
already observed, the closer contacts with and knowledge of
African traders gave them advantages over Europeans when 
granting c red it.170 Muslim Lebanese also had the benefit of a 
common religion with many African traders.171 However, these 
factors were often of minor importance with the Lebanese when
trading with Mauritanians who had the worst reputation for credit 
worthiness. Nonetheless, the Lebanese appeared to be the 
principal suppliers of Mauritanians as they were prepared to take 
more risks than European firms and probably had a better 
knowledge of their debtors.172
A brief case study of one particular Mauritanian trader, covering 
the years 1984 to his death in 1989 helps illustrate the kind of
problems faced in the pursuit of bad debts. Whilst the case of
Taleb Amar Ould Mohammed (also referred to as Ould Mohammed 
Bilal in some legal documents but hereafter referred to as Taleb)
167 EIU, Report. (No.2, 1989), p. 19.
168 Kone, ‘Pouvoir’, p .15; Bigo, ‘Network’, p.525; Personal experience: 
observation. There is in fact no doubt that this was (probably still is) the 
case as numerous conversations with company officials and customs 
officers in 1983-85 proves. However, it is obviously not possible to reveal 
these sources, some of whom were employed by major foreign interests.
169 Personal experience: observation. I was responsible for collecting bad
debts in 1984-85. See also DSA: credit client cards (1983-86).
170 Winder, 'Lebanese', p .310.
171 1hlA, p.321.
172 Interview: Merhouet: Mr. Henri Zamble, Chef du Personel at DANAFCO
and independant candidate for deputy in the 1990 elections (Abidjan,
December 1990): Ould Boubakar: Mr. Frederick Attoh, DANAFCO General 
Manager (Abidjan, September 1990): La Rue; Fieldwork: discussions with 
Lebanese traders; Personal experience: discussions with Lebanese traders 
and with the CICA Marketing Manager (November 1990): observation; DSA: 
credit client sheets (1984-88).
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cannot be construed as being typical of the M auritanian 
community, it provides evidence for some of the points made 
above as well as illustrating the problems suppliers often
encountered in pursuing bad debts of all nationalities and types of 
clients through legal channels.
Taleb first came to the attention of DANAFCO in 1984 when he 
came up to the Abidjan office offering to pay off the debt of a 
family member in San Pedro amounting to a little under seven
hundred thousand CFA.173 At the same time he requested Jumbo 
stock cubes on thirty days credit and after details of his bank 
account were provided and checked,174 the goods were delivered 
by the company's Marketing Director for cubes, one Abdoul Karim 
Mourad. At the same time some two million CFA of other 
merchandise were delivered to another of Taleb’s stores by the 
Divers Products Marketing Department (of which I was the 
Manager). Neither delivery was known to the other department at 
the time but the sum total of the goods, some five million CFA, 
was within the credit limit recommended by the bank and post 
dated cheques had been obtained for both sales.175
Just before the cheques bounced, another cube delivery was made
to Taleb, bringing the total up to 11 million CFA.176 The cube 
Marketing Manager immediately departed for San Pedro to obtain 
payment in cash but, after several days searching, was unable to 
find the client. He therefore seized a lorry at Taleb's store, filled it 
with as many goods as he could, and departed for Abidjan. 
However, this was done without proper legal proceedings and was 
in fact illegal. Consequently, upon his return to San Pedro in 
further pursuit of Taleb, Abdoul Mourad was jailed for a few days 
in Sassandra (San Pedro is in the prefecture  of Sassandra).177
173 DSA: credit client sheets (1984); Personal experience: I was the one he 
first came to see.
174 Personal experience: the company's Managing Director at the time,
Marc Cheriaux, had a friend at a bank who provided information on clients' 
credit cred ibility .
175 See DSA: credit client sheets (1984-85).
176 Ibid.
177 Personal experience: recollection o f the events and discussions with 
A.Mourad and H.Zamble (1984-86); Interview: Zamble.
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This was a bad mistake by DANAFCO but the lorry was quickly 
returned and legal proceedings started against the client, first in 
Sassandra and later in Abidjan. Taleb responded by launching his 
own legal proceedings against the company, claiming amongst 
other things that he had never had any contact with DANAFCO and 
demanding a court order to close down the company.178 It was 
now April 1986 and the company had seen none of its money. 
These claims were thrown out of court but by this time Taleb was 
holed up in the Mauritanian embassy which refused to expel him. 
It also emerged from a variety of documents that Taleb was the 
Mauritanian community leader for the Sassandra prefecture .179
As well as using legal means to delay and discourage DANAFCO 
and three other companies present at some or all of the hearings 
(SACI were owed 16 million, Blohorn three million, Trituraf four 
million), Taleb also used some illegal ones, mostly alleged bribery 
of various officials. 180
Taleb eventually emerged from the embassy and was condemned 
to go to prison for two years on the bounced cheques but was 
released in September 1988 when the President announced a 
general amnesty to celebrate the first papal visit. He promptly 
fled the country and died in M auritania the next year.181 
DANAFCO, meanwhile, after over three years of legal proceedings 
finally saw some of their money when the court awarded the 
company possession of Taleb's four shops and all the merchandise 
in them. After legal and other related expenses had been 
deducted, the company had recuperated ju st 700,000 of the
178 DSA: legal document, 'Extraits des minutes du Greffe du Tribunal de 
Premi6re Instance d’Abidjan' (April 23 1986); Fieldwork: discussions; 
Interview: Zamble.
179 DSA: file, ’Dossier sur l'affaire Taleb'; Personal experience: discussions 
with Zamble (summer 1986).
180 Personal experience: discussions with Zamble in 1985 and 1986; 
Interview: Zamble.
181 Interview: Zamble; EIU, Report. (No.4, 1990), p. 16.
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eleven million it was owed. None of the other companies received 
any th ing .182
Whilst Taleb allegedly used bribery, the Lebanese community 
have long supported the political aspirations of Ivorians by 
financial payments which could be interpreted as either donations 
or bribery. Prior to the emergence of the PDCI, Lebanese traders 
had paid "some form of informal tribute to local notabilities in 
exchage for the privilege of buying and selling goods in the 
a re a ." 183 As the reality of independence became apparent, they 
increasingly switched their financing to local party chiefs as a 
means of insuring their continued presence in the territory and 
these contributions continued into the 1980s.184 However, it does 
not appear that they reached the same level of involvement as did 
some of those in Senegal.185
Some would call the above bribery, in which case many Europeans 
would also have less than clean hands. Winder referred to 
b r ib e ry 186 (though of whom is not clear) and an official at the 
patents office in Abidjan, in explaining why the records were not 
accurate, said that Lebanese bribery of political figures gave them 
protection against paying for the proper commercial licenses.187 
In Senegal, Cruise O'Brien asserted that "the system of payoff by 
the Lebanese operates up to the highest level in public life".188 It 
is also known that many Lebanese gained political favours 
through the handling of some members of the elite’s financial
182 Interview: Zamble; Fieldwork: discussions with Zamble. See also DSA: 
file, 'Taleb'.
183 Zolberg, One Party, p. 118.
184 Ib id : M.A.Cohen, Urban Policy and Political Conflict in Africa 
(University o f Chicago Press, Chicago, 1974), pp.128-129; Personal 
experience: discussions with Lebanese traders, e.g. Adnan Ajani o f Lakota 
(1985 ).
185 S.Boumedouha, 'Adjustment to West African Realities: the Lebanese in 
Senegal', A frica . 60, 4 (1990), p.544.
186 Winder, ‘Lebanese’, p .314.
187 Fieldwork: discussion with patentes office official (July 1990). The 
individual concerned not surprisingly declined to give his name.
188 R.Cruise O'Brien, ‘Protection’, p. 112.
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affa irs189 but, as an article in Fraternite Matin pointed out, "s'il y a
eu des corrupteurs libanais c'est parce qu'il a bien existe des «
corrom pus»  ou des corruptibles nationaux ”.19° Further, whilst the 
Lebanese were “in percentage terms relative to the rest of the 
population, at the top of the list of convictions for economic fraud”, 
the amounts embezzled showed “this practice turns out to be as 
much a privilege of the French and the Ivorians as of the
Lebanese”.191
In part because of their reluctance to integrate socially, the
Lebanese were mistrusted by many Ivorians although at times 
"Ils n'hesitent pas a apporter leur soutien materiale aux grandes 
causes nationales" . 192 Their economic activities also gave rise to 
suspicions about their professional m orality193 and their at times 
flamboyant lifestyle was also disliked194 although members of the 
Ivorian elite were as guilty if not more so of such behaviour.195 
Although Lebanese communities were closely kn it196 and they 
"vivent en communaute fermee qui ne songe qu'a Vinteret de ses 
m em bres  "197 they "appear to be un-assimilated, closed, isolated 
social g roups."198 Thus it is misleading to judge Lebanese 
integration into Ivorian life by the number of inter-racial 
marriages. These were rare,199 but so were marriages outside of 
the religious group.200 As Boumedouha pointed out, "even in 
Lebanon, it is quite unusual for a Shi'a, a Sunni, a Maronite, or a
189 Personal experience: discussions with Peter Toxvaerd, formerly Danish
ambassador to Ivory Coast (1984-85). This source was well aquainted with a
number o f individuals behind the senior M inisters.
190 N.Yao, ’Libanais d'Afrique', Fraternite Matin (July 5 1990), back page.
191 Bigo, ‘Network’, p.525.
192 Kone, ‘Pouvoir’, p. 15.
193 Binet, ‘Libanais’, p.261.
194 Bigo, ‘Network’, pp.523-524.
195 Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation.
196 White and Gleave, Econom ic Geography, p.203.
197 Kone, 'Pouvoir', p. 14.
198 Winder, ‘Lebanese’, p .317.
199 But not unheard of. One Lebanese in Bondoukou, Jouhair Talal, has long 
been married to a Baoule. Personal experience: observation.
200 Kone, ‘Pouvoir’, p. 15.
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Greek Orthodox to marry someone from outside their religious 
group".201
Despite the many longstanding criticisms of the Lebanese, it was 
the Mauritanian community whuch appeared to be the least 
popular with Ivorians and other NSE traders.202 Further, some 
salesmen’s practice of 'unofficial credits' described above was not 
usually extended to Mauritanians.203 As well their reputation for 
bad debts, Mauritanians were disliked by some Ivorians because 
they perceived them to be rascist. Salesmen and market traders 
claimed that they talked down to them because they were darker 
skinned and cited the fact that, in Mauritania, most blacks were 
the slaves of the fairer skinned peoples (effectively legally so 
until around 1980).204 The impression was doubtless compounded
by the closed social environment in which Mauritanians moved. 
Given, in addition, the resentment at their economic success at a 
time when many Ivorians were being made redundant, it was 
perhaps not surprising when, in 1981, they joined the list of 
foreign nationals who have been subjected to Ivorian racial 
a ttacks.205
Whatever the truth about allegations of economic and political 
corruption, the reality about the Lebanese and other foreign 
communities in Ivory Coast is probably no worse than that about 
the Ivorian elite or European interests and individuals. European 
interests throughout West Africa constantly accused the Lebanese 
of a wide range of crimes, of being exploitive and corrupt, but
these accusations could equally well be levelled at those who
201 Boumedouha, ‘Adjustment’, p.546. See also Gilmour, Fractured, pp. 13-14.
202 Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation.
203 Personal experience: discussions with salesmen: observation. On at least 
three occassions during 1984 on trips to San Pedro and Abengourou, I 
witnessed this problem. The salesman had deposited goods earlier but on 
returning to cash in, the trader who had taken receipt o f the goods was not 
there. The trader now in charge would deny all knowledge o f  the goods, 
saying that payment would have to wait until the original trader returned 
and, further, he had no idea when that would be. It was always the same
story. Strangely enough, if  the salesman said he would return at, say, ten in
the morning but instead arrived at nine, the original trader would almost 
always be there.
204 Fieldwork: dicussions with traders and salesmen.
205 EIU, Cote d’lvoire Country Profile 1990-91. p.4.
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made them .206 As one individual explained in declining to 
complete a fieldwork questionnaire, the Lebanese have rarely 
been given a fair hearing.207
3.6 IVORIANS AS NSE TRADERS, 1956-1990
The emphasis of this chapter has been on foreign rather than 
Ivorian NSE traders as they have constituted the large majority 
store owners throughout the period. Many of the pre-colonial and 
colonial factors which kept Ivorians from trade continued to do so 
after 1956. Akeredolu-Ale's model attributing the success of the 
Ijebu in Nigerian internal trade to geographical location, economic 
necessity and cumulative advantages again helps to explain the 
failure of Ivorians to expand their interests in NSE store 
ow nersh ip .208
Geographical location has been important because of the number 
of migrants who have sought areas richer than their own i.e. 
peoples from the Sahelic countries. This has meant more 
competition for those Ivorians who have gone into trade and could 
well have discouraged others from doing so for the same reason.
More important was economic necessity. With a booming economy 
from the 1950s to the end of the 1980s, Ivorians, compared to 
many other nationals in their own country, have been almost 
spoilt in availability of steady income jobs compared to 
neighbouring countries. There thus has been less of a need for
Ivorians to try their hand at an occupation which was not only
regarded as insecure but 'beneath' them. At the same time, the
economic boom proved to be a magnet for foreign Africans, most 
notably the Nigerians in the 1950s and 1960s and the
206 R.Cruise O'Brien, ‘Protection’, pp.95-115 ; Bigo, ‘Network’, p.525.
207 A Shi'ite owner o f an alimentation in Gagnoa. W e had a long 
conversation on people writing about the Lebanese and he was evidently 
well read. Despite his hostility towards much o f the academic and non- 
academic literature, he was unfailingly polite throughout, as were the vast 
majority o f Lebanese I encountered.
208 Akeredolu-Ale, ‘Sociohistorical’, pp.347-364.
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Mauritanians since then. This is where the third point comes into 
play, cumulative advantages.
The early chapters showed how the Dioula exploited their trading 
knowledge and contacts, greatly facilitated by a common faith, 
Islam. This is an advantage they have maintained over other 
Ivorians. The Mauritanians also had a common religion (though 
there is no suggestion that it helped them with the Dioula) and a 
long history of trading which enabled them to become 
exceptionally well organised and supportive of each other. 
Ivorians had neither the advantage of a close knit, financially 
secure community or the extensive trading experience which was 
probably needed to acquire the former.
3.7 CONCLUSION
W hilst the weaknesses of NSE sector traders have been 
highlighted by many sources, the strengths have generally been 
given rather less prominence. The success of the Lebanese is 
perhaps best illustrated by the way in which they out thought and 
out manoeuvred the European trading companies as well as 
independent European traders and Africans. In short, no other 
group displayed the same level of commercial ability in a 
constantly changing environment. The belief in the early 1960s 
that the Lebanese would shortly give way to a new African 
comercial class209 failed to materialise.
Many African traders also managed to survive, some even to 
prosper. M auritanians provide a clear exam ple of how 
commercially organised communities provided a range of support 
systems which benefited the community as a whole. New traders 
benefited from the experience and financial assistance of their 
elders. Established traders benefited from having apprentices as 
cheap labour and probably gained from assisting in financial 
transactions on behalf of new store owners. Most of these benfits
209 Winder, ‘Lebanese’, p .310.
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appear to have been available to the other main organised group, 
the Dioula.
This is not to say that the NSE sector has no weaknesses for it 
clearly did. Family obligations, lack of finacial resources, illiteracy 
and poor accounting methods worked against these traders. 
Further, some traders appeared to have little or no support 
network. This seems especially true of non-Dioula Ivorians whose 
participation continued to be undermined by the cumulative 
advantages of other traders and, until at least the early 1980s, by 
opportunities available in other areas of the national economy. 
But, as the following chapter shows, NSE traders had a better 
understanding than their WSE counterparts of multiple store 
ownership, the amount and range of goods to stock, the potential 
of a store in a given location and the ability make changes in 
rapidly changing circumstances.
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CHAPTER 4
THE TRANSFER OF WESTERN DISTRIBUTION TECHNIQUES 
TO IVORY COAST: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
This chapter examines the fortunes of stores in the Western Style 
Enterprises (WSE) sector, contrasting them with those in the Non- 
Western Style Enterprises (NSE) sector. The introduction of 
western distribution techniques occured in two ways. The first 
was through w estern -sty le  and m ostly  w estern-ow ned  
enterprises, these including family grocery stores, supermarkets, 
and trading company wholesale and retail chains. The second 
concerned governm ent and French-backed program m es to 
transfer western methods to Ivorians. These successive attempts 
at introducing nationwide distribution networks have never been 
analysed from an economic perspective.1
Although numerically only a small percentage of total stores, 
multiple retail chains received the lion's share of attention and 
investment from both western enterprises and the state. Western 
interests doubtless hoped to capture the lion's share of the retail 
and wholesale sectors and the state joined them in believing that 
modern distribution technologies would increase efficiency in the 
channels of distribution. They also hoped to achieve price 
conformity throughout the country and to bring a wide range of 
goods to a large proportion of the population as a large internal 
market was essential if the Ivorian industrialisation strategy was 
to be sustained. Further, the state saw the chain store operations 
as a means of increasing its own participation in internal 
distribution. This inevitably brought state and western interests 
into conflict.
The rest of the chapter is organised in four main sections. The first 
looks briefly at the characteristics and history of the different 
types of stores which have been classified as WSEs. The second
1 Though they have been from a political perspective. See C.Boone, 
'Commerce in Cote d'Ivoire: Ivorianisation without Ivorian Traders', J M A S . 
31, 1 (1993), pp.67-92.
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section analyses the strengths and achievements of chain stores 
and the third their weaknesses, both through comparisons with 
stores in the NSE sector and independent WSE outlets. The fourth 
section looks at the latest attempt to boost Ivorian participation in 
the distributive trades following the failure of the state 
supervised chain stores. Finally, the principal findings and their 
wider implications are summarised and assessed in the conclusion.
4.1 ORIGINS AND TYPES OF WSE STORES
Five types of WSE retail store can be identified during the period 
1956-1990: small retail chains, grocery chains, independent
grocery stores, supermarkets and wholesale chains. All of these 
stores, either consciously or otherwise, imitated the trading 
practices and theories prevalent in North America and Europe. 
Most, but not all, were characterised by most of the following: 
formally aquired skills, use of bookkeeping methods, difficult 
entry, corporate ownership, large scale of operation, use of cash 
tills and other retail technology, tidy physical appearance, regular 
salaried employees and reliance on overseas financial and 
technical resources.
The most numerous WSE stores for much of the period were the 
small retail chains, the origins of which can be traced in America 
to such pioneers as H.B.Claflin & Company in the 1860s, originally 
a wholesaler, and the 'Economy stores' of the Great Atlantic and 
Pacific Tea Company (A&P) started in 1913.2 Much like the Societe 
Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain (SCOA), retail chains which 
existed in the early to middle nineteenth century were usually 
"wholesale-retail vertically integrated partnerships spawned by 
the former's need to distribute imported goods".3 Claflin began to 
aquire retail stores in the 1860s and 1870s4 just as SCOA did in
2 R.J.Bullock, ’A History o f the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company Since 
1878', Harvard Business R eview . 12, 1 (1933), pp.59-69; S.C.Hollander and 
G.S.Omura, 'Chain Store Developments and Their Political, Strategic, and 
Social Interdependencies', Journal o f Retailing. 65, 3 (1989), pp.304-311.
3 Hollander and Omura, 'Chain', p.304.
4 Ibid.
144
the late 1950s and early 1960s with its Chaine Avion in Ivory 
C oast.5 A&P stores aimed to distribute goods into neighbourhoods 
at low, uniform prices but their stores were smaller than other 
grocery outlets and were aimed at the poorer consumer. They also 
had a low outreach because of their size (run by a single manager 
plus perhaps a helper), and the local low income consumers they 
were aimed at but the 1930s depression severely curtailed the
chain's growth.6 Multiple retailers grew rapidly in France and 
other European countries during the period 1890-1914 with most 
specialising in food and tobacco7 whilst stores selling a variety of 
types of products at low prices evolved later, in the 1920s and 
1930s.8 An important factor in the growth of chain stores was the 
apparent demand for standard quality low priced goods,9 factors 
which were perceived to have been required in early 1960s Ivory 
Coast. Thus the small retail chain stores were aimed primarily at 
low income consumers, much like A&P's economy stores.
As Table 13 shows, there were four retail chain groups in the 
1960s. Chaine Avion was the first to be set up, in 1956, and the 
last to collapse, in 1984. When SCOA's Avion began operations it 
took over the parent company’s old trading post buildings (closed 
in 1955), in many instances using the same personnel as well.10 
Undoubtedly, as the existance of buildings in many towns helped
to keep costs down,11 so too did the availability of at least 
partially trained staff. These were probably major factors in 
determing the initial rapid growth. SCOA instituted a number of
changes during the following years but eventually closed the
chain in 1984.12 Stores were run by managers or g era n ts  and
5 D.Bollinger, Le marketing en Afrique. tome 1: la Cote d'Ivoire (CEDA, 
Abidjan, 1977), p. 130; A-L.Bonnefonds, 'La transformation du commerce de 
traite en Cote d'Ivoire depuis la dernier guerre mondiale et l'independance', 
Cahiers d'Outre Mer. 21, 84 (Bordeux, 1968), p.403.
6 Hollander and Omura, 'Chain', p.307; Bullock, 'Tea', pp.65-67.
7 J.B.Jefferys and D.Knee, Retailing in Europe (Macmillan, 1962), p.53.
8 Ib id . pp.54-55.
9 Ibid . p.52; Bullock, 'Tea', pp.65-66.
10 Ibid. p.403; Bollinger, M arketing , p. 130.
11 Bollinger, M ark etin g , p. 130.
12 R.E.Grupp, 'Transposition en Afrique noire de methodes comm erciales 
modernes: l'entreprise succursaliste "Chaine Avion" en Cote d'Ivoire.' In 
Laboratoires 'Connaissance du tiers monde', Entreprises et entrepreneurs
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were owned and supplied by the company, and this was also true 
of the Chaine Elephant chain which was owned by Commerce 
Africain, another long established trading company.13 Elephant 
was closed in 1969 when Commerce Africain was taken over by 
Peyrissac.14
SCOA, along with the state, also had an interest in the Societe 
ivoirienne de distribution economique (SIDECO) which was a 
voluntary chain (stores owned by the traders).15 SIDECO had three 
main components, two active and one passive. The passive one 
was the state which held 46.33% of SIDECO's capital but did not 
have any say in the running of the organisation.16 The state's role
was thus limited to a supportive one in that it helped to finance
the in itiative.17 Much of the finance came from the managing
company UNACI18 which held 23.67% of the capital.19 SCOA, the 
other active component of the group, purchased the goods on 
behalf of SIDECO.20 This voluntary chain declined fairly rapidly in 
the late 1960s for reasons not entirely clear. Boone stated that its 
problems "appear to have been in part because of conflicts with 
its suppliers"21 while IDET-CEGOS stated ”il ne lui a pas ete
possible de faire respecter aux affilies le minimum de discipline
en Afrique xix et xx siecles: tome 2 (L’Harmattan, Paris, 1983), pp.353-367; 
E.Assidon, Le commerce captif (L'Harmattan, Paris, 1987), p . l l l .
13 Bonnefonds, 'Traite', pp.403-404; ANCI, 1457/X-54-14: Fiches de 
R enseignem ent (1936).
14 Chaine Elephant is in fact only discussed briefly in Bonnefonds, 'Traite', 
p.404, and mentioned in just one sentence in IDET-CEGOS, 'Elements d'une 
politique de distribution' (Docum ents internes travaux preparatoires aux 
plan 1971-75, 1968), p.6; A.Diambra-Hauhouot, 'Le commerce de detail dans 
l'agglomeration d'Abidjan' (IGT, Universite d'Abidjan), p.6.
15 IDET-CEGOS, 'La distribution en Cote d'Ivoire', (Ministere du Plan,
Abidjan, n.d. circa 1963), pp.60-68.
16 J.Dutheil de la Rochere, L'etat et le developpement economique de la Cote 
d'Ivoire. (Pedone, Paris, 1976), p.369.
17 Bonnefonds, 'Traite', p.401.
18 Assidon, C a p tif . p. 108. The meaning o f this acronym is not given but, at a 
guess, it probably stands for Union National des Actionnaires de Cote  
d'Ivo i re .
19 Calculated from Assidon, C ap tif. p. 108 and Dutheil de la Rochere, E tat. 
p.369.
20 IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution', p.66; Assidon, Captif. p. 108.
21 Boone, 'Commerce', p.76.
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necessaire au bon fonctionnement d'un groupement d'achats."22 
Consequently, SIDECO had switched to concentrating on being an 
importer and wholesaler by 1968.23 Much the same reason led to 
the demise of the other voluntary chain by 1969, the Systeme 
d'Achat et de Vente Economique (SAVE), a co-operative founded 
in I96024 and supplied by yet another long established trading 
company, the Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrique Occidentale 
(CFAO).25
Finally, the state initiative, the Programme d’Action Commerciale 
(PAC), was started in 1970 with the aim of increasing the number 
of Ivorians in trad e .26 It arose directly  out of the 
recommendations by the French research company IDET-CEGOS in 
preparatory documents for the 1971-75 five year plan.27 Chaine 
PAC was a voluntary chain with stores held by the trader on a 
franchise basis until paid for.28 Its members drew neither salary 
nor commission, thus operating financially like any other 
independent trader.29 The projected target of 800 stores by the 
end of 1975 was never reached30 and by 1980 the state was no 
longer prepared to absorb the financial losses the initiative 
incurred .31
22 IDET-CEGOS, ’Elements', p.4.
23 Ibid.
24 B.Campbell, ‘The Social, Political, and Economic Consequences o f French 
Private Investment in the Ivory Coast’ (Ph.D., University o f Susex,
Brighton, 1973), p .318.
25 Ibid, p.3; Bonnefonds, ’Traite', p.405; Boone, 'Commerce', p.78. The date o f
SAVE’s final demise is not given in any o f these sources but it was not 1960
as stated by Grupp, 'Avion', p.358.
26 RCI, 'Le Programme d'Action Commerciale', (Ministfcre de l'Economie et
des Finances, Abidjan, n.d. circa 1971), p.2.
27 IDET-CEGOS, 'Elements'; Dutheil de la Rochere, Etat. p.369; G.Delaporte, 'La 
politique fruitiere et legumifcre de la Cote d'Ivoire', M arches T ropicaux. 1639 
(8 avril 1977).
28 Bollinger, M arketing, p. 134.
29 RCI, 'Action', p.8.
30 Ibid, p. 12 ; Bollinger, M arketing , p. 135 ; RCI, La Cote d'Ivoire en chiffres 
1980-81 .
31 Grupp, 'Avion', p.355.
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TABLE 13: NUMBER OF SMALL RETAIL CHAIN AND GROCERY CHAIN STORES
YEAR SCOA ELEPHANT SAVE SIDECO PAC JAG SACI
1 9 5 7 (9 0 )
1 9 6 3 (1 1 7 ) (50) +
1 9 6 4 (8 9 ) 99*
19 6 5 150* (3 0 ) 96*
1 9 6 6 (1 0 0 )
1 9 6 7 159* (4 8 )
1 9 6 8 162* (30) +/- 40* +/- [15]
1 9 6 9 (2 2 )
1 9 7 0 (139) [321 (1 7 )
1971 (67) [161
1 9 7 2 183* (1 9 3 )
1 9 7 3 (134) [601 (2 3 2 ) [7]
1 9 7 4 [821
1 9 7 6 (141) [66] (241) [77] [15]
1 9 7 8 (2 5 0 )
1 9 8 0 (132) [95] (1 9 5 )
1 9 8 2 200*
1 9 8 5 144* [5] +/-
1 9 8 7 (105) +/-
1 9 9 0 [101
KEY: ( ) = Small retail only, [ ] = Grocery only, * = both, +/- = circa, + = at least. 
Sources: E.Assidon, Le commerce captif (L’Harmattan, Paris, 1987), p .96; R.E.Grupp, 
Transposition en Afrique noire de methodes commerciales modernes: l'entrepise 
succursaliste "Chaine Avion" en Cote d'Ivoire’. In Laboratoires "Connaissance du tiers 
monde", Entrepises et entrepreneurs en Afrique xix et xx siecles. tome 2 
(L'Harmattan, Paris, 1983), p .354; D. Bollinger, Le marketing en Afrique. tome 1: La 
Cote d'Ivoire (NEA, Abidjan, 1977), pp. 130, 133-134; IDET-CEGOS, 'Elements d'un 
politique de distribution’ (Documents internes au travaux preratoires aux plan 1971- 
75, Abidjan, 1968), p.2; A.L.Bonnefonds, 'La transformation du commerce de traite en 
Cote d'Ivoire depuis la derniere guerre mondiale et l'independance', Cahiers d'Outre 
M er. 21, 84 (1968), pp.400-405; C.Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'L’impact des interets 
coloniaux SCOA et CFAO dans l’ouest africain', Journal of African History. 16, 4 
(1975), p .6 17; SEDES, 'Region de sud-est: 6tude socio-economique' (Ministere du Plan, 
Abidjan, 1967); IDET-CEGOS, 'La distribution en Cote d'Ivoire' (Ministfcre du Plan, 
Abidjan, n.d., circa 1963), p.67.
With the exception of Elephant and SAVE, the small retail chains 
also operated grocery or mini-supermarket stores which targeted 
African customers in the middle to upper income groups in the 
main urban centres (see Table 13). These outlets were run along 
the same principles as the smaller stores except that they stocked
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more items and had facilities for frozen foods.32 In the case of 
PAC, the large grocery stores or superettes only were run directly 
from headquaters.33 In 1973, the three Cocody outlets accounted 
for ten percent of the total turnover of the entire PAC group.34 In 
addition to the aforementioned groups, two other companies also 
operated grocery chains. Etablissements Jean Abile-Gale (JAG), 
whose principal activity was coffee processing, sold its SAMA 
outlets to PAC in 1976.35 Societe Africain de Commerce et 
d'Industrie (SACI), which stocked more goods than the others,36 
gradually declined until declaring bankruptcy in 1990.37
With the demise of Avion, SCOA launched a small chain of grocery 
stores called Jok in 1983.38 These were bigger than the Avion 
grocery stores and, according to a report in African Business, "the 
creation of neighbourhood superettes . . . .met with unanticipated 
success in Ivory Coast."39 The Jok stores were easily recognised 
by their bright exteriors40 and in January 1985 had a combined 
turnover of 25 million CFA per month.41 Nonetheless, they were 
supplanted by the min-Score a few years later which took over 
some of the old Jok buildings.42 They were closed when SCOA 
ceased all retailing operations in Ivory Coast in 1991.43
32 A.Maurel, 'Les societes de distribution alimentaire en Cote d’Ivoire’, 
A f r i c a [now Africa International!. 68, (1974), p.43.
33 RCI, Cote d'Ivoire: vingt ans. (Fraternit6-Hebdo, Abidjan, 1980). Figure 
includes l ibre service  stores but not s u p e r e t t e s .
34 Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p.43.
35 Bollinger, M arketing , p. 135.
36 Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p.41.
37 DSA: internal report, J.Ayirebi, 'Survey o f Distribution Outlets, Abidjan' 
(1983); Interview: Mr. Frederick Attoh, DANAFCO General Manager 
(Abidjan, September 1990).
38 Personal experience: observation. All dates for personal experience are 
for all o f  the periods 1983-85 and 1986 unless otherwise indicated.
39 H.French, 'SCOA Aims for Renewed Profits', African B usiness. 72 (August 
1984).
40 Personal experience: observation.
41 DSA: handwritten list o f JOK outlets (1985).
42 Fieldwork: discussion with Mme R.Theze, Charges des Supermarches at 
DANAFCO, previously at Abinader. All dates for fieldwork are for all o f  the 
period July-December 1990 unless otherwise indicated.
43 WAHA: telex sent to Wander, Berne (Febuary 1992).
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Of the WSE retail stores, independent grocery outlets are the least 
easily embraced by the above definition but nonetheless are 
clearly within the parameters. In the 1950s to the early 1960s 
most were probably French owned but the numbers are unclear. 
In 1962 there were around 250 French owned establishments but 
this figure appears to include specialist stores, wholesalers, timber 
merchants, repair shops and gas stations amongst others.44 By the 
early 1970s most independent grocery stores were probably 
Lebanese owned45 but again there are no figures. By the mid 
1980s their dominance, especially in the interior, was very
apparent though some in Abidjan were owned by Ivorians, mainly 
Baoule and Agni in Yopougon, Treichville, Marcory, the Zones and 
Cocody-Riviera-Blokoso. Each town in the interior with a 
population over 10,000 had between one and four independent 
grocery stores around this time. It would be possible to estimate 
the number of independent grocery stores at around 130 in
Abidjan and 140 in the interior for the period 1984-85.46 Many 
have existed in the same location for ten or more years and
continued to do so in 1990, by which time they constituted easily 
the majority of all grocery stores.47
The final type of WSE retail stores are supermarkets. Ever since 
the appearance of Printania in Ivory Coast in 1956,4 8 
supermarkets have opened with surprising regularity even into
44 SEDES, 'Region du sud-est: etude socio-economique' (Ministere du Plan, 
Abidjan, 1967); SEDES, 'Region de Korhogo. Etude de developpement socio- 
economique.’ (Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, 1965); SEC-OBM, 'Region de Daloa- 
Gagnoa. Etude socio-economique' (Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, n.d. circa 
1964); BCCEER, 'Etude regional de Bouake (fevrier 1962 - decembre 1963)'
(Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, 1965); IDET-CEGOS, 'Region Odienne - Seguela'
(Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, 1968); BDPA, 'Etude general de la rdgion de
Man’ (Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, 1978).
45 Interview: Mr. Bernadin Doh Gilles, Salesman at Blohorn and DANAFCO  
(Abidjan, 2nd. interview, October 2 1990).
46 DSA: internal reports, L.Bosteen, 'Survey o f Distribution Outlets and 
Ethnic/National Groups, Abidjan Town' and 'Survey o f  Distribution Outlets 
and Ethnic/National Groups, Bush Sector o f  Abidjan' (both 1985): internal 
reports, J.S.Ayirebi, 'Survey o f Distribution Outlets, Bouake' (March 1984) 
and 'Abidjan'; Personal experience: 1 visited most o f these towns.
47 Personal experience: discussions with Lebanese traders; Fieldwork: 
observation: discussions with Lebanese traders.
48 CCC1, Bulletin Mensuel. 6,(1973), p.93.
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the recession hit 1980s. Details of the various stores are given in 
Table 14 below.
TABLE 14: SUPERMARKETS IN IVORY COAST
SUPERMARKET
CONTROLLING
GROUP ORIGIN
YEARS
EXISTED
SIZE
(m 2) LOCATION
P r in ta n ia SCOA F r e n c h 1956-75 ? P la tea u
Score 1 SCOA F r e n c h 1969-91 2000 P la tea u
Score 2 SCOA F r e n c h 1979 1,100 2 Plateaux
Score Riviera SCOA F r e n c h 1981-91 550 R iv ie r a
Score Koumassi SCOA F r e n c h 1987-91 1,200 K oum assi
M on op rix L a fa y ette F r e n c h 19637-83 1,188 P la tea u
M on op rix L a fa y ette F r e n c h 7-1989? B ouake
Froid Industriel Froid
In d u str ie l
F r e n c h 7-1983 680 P la tea u
Froid Industriel Froid
In d u str ie l
F r e n c h 1967-76 Cocody
Froid Industriel Froid
In d u str ie l
F r e n c h 1969-7 K oum assi
Trade Center Trade Center L e b a n ese since 1982 600 P la tea u
Froid Industriel Trade Center L e b a n ese since 1983 680 P la tea u
A u torou te Trade Center L e b a n ese since 1986? 1,000 Zone 4
SM Marcory Trade Center L e b a n ese since 1986? M arcory
Nour A1 Hayat PROSUMA P a k ista n i since 1967 800 P la tea u
C h am p ion PROSUMA P a k ista n i since 1985 600 Cocody
Super Hayat PROSUMA P a k ista n i since 1987 1,100 Zone 4
Azar & Salame L e b a n ese since 7 365 P la tea u
Super PAC PAC I v o r ia n 19757-80? 500 Cocody
P r im a SODICO-CI v a r io u s 1990-91 2,500 Zone 4
J u lie n SODICO-CI v a r io u s 19907-91? 2 Plateaux
SM Koumassi L e b a n ese 7-1987 1,200 K oum assi
Sources: CCCI, B ulletin  M ensuel. 6 (juin 1973), p.93; A.Maurel, 'Les soci£t£s de 
distribution alimentaire en Cote d’Ivoire', A fr ic a  [now A frica  In tern ation a l!. 68 
(1974), pp.43-45; Interview: Mr.Anthony, Score General Manager (Novem ber 1990): 
P.Paoli, Champion Supermarket Manager (November 1990); Assidon, C aptif. pp.72, 102; 
WAHA: telex to Wander, Berne (Febuary 1992); IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution'; Bollinger, 
M ark etin g , pp. 135-136; Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: discussion with 
Frederick Attoh, DANAFCO General Manager, (1990): observation; RCI, Repertoire des 
industries et activites de Cote d'Ivoire 1985-86 (M inistere du Plan, Abidjan, 1986); 
EIU, Cote d'Ivoire Country Report (N o .l, 1990), pp.28-29.
The principal location of supermarkets has been Abidjan ever 
since 1956 as this was where the vast majority of high income 
consumers lived. Specifically, most of them have been on the 
Plateau which is the central business district. Only in the late 
1970s did the pattern begin to change with many locating in new,
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less crowded, areas: the largely industrial but also residential Zone 
4, Cocody and Deux Plateau where many of the Ivorian elite and 
embassy staff lived and Marcory, sections of which were occupied 
by Europeans and high income Africans.49
Table 14 shows that two groups dominated the supermarket 
sector by the end of 1991, Societe de Promotion de Supermarche 
(PROSUMA) and Trade Center. These have supplanted the Score 
and Froid Industriel groups as the principal owners of 
supermarkets. The Trade Center group, established in 1982 with 
100% Lebanese cap ita l,50 has been the most ambitious and 
arguably the most successful of the supermarket groups in the 
1980s, buying out Froid Industriel in 1983 and converting the 
Bijani Freres grocery stores into supermarkets.51 PROSUMA, in 
addition to its three Abidjan supermarkets, also owned a grocery 
outlet in Bingerville.52 The Prima store, rather grandly referred to 
as a hypermarket, was the last entrant into the supermarket 
stakes. At 2,500 m2, it was the largest retail outlet in West Africa 
and opened in Febuary 1990 with the aim of promoting African 
p ro d u c ts .53 Despite this, a substantial quantity of the goods were 
of US origin (and often with the date expired) and the proportion 
of African goods appeared to be no higher than in any other 
superm arke t.5 4
The final type of WSE traders are wholesalers, most of which were 
chains at either national or, less commonly, regional level. The 
origins of wholesale chains can be seen to stem from the factories 
and stores of the large trading companies. Mueller and Garoian 
noted that the general store in the US "embodied many of the
49 Interview: Mr. P.Paoli, Manager o f the Champion Supermarket (Abidjan, 
November 1990); Bollinger, M arketing , pp. 135-136; Maurel, ’Alim entaire1, 
pp.43-45; SCIMPEX, M.Esmail, 'Rapport de la commission 9 "Grandes 
Surfaces" ’ (May 28 1985); SCIMPEX, 'Commission grandes surfaces et 
superettes: reunion du 3-5-85'; Fieldwork: observation.
50 RCI, Repertoire des industries et activites de Cote d'Ivoire 1985-86 
(Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, 1986).
51 Personal experience: discussion with Theze; Fieldwork: discussion with 
Theze (December 1990).
52 Fieldwork: discussion with Theze.
53 EIU, Cote d'Ivoire Country Report (N o .l, 1990), pp.28-29.
54 Fieldwork: observation.
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traditions of the trading posts from which it evolved",55 the same 
path of evolution as Ivory Coast. Like the trading posts, general 
stores in the US and wholesale chains in Ivory Coast provided 
customer credit and service from a sales assistant as goods were 
generally behind the counter.56 Table 15 below shows the 
principal companies which operated wholesale chains in the Ivory 
Coast interior as well as Abidjan.
TABLE 15: PRINCIPAL WHOLESALE CHAINS IN IVORY COAST
CHAIN CONTROLLING
GROUP
AREA OF 
OPERATION
DETAILS
GF
OUTLETS
YEARS IN 
EXISTANCE
% TURNOVER 
IN FOOD
SIDECO SCOA (1979: 
62% )
n a tio n a l 15 (1973) 19617-83 65% (1973)
G en era l
Im p o rt
CFAO n a tio n a l 15 (1973) t i l  e n d  
1980s
70% (1973)
SACI SACI n a tio n a l 16 (1973) 7-1990 80% (1973)
CFCI U n ile v e r n a tio n a l 22 (1985)a 7-1991a 60% (1985)a
SOOOCE SOCOCE c e n tr e
w est
6 (1990) 1967-
CNCI CNCI n o r th 10+ (1990) 1926- 30-35%
(1990)h
IVODIS U n ile v e r ,
SCOA
n a tio n a l 1986-91 20-25%
(1 9 9 0 )c
a: Interior general merchandise stores only, 
b: processed foods only, 
c: estimate based on Korhogo store.
Sources: Assidon, C a p tif. p.70; Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p.45; RCI, Repertoire 1985-86: 
Fieldwork: observation: discussions with Attoh, CNCI manager and IVODIS manager, 
Korhogo (November 1990): questionnaires (1990); DSA: unknown author, 'Entretien 
avec le Directeur General et le Directeur Commercial de la Societe CFCI ce matin a nos 
bureaux' (n.d., circa 1984); WAHA, telex to Wander.
Surprisingly little has been written about company-owned 
wholesale and semi-wholesale outlets for virtually the entire 
period under study and their numbers are thus difficult to 
establish. The situation is further complicated by the failure of the 
sources to distinguish between food and non-food stores and thus 
the precise activities of Compagnie Francaise de la Cote d'Ivoire
55 W.F.Mueller and L.Garoian, Change in the Market Structure o f Grocery 
R e ta ilin g . (University o f W isconsin Press, Madison, 1961), p .11.
56 Ib id : Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation: 
discussion with IVODIS manager in Korhogo (November 1990).
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(CFCI), CFAO and SACI in the 1960s are something of a mystery.57 
However, it is evident that at least one of the three had a store 
which wholesaled processed foods in each of the major towns in 
the 1960s.58 It may thus be reasonably assumed that they, along 
with the Lebanese, were the principal suppliers of processed foods 
to independent traders and thus performed an important function 
during the 1960s.
From the information available, it would appear that the European 
trading companies withdrew virtually all of their trading posts in 
the period immediately following independence but that some 
companies returned, in different forms, fairly soon after. Of the 
three main colonial companies (CFAO, CFCI and SCOA), CFCI 
appears to have been the most resistant to a complete withdrawal. 
Most of the sources stated that this company retained wholesale 
and semi-wholesale outlets in most regions.59
CFAO and SCOA, on the other hand, adopted different strategies 
from CFCI and each other. SCOA appears to have closed all of its 
trading posts60 and opted, as illustrated above, for retailing 
through multiple chain stores. It also set up the wholesale group 
Ivoirienne de distribution et d'exportation (IDEX) but it appears 
not to have had many outlets.61 CFAO also closed all of its trading 
posts but instituted the SAVE initiative62 as well as the import 
and wholesale company General Import.63
In addition to the above three companies, there remained a 
number of smaller enterprises with wholesale and semi-wholesale 
stores, most of them located in Abidjan. In 1963 at least one of
57 Both IDET-CEGOS, 'Elements' and Bonnefonds, 'Traite' fail to even mention 
these com panies.
58 SEDES, 'Sud-est'; SEC-OBM, 'Daloa-Gagnoa'; SEDES, 'Korhogo'; BDPA, 'Man'; 
IDET-CEGOS, 'Odienne-Seguela'; BDPA, 'Etude de la region d'Odienne- 
Boundiali' (Ministdre du Plan, Abidjan, n.d. circa 1963). See also Campbell, 
‘Investm ent’, p .319.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid; Assidon, Cap tif . pp.69-72.
61 Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p.45.
62 Assidon, C aptif. p.70.
63 Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p.45.
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the commercial houses had wholesale stores or depots in the 
following towns: Dabou, Lahou, Tabou, Sassandra, Bingerville, 
Bassam, Alepe, Aboisso, Adiake, Agboville, Adzope, Abengourou, 
A gnib ilekro , Bondoukou, Bouna, B ongouanou, Bokanda, 
M'Bahiakro, Dabakala, Katiola, Ferkessedougou, Bouake, Dimbokro, 
Toumodi, Tiassale, Divo, Lakota, Gagnoa, Soubre, Oume, 
Yamoussoukro, Sinfra, Issia, Guiglo, Duekoue, Toulepleu, Daloa, 
Bouafle, Tiebessou, Beoumi, Zuenoula, Vavoua, Man, Danane, 
Seguela, Mankono, Korhogo and Odienne.64 The ten largest 
com panies in 1966-67 owned 135 such stores and 70 
w areh o u ses65 whilst in 1972-73 the seven largest companies had 
104 wholesale and semi-wholesale outlets. However, some of 
these did not deal in processed foods.66
As far as the northern-based companies are concerned, these have 
also been ignored by most of the sources. Due to the fact that the 
sources on the north were based on information gathered no later 
than 1963,67 the fate of all but one of these companies is not 
known. Only Commercial du Nord de Cote d'Ivoire (CNCI) still 
existed in 1990 as a supplier of processed foods to local traders68 
and it can only be assumed that the others gradually disappeared, 
failing to see out the 1960s and reach the boom years of the 
1970s when their closure would have been more unlikely.
For the 1970s in the interior, one is thus left with the following 
wholesalers of processed foods in the WSE sector: CFCI, SACI, CNCI, 
General Import, IDEX, Societe Commerciale de Centre Ouest 
(SOCOCE) and SIDECO. These were later joined by Ivoirien de 
distribution (IVODIS) gros (gros meaning wholesale). To this list 
must be added perhaps a dozen other names, the majority of 
which probably had no establishments outside Abidjan. All, except 
possibly SIDECO, operated in much the same way. They were
64 IDET-CEGOS, ’Distribution'.
65 L.Fabiani, 'Circuits de distribution en Cote d'Ivoire', (Memoire d'entree, 
Centre des Hautes Etudes de l'Afrique et de l’Asie Modernes, Paris, 1967).
66 CCCI, Bulletin. 6, p.92.
67 IDET-CEGOS, 'Odienne-Seguela'; SEDES, 'Korhogo'; BDPA, 'Odienne- 
B ou n d ia li'.
68 Fieldwork: discussions with CNCI staff (November 1990); Interview: CNCI 
Director (Korhogo, November 20 1990).
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centrally controlled with managers in each of the stores. Prices, 
goods stocked, frequency of deliveries to the stores, and even 
opening hours were uniform and determined by the head office in 
Abidjan which was also where their central depots were. None of 
the companies mentioned were involved in the promotion of the 
products they sold.69
TABLE 16: LOCATION OF CFCI STORES IN 1982, 1985 AND 1989, AND TURNOVER 
IN 1985.
LOCATION STORES STORES TURNOVER
1982 1985
A b en g o u r o u 1 1 la r g e
A g n ib ile k r o 1 1 sm a ll
B ondoukou 1 1 1 a rg e
B o n g o u a n o u 1 1 m ed iu m
B ou ake 1 1 very large
B o u n d ia li 0 1 m ed iu m
D abakala 0
D aloa 1 1 la r g e
D a n a n e 1 1 1 a rg e
D aoukro 0 1 la r g e
D im bokro 1 1 la r g e
D ivo 1 1 la r g e
D u ek ou e 1 1 la r g e
F erk essed o u g o u 0 1 m ed iu m
G agnoa 1 1 1 a rg e
I s s ia 0
K o rh ogo 1 1 la r g e
M an 1 1 very large
O d ien n e 1 1 sm a ll
San Pedro 0 1 la r g e
S e g u e la 1 1 1 a rg e
S o u b re 0 1 sm a ll
Toum odi 1 1 sm a ll
Y am ou ssou k ro 1 1 m ed ium
STORES
989
Sources: DSA: 'Entretien CFCI'; RCI, Annuaire officiel des abonnes au te le phone 1990 
(C ote d ’Ivoire) (O ffice National des T elecom m unications, Abidjan, 1990); RCI, 
R e pertoire 1982-83 .
Of the three big trading companies in Ivory Coast during the 
colonial years, CFCI evolved into the most com prehensive
69 IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution', pp.16-41; Bollinger, M arketing, pp .129-130; 
Maurel, 'Alimentaure', p.45; CCCI, B u lletin . 6, p.92; Fabiani, 'Circuits'; 
Interview: Mr. Kobenan, Director o f SCIMPEX (Abidjan, December 10 1990): 
Mr. Claude Assouan, Directeur d'Achats at CDCI (Abidjan, December 4 1990); 
DSA: memo, 'Entretien avec le Directeur G6neral et le Directeur Commercial 
de la Societe CFCI ce matin a nos bureaux' (n.d., circa 1984).
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wholesaler. The company possessed three main branches, these 
being textiles, construction materials and general merchandise.70 
Only 17% of CFCI's total 1973 turnover was in food products.71 
The locations of its general merchandise stores in 1982, 1985 and 
1989 are given in the table above.
In Bondoukou in 1971 only 35% of general merchandise store 
turnover was in food (plus another 17% in drinks).72 In 1985 60% 
of CFCI sales were in food and drinks. In 1985 there were 22 of 
these wholesale stores in the interior. Four of the stores were 
designated entrepots centraux , these being in Abidjan, Gagnoa, 
Bouake and Abengourou.73 The following two sections examine 
the successes and failures of these and other chain stores.
4.2 STRENGTHS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF CHAIN STORES
Chain stores had, in theory at least, six main strengths and 
achievements. Probably the most noticeable to the average 
Ivorian was that the small retail chains brought a wide range of 
goods within physical reach of a large number of consumers. Most 
of the retail chains had stores located in villages as well as towns 
throughout the country. Thus, for the first time, rural consumers 
especially were presented with a wide choice of merchandise 
without having to travel long distances. Table 17 gives some idea 
of how widespread the Avion and PAC stores were. The former 
brought many goods within reach of a large number of consumers 
through its stores located in villages and, until at least the mid 
1960s, through its 'lorry shops' which travelled around the small 
villages.74
70 Fieldwork: observation.
71 IMd.
77 SIGES, 'Etude regional e de la sous-prefeclure de Bondoukou' (M inistere 
du Plan, Abidjan, 1971). Bondoukou is now a prefecture.
73 DSA: memo, 'CFCI.
74 Bollinger, M arketing, pp .133-134; IDET-CEGOS, 'Odienne-Seguela'.
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TABLE 17: LOCATION OF PAC AND AVION STORES BY REGION IN OCTOBER 1976.
REGION PAC AVION % OF POP 
IN REGION
% OF 
STORES
ABIDJAN 61 5 6 14 2 6
NORTH 1 7 17 (Korhogo 3) 1 2 7 .5
WEST 19 (Man 5) 15 (Man 3) 1 1 7 .5
CENTRE WEST 30 (Daloa 4, Gagnoa 4) 25 (Daloa 3, Gagnoa 4) 19 12. 5
SOUTH WEST 13 (San Pedro 4) 15 (San Pedro 5) 4 6 .5
CENTRE 37 (Bouake 15) 19 (Bouake 8) 2 0 12. 5
EAST 16 (Abengourou 3) 1 1 7 6
SOUTH EAST 48 (Bassam 3) 49 (Bassam 3, Dabou 3) 13 2 1 . 5
TOTALS 241 2 0 7 10 0 1 0 0
Sources: Bollinger, M a r k e t i n g,, pp.133-134; RCI, Population de la Cote d'Ivoire 1975. 
(Ministere de l'Economie, Abidjan, 1975), pp.52-57.
The range of goods these stores stocked was also impressive. The 
number of items sold in each Avion increased gradually over the 
years from 700 items in around 196375 to between 1,500 and 
1,800 around 1969 of which half were described as 
alimentation.16 The range of products SIDECO stocked was similar 
to Avion with 60% to 70% of turnover coming from sales of flour, 
salt, sugar, milk, wine, corrugated metal, cement, cooking oil, soap 
and beer.77 PAC stocked some 450 lines at the beginning,78 800 in 
1971,79 1,300 in 1973, and 2,000 by 1976.80 The range of goods 
was the same in all outlets of the same size and was aimed at 
satisfying "les besoins essentiels des consommateurs ivoiriens".81
The second important achievement was the introduction of 
uniform prices throughout the country. If other retailers and 
wholesalers were to compete, they had to match chain store 
prices. Some 90% of goods sold by Avion and others had the same 
public retail price as those sold in Abidjan despite Avion's 
transport costs amounting to 4.5% of turnover in the early
75 SEDES, ’Sud-est'.
76 Diambra-Hauhouot, ’Agglomeration', p .6.
77 IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution1, p.67.
78 CCCI, B u lletin . 4 (avril 1972).
79 RCI, 'Action', p.10.
80 CCCI B u lletin . 6 (juin 1973), p.93.
81 RCI, 'Action', p. 10.
158
1 9 7 0 s .82 Thus consumers in Odienne in the far north paid the 
same for a pack of biscuits as did those in Abidjan.
The third achievement was to introduce new Ivorian traders to 
bookkeeping and other forms of technical assistance and training 
as well as publicity and promotion. Training lasted six months in 
Avion's own school at the end of which prospective traders had to 
pass an exam and serve an apprenticeship.83 PAC's Ecole de 
Commerce provided training for promoters, people new to trade, 
traders already owning a store, and salesmen, cashiers and 
warehouse keepers. Tuition was free upon acceptance for a course. 
Acceptance was conditional on Ivorian nationality, aged 21 to 35 
and varying academic qualifications depending on the course.84 
Similarly, many Ivorians would have benefitted over the years 
from working in the wholesale chain stores.
SAVE traders received technical assistance from CFAO as well as 
money for investing in the enterprise (e.g. to help them finance 
purchases of goods)85 whilst SCOA provided free technical 
assistance to traders who were members of SIDECO.86 SCOA was 
also obliged to train four Ivorian SIDECO directors for three years. 
For the first 18 months, the four European managers directly ran 
operations with the Ivorians as observers whilst for the remaining 
period the Ivorians were responsible but could call on the 
Europeans for assistance at any time.87 Finance was provided to 
traders who wished to join SIDECO to transform their stores into a 
more organised and 'presentable' (i.e. western looking) form.88 
They were also encouraged to have an accountant or
82 Ibid; SEDES, 'Sud-est'; Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p.41; IDET-CEGOS, 
'Distribution', p .67.
83 Interview: Mr. Nestor Kouassi Kouakou, former Chaine Avion Manager 
(Abidjan, August 20 and 21 1990); Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p.41; Bollinger, 
M arketing , p. 131; Grupp, 'Avion', p.360.
84 RCI, 'Action', p.6; Dutheil de la Rochere, Etat. p.371.
85 Bonnefonds, 'Traite', p.405; Assidon, Captif. p.70.
86 Fabiani, 'Circuits'; Bonnefonds, 'Traite', p.400.
87 Bonnefonds, 'Traite', p.400.
88 Ib id . p.67.
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b o o k k e e p e r89 and/or to compile sales statistics every month.90 
PAC traders were supervised by 17 assistants in 1971, each one 
responsible for between five and eight outlets. Each store was 
visted twice weekly during which accounts were checked, 
information from central office conveyed and any other necessary 
assistance rendered.91 Traders were also encouraged (or it may 
have been compulsory) to have bank accounts.92 For Avion 
regional inspectors were charged with monitoring and assisting 
the store operators. They were answerable to the two or three 
heads of sector who were retail experts from France. They in turn 
were answerable to and advised the senior management which 
determined such policies as range of products stocked and 
expenditure on technical assistance.93
Whilst Avion and PAC no longer exist as chains, many of the 
better located stores survived under independent management 
for ten or more years, despite declining incomes throughout this 
p e r io d .94 How much this is due to the training they received as 
against their own individual skills and commercial instincts is 
impossible to measure but the fact that many continued to keep 
books might indicate that they at least found some aspects of it 
useful.
Efforts at promoting SIDECO products through in-store publicity 
were also made with promoters visiting different regions in 
tu rn .95 PAC distributed 5,000 signs with the group's logo and all 
stores had a roughly similar exterior. In addition, the government 
newspaper Fraternite Matin carried an item saying "Am service du 
consommateur " every Monday and traders could participate in a 
weekly radio programme "A I'heure du consommateur ".96 This 
effectively gave them free publicity. Avion was also active in the
89 Fabiani, 'Circuits'.
90 IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution', p.67.
91 Ibid.
92 Bollinger, M arketing, p. 134.
93 Interview: Kouakou; Bonnefonds, 'Traite', p.403; Fabiani, 'Circuits'.
94 Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation: d iscussions 
with former PAC and Avion traders.
95 IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution', p.67.
96 CCCI, B u lle t in . 4.
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promotion of the goods it sold. A Chain Avion magazine was 
published six times a year and was available free to clients, 95% 
of whom were Africans. It contained advertisements for products 
and educational and other articles as well as com petitions.9 7 
Wholesale chains, on the other hand, do not seem to have ever 
advertised the products they sold as there is no mention of them 
having done so in any of the sources consulted for the thesis. CFCI 
confirmed this impression in 1990 when a senior director stated 
the company regarded publicity as the manufacturer’s concern.98
The fourth achievement of the chain stores was that they 
provided a network of outlets for Ivorian manufacturers as well 
as imported produce. For Avion grocery and small retail chain 
stores the origin of the goods even in 1963 was, in terms of value 
in turnover, split evenly between imported and local.99 Other 
chain stores such as SACI and CDCI also bought goods from local 
m a n u f a c tu r e r s 100 but larger stores tended to stock a higher 
proportion of imported items.101
The fifth achievement of WSE chain store companies was the 
employment of Ivorians in trade though, in practice, it would have 
been politically inadvisable for private companies to do otherwise 
for most positions. Each of the Avion retail store managers had to 
be an Ivorian national.102 However, despite the nationality 
requirement, it appears that there were non-Ivorian managers. In 
1970 for example, 25 of the 160 gerants  were non-Ivorian and 
by around 1973 6% still did not meet the company’s nationality 
c r i t e r i a .103 There is no available explanation for this rather 
strange departure from policy, the least implausible possibility 
being that they had been employees in the old trading posts. For 
PAC, increasing Ivorian participation in trade was the primary
97 Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p .39; Grupp, 'Avion', p.359.
98 Interview: Assouan.
99 SEDES, 'Sud-est'.
100 Fieldwork: discussion with SACI store manager, Plateau (1990); 
Interview: CNCI Director: Assouan.
101 Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p.43.
102 Bollinger, M arketing, p. 131.
103 Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p.41.
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objective and there is no indication that the group ever departed 
from this policy regarding using Ivorians as store managers.104
Finally, the main strength which chain companies had was that, 
because the stores were supplied from a single buying house, bulk 
buying meant cheaper prices from suppliers and thus bigger 
m a rg in s .105 Or at least that was the theory. In practice, the retail 
store owners probably saw little or none of the extra margin. 
Some stores in the SAVE chain purchased goods cheaper from 
other wholesalers than CFAO, the company which was supposed to 
be buying in bulk at low prices on their behalf.106 In short, one 
might say that voluntary chain traders were exploited by CFAO. 
The margins in the Avion stores on products varied from 18% to 
22% which probably meant that whilst the stores were getting 
goods cheaper than they could have done from another 
wholesaler, SCOA was taking a larger than normal cut given that 
there was no wholesale intermediary and that SCOA purchased 
the goods in bulk through its buying houses.107 PAC margins were 
even less, up from just 12% in 1971 to 16.24% later in the same 
y e a r.108 There is unfortunately no information on the margin that 
the wholesale companies made but they would also have 
benefitted from buying in bulk. Their head offices took charge of 
importations through the respective Centrals d’Achats in Paris and 
other major centres in Europe and America as well as the 
purchasing of local manufactures.109
104 RCI, ’Action’, p.2.
105 IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution', p.66; Assidon, Captif. p.108.
106 Interview: Doh Gilles (2nd.).
107 Fabiani, 'Circuits’.
108 CCCI, Bulletin. 4.
109 IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution', pp.16-41; Bollinger, M arketing, pp.129-130; 
Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p.45; CCCI, B u lle tin . 6, p.92; Fabiani, 'Circuits'; 
Interview: Kobenan: Assouan; DSA: memo, 'CFCI'.
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4.3 W EAKNESSES OF WSE CHAIN STORES
Weaknesses of chain stores can be grouped under three headings: 
overheads, flexibility, and outreach (the area size from which a 
store can attract customers) and location. It will become 
increasingly apparent that many of the achievem ents and 
strengths of chain stores outlined above were more in theory than 
in practice, the reasons being substantially due to the three 
aforementioned factors. The main overheads which one or more of 
the retail chains had to face were transport, investment in 
buildings, technical assistance, publicity, training, unpaid loans, 
interest rates and corruption. Whilst the turnover from chain 
stores was substantial, the overheads outweighed any of the 
economies of scale which resulted from nationwide distribution.
Transport became a major problem for most of the chain store 
companies. One of the main reasons for this was the rise in 
transport costs. These approximately doubled between 1974-75 
and the early 1980s from CFA 258 million to over CFA 500 
million, or from roughly 3% to around 4% of turnover.110 Many 
stores were over 500 kilometres from the Abidjan depots and the 
more stores the groups opened the greater the problem became. 
Further, many of the stores could only be reached via poor roads 
which meant a much shortened life span for lorries.111 Even 
though SCOA moved to rectify this problem in 1973 by 
abandoning the uniform price policy, costs continued to be a drain 
on profits, not least because of the oil price shocks in the 1970s. 
By the early 1970s Chain Avion was delivering 50,000 tonnes of 
goods a year which meant a turnover of six billion CFA.112 With 
SAVE it was the traders who had to pay transport costs113 and 
this could only have increased their financial problems even 
though they could probably do it cheaper than CFAO. Partly as a
110 Grupp, ’Avion', p.364.
111 If Bollinger, M ark etin g , pp.133-134 is checked against a road map for 
Ivory Coast, the problem becomes evident. From personal experience I was 
well aware o f the need to minimise sales trips on poor roads as lorry 
lifespans are shortened and fuel consumption per kilometre can almost 
double; SCOA, 'Review of operations 1978’.
112 Maurel, 'Alimentaire', pp.37-39.
113 Interview: Doh Gilles (2nd.).
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result, CFAO was forced to let some bad debtors continue trading 
so that they could pay back what they owed the company.114
The transport problem was less acute for the regional chains and 
all but insignificant for other WSE stores. The SOCOCE and CNCI 
regional chains, by their very nature, had less territory to cover 
whilst independent grocery stores bought from local wholesalers 
or travelling salesmen.115 Supermarkets, being located in Abidjan, 
were close to their suppliers though most were delivered to by 
im porters anyw ay.116 Prior to 1980 CFCI delivered to major 
clients from all of its depots but after that year this was only done 
in Abidjan and Bouake where competition necessitated a more 
complete service.117 IVODIS made no deliveries at all which would 
have put it at a disadvantage compared to many independents 
who occasionally delivered large orders, as did CNCI.118 NSE stores 
were much like independent grocery stores in that they either 
bought from the local wholesaler or from a travelling salesvan. 
Many NSE traders owned five or even ten stores but rather than 
having them scattered across the country they located them in the 
same region to keep down transport costs and to enable them 
more easily to monitor the smooth running of the stores.119 Where 
longer distances were involved, many used cheap forms of 
transport, for example carrying goods as luggage in a bush taxi. 
Many Lebanese and large African traders had lorries which were 
driven by informally-employed chauffeurs (i.e. cheap labour) and 
were barely road-worthy with repairs carried out by informal 
sector road-side garages with limited facilities but admirable 
expertise and efficiency.120
114 Ibid.
115 Fieldwork: observation: discussions with traders; Interview: CNCI 
Director; Personal experience: observation: discussions with Lebanese and 
Ivorian traders.
116 Personal experience: observation; DSA: invoices (1980-90).
117 Interview: Assouan.
118 Fieldwork: discussion with IVODIS gerant in Korhogo; Interview: CNCI 
D irector .
119 Fieldwork: dicussions with traders (see also table in previous chapter); 
Interview: El Jilani Ould Boubakar, Mauritanian wholesaler at Koumassi 
since 1970 (Abidjan, December 8 1990).
120 Fieldwork: observation; Personal experience: observation: discussions  
with traders and garage owners. DANAFCO often used informal garages for
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Technical assistance, publicity, administration and training further 
added to costs. As already indicated, technical assistance involved 
employing supervisors to visit stores monthly and assist with 
bookkeeping, stock taking and other problems which might arise. 
Given the desire to introduce western commercial methods into a 
developing economy, these were mostly unadvoidable but costly 
fixed expenses. PAC and Avion had all of these expenses, including 
the running of the Ecole de Commerce and Avion's commercial 
s c h o o l121 whilst SCOA footed the bill for SIDECO's technical 
assitance program from which 99 traders were benefitting from in 
1964 .122 Whilst at SAVE it was the traders who were responsible 
for the upkeep of the property, it was CFAO who paid the bill.123 
It also appears that, despite spending money on technical 
assistance SIDECO failed to adequately monitor their member 
trad e rs ,124 and that SAVE made similar mistakes. They failed to 
select traders with the same rigour that Avion did125 and do not 
appear to have given any, or at least very little, training.126 Whilst 
many thousands of individuals trade in the informal sector 
without any instruction, it seems inevitable that for an operation 
like SAVE, with all the money staked in it and with more fixed 
financial obligations to be met, a sound ability to handle 
bookkeeping would be required: supplying the materials was not 
enough.
As far as physical appearance was concerned, there is no evidence 
to suggest that Ivorians cared whether a shop’s shelves and doors 
were nicely painted or not, yet considerable emphasis was placed
minor maintenance work as the company's experience was that they were 
quicker and cheaper than their formal sector equivilants. M ost were also 
more honest in their assessment o f what repairs and spare parts were 
n eed ed .
121 Bollinger, M ark etin g , pp. 130-135; Maurel, 'Alimentaire', pp.37-43.
122 Fabiani, 'Circuits'; Bonnefonds, 'Traite', p.400; SEDES, 'Sud-est'.
123 Bonnefonds, 'Traite', p.405.
124 IDET-CEGOS, 'Elements’, p.4.
125 Ibid, p.3; SEDES, 'Sud-est'.
126 SEDES, ’Sud-est’.
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on this127 apparently in the unproven belief that customers were 
put out by the shabbiness of NSE stores. Further, most WSE stores 
from SIDECO to SACI, JAG and the supermarkets had salaried 
employees which meant paying a minimum wage maybe twice 
that of what Lebanese traders paid store assistants.128 Avion 
managers were given family allowances, some medical insurance 
also covering the family, annual holidays,129 free accomodation, 
electricity, water, property insurance and a trading licence.130 NSE 
traders in general, as was shown in the previous chapter, were 
likely to use family labour and wasted few resources on 
overheads generally.
Wholesale chains, as has already been observed, did not promote 
their products and also had no technical assistance expenses in the 
way that the retail chains did. However, they were at a 
disadvantage to independent wholesalers on costs related to 
salaried em ployees for independents used m ostly fam ily 
lab o u r.131 At the end of 1990, Commerce et Distribution de Cote 
d'Ivoire (CDCI, as CFCI was renamed in March 1989) had 30 
outlets in Ivory Coast, each with a manager. Controlling the 
managers were ten Chefs de Secteur who were each responsible 
for three stores. They in turn were answerable to the D ire c te u r  
Commerciale in Abidjan.132 CNCI and SOCOCE administration was 
not only simple but worked in fairly simple, but perfectly 
adequate, surroundings, in marked contrast to some other 
wholesale companies.133
Unpaid loans and investments in buildings and other materials 
further increased overheads. From 1956 to the mid 1960s, SCOA
127 Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observations at the Ecole  
de Commerce (December 1990); CCCI, B ulletin . 4; photographs in SCOA, '1907- 
1987: 80em anniversaire' (Telex Journal, Numero special, 1987).
128 Bonnefonds, 'Traite', p.400; CCCI, B u lletin . 4; Bollinger, M arketing, p. 134; 
CCCI, B u lle tin . 6, p.93; Fieldwork: observation.
129 Grupp, 'Avion', pp.360-361.
130 Bollinger, M ark etin g , p. 131; Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p .37.
131 Personal experience: observation. Also, see the questionnaire responses 
in the previous chapter.
132 DSA: memo, 'CFCI'.
133 Fieldwork: observation.
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managed to limit building expenses by converting its old trading 
stations into stores but by the end of the decade there were few 
left to convert.134 PAC had to start from scratch and although the 
traders were supposed to reimburse the state for the store, the 
fact that there were closures from at least around 1976135 and 
probably earlier supports the assumption that there were bad 
debts incurred by the government as at least some of these 
closures would have involved traders who had not repaid the 
loan. In addition, it is possible that the group incurred losses on 
the non-payment of goods delivered to some stores which were in 
financial difficulty. This problem was also faced by CFAO with its 
SAVE chain.13*
These financial problems occured despite the deposits which 
many traders had to make. Avion managers, before being 
assigned a store, had to pay CFA 150,000 deposit,137 increased to 
300,000 by 1969.138 PAC students had to deposit CFA 50,000 
which represented the first re-imbursement of the loan they 
would get upon completion of the course.139 Some of SIDECO’s 
finance came from its members, the traders who benefitted from 
the services provided by the company, each of whom deposited a 
sum of CFA 100,000 for which they could obtain goods on 
c red it,140 conditional on the additional payment in advance of 1% 
of the value of goods ordered.141
In PAC's case, the problem of unpaid loans was worsened by 
corruption. PAC was under the overall control of Henri Konan 
Bedie who was the Ministre de VEconmie et des Finances at the
134 Bonnefonds, ’Traite', p.403; Bollinger, M ark etin g , p. 130.
135 Bollinger, M arketing , pp. 131-135; RCI, La Cote dTvoire en chiffres 1980- 
8 1 T-C.  Gnui, 'Enquete sur les conditions d'implantation de magasins PAC 
dans la zone AVB' (Maitrise d'economie appliquee, Faculte Sciences 
Economique, Universite National de la Cote d'Ivoire, Abidjan, 1978).
136 IDET-CEGOS, 'Elements', p.3.
137 Interview: Kouakou; Grupp, 'Avion', p.360.
138 Diambra-Hauhouot, 'Agglomeration', p .6.
139 RCI, 'Action', p.6.
140 Bonnefonds, 'Traite', pp.400-401.
141 Ibid; IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution', p.66.
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time of the initiation of the group in 1970.142 However he spent 
much time abroad setting up the Ivorian UN mission and 
eventually was dismissed in 1977 after being accused of economic 
m ism an ag em en t.143 One source claims that, during his absence, 
PAC was badly managed and corruption set in as politicians 
sought to place their sons and an assortment of other relatives in 
the group without them having the right qualifications.144 
Verifying this now is probably imposible but given the record of 
elite corruption in the country, it must surely be a strong 
possibility.
The second group of weaknesses relates to flexibility. This 
concerns uniform stocking policy, the delivery system, incentives 
and the uniform structure of the various chain store groups. By 
stocking the same range of products in every store, the small 
retail chains took no account of regional differences in demand 
which, as is illustrated in Chapter Six, vary considerably. For 
example, NSE stores in the west carried a far higher proportion of 
cosmetic products than did those elsewhere. In the east, stores 
were more inclined to stock items familiar to Ghanaian consumers 
due to the large number of cross-border migrants.145
Sales statistics might indicate that the wholesale chains were more 
flexible in this respect as there were considerable variations in 
the types of products sold in different regions. In 1962 for 
example 27.9% of the turnover in Abidjan (which accounted for 
50.5% of all food and drinks sales by the commercial houses) of 
the 15 largest companies was in food and drink products whilst in 
the surrounding sub-prefectures of Abidjan it was 60.3% and the 
south west region (Sassandra, Bereby, Tabou etc) 55.2% .146 If
142 RCI, 'Action', p.2.
143 RJ.Mundt, Historical Dictionary o f the Ivorv Coast (Scarecrow Press, 
Metuchen, 1987), p.92.
144 Interview: Kouakou. It should be noted that the interviewee is o f the 
same ethnic group (Baoule) as Konan Bedie. Such links have been known to 
cloud judgement o f  ministerial capabilities (witness Houphouet and FPI 
leader Gbagbo scoring heavily in their own regions in the 1990 
Presidential e lection s).
145 DSA: internal report, L.Bosteen, 'Bush Sector'; Fieldwork: regional 
distribution survey.
146 IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution'.
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nothing else, these figures do indicate the folly of the small retail 
chains' uniform stocking policy. The Mini-Score managers, whose 
stores carried roughly 3,000 references of which between 1,500 
and 2,000 were food items, were allowed some leeway in deciding 
which products to stock.147
The reliance of chain stores on fixed delivery dates often meant 
stock ruptures impeding the efficiency of the service they 
provided as they were not allowed to buy stocks from any other
supplier. Deliveries to the stores from the central warehouse were
usually made weekly at a fixed hour on a fixed day at which time 
orders for the following week also were taken.148 SIDECO and PAC 
had a similar system though the former owned 16 depots around 
the country from which goods were dispatched.149 Managers were 
not allowed to try new products which might have attracted a 
loyal clientele in their cachement area.150 Further, due to the time 
it took to deliver goods, ruptures in stock in the Chaine Avion 
stores in 1983 were as long as eight to ten days.151
Score supermarkets listed around 200 items for which there 
should never be a rupture in stock. But from 1983, orders for 
other products were only placed once there were no items of a
product group left on the shelf. This led to situations where, if
there were three flavours of a particular brand of honey and two 
sold out, a new order for all three would not be placed until the 
last flavour had also sold out.152 Monoprix had 7,000 lines chosen 
from the same products as those sold in the French Monoprix yet 
between 60% and 70% of the clients were African153 which, with 
African consumers the worst affected by the recession, perhaps
147 Interview: Mr. Yace, SCOA Service d'Achats (Abidjan, December 15 
1990).
148 Maurel, 'Alimentaire', pp.37-39.
149 IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution', p.67; Fabiani, 'Circuits'; Bonnefonds, 'Traite', 
pp.400-401; CCCI, Bulletin. 6, p.93.
150 Personal experience: this phenomenon was found to work in favour o f  
such products as lucozade (amongst som e Mauritanians) and marmite 
(amongst retailers in areas with a large Ghananian population).
151 Fieldwork: notes taken from Mme R.Theze who kept records o f meetings 
during weekly sales visits to the Abidjan supermarkets in 1983.
152 Fieldwork: Theze notes.
153 Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p.45.
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explains why it was the first to be forced to close in 1983.154 
Compare this to the flexibilty of the Trade Center supermarkets. 
The Trade Center group placed more emphasis on food items than 
the other supermarkets. The original store sold only foods of 
which 60% were fresh and there was one shelf devoted to 
American products.155 All of the group's stores were noticeably 
more presentable than those of any other supermarket. Spacing 
between shelves was greater, the interior decoration newer and 
the stores spotlessly clean.156 The success of the Trade Center 
over the other groups is perhaps best explained by it apparently 
concentrating on the European and Lebanese consumer groups, to 
whom tidiness appealed, and by its tendency to stock more non- 
French items than the others.157
The final area of inflexibility concerns the uniform structure of 
the groups. Whilst this may or may not have helped to increase “la 
solidarite nationale ” 158 as Grupp claims it did for Avion, it 
certainly did nothing for the ability of the g e ra n ts  to adapt to 
local or special circumstances. They would have been unable, for 
instance, to launch special price promotions on products which 
showed potential or which were moving slowly for the uniform 
price policy would have, for the most part, prevented such an 
initiative. Nor, given that they could only obtain stock from the 
parent companies (SAVE traders, for instance, had an exclusive 
contract with CFAO), would they have been as likely to receive 
promotional gifts and aids such as caps and plastic bags from
travelling salesman. Such items were used as inducements by 
salesmen and thus they tended to hand out aids in relation to the 
sales they made at each store.159
Again, none of these problems were faced by NSE stores. They
could purchase goods from the nearest wholesaler whenever the
154 Personal experience: observation (1983).
155 Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p.45.
156 Fieldwork: observation.
157 Fieldwork: brand range survey.
158 Grupp, 'Avion', p.365.
159 Personal experience: I was responsible for the distribution o f these 
items (1984-85); Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p .39; Bonnefonds, 'Traite', pp.404- 
405.
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need arose and adapt to sudden shifts in demand as well as 
reg ional circum stances and the dem ands of p articu la r 
cu s to m ers .160 Being independent, they also had more incentive to 
succeed than the salaried employees of some of the retail chains
and all of the wholesale chains even if one considers that
commission was paid. SCOA paid their small retail managers a 
commission of 4% of the store's total turnover plus 1% of untaxed 
merchandise, yielding in all an average of 4.75% of the sales value 
in the early to mid 1970s.161 JAG, SACI and other chain store 
managers were also paid a commission.162
Perhaps in response to declining growth in turnover in the 1960s 
(in 1964 it was 31.5%, in 1965 20.8% and in 1966 just 5%),163 
SCOA launched a number of initiatives in the 1970s aimed at 
encouraging their store managers. In 1975 and 1977 they 
received shares with those who had been with the company
longest having p riority .164 By 1978 the g era n ts  held 20% of 
Chaine A vion’s cap ita l.165 In addition, they were granted
representation on the Conseil d ’Administration, a move which 
followed the setting up of Avion as a separate company. Earlier, 
the gerants  created the Union des Gerants-Mandataires de Chaine 
Avion Cote d’Ivoire (UGMCACI). Through this body and the store 
managers' representation on the Conseil , SCOA hoped to increase 
understanding and co-operation within the company. Further, 
some g e r a n t s  were sent to France to attend courses at the 
com pany’s ex p e n se .166 The aims of these changes are well 
summarised by Grupp when he said “// est clair que, pour rendre 
la Chaine Avion solide et performante, SCOA a joue, au maximum, 
la cart de I'incitation materielle et psychologique” ,167
160 Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation.
161 Bollinger, M ark etin g , p. 131.
162 CCCI, Bulletin . 6, p.93.
163 IDET-CEGOS, ’Elements', p.2.
164 Grupp, ’Avion’, p.361.
165 Assidon, Captif. p. 108.
166 Grupp, ’Avion’, p.358.
167 Ib id .
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Despite the changes, profits declined in the late 1970s: between 
1976/77 and 1977/78 they fell from FF 1,550,000168 to FF 
1 ,398 ,000 ,169 a decline of 10%170 on a turnover that rose by 10% 
over the same years.171 The profit for 1977/78 represented just 
0.64% of turnover. Further, with the economy in decline, the 
government became more strict on price margins as it sought to 
control inflation so profit margins on products were squeezed.172 
At the same time, SCOA had progressively to increase the 
commission it gave to the gerants  as they faced increasing costs, 
especially concerning the people they employed to help them in 
the stores.173 As a result of these developments, SCOA instituted 
more changes in the structure and functioning of Avion. In 1981 
(by which time SCOA had purchased the shares given to the 
gerants  in 1975 and 1977)174 Avion became a part of the IVODIS 
group along with the Score supermarkets and the loss making 
outlets were closed.175 In 1984 they allowed the managers to buy 
goods from other suppliers on their own initiative176 and, finally, 
in the same year, they were allowed to buy the stores.177
Wholesale chains, especially the national ones, were probably 
more hampered by inflexibility than anything else. CFCI, like most 
other establishments of its kind, stocked only goods which were 
manufactured locally or which it imported itself. In the late 1980s 
many food items were dropped because of ‘the extent of fraud 
which enables Lebanese companies to import goods with much 
lower customs costs’.178 The independent and regional wholesalers
168 SCOA, 'Assemble Generate Ordinaire du 28 fevrier 1978, Exercice 
1976 /77 .'
169 SCOA, 'Les Comptes, Exercice 1977/78.'
1711 SCOA, 'Review of operations 1978', gives the figure as 20% which is 
probably a misprint.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 Grupp, 'Avion', p.360.
174 Ibid. p.357 (footnote 3).
175 Assidon, Captif. p.111.
176 Personal experience: discussion with Mme R.Theze who, until that time, 
was responsible for supervising Chaine Avion orders (1984).
177 Assidon, C aptif. p.111.
178 Interview: Assouan.
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had no such policy, instead buying, locally if necessary, whatever 
products their customers demanded.179
National wholesale chains were also generally less flexible on 
credit conditions. IVODIS gros, for example, gave 20 days credit to 
clients judged to be reliable.180 Also, most wholesale store 
managers rarely left their stores, their only contact with clients 
being when the client came to buy.181 CNCI’s system for credit and 
deliveries was fairly flexible. Clients could fetch the goods 
themselves or have them delivered. Some clients paid cash, others 
benefitted from the company’s depot system whereby goods were 
deposited with a client for a previously agreed period of time at 
the end of which he had to either pay in full or return the stock 
which was unsold at the same time as paying for the balance. CNCI 
had no salesmen, just Chefs des Ventes who monitored clients. The 
company’s flexible attitude concerning credit conditions would 
have helped to minimise risk without jeopardising sales volume. 
Further, by granting clients the option of returning unsold goods, 
CNCI avoided both bad relations and pressurising them to sell 
which could have led to the client cutting prices and destabilising 
the m arket.182 By the 1980s, SOCOCE dominated the wholesale 
trade in its region and was the main distributor there for Nestle 
products as well as several others. Its success is generally 
attributed to its knowledge of sem i-w holesalers, m ostly 
L e b a n e s e .183 As the previous chapter illustrated, independent 
wholesalers were even more flexible (and also knowledgeable) in 
their methods of operation.
The final group of weaknesses concerns outreach and location, 
factors which affected the small retail chains almost from the
179 Fieldwork: discussions with Lebanese traders and CNCI store manager, 
Korhogo (November 1990).
180 Fieldwork: discussion with IVODIS manager in Korhogo (November 
1990).
181 Personal experience: discussions with store managers in Gagnoa and 
Man (1984-85); Interview: Mr. Konan, Manager o f IVODIS gros store 
(Aboisso, November 8, 1990).
182 Interview: CNCI Director.
183 Personal experience: according to both other Lebanese traders and 
Marc Cheriaux, formerly managing director o f DANAFCO, now at Ducros 
(Cote d’Ivoire).
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beginning and the grocery chains since the economic downturn. 
Given that small retail chains stocked around ten times as many 
lines as the average NSE store by the 1970s, a far higher turnover 
was required to support the financing of so much stock. This 
proved a heavy burden when, between 1975-76 and 1981, 
interest charges as a proportion of turnover increased from 0.8% 
to 1.65% 184 and meant that chain stores had to have a large 
consumer outreach. However, poor consumers were unlikely to 
travel far to make their purchases and what purchases they did 
make were small ones every day rather than large ones once or 
twice a week. The reasons for this were practical: they did not 
have cars so could not transport large quantities; their finacial 
resources at any given time were usually scarce so they could not
afford to buy in large quantities; and they mostly did not have the
necessary storage facilities at home so perishable goods had to be 
purchased daily. Additionally, because they shopped on foot, most 
preferred to visit two or three stores within five minutes walking 
distance rather than walk twenty minutes to one store where all 
purchases could be made. Thus the small retail chain could not
entice enough customers to justify the stock range they held.185
The aim of Avion was to present the Ivorian consumer with a 
store which stocked all of the goods they might want (i.e. not just 
basic items) at uniform prices in an attractive environment. In
practice, this involved too many overheads as stocks were 
necessarily larger than the average independent small retailer 
due to the large number of lines sold.186 Probably because of the 
high overheads, the advantage in prices when shopping at Chaine 
Avion was far from always borne out in 1983 at least.187 The
18  ^ Grupp, 'Avion', p.364.
185 See, for example, R.Savitt, 'Retail Change and Economic Development'. 
Chapter 2 in A.Findlay, R.Paddison, and J.Dawson (eds.) R eta ilin g  
Environments in D eveloping Countries (Routledge, 1990); A.Goldman, 
'Outreach of Consumers and the Modernisation o f Urban Food Retailing in 
Developing Countries', Journal o f Marketing. 38 (October 1974); S.Samiee, 
'Impediments to Progress in Retailing in Developing Nations'. Chapter 3 in 
Findlay et al (eds.), R e ta ilin g .
186 IDET-CEGOS, 'Elements', pp.2-3.
187 Personal experience: frequent visits into the interior were made at this 
tim e.
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same problems also affected other outlets which carried a similar 
number of lines (PAC, Elephant, SIDECO and possibly SAVE).188
As far as location was concerned, the number of small retail 
chains meant that there were often several stores within a short 
distance of each other, thereby further limiting the ability of each 
individual outlet to capture the necessary number of customers. 
Whilst Avion went to considerable lengths in researching the 
feasibility of opening stores in selected areas,189 SAVE had a 
tendency to open stores close to other retail chains selling a 
similar line of goods at similar prices.190 As a result, turnover was 
adversely affected with both stores competing for the same 
clientele. By the early 1980s, if not earlier, the problem was that 
too many stores were located away from the main areas of 
commercial activity due to the rapid growth and changing 
business patterns of many towns. Few were ever constructed near 
market places where they might have acted as semi-wholesalers 
to market traders, a function often vital to the survival of NSE 
sto res .191
Grocery chains were aimed at a different type of consumer and, as 
long as middle income customers existed in sufficient numbers, 
they survived. These consumers often did have cars, fridges, 
freezers and the money to make large purchases a practical 
option. Thus, the outreach required to justify the size of these 
stores was attained. The outlets were located in all the major 
towns as well as most of the districts of Abidjan.192 The 1968 JAG 
stores, all air-conditioned and selling fresh fruit and vegetables 
and frozen fish in addition to a wide range of other consumer 
goods, were mostly located in the coffee and cocoa belts,193 
presumably to cash in on the higher incomes in these areas. The
188 Bonnefonds, 'Traite', p.404; IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution', p.67.
189 Bonnefonds, 'Traite', p.404.
190 IDET-CEGOS, 'Elements’, p.3.
191 Personal experience: observation: discussions with traders; Fieldwork: 
observation: discussions with traders. See also the comments in the 
previous chapter on retailers as sem i-wholesalers and the evidence from  
the cube trade in chapter 7.
192 Bollinger, M arketing, pp. 130-136.
193 IDET-CEGOS, 'Elements', p.5.
175
Mini-Score, with a surface area of between 250 and 300 m2, were 
intended to attract clients from their localities.194
However, when the economic climate deteriorated all eventually 
had to close because of the contraction of their customer group. 
The high survival rate of Lebanese independent grocery stores 
was probably due to them having built up a loyal clientele 
through personal contact over many years, their lower costs 
through the employment of family labour and because they were 
able to vary their product lines according to demand.195 They 
were probably the preferred stores of the Lebanese community 
which, especially in the towns of the interior, tended to be fairly 
close knit.196 By the mid 1980s, the mini-Score and the declining 
SACI apart, the vast majority of grocery stores were privately 
owned independents.197 Many of these were owned by former 
Avion and PAC traders.198
Supermarkets also fared better than chain stores. Catering 
primarily to high income groups, the majority attracted most of 
their clientele from the expatriate community which was probably 
largely unaffected by the recession in terms of income. It was 
only during the mid 1980s that many began to leave the 
c o u n try 199 and it is only since then that supermarket numbers 
declined. PROSUM A can be seen as the most European orientated 
of the groups. Nour A1 Hay at in the early 1970s stocked some 
4,000 different food lines with 55% of these being preserves and 
catered for between 40,000 and 45,000 customers per month.200
194 Interview: Mr. M.Anthony, Director o f the Score group (Abidjan, 
Novem ber 1990).
195 Personal experience: discussions with salesmen and traders; Fieldwork: 
discussions with traders.
196 Personal experience: discussions with Lebanese traders and Frederick 
Attoh, DANAFCO Branch Manager at Bouake, 1982-88, later General 
Manager; Fieldwork: discussions with Lebanese traders e.g . Alimentation 
Camille in Gagnoa.
197 DSA: internal reports, L.Bosteen, 'Abidjan Town1 and 'Bush Sector'.
198 Personal experience: observation.
199 Mundt, D iction ary , p.71.
200 Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p.43.
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In 1990, 90% of Nour A1 Hayat clients were Europeans201 whilst 
around 80% of Champion’s clients were European, most but not all 
of them French, 10% were African and 10% were from other 
continents. Many of the latter's clients were embassy employees 
in the area. The PROSUMA group stocked more non-Ivorian 
products than any other in the country.202
In marked contrast to PROSUMA, 98% of clients at Score 1 in 1990 
were African whilst the other three Scores attracted a clientele 
which was 60% African, most of them from the areas surrounding 
the stores. Given this reliance on African clients, their closure is 
perhaps not surprising for it was the middle to upper income 
Ivorians who lost the most during the 1980s.203 There was also a 
locational problem with the Score Koumassi store which was badly 
designed and, by 1990, was facing competetion from three other 
supermarkets in the area.204
Location was also a problem for the Societe de distribution et de
commerce (SODICO). SODICO rapidly aquired a reputation for slow
payment of invoices and it seemed clear from the start that the
Prima outlet was loosing money.205 Located in Zone 4, it faced stiff 
competition from Super Hayat and the Trade Centre's expanded 
outlet bought from Bijani Freres. Outreach was not the sole 
problem though; whilst the staff were unfailingly polite and the 
premisis clean, many goods were damaged and many popular 
lines were not stocked.206 The fact that one of the backers was 
reportedly refused permission to build a store in Yaounde because 
of bad debts207 probably did not help confidence amongst 
suppliers.
201 Fieldwork: discussion with Sultan Ali Esmail, General Manager o f  
PROSUMA (October 1990).
202 Interview: Paoli.
203 EIU, Reports (various issues 1989-93).
204 Interview: Anthony.
205 Fieldwork: Theze notes.
206 Fieldwork: observation.
207 EIU, Report (N o .l, 1990), p.29.
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Problems of outreach for most stores were compounded by 
declining incomes during the 1980s. This hit Avion especially hard 
as 98% of its clients were African.208 Supermarkets, which shared 
an estimated 35 billion CFA market in 1989209 were faced with a 
declining European population (80% of superm arket clients 
overall) and the squeezing of African incomes.210 Whilst chain 
stores in the US faced similar problems (but survived) in the wake 
of the Great D epression,211 the economy cannot be held 
responsible for their demise as SAVE, SIDECO, Elephant and PAC 
had all collapsed or were collapsing by the late 1970s when 
incomes had not yet begun to decline.
Another scapegoat for the problems of WSE stores has been the 
Lebanese. Many of CDCI's problems were, according to the 
Directeur d'Achats Claude Assouan, due to fraudulent competition 
by the Lebanese.212 Others too complained of unfair competition 
from smaller Lebanese traders who allegedly got by on fraud but,
as the head of the government's anti-fraud division pointed out,
this was difficult to prove.213 Supermarkets also complained of 
fraud but their clients were different from those of Lebanese 
wholesalers. Perhaps more justifiably, African B usiness reported 
that in October 1991 "merchants in Abidjan closed their shops and 
held a demonstration in protest against . . . .  corrupt customs 
officials, some of which reportedly refuse to give receipts for
duties paid unless they are bribed first".214 However, this affected 
all im porter-distributors.
Location has also played a part in the downfall of the national 
wholesale chains. Many of their stores occupied old buildings 
located away from the market places and small retail stores. The 
CFCI store in Gagnoa, for example, was one of the furthest
208 Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p.41.
209 EIU, Report (N o .l, 1990), p.28.
210 SCIMPEX, ’Commission’.
211 Hollander and Omura, 'Chain', p.3Q9.
212 Interview: Assouan.
213 EIU, Report (N o .l, 1990), p.29.
214 M.Dzisah, 'Prime Minister Completes His First Turbulent Year in Office', 
African B usiness. 161 (January 1992).
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wholesalers from both local markets whilst the outlet in Zone 4 
was nowhere near any other similar commercial activity. The 
same was also true of IVODIS gros in Aboisso and many of the 
SACI stores. In marked contrast, independent wholesale stores 
were located close to market places and were often jammed with 
customers throughout the morning when most semi-wholesale 
purchases were made.215 The decline of WSE chain stores and the 
domination of independent and NSE outlets by foreigners further 
removed Ivorians from the commercial environment.
4.4 THE POLITICS OF WSE IVORIANISTAION AND THE PNCI
At a seminar held at the Ministry of Commerce in 1982 on the 
extent of Ivorian participation in internal distribution, the 
concluding report complained of “la metalite non-commercante de 
I ’lvoirien  ” .216 Yet, though the government may well despair at 
the inability of Ivorians to compete with foreign traders, rarely 
has it been their genuine ally. The previous chapter examined 
Ivorian participation in the NSE sector and concluded that little 
had changed since before independence. WSE private and state 
chain store initiatives were championed by the government as a 
way of redressing this imbalance as well as providing a national 
distribution network but neither initiative assisted established 
Ivorian traders in the NSE sector. Boone argued that in commerce,
R elations betw een the Governm ent and ind igenous business  
interests . . . seem to have been guided by a statist strategy aimed 
at (i) co-opting an elite  into lucrative, 'rent-collecting' niches
that lay under the direct control o f the regime's leaders, and (ii) 
circum scribing possib ilities for the expansion o f  parts o f  the 
local private sector that might have maintained or developed
more political independence vis-a-vis the state.2 12
In arriving at the first point of this conclusion, Boone contended 
that the state's support for the foreign private sector was less
than "some observers have argued" as many of PAC's activities
215 Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation.
216 RCI, 'Seminaire sur le commerce, theme 2: promotion d'un commerce
ivoirien' (Ministere du Commerce, Abidjan, novembre 1982).
217 Boone, 'Commerce', p.91.
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encroached upon their importing and distribution interests.218 The 
reasons for state support for Avion and other mainly French chain 
store initiatives prior to PAC are not difficult to find. Their 
employment of Ivorians was consistant with the government's 
Ivorianisation policy and would have garnered popular support 
for the regime. Also, the retail networks were seen as part of a 
foreign investm ent driven industrialisation  strategy which 
required the expansion of the internal market. Perhaps most 
importantly, the chain store operators were easier to tax than the 
informal sector and counterbalanced the vibrant Lebanese sector. 
M ytelka’s contention that foreign capital and interests have 
shaped Ivorian economic growth219 is inaccurate when applied to 
the distribution sector. Foreign interests had some influence but it 
was the ruling elite which reaped most of the benefits.
Boone's second point was, in effect, an application to Ivory Coast 
of an idea which Boumedouha had already hinted at for Senegal:
The Senegalese elite must have known that they were better o ff  
with a powerless community, and (arguably) one drawn from a 
foreign ethnic group, dom inating certain trading sectors than 
with the Senegalese.2 2 ®
Taken together, these arguments lead to the conclusion that the 
state was primarily interested in preserving an internally and 
externally politically non-threatening balance of French, Lebanese 
and Ivorian interests in the commercial sector at the same time as 
milking what financial benefits it could. However, the collapse of 
first PAC and then Avion, and the ever increasing commercial 
muscle of the Lebanese, has rendered this argument redundant 
for the mid 1980s onwards.
With the number of Ivorians in trade still intolerably low, in the 
view of the government and of many Ivorians, the state decided 
to launch another in itiative, the Programme N ational de
218 Ib id .
219 L.K.Mytelka, ‘Foreign Business and Economic Developm ent’. In 
I.W.Zartman and C.Delgado (eds.), The Political Economy o f Ivory Coast 
(Praeger, New York, 1984), p. 172.
22® S.Boumedouha, 'Adjustment to West African Realities: the Lebanese in 
Senegal', A frica . 60, 4 (1990), p.544.
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Commercants Ivoirien (PNCI) in 1985.221 The PNCI aimed to 
increase the number of Ivorians owning retail stores as well as 
helping those that already existed to survive. The project was 
financed by the French and Ivorian governments with three 
French technical assistants sent to help run the programme from 
1985 to 1989.
The technical assistance consisted of supplying sim plified 
accounting books, stock ledgers and any advice that might be 
required. Traders were also supplied with a PNCI sign to display 
on the front of the store and were advised on the range of 
produce they should stock.222 For the small (level one) store with 
a surface ranging from between 10m2 to 60m2’ 110 product lines 
or references were recommended. New traders at this level 
required around one million CFA, half for the premisis and half for 
the stock. For larger (level two) stores of a surface area between 
6 0 m 2 and 120m2 200 references were recommended with an 
additional financing of half a million for the extra stock.223 
Assistance was free on the condition that traders could meet the 
financial requirements.224
In 1989, with perhaps one eye on the ever increasing Lebanese 
dominance, a new initiative in the programme offered 300 hours 
of free training to any trader, regardless of nationality, who had a 
com mercial licence, was registered with the Chambre de 
Commerce and owned a fixed place outlet with at least 200,000 
CFAs worth of stock. 180 hours of the training was theoretical, the 
rest practical. Also in 1989 the French government withdrew from 
the financing of the project. By this time assistance was costing an
22 * Interview: Mr. Jacques La Rue, Chef de Mission PNCI (Abidjan,
December 12 1990).
222 Ibid.
223 Interview: Mr. Fofana Coulibaly, Director o f the Ecole de Commerce 
(Abidjan, December 4 1990). He was previously in charge o f PAC training 
which also took place at the same premises, and was kind enough to give me 
a tour o f the buildings. Unfortunately, PAC archive records were destroyed 
some years ago.
224 Interview: La Rue.
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average of CFA 25,000 per month per trader but the Ivorian 
government maintained its committment to the programme.225
The principal financial source for new traders in the PNCI was the 
family. There was a danger here in that family members would 
want something back so traders were effectively recommended to
take the money and set up the store somewhere else. A better
source, but less common, was indirect family finance whereby a
wealthy relative (usually a member of the political elite) gave the
money. Such cases rarely resulted in subsequent interference by
the benefactor. Severence pay for employees made redundant by 
firms closing down or contracting was another source. Some
employees nearing retirement set up their son or nephew using 
their salary and retirement benefits as it was forbidden for a
salaried person to own a commercial establishment. Finally, there 
were a few cases where a group of traders banded together to 
help a new trader get started (which very much resembles the
Mauritanian method).226
At the end of 1990 there were 850 Ivorian traders registerd with 
the programme,227 traders who were effectively being transferred 
from the NSE sector to the WSE sector. However, there were some 
important differences from the PAC initiative. First, the range of 
products recommended was smaller than the number carried by 
the old chain stores. Second, the traders were perfectly free to 
take on additional products if they so wish. Finally, traders 
purchased the goods locally or wherever they wished rather than 
being delivered to from a central depot.
There is thus an attempt to combine the perceived strengths of 
both WSE and NSE stores. Only time will tell whether this will 
work but it seems that at least one lesson has yet to be learned: 
consumer outreach, or the area from which a store draws it's 
customers. Stores are still being recomended to stock more lines 
than most NSE small retailers sell - an average value of 500,000
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid; Interview: Coulibaly.
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CFA compared to 200,000 CFA. Nor does the recommended list 
take account of regional differences. PNCI members must also 
invest between 500,000 and one million CFA in their property to 
qualify for technical assistance, a sum far exceding that expended 
by most NSE small retailers and an excessively high entry 
threshold. One can therefore only conclude that if this initiative 
survives, it will be both because of and in spite of the advice the 
traders are receiving.
4.5 CONCLUSION
Every attempt at nationwide distribution in Ivory Coast since 
1956 has failed. None of these initiatives survived and many 
folded in the 1960s and 1970s when economic growth in Ivory 
Coast was matched by few countries anywhere else on the African 
continent. The only WSE companies with more than a handful of 
outlets operating in 1992 (CNCI and SOCOCE) traded only in the 
north and centre west regions, the former being the poorest 
region of the country. Clearly, therefore, the economic recession of 
the 1980s cannot be held entirely responsible for these failures.
In the US, the Great Depression led to a severe scaling down of 
chain store operations in the 1930s but they survived.228 The 
correlation found in Europe between an increase in personal 
consumption per capita and an increase in sales per full-time
person employed in chain stores was but one reason for this
failure, albeit an important one.229 Despite this, all of the sources 
consulted on internal distribution in Ivory Coast have blamed the 
recession, only reluctantly admitting as secondary factors a few of 
the above mentioned failings of the small retail and grocery 
chains.
Chain store operations did have some successes. Price conformity 
became the rule rather than the exception, some Ivorians did
benefit enough from their training to survive independently and 
far more goods did become available to many consumers.
228 Hollander and Omura, 'Chain', pp.307-309.
229 Jefferys and Knee, E u rop e, pp.35-39.
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However, private interests failed to convert their dominance of 
importing into a similar dominance in distribution. The state too 
failed to dominate the sector. W hilst goods became widely 
available, neither the state nor the private companies could force 
the consumers to consume them. Consequently, the boost which a 
nationwide distribution network was expected to give to the 
Ivorian industria lisation  strategy, based on the w estern 
experience of large-scale retailing being "brought into existence 
by the development of mass production of consumer goods on the 
one hand and by the growing homogeneity of effective consumer 
dem and on the other" never really  m aterialised . This 
'homogeneity of effective consumers' had arisen through wage- 
e a rn in g  em p lo y m e n t, u rb a n is a tio n  and im p ro v ed  
c o m m u n ic a tio n s .230 In the west, stores were located in urban 
areas, especially booming suburban ones,231 whereas in Ivory 
Coast many were in villages. Further, the wage-earning employees 
were a comparatively small group in Ivory Coast, even in cities 
and, as Chapter 6 shows, consumers were far from homogenous.
Although supermarkets appeared to be even more inappropriate 
than small retail chains, they were aimed at a different market. 
The supermarkets were not an inappropriate technology because 
their target market was sufficiently wealthy and westernised in 
its consumer habits to justify these stores. Thus, a western 
technique was being associated with a westernised market. This 
was also largely true of grocery stores as the survival of the 
independents would suggest. The demise of the grocery chains 
was partly because their target consumer group - middle income 
Ivorians - contracted but also because they did not have the 
flexibility of the independents which might have enabled them to 
compete more successfully.
All of the above reinforce the arguments about chain store 
weaknesses in Ivory Coast. The advantages of economies of scale 
were lost through increased overheads, many of which arose from 
transport costs. Transport costs became a problem in large part
230 Ibid. p.50.
231 Hollander and Omura, 'Chain', pp.306.
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because of poor store location which also was responsible partly 
for inadequate store turnover. This in turn was due partly to low 
consumer outreach. The inflexibility of the chain store operations 
only served to worsen the consequences of the aforementioned 
failings. In short, the technology was inappropriate for the 
environment. Finally, as Boone noted, the state's attempt to co-opt 
the benefits of the commercial sector for itself,232 which Campbell 
argued has happened in other economic sectors,233 led to a 
proliferation of stores when Chaine Avion was already struggling, 
thereby undermining the stated aim of Ivorianisation through 
both Avion and PAC. Contrary to both the radical and liberal 
arguments on the economy in general,234 the end result of this 
clash between state and foreign interests was the failure of both 
initiatives as well as the undermining of NSE Ivorians (and other 
Africans) from the early 1960s to the early 1980s.
232 Boone, ‘Commerce’, p.67-92.
233 Campbell, ‘State and Capitalist Development in the Ivory Coast’. In 
P.Lubeck (ed.), The African Bourgeoisie (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1987), 
pp.281 -300 .
234 Ib id : Mytelka, 'Business', pp. 149-173 ; J-A.Faure and J-F.Medard, 'Classe 
dominante ou classe dirigeante ?'. In J-A.Faur6 and J-F.Medard (eds.), Etat et 
bourgeoisie en Cote d'Ivoire (Karthala, Paris, 1982), pp.139-140.
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CHAPTER 5
SUPPLIERS. PRODUCTS AND BRANDS
This chapter aims to examine the balance among suppliers 
between importers and manufacturers and the reasons why 
im porters increasingly dom inanated luxury goods, w hilst 
manufacturers increasingly dominated most of the volume items. 
The chapter also looks at the importance of brand, especially 
umbrella or manufacturers' brands, and at why some product 
groups became multi-brand whilst others did not. This also 
requires a look at the circumstances under which monopolies and 
oligopolies occur. The chapter tackles this material by first looking 
at the suppliers, how they operated and their respective 
advantages and disadvantages. Next, the extent of product 
distribution is assessed. Finally, the reasons why some products 
declined or disappeared altogether from the market are examined.
5.1 PROCESSED FOOD SUPPLIERS
There were two kinds of suppliers of processed foods in Ivory 
Coast, local manufacturers and importers. W hilst the large 
majority of processed foods were imported, most of these were 
not found outside supermarkets. Many of the biggest selling items 
were at least processed in Ivory Coast even if most of the inputs 
were imported.
Before independence there were few manufacturing concerns and 
most of those were reconditioning industries related to soaps, oils, 
ice and the bottling of wine.1 The reasons for this partly relate to 
the late development of the colony (as explained in the previous 
chapter) and partly because, unlike the colonial administration, 
one of the main priorities of the new government in the 1960-70
1 L. Gbagbo, 'Les entreprises coloniales en Cote d'Ivoire k la veille de la 
seconde guerre mondial'. In Laboratoire 'Connaissance du tiers-monde' 
(ed.) Entreprises et entrepreneurs en Afrique xix et xx siecles. tome 2, 
(L'Harmattan, Paris, 1983), p.483; Interview: F.Coulibaly, Director o f the 
Ecole de Commerce (Abidjan, 4 1990).
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plan was im port-substitution industrialisation to combat the 
"increasingly unfavourable terms of trade".2 The first tangible sign 
of this new direction was evidenced during the transition phase 
from colonial rule to independence when Nestle agreed in 1959 to 
set up instant coffee production facility under the guise of a 
subsidiary, Compagnie Africaine de Preparation Alimentaire et 
Dietetique (CAPRAL).3
From the point of view of attracting other investors, the Nestle 
agreement was an important vote of confidence in the new regime 
by one of the world’s largest food m anufacturers. The 
opportunities of a base from which to supply other West African 
markets and the liberal investment code (plus special concessions 
to CAPRAL) were two major attractions of Ivory Coast for a 
multinational to locate in Abidjan.4 More important though was 
the export of raw coffee, the production of instant coffee being a 
secondary consideration.5 The single greatest constraint on import 
substitution industrialisation was the size of the internal market, a 
limitation which the government hoped to overcome with income 
from the export economy and, indeed, from industrialisation 
itself.6
To an extent this happened for other manufacturers followed. 
Nestle set up another subsidiary, Nouvelles A lim entations 
(NOVALIM), in 1977 which took over the manufacture of stock 
cubes (started in 1976) from CAPRAL.7 Ivoirlait and Saprolait 
began production of milk products in 1963 and 1975 respectively, 
Abinader of sweets in 1963, and Preparations Alimentaires
2 L.R.Alschuler, M ultinationals and M aldevelopm ent (M acm illan, 
Basingstoke, 1988), pp.68-71.
3 J.Masini, M .Ikonicoff, C.Jedlicki and M.Lanzarotti, M ultinationals and 
Development in Black Africa: a Case Study in Ivorv Coast (Saxon House, 
Farnborough, 1979), pp. 113.
4 CCCI, Bulletin M ensuel. 2 (fev 1963), p. 18; Alschuler, M ald evelop m en t.
p .81.
5 Masini et al, B lack , p .115. r
6 Alschuler, M a ld ev e lo p m en t. p.71.
7 Masini et al, Black., p. 131; RC1, Repertoire des industries et activites de 
Cote d'Ivoire 1982-83 (Ministfcre de l'lndustrie, Abidjan, 1982).
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(PREPAL) of stock cubes in 1983.8 There were others too, like 
Chocodi, Y oplait and Compagnie Ivoirienne de Produits 
Alimentaire (CIPA) but only one of the above, PREPAL, had a 
majority Ivorian shareholding (it folded in 1985).9 Nonetheless, 
around 75% of processed food items in grocery stores in 1990 
were imports.10
Manufacturing as a whole showed an impressive rate of growth in 
terms of Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) for the years 1965 to 
1973 when it averaged 8.9% per annum but this declined to 5% 
between 1973 and 1984 and is estimated at just 0.9% from 1980 
to 1986.11 Consumer goods accounted for over 60% of production 
for all of this period with nearly 70% of all manufactured exports 
food related by 1982.12
Despite the growth in MVA, benefits to the Ivorian economy were 
limited by the cost of capital goods, the proportion of inputs 
imported, the repatriation of company profits and the cost of 
technical assistants. Capital goods added to the import bill and 
limited the creation of employment because they were high 
technology which meant that foreign technicians were needed. 
European managers, who earned 41% of total industrial wages in 
1 9 7 1 ,13 repatriated large amounts of their salaries. Further, the 
capital intensive technology meant in some cases highly priced
products because the size of the internal market made economies
of scale difficult.14 Finally, in a point related to what many see as 
the fundamental contradictions in Ivorian development policy,
Alschuler argued that:
8 RCI, Repertoire 1986-87.
9 Ib id : A.Dubresson, V illes et industries de Cote d'Ivoire (Karthala, Paris,
1989); Fieldwork: observation. All Fieldwork references are for all the 
period July-December 1990 unless otherwise stated.
10 Fieldwork: brand range survey.
11 R.C.Riddell et al, Manufacturing Africa (James Currey, 1990), p.154.
12 Ibid. pp .157-159.
13 Alschuler, M a ld ev e lo p m en t. p.83.
14 Ib id . pp.65-101; Riddell, M anufacturing, pp .152-172.
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Since tariff protection elim inated com petition, the foreign firms 
simply passed on their high production costs to the consumer in 
the form o f high prices. The highly priced consum er goods, 
being beyond the reach o f minimum w age agricultural labor, 
reinforced the initial condition o f a restricted internal m arket.1 6
Putting figures to the number of processed food importers over 
the years is a hazardous task16 but one that needs nonetheless to 
be attempted. In 1961-62 there were probably at most 50 
processed food importers in the formal sector, 19 of which were 
among the 30 largest import firms. The five largest companies 
accounted for 44.3% of the value of food and drink imports in 
1 9 6 1 .17 There are no other figures available until 1979, the 
figures for which are shown in Table 18 along with other available 
data.
TABLE 18: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF FORMAL SECTOR FIRMS IMPORTING 
PROCESSED FOODS, 1979-1988
YEAR NUMBER
1979 43
1982 39
1985 37
1987 32
1988 28
Sources: RCI, Repertoire des industries et activites de Cote dTvoire (M inistere de 
l'ln d u str ie , Abidjan ^ various editions 1982-89); Afrique Entreprise, 'Fichier des 
entreprises d'Afrique Noire' (Paris, 1979).
Most of these companies were founded before 1970 but by 1992 
four of the oldest ones were forced to close. Of the 17 companies 
which survived the economic downturn from 1979 to 1989, the 
large m ajority were either large firm s and/or also had 
manufacturing interests. The decline in formal sector firms over 
this decade occurred at the same time as a rise in the number of 
informal sector importers with lower operating costs and cheaper
15 Alschuler, M an u factu rin g , p .85.
16 One list o f importers obtained from the Ministry o f Commerce showed 
less than half o f the companies known to exist in 1990 according to 
fieldwork and RCI, Repertoire 1989-90. See also Riddell, M anufacturing. 
p. 154 regarding this problem.
17 IDET-CEGOS, 'La distribution en Cote d'Ivoire' (Ministfcre du Plan, Abidjan, 
1963), pp. 18-20.
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sources of supply. There are no figures available on either their 
numbers or the extent of their operations.18 The reasons for these 
developments are analysed below.
There were four types of importing company according to the 
system of product purchasing. Most large importers used buying 
houses: the company wishing to import sent an order and
purchases were made on its behalf. The role of the buying house 
was to seek out the best product at the lowest possible price, on 
the best possible paying conditions and within the importing 
company's specifications. They might also take care of shipping 
formalities and other paper work in the product’s country of 
origin. The purpose was thus to ensure regular supplies at 
competitive prices for the importer.19 Some companies such as the 
Compagnie Francaise d'Afrique Occidentale (CFAO)20 and the 
Societe Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain (SCOA)21 had their own 
buying houses w hilst others, especially the superm arkets, 
arranged to be supplied by an independent buying house.22 Most 
of these buying houses were in Paris as many of the products 
purchased were French. However, CFAO had one in New York in 
1946 and others served Ivorian importers from London and 
Rotterdam as well.23 The Chaine PAC and Avion retail chains were 
also partially served with imports through buying houses.24
Another method of product purchasing involved a company 
setting up a subsiduary in Ivory Coast which then imported and
18 Interview: Claude Assouan, Directeur d'Achats at CDCI (Abidjan,
December 4 1990); Personal experience: discussions with Lebanese traders 
and customs officials; SC1MPEX, M.Esmail, 'Rapport de la Commission 9 
"Grandes Surfaces" ' (May 28 1985).
19 A.Maurel, 'Les societes de distribution alimentaire en Cote d'Ivoire', 
A frica  [now Africa International!. 68 (Dakar, fev-mars 1974), p.45;
Interview: Mr. Yace, SCOA Service d'Achats (Abidjan, December 15 1990):
Mr. Kobenan, Director o f SCIMPEX (Abidjan, December 10 1990); IDET-CEGOS, 
'Distribution', p .21.
20 H.Bonin, CFAO: cent ans de competition (Economica, Paris, 1987), p.314.
21 Interview: Yace; Maurel, 'Alimentaire', p.45.
22 IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution'.
23 Bonin, CFAO . p.314; IDET-CEGOS, 'Distribution', p.21.
24 D.Bollinger, Le marketing en Afrique. tome 1: La Cote d'Ivoire (CEDA, 
Abidjan, 1977), pp.130-135.
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distributed the parent company's products.25 The clear advantage 
of this was that the producer directly controled the marketing of 
its products without the heavy financial commitment involved in 
manufacturing. This did not mean that manufacturing would not 
follow later (as happened with Nestle and stock cubes).26 One 
other advantage was exclusivity in distribution, something which 
was not always respected by the head office when its goods were 
handled through an agent. More recent examples of foreign 
producers switching from agent to subsiduary distribution are 
Bridel milk,27 formerly imported by Continentale de distribution 
(CODIS) and Ducros spices, previously handled by the Danish 
Africa Company (DANAFCO) and, before that, by the Compagnie 
Francaise de Cote d'Ivoire (CFCI).28
The third method of importing involved the importer being in 
direct contact with the overseas manufacturer. None of the 
literature consulted above deals with this type of operation, which 
may be termed 'agency importing'. In 20 years of trading in Ivory 
Coast since 1970, DANAFCO rarely used a buying house, relying 
instead on agency importing. Others which used this method 
include CODIS, the Societe de distribution et de representation 
(SODIREP) and the Societe commerciale de diffusion (CODIF). 
Generally, agency importers were small to medium sized formal 
sector firm s.29 Initial contact between agent and supplier was 
either direct, in that one solicited the other, or indirect. The British 
and Danish embassies in Abidjan regularly received enquiries 
from overseas manufacturers looking for recommended agents.30
25 IDET-CEGOS, 'Dustribution', p.17.
26 Masini et al, B la ck , pp. 130-131.
27 Interview: Mme. Said, Senior Secretary at CODIS (Abidjan, October 1990).
28 Personal experience: discussions with Marc Cheriaux, DANAFCO General 
Manager, later at Ducros (Cote d'Ivoire) (1985).
29 Personal experience: discussions with Cheriaux (who used to work for 
CODIF); Interview: Said; RCI, Repertoire 1985-86.
30 Fieldwork: discussion with the Commercial Attache at the Bristish 
Embassy in Abidjan (Nov 1990); Personal experience: discussions with Peter 
Toxvaerd, DANAFCO Director o f Marketing (1984-85). He was Danish 
ambassador to Ivory Coast 1978-81.
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Contact, direct or indirect, was usually made by the importer 
looking to expand range and turnover or to replace an agency just 
lost. Assuming that another importer already held the agency, the 
prospective supplier assessed the credit risk involved and set its 
credit conditions (usually payment 60 days from date of arrival in 
port, sometimes with external bank guarantee). The quantities 
involved and proposed marketing strategy were usually used as a 
means of persuading the supplier to grant an exclusive agency 
agreement. However, suppliers who previously had their products 
on the Ivorian market would often come up with their own 
proposals and set targets for the agent, as was frequently the case 
when the importer was attempting to "poach" an agency away 
from another importing company. This was not an uncommon 
practice, especially in times of economic hardship when the risks 
of marketing new products are higher and when strains in the 
relationship between agent and supplier may arise with falling 
sales. Examples of "poaching" include Lesieur mayonnaise (from 
SIFCODI to SNEM in 1990), Ovaltine (from SODIREP to DANAFCO in 
1984) and, with compliments returned, Lyons tea (from DANAFCO 
to SODIREP in 1989). If the importer already held the agency in 
another country, the process was often a formality.31
Exclusivity for a product was often difficult to aquire for small 
companies and, more recently, even for a large company such as 
S C O A .32 Whilst CODIS was supposedly the exclusive agent for 
Gervaise ice cream, Findus, Even and other brand names, the 
com pany founnd it im possible in practice to prevent 
supermarkets importing these brands them selves.33 Often this 
was because the products came from different factories in 
continental Europe; one such example was Quaker cereals.34
31 Fieldwork: discussion with Bernadin Doh Gilles, Salesman at Blohorn and 
DANAFCO; Interview: Mr. Eric Bosteen, Chairman of West Africa Holdings, 
parent company o f SAFA and DANAFCO (Abidjan, 1st. interview, November 
15 1990); Personal experience: observation: discussions with Toxvaerd.
32 Interview: Yace; Personal experience.
33 Interview: Said.
34 Personal experience: discussions with Mme Roselyn Theze, Charges des 
Supermarches at DANAFCO 1982-88 and Senior Secretary at Abinader 1988- 
90: observation.
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The final method of import purchasing is that conducted on a non­
agency basis, at irregular intervals and where the individual or 
company wishing to import nearly always approached the 
supplier. Again, there is little in the literature about this form of 
importing but most people in trade were well informed about 
these generally simple procedures which were used almost 
exclusively by the informal sector. Most of the products involved 
were multi-brand name items like tomato concentrate, sardines 
and cheap biscuits, often from other developing countries. There 
was rarely any promotional back-up for these processed foods as 
no long-term formal links existed between importer and supplier 
and nor was there usually exclusivity. A company or individual 
sometimes imported the product once and then never again 
because the supplier did not appear to be interested in having a 
permanent representative.35
In terms of the proportion of processed foods on the Ivorian 
market, the importance of buying houses decreased over time. 
Earlier, especially before the 1950s, the big companies dominated 
the market and most if not all used buying houses: the advantages 
of lower prices and knowledge of world markets almost made this 
a necessity. From the 1960s to the mid 1980s it would appear that 
agency importers increased in importance but from the mid 1980s 
non-agency irregulars began to supplant them. In addition, the 
proportion of goods manufactured in Ivory Coast rose fairly 
dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s, further decreasing the 
importance of buying houses.
5.2 THE EXTENT OF PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION
As implied earlier, many products which were found in 
supermarkets and grocery stores were not available in small retail 
stores. The former tended to stock a wider range of product 
groups and more brands within each product group. A product
35 Personal experience: observation: discussions with customs officia ls and 
formal and informal sector traders; Interview: Mr. Merhouet, Junior 
Partner o f SABIMEX (Abidjan, November 13 1990).
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group is best defined by examples; biscuits, concentrated milk, 
coffee, breakfast cereals and tinned sardines are all products 
groups. A brand has been defined by Bowbrick as "a label which 
indicates that all products carrying a label have a common 
manufacturer, distributor, retailer or country of origin".36 Lu, 
Bonnet Rouge, Nescafe, Kellogs corn flakes and Armorial are all, 
respectively, brands within those product groups mentioned 
above. However, there are different levels of brands. Umbrella 
and manufacturers' brands like Unilever and Nestle were an 
important influence on decisions by traders whether to purchase. 
Main brands such as Brooke Bond and sub-brands like PG Tips can 
be important to the consumer. Finally, a product line denotes a 
particular product, for example a Nescafe lOOg tin is a different 
product line to the 200g tin.37 The purpose of these definitions 
will become clear later.
It is argued in this section that competition between brands in 
supermarkets and, to a lesser extent grocery stores, was in most 
instances different from that in the small retail store sector. It is 
also argued that, in the small retail store sector, the brand names 
within some product groups were important whilst in others they 
were not. The evidence upon which these arguments are based 
comes partly from fieldwork surveys of stores in nine different 
locales where data was collected on the stocking patterns of all 
stores within a certain town or district of Abidjan and partly from 
observation and conversations with traders during the fieldwork 
period and from personal experience. Other than one or two lines, 
earlier sources make no reference to brands stocked by stores. 
Consequently, the arguments pursued in this and the following 
section are based primarily upon evidence from the years 1983 to 
1990 though reference is made to earlier years where possible. 
First, though, a look at the quantities of goods imported into the 
country.
36 P.Bowbrick, The Economics o f Quality. Grades and Brands (Routledge, 
1992), p.29.
37 Ibid. pp.29-31.
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Unfortunately, it is difficult to be precise in calculating the total 
value of processed food imports because of the different 
categories chosen by the UN and Ivorian customs. This problem 
was particularly acute for the years before independence but 
reasonably accurate estimates can nonetheless be made from 
1960.
The value of food and drink as a percentage of total imports has 
varied from between 13% and 21.4% 38 of the total and averaged 
16.9% from 1961 to 1969, 15.05% from 1970 to 1979 and 18.9% 
from 1980 to 1985.39 The fall in the percentage during the 1970s 
was due partly to increased capital goods imports40 and partly to 
a dramatic fall in rice imports for the years 1975 and 1976 whilst 
rice also accounted for a large part of the rise in the food imports 
percentage during the 1980s.41 The proportion of processed foods 
in total food and live animals imports rose after 1965 as 
illustrated in Table 19.
TABLE 19: PROPORTION OF PROCESSED FOODS IN TOTAL FOOD AND LIVE 
ANIMAL IMPORTS
YEAR FOOD & ANIMALS PROCESSED FOOD PROCESSED FOOD %
1965 $ 33,546,000 $ 9,319,000 27.8
1975 $ 135,535,000 $ 38,185,000 28.2
1985 $ 260,847,000 $ 83,141,000 31.9
Source: United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics, (series D vol 15 No 27, 1965), 
pp.6731-6736, (series D vol 25 No 15, 1975), pp.57-60, (series D vol 35 No 14, 1985), 
pp. 145-148. Processed food figures do not include honey, frozen meat or frozen fish. 
The inclusion of some processed foods used in local production (e.g. powdered milk for 
yoghurt product) could not be avoided.
This small rise in the proportion of processed foods was largely 
due to condensed milk which was by far the most important 
processed food import. At the same time, the imports of four of
38 J.Roche, 'Le role des importations dans la consommation alimentaire en 
Cote d'Ivoire', Cahiers Sciences Humaines. 24, 4 (ORSTOM, 1988), p.522. For 
the years 1957 to 1985 only.
39 Calculated from Ibid. p.523.
40 See RCI, Statistiques Douaniers.
41 Roche, 'Role', p.525. Rice alone accounted for 24% o f the value o f food 
and drink imports between 1980 and 1985.
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the next m ost  im portant p r o c e sse d  fo o d s  in 1965  fa i le d  to e v o lv e  
as ra p id ly  b e tw e e n  1965  and 1 9 7 5  w h i l s t ,  by  1 9 8 5 ,  th e y  had  
m o st ly  stagnated  in term s o f  tonnage  and w ere  in d e c l in e  in term s  
o f  proportion . T h e se  d e v e lo p m e n ts  are i l lustrated  in the  F ig u r e s  1, 
2  and 3.
FIGURE l
P E R C E N T A G E  D ISTRIBU TIO N  O F  T H E  U S $  V A LU E-O F 
P R O C E S S E D  F O O D  IM P O R T S ,1 9 6 5
4 0 . 7 2 %
3 2 . 8 4 %
7 . 0 7 %
7 . 1 9 % 1 2 . 1 8 %
□  CO ND MILK 
H  P R E S FISH
■  PRESVEG  
H  BUTTER
■  OTHERS
Source: Calculated from United Nations, C om m odity  Trade Statist ics  series D  vol 15 N 2- 
27 (1 9 6 5 ) ,  p p .6 7 3 1 -6 7 3 6 .
FIGURE 2
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE U S$ VALUE OF PR O C E SSE D  FOOD
I M P O R T S , 1 9 7 5
3 3 . 2 8 %
4 4 . 5 6 %
4 . 8 7 %
□  C O N D  MILK 
M P R E S  FISH 
■  PRESVEG
□  BUTTER 
H  OTHER
Source: Calculated from United N ations C om m od ity  Trade Stat ist ics  series D  vol 25 N 2-
15 (1 9 7 5 ) ,  pp .5 7 -6 0 .
1 9 6
FIGURE 3
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE U S$ VALUE OF PR O C E SSE D  FOOD
I M P O R T S 1 9 8 5
4 1 . 2 1 %
2 . 4 7 %
4 4 . 6 5 %
□  C O N D  MILK
■  PRESVEG
OTHER
BUTTER
P R E S FISH
7 . 4 8 %  4 . 1 9 %
Source: Calculated from United Nations C om m o d ity  Trade Stat ist ics  series D  vol 35 N 2- 
14 (1 9 8 5 ) ,  p p . 14 5-148 .
F ig u r e  4 s h o w s  the e v o lu t io n  o f  m arm alad e  im p o rts  w h ic h ,  l ik e  
the other products  in the p ie  charts, la rg e ly  corre la te  to the  le v e l  
o f  G D P  per capita.
Sources: RCI, Statist iques D ouaniers (1 9 6 0 -8 5 ) .
T h e  d i s c u s s io n  on p roducts  is  d iv id e d  in to  t w o  parts. T h e  f ir s t
c o n c e r n s  th o s e  p rod u cts  fo u n d  in a ll  t y p e s  o f  s to r e s  and the
s e c o n d  th o se  g e n e r a l ly  o n ly  in su p erm a rk ets  and g r o c e r y  s to res .
T h e  n u m b er  o f  p r o c e ss e d  fo o d  p rod u ct  l in e s  fo u n d  n a t io n a l ly  in
FIGURE 4
IMPORTS OF MARMALADE IN TO N N ES
1 9 6 0  1 9 6 5  1 9 7 0  1 9 7 5  1 9 8 0  1 9 8 5
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the majority of all types of stores in 1990 was limited to around 
fifty. These fell into 12 product groups comprising approximately 
20 dominant brands or sub-brands (shown in Table 20). By 
dominant brands it is meant brands within a product group which 
had a distribution coverage of at least a third of that of the group 
total. There was also a large number of brands and sub-brands 
within the 11 product groups which had a limited distribution for 
reasons not related to them being supermarket or grocery store 
products (i.e. price and luxury status were not relevant).42
TABLE 20: WIDELY DISTRIBUTED PRODUCTS, THEIR SUPPLIERS AND ORIGIN
PRODUCT
GROUP
YEAR FIRST 
IN ALL 
STORE TYPES
1990
DOMINANT
BRANDS
ORIGIN OF 
DOMINANT 
BRANDS
MOST
RECENT
SUPPLIERS
N° of 
BR'DS
c o n d e n se d
m ilk
p r o b a b ly  
pre WW2
Nestle, Geant, 
G ranlait,
B .R ouge
H olland,
lo ca l,
F ra n ce
N estld ,
SIALIM,
SABIMEX
15
tea early 1960s Lipton, Kettle Belgium ,U K CDCI 11
c u b e s 1970s ? M aggi, Jumbo lo ca l Nestte, CICA 2
c o f f e e early 1960s Nescafe, JAG, 
l'Or Brun
lo ca l Nestle, SAT, 
JAG
6
b is c u its 1950s ? n o n e + 20
tomato tins 1960s ? n o n e 31
c h o c o la te
p o w d er
early 1960s N escao,
CHOOODI
lo ca l N estl6 ,
CHOCODI
5
S a r d in e s 1950s ? Sabri, El’be, 
P r in c e s s e
M orocco SABIMEX,
SGI
13
m a r g a r in e 9 Blue Band lo ca l B lo h o r n 2
baby food early 1970s C erelac lo ca l N e stle 3
p ow d ered
m ilk
p r o b a b ly  
pre WW2
Nido F ra n ce N e stle 7
rolled oats late 1970s ? Quaker H olland DANAFCO 1
Sources: Fieldwork: brand range survey: d iscussion , A lex Adou Brou, salesm an
(August 8 1990); Interview: Doh Gilles (1st.): Mr N’Gozan, CFCI manager (December 12 
1990); J.M asini, M .Ikonicoff, C .Jedlicki and M .Lanzarotti, M u ltin a tio n a ls  and 
D evelopm ent in Black Africa: a Case Study in the Ivory Coast (Saxon H ouse, 
Farnborough, 1979), p. 126; RCI, Repertoire des industries et activites de Cote d'Ivoire 
1 984- 85  (Ministere de l'lndustrie, Abidjan, 1985); SEDES, 'Region de Korhogo. Etude 
de developpement socio-economique' (Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, 1965).
Despite the dominance of France in other areas of trade, few of the 
main processed foods came from the former metropole. Most were
42 Fieldwork: regional distribution survey: observation: brand range 
survey: PNCI, ’Produits de base pour magasins type 1 et 2'.
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processed locally with largely imported inputs. Hence there was a 
lack of linkages. Most of the product groups show oligopolies or 
monopolies and these were also the areas where the most 
promotion and advertising activity took place. This situation 
reached its most extreme with the dominance of Nestle as a 
manufacturing brand. It was the number one distributed brand in 
five of the 12 product groups and was a close second in a sixth.
TABLE 21: NUMBER OF STORES STOCKING CHOCOLATE DRINK BRANDS IN 
SELECTED LOCALES, 1990
BRAND A b oisso T ieb'sou Lakota G uiglo F erk e M a rco ry A ttie c o u b e
N escao 50 28 54 37 58 162 91
C hocodi 22 11 16 12 11 135 82
O valtin e 17 5 3 4 8 66 21
M ilo 14 0 2 0 19 19 10
N e sq u ic k 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
Total
C o v era g e
54 29 54 39 59 174 93
N°QF
STORES
64 39 61 62 77 186 100
Key: Tieb'sou = Tiebessou, Ferke = Ferkessedougou,
Note: Marcory and Attiecoube are districts of Abidjan.
Source: Fieldwork: regional distribution survey (1990).
TABLE 22: NUMBER OF STORES STOCKING COFFEE BRANDS IN SELECTED 
LOCALES, 1990
BRANDS A b oisso  A sse u fr y  T ieb'sou Lakota G uiglo  F e r k e  A ttie c o u b e
N e sc a fe 60 18 35 56 54 70 100*
SAT 16 6 13 22 2 48 75
JAG 5 10 12 49 2 4 34
D olca 9 3 2 1 0 4 12
GTF 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
M axw ell 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total
c o v e r a g e
61 20 37 59 54 76 100*
N° OF 
STORES
64 20 39 61 62 77 100
Key: Tieb'sou = Tiebessou, Ferke = Ferkessedougou. * Estimate based on 75 stores. 
Note: Attiecoube is a district of Abidjan.
Source: Fieldwork: regional distribution survey (1990).
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TABLE 23: NUMBER OF STORES STOCKING BABY FOOD CEREAL BRANDS IN 
SELECTED LOCALES, 1990
BRANDS A sse u fr y T ieb'sou L akota G uiglo F e rk e A ttie c o u b e
C erelac 16 29 50 32 55 87
M aizen a 0 0 0 1 0 0
P h o s p h a t in e 0 0 0 0 1 3
Total 16 29 50 32 55 87
c o v e r a g e  
N2 OF STORES 20 39 61 62 77 100
Key: Tieb'sou = Tiebessou, Ferke = Ferkessedougou 
Note: Attiecoube is a district of Abidjan.
Source: Fieldwork: regional distribution survey (1990).
Table 21 shows clearly that only two of the five brands, Nescao 
and Chocodi, can be regarded as having wide coverage in these 
locales and even Chocodi, a heavily advertised product, was weak 
outside Abidjan. In Table 22, the Nestle product faced more 
competition but the other two leading coffee brands were clearly 
secondary whilst in Table 23 Nestle effectively had a monopoly in 
the baby cereal market. The fact that Nestle had so many products 
on the market reinforced its position with traders, the name not 
only being well known but the strength of some lines carrying 
weaker ones. Tables 21 to 23 also reveal what Table 20 hides, that 
there were regional differences both in brands available and 
overall coverage of a product group, as shown in Table 24.
The following two tables relate to tinned tomatoes. Table 24 
clearly illustrates that the number of brands rendered market 
domination by any one brand impossible, at least without
publicity, which none received. Even La Bianca, whilst being twice
as popular as the next brand, failed to achieve any sort of 
dominance in four of the six locales. This was in part due to the 
large number of importers of tomatoes as some suppliers had 
better contacts at the wholesale level in certain areas than others. 
Table 25 shows that most of the importers of this product type
were Lebanese and that companies tended to import several
brands.
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TABLE 24: OCCURRENCE OF TINNED TOMATO BRANDS IN STORES OF SELECTED 
LOCALES, 1990
BRAND A sse u fr y  T ieb essou Lakota G uiglo F erk e A ttie c o u b e
La Bianco 7 6 12 30 39 16
Salsa 4 10 21 1 3 12
Cam el 0 1 6 4 0 25
La Perl a 5 6 9 3 8 4
R on d isa 3 4 4 0 0 0
S o la r ia 0 4 9 1 1 9
C alypso 2 4 5 7 3 1
V a lfru tta 2 3 4 0 6 5
Sole Mio 1 3 2 1 10 0
R u sso 0 2 1 3 11 0
T orro 1 0 5 1 1 8
F e g e 2 4 2 4 0 3
All other 
19 brands
7 13 25 14 14 8
Total
C ov era g e
19 38 53 54 66 88
NUMBER 20  
OF STORES
Key: Ferke = Ferkessedougou 
Note: Attiecoube is a district 
Source: Fieldwork: regional
39
of Abidjan, 
distribution
61
survey
62
(1990).
77 100
TABLE 25: KNOWN IMPORTERS OF BRANDS OF TINNED TOMATOES, 1989-90
IMPORTER NATIONALITY BRANDS
IMPORTED
SABIMEX L e b a n ese 8
Pri ma Iv o r ia n /S a u d i 5
SOCOCE L e b a n ese 3
SAEG L e b a n e se 2
J o n a th a n L e b a n ese 2
SOGECIM L e b a n e se 2
SMTT L e b a n e se 2
CIREPCI L e b a n e se 2
SGOA F r e n c h 2
Sources: Fieldwork: brand range survey (1990); Interview: Claude Assouan, Directeur
d'Achats at CFCI (Abidjan, December 4 1990): N'Gozan: Doh Gilles (1st.): Mr.Merhouet,
Junior Partner of SABIMEX (Abidjan, November 13 1990).
The question naturally arises why some importers dealt in so 
many brands, to which there are three answers. First, many 
brands were of variable quality at times so importers often placed 
orders with more than one manufacturer if one brand turned out 
to be poor. Second, some sizes of a brand were unavailable so the 
importer found himself importing, say, two sizes of one brand and
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another size from a different manufacturer. Third, prices changed 
rapidly so one brand was sometimes cheaper early in the year but 
became more expensive a few months later.43
Non-luxury processed foods of many brands were imported 
increasingly by the Lebanese informal sector but also by trading 
houses who previously had a monopoly in this area. Most of these 
items were from big selling product groups but there was rarely 
any promotional back-up and each brand often had several 
importers, some regular but others just occassional. The brand 
name was unim portant to the consum er and frequently  
disappeared from the market after a year or two though it 
sometimes reappeared several years later. This situation was 
typified by concentrated tomatoes in tins of which there were 
around 50 brands in 1990. Cheap sardines, cheap tinned peas, 
butter and cheap biscuits are the other main examples of many- 
brand non-luxury processed foods. Many of these products were 
imported from other Third World countries and, increasingly, 
from Eastern Europe.44
Many of the products in Table 21 were widely available in the 
1960s but some, like Quaker45 and Maggi (see Chapter 7), took 
several years to reach the majority of stores. Others, like Lipton, 
were on the verge of losing their monopoly in 1990 though they 
remained widely available. Some ceased to be present in more 
than a handful of outlets, mainly because they were too expensive 
as incomes continued to shrink in the latter half of the 1980s. 
Examples of these are Milo chocolate powder and Ovaltine.46 The 
overall pattern however, is one of continuity. The large proportion 
of locally manufactured products is unsurprising as these were
43 Interview: Merhouet; Fieldwork: discussions with Lebanese traders 
(1 9 9 0 ).
44 Interviews: Kobenan: Merhouet; Fieldwork: observation: discussions 
with traders: brand range survey; Personal experience: observation: 
discussions with traders.
45 Interview: E. Bosteen (1st.).
46 Fieldwork: regional distribution survey; DSA: internal reports, L.Bosteen, 
'Survey o f  Distribution Outlets and Ethnic/National Groups, Abidjan Town' 
and 'Survey o f Distribution Outlets and Ethnic/National Groups - Bush 
Sector o f Abidjan' (both 1985).
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the most heavily promoted. Of the imported ones, all were heavily 
promoted with the exception of Le Roux chicory for which, unlike 
the others, there was no sole agency.47
Finally, chicory and corned beef are not multi brand but are non­
luxuries which received no promotion and which, again unlike 
other one or few brand processed foods, were imported by the 
Lebanese informal sector. For corned beef, the brand name used 
to be important as Exeter was a mark of quality48 but it priced 
itself out of a market which, by 1990, had only four brands.49
Chicory was represented by a single brand with many importers;
this market was described by one CFCI manager as a "disaster"
because of large scale fraud.50
The second group of products consists of those which were found 
only in supermarkets and grocery stores i.e. they are luxury 
products. These products were usually imported either by the 
supermarkets themselves or by small to medium sized European 
owned firms with sole agency agreements. There was rarely any 
promotional activity and sales were small except perhaps over 
Christmas when some items such as Planters and Munch Kings 
snack foods realised a two or three million CFA turnover for the 
m on th .51 Other items in this category were often aimed at specific 
communities, for example Marmite and Heinz Baked Beans for the 
400 odd Britons52 and for high earning Ghanaians.53 However, 
such imports were high risk (legend has it that the - French - 
manager of one company despairingly dumped a consignment of 
Baked Beans in the lagoon) and were very much on the decrease
47 Interview: Assouan.
48 Interview: Mr. Bernadin Doh Gilles, Salesman at Blohorn and DANAFCO  
(Abidjan, 2nd. interview, October 2 1990): E.Bosteen (1st.).
49 Interview: Doh Gilles (2nd.); Fieldwork: regional distribution survey: 
product range survey.
50 Interview: Assouan.
51 DSA: sales ledger (1983-86).
52 Personal experience: from a conversation with a senior British resident 
(1 9 8 3 ).
53 Personal experience: according to various Ghanaian aquaintences and 
store keepers (1983-84).
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over the late 1980s due to the shrinkage of the expatriate 
com m unity.
There are also many brand luxury items, the availability of which 
was usually restricted to grocery stores and supermarkets. 
Virtually all of these products were brand names popular in
France, imported by small to medium sized European companies 
on a sole agency basis and aimed at the European type consumer. 
Such items were often promoted in stores but rarely through the 
media. They included tinned fruits and vegetables, cheese, high 
quality sardines and other tinned fish, infusions, honey, jams and 
breakfast cereals and formed the bulk of processed foods found in 
supermarkets and grocery stores.
The range of outlets in which different types of products were 
found is largely dealt with in the following chapter but a few
general points on this issue are needed here as they were 
important to decision making in the purchase of products. The 
extent of distribution depended basically on two factors: the type 
of product and the resources of the importer/manufacturer. Road 
conditions are all-important for fragile processed foods so towns 
which could be reached by tarmac roads were more likely to have 
a variety of brands and product types. The growth of the tarmac
road network since the 1950s54 (see Maps 1 to 3 in Chapter 1)
thus greatly facilitated the expansion of product availability in 
many areas of the country. Other products required refrigeration 
during transport and this meant a considerable investment in 
specialised lorries, an investment which often only the bigger 
companies could afford to make.
5.3 THE DECLINE AND DISAPPEARANCE OF PRODUCTS
Of the many factors which were responsible for the disappearance 
of products from the market, some have already been hinted at in 
the above paragraphs. Processed foods which were manufactured
54 ORSTOM and IGT, Atlas de Cote d'Ivoire (Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, 1979), 
section D2a.
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in Ivory Coast were probably the least likely to disappear, 
followed by those imported by multinationals. The reason for this 
seems fairly clear in that, unless market demand changed 
dramatically, multinationals were unlikely to drop their own 
products and were not susceptable to the m arket being 
undermined by a supplier failing to respect exclusivity. The main 
threat thus came from competition but here too they were at an 
advantage for they possessed the financial resources to out­
advertise and out-price cut almost all competition. Thus the only 
multinational processed foods which were likely to disappear 
from the market were those which the parent company ceased to 
produce or, during an economic downturn, which were luxury 
items. Multinational processed foods apart, most other products 
were vulnerable to a large number of factors relating to anything 
from performance of the economy to fraudulent imports to 
supplier-agent disputes.
Probably the biggest reason for product disappearance over the 
last five years covered by the thesis was excessive competition 
from imports which were much cheaper than similar existing 
brands. This was due to either dumping, customs fraud or, more 
simply, access to suppliers with highly competitive products. 
Dumping was cited by the supermarkets as being one reason why 
their turnover declined though this concerned mainly basic 
p ro d u c ts 55 which were not as important to supermarkets as to 
smaller outlets. Imports involving customs fraud were equally 
resented by the WSE/formal sector and led to some products 
disappearing because they could not compete on price. Laicran 
milk powder, Torro tomatoes and Globus peas were all dropped by 
CFCI for this reason.56
For some sections of the market, cheap alternative sources of 
supply were even more devastating to existing products. The most 
obvious example is biscuits from South Africa.57 The Lebanese 
were the main 'culprits' here though in fairness they merely took
55 SCIMPEX, 'Commission' p.2.
56 Interview: Assouan.
57 Fieldwork: brand range survey.
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advantage of a relaxation in trade sanctions to supply the 
generally high quality biscuits58 which many Ivorians would 
otherwise not have been able to afford. As a result of these cheap 
imports, CODIF, a major biscuit importer, went into receivership in 
199059 whilst DANAFCO, since 1989, stopped importing over half 
of its 20 odd lines of Oxford biscuits.60 Even prior to the cheap 
South African imports, there was fierce competition in the biscuit 
market. Nevertheless, in 1990, after some five years of cheap 
imports, the Nour A1 Hayat supermarket still stocked over 100 
different types of biscuit representing nearly 100 brand names of 
non-South African origin.61 Similarly, in the market for teabags, 
Liptons held sway from the early 1980s but a comparison 
between outlet surveys conducted in 198562 and 199063 seems to 
indicate that it was it was latterly suffering from an influx of 
cheap competitors.
Excessive competition was not just be caused by price but also by 
the arrival of otherwise more attractive products or through 
heavy advertising. The Jumbo cube saw its market share fall in 
the mid to late 1980s because the manufacturer was unwilling to 
compete with Nestle in advertising expenditure and Lyons tea 
suffered a similar fate at the hands of Liptons in the early 1980s 
despite a much lower public retail price.64 The SCOA supermarket 
group had a policy of suppressing one brand if a more attractive 
(better quality, better known, cheaper etc) rival brand became 
available.65
Some products also disappeared or experienced sharp falls in 
turnover due to price rises beyond that of similar products as
58 Fieldwork: observation.
5  ^ Interview: Mr. Frederick Attoh, DANAFCO General Manager (Abidjan, 
September 1990).
60 DSA: stock ledger (1989-90).
61 Fieldwork: product range survey.
62 DSA: internal reports, L.Bosteen, 'Abidjan Town' and 'Bush Sector'.
63 Fieldwork: regional distribution survey.
64 Interview: E. Bosteen (1st.); Fieldwork: observation; Personal experience: 
o b se r v a tio n .
65 Interview: Mr. M.Anthony, Director o f the Score group (Abidjan, 
Novem ber 1990).
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opposed to the sudden importation of cheaper produce. One such 
product was Exeter corned beef in the late 1970s66 which is no 
longer availab le .67 The Royal Brand of custard powder also 
disappeared though price was not the only reason.68 Price also 
played a part in the failure of the Jumbo fish cube (discussed in 
more detail later)69 but for some products demand was less 
elastic. Kjeldsen's buttercookies from Denmark and Quaker honey 
from Holland both experienced sharp price rises in the early 
1980s without any fall off in sales because they were products 
aimed at wealthy consumers.70
A decline in sales caused by price rises, or any other factor for 
that matter, could also lead to a product disappearing because 
orders no longer filled a container, even though sales may have 
been sufficient to ensure a profit. Filling a container could be a 
major problem for luxury products of non-French or Dutch origin 
as there were fewer possibilities for combining products to fill a 
container. Several lines of Ota breakfast cereals disappeared in 
1988 when that company switched production of items to France: 
the remaining Danish-produced cereals did not sell well enough to 
justify importation by the container load whilst shipping by 
palatte proved too expensive.71
Other problems could arise from suppliers switching countries, 
especially where the management was concerned. Klim milk 
powder used to be imported from Denmark by DANAFCO in 
1979*72 but jn i 98i production was switched to South Africa. The 
South African management refused to accept that the agent had 
blacks am ongst their management, some of whom were
66 Interview: Doh Gilles.
67 Fieldwork: regional distribution survey: product range survey. A 
product o f  French origin, Ester, has tried to exploit the Exeter brand name 
which had a reputation for quality.
68 DSA: stock ledger (1984); Personal experience: I was involved in the 
liquidation o f the final stocks o f this product.
69 DSA: stock ledger (1985-88); Personal experience: discussions with
traders (1985).
70 DSA: stock ledger (1983-86).
71 DSA: stock ledger (1988); Personal experience: discussions with Theze.
72 DSA: stock ledger (1979): import licenses (1979).
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responsuble for the marketing of their product and demanded 
that whites be put in charge. DANAFCO refused and dropped Klim 
from its list of imports.73 Standard Brands was another company 
that moved one of its subsiduaries' management, this time from 
Liverpool to Athens in 1980. The Greek management proceeded to
raise prices and ship its Royal custard and Baking powder to
anyone who wanted, thereby breaking its agency agreement. The 
end result was that the agent ceased importing and, four years 
later, the Royal brand was no longer available in Ivory Coast.74
However, a change in management did not always lead to a 
product disappearing but it may have meant a reassessment of
the agent's performance, leading to a change in importers. 
Alternatively, company politics rather than performance may
have been the deciding factor, as was the case with Lipton tea. 
From 1981 to 1989 SODIREP marketed this brand with great 
success, displacing Lyons and Kettle as the dominant brand75 but 
in the latter year Unilever bought Liptons and gave the agency to 
Blohorn, another of its subsidiaries.76 Unilever also tried to wrest 
the Quaker agency from DANAFCO for CFCI in the early 1980s by 
threatening to cease distributing in the Middle East where it held 
the agency through yet another subsidiary. Having worked with 
DANAFCO for over 15 years and being more than satisfied with 
the agent's performance in West Africa, Quaker refused but had to 
ship small quantities to CFCI as a concession.77
Good relations between supplier and agent were often essential to 
the success of a product and this includes suppliers being willing 
to invest in promoting products which showed potential. Quaker 
and DANAFCO both benefitted from a cordial relationship and 
mutual understanding of each others problems. This was not the 
case between Wander and SODIREP, respectively supplier and 
importer of Ovaltine until 1984 when Wander tired of throwing
73 Interview: E.Bosteen (1st.).
74 Ibid; Personal experience: discussion with Cheriaux (1984).
75 Interview: Doh Gilles (2nd.).
76 Interview: E.Bosteen (1st.).
77 Ibid; Personal experience: discussions with Ian Trier, Quaker Special
Markets D ivision (1984-85).
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money at the product with no noticeable results and changed 
ag en ts .78 Bad relations also existed between United Biscuits and 
DANAFCO due to the former continually sending biscuits from 
their old stock, the expiry dates leaving the agent only a month or 
two to sell the stock. The agent eventually tired of this and 
stopped importing in 1985.79 Unlike Wander though, United 
Biscuits failed (or did not try) to find another agent.80
A change in packing could also adversely affect a product as was 
the case with Standard Brands’ Lion baking powder and Lyons' 
bakery products.81 Alternatively, it could prove spectacularly 
successful as illustrated by the Jumbo cube though Ovaltine, 
Lipton and Lyons were apparently unaffected by change. There 
was often little an agent could do if a supplier decided to change 
the product design as the Ivorian market was rarely significant 
enough to merit consideration. Likewise, some products which 
sold well in Ivory Coast disappeared because the supplier ceased 
production due to lack of sales on the world market. Cessation of 
production, though, would appear to have been more common 
where local manufacturers were concerned, the best known 
examples being PREPAL's Tanti cube in 198582 and REK 
pasteurised milk sometime after 1986.83 Alternatively, a product 
could disappear because the importer closed down, as was the 
case with Coast concentrated milk in 1980.84
Finally, and a factor which became increasingly important, 
suppliers sometimes set credit conditions with which no agent felt 
able to comply. Kerrygold, after suffering heavy losses through 
fraud along the coast, required external guarantees and granted a
78 Personal experience: discussions with Peter Kingsberger, Wander 
Regional Manger (1984-85).
79 DSA: telexes between DANAFCO and United Biscuits (1985); Personal 
experience: I was responsible for disposing o f the stock (1985).
80 Fieldwork: observation.
81 Interview: E.Bosteen (1st.).
82 Dubresson, V il le s .
83 Fieldwork: observation.
84 Interview: Doh Gilles (2nd.).
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limited credit period.85 This lack of confidence undoubtedly also 
stemmed from the economic climate when, in addition to agents 
who wiould not pay, suppliers also had to take into account those 
which suddenly found they could not pay.
If most of the examples given above are recent, this is not just 
due to a scarcity of sources for earlier periods. Two of the main 
reasons for product disappearance or declining sales, fraud and 
cheap alternative supplies, are recent phenomena probably linked 
to the decline of the economy during the last decade. This latter 
was the cause of much supplier-agent friction with the former not 
always prepared to accept that declining sales were not the fault 
of the latter. Further, competition greatly intensified over the 
years due to the increased variety of products available86 and 
this, combined with the economic decline, inevitably led to a 
higher 'casualty rate'. When (hopefully rather than if) the 
economy improves and consumer resources rise again, the 
casualty rate should decline though by how much may depend on 
the rate of increase in fraud.
5.4 CONCLUSION
There are a number of factors which have determined the 
survival of some products against the failure of others. Chief 
amongst these is consumer demand (dealt with more thoroughly 
in the next two chapters) which enabled the product to sustain 
sufficient turnover to enable local manufacture and/or heavy 
promotional support. Attaining the stage of local manufacture can 
be seen as crucial for the investment involved almost certainly 
meant a sustained effort to keep the product a market leader 
within its product group. If this effort subsequently led to 
monopoly control then the presence of the product on the Ivorian 
market was further secured. In the case of Nestle, monopoly or
85 Interview: Mr. Eric Bosteen, Chairman of West Africa Holdings, parent 
company of SAFA and DANAFCO (Cahors, France, 2nd. interview, Febuary 9 
1992).
86 Interview: Doh G illes (2nd.); Personal experience: discussions with 
trad ers.
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oligopoly markets were further strengthened by the number of 
brands and the power the company could wield over traders - 
hence the benefits of umbrella brands.
The increasing dominance of Nestle and Unilever (margarine, 
many soap product lines, oils, etc) and the rapid decline since the 
mid 1980s of formal sector importing companies left Lebanese 
traders, with their extensive and increasing interests in the 
importation of cheap goods on which duties were frequently 
evaded, as the only bulwark against this multinational dominance. 
Their power in trade is well illustrated by the fact that they were 
largely responsible for the demise of many small, formal sector, 
importing companies whose products were increasingly the 
victims of cheaper alternatives. Both the Lebanese and the two big 
multinationals had a further advantage over the competition in 
that they were well connected to the ruling elite.
The continued existance of product lines with little promotional 
support is more difficult to explain but most instances occured 
where other lines within the product group also lacked 
promotional support and most were handled by Lebanese 
interests which had strong contacts at the wholesale level. The 
best example here is the tinned tomato product group. Products 
handled by large companies held an additional advantage in that 
they were less likely to disappear due to the company closing 
down but it is debateable whether this remained true in the late 
1980s.
For supermarket lines, the presence of a large French community 
determined that most brands would be ones familiar to French 
consumers i.e. mainly French brands. Supermarkets in Ivory Coast 
mostly stocked brands which were familiar to French consumers 
and the fact that French labelling was required by most 
supermarkets decreased the likelyhood of unfamiliar products 
appearing. However, it was noted that baked beans were specially 
imported with the Anglophone community in mind.
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The sales volume of many items, even with prospects for 
exporting to neighbouring countries, did not justify the capital 
investments involved in setting up a local manufacturing plant. 
With many luxury items consumed mostly by Europeans, and with 
few if any local raw materials, the local manufacture of breakfast 
cereals, corned beef and the like held few economic incentives. 
That bulk items such as milk, tinned tomatoes and sardines were 
mostly imported was due probably to the lack of local resources 
and/or the very low FOB price. The local manufacture of chocolate 
deritives, sweets, instant coffee and yoghurts was favoured by the 
size of the internal market, prospects for regional exports, no or 
few cheap imports, and/or the availability of local raw materials. 
Whilst the market for instant coffee was small when Nestle 
started CAPRAL as a local manufacturer, government sweetners, 
the abundance of a local raw material and the potential for 
regional exports made the investment worthwhile in the long 
term. In summary, decisions to manufacture locally or to import 
were based mostly on economies of scale, government incentives, 
regional export potential and local raw materials.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONSUMER DEMAND AND PROCESSED FOODS
Since the evolution of trading companies and stores was closely 
linked to the demand for the products they sold, the analysis of 
entrepreneurs and the determinants governing processed foods 
supplied remains incomplete without an assessment of the extent 
of that demand. The vigorous economic climate from -the 1950s to 
the late 1970s, of which traders were an im portant part, 
contributed to the rapid population growth by enticing foreign 
migrants to Ivory Coast. Commercial activities also contributed to 
increased purchasing power and entreprenuers attempted to 
augment demand through marketing.
The factors determining consumer demand in any country are 
many and complex. The first elements of demand reveiwed are 
population and income. This is followed by looking at the less 
easily measured determinants which fall into two broad groups. 
The first, exogenous factors, were urbanisation, indigenous eating 
habits, working environm ent, level of education, m edia 
penetration, income distribution, transport and the distribution 
network. In the second group, induced demand, the factors come 
under two headings: product attributes (price, packing, nutritional 
value, novelty, conveniance, status and taste) and marketing 
(advertising, field promotions, sponsoring and point of sale or 
product placement by salesmen). In addition, word of mouth may 
be an effective marketing tool for exploiting product attributes 
but is not always induced by the marketeer.1
The rest of the chapter is divided in to five sections. The first 
provides an overview of consumption, examining potential and 
actual demand by looking at population, income and imports as
1 Some aspects o f this model were derived from a study on Argentine beef 
imports in B.Y.Kouassi, ‘Toward an Adoption Decision Model for Processed 
Foods in Developing Nations’ (Discussion paper No. 110, Centre for Research 
on Econom ic Development, University o f M ichigan, Ann Arbor, November 
1984), and from W.O.Jones and C.Merat, ‘Consumption o f Exotic Consumer 
Goods as an Indicator of Economic Achievement in Ten Countries o f  
Tropical Africa’, Food Research Institute Studies. 3, 1 (Febuary 1962), p.44.
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w e ll  as the e x te n t  o f  p r o c e ss e d  fo o d  d em an d  in re la t ion  to tota l  
fo o d  c o n s u m p t io n .  T h e  s e c o n d  s e c t io n  takes  the a n a ly s is  a s tep  
fu r th e r  by  a s s e s s i n g  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  b e t w e e n  u r b a n i s a t io n ,  
in c o m e  d istr ibution  and p r o c e sse d  fo o d  d em an d . T h e  third s e c t io n  
a n a ly s e s  the r e a so n s  for h igh er  c o n s u m p t io n  in urban areas and  
h igh  in c o m e  grou p s  and the fourth lo o k s  at d em an d  in d u c e d  by  
m ark etin g  a c t iv i t ie s .  F in a l ly ,  the c o n c lu s io n  su m m a r ise s  the m a in  
f in d in g s  o f  the chapter.
6.1 E X T E N T  OF D E M A N D : AN O V E R V IE W
P o p u la t io n  s iz e  is  p r o b a b ly  the s im p le s t  m ea su r e  o f  a m arket's  
potentia l .  S in c e  1 9 5 0 ,  Ivory C oast  has e x p e r ie n c e d  one  o f  the m o s t  
rapid gro w th s  in p op u la t ion  in the w orld . B e tw e e n  197 5  and 1 9 8 8  
the popu la tion  grew  at an annual rate o f  3 .8 % .2 F igure 5 s h o w s  the  
e v o lu t io n  o f  the  p o p u la t io n  fro m  1 9 5 0  to 1 9 9 0 ,  r e v e a l in g  an  
in c re a se  in the num ber  o f  m ou th s  to f e e d  by a factor  o f  around  
four and a half.
FIGURE 5: IVORY COAST POPULATION, 1950-90
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Sources: World Bank, World Tables 1983. vol 2, p.47: World Tables 1988-89. pp.212- 
213; EIU, Cote d'Ivoire Country Report. (No.3, 1991), p.3.
W ith  fo r e ig n e r s  ( m o s t ly  M a lia n s  and B u r k in a b e s )  a c c o u n t in g  fo r  
21 .3%  o f  the total p opu la t ion  in 1 9 7 5 ,  Ivory  C oast  had the h ig h e s t
2 EIU, C ote d’Ivoire Country P rofile 1 9 9 3 /9 4 . p.9.
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proportion of any West African country. More than half of all
immigrants were in the south3 and by 1988 the proportion of
foreigners had risen to 28%, putting the annual rate of
immigration at 6% since 1975. The rapid population growth has 
also been due to an increase in the average life expectancy from 
33 years in 1958 to 56 years in 1988.4
The European population grew from 7,963 in 19515 to 14,000 in 
19556 and around 65,000 in the early to mid 1980s.7 The French
component rose from 28,000 in the late 1960s to 44,000 in the
1970s but had declined to 23,000 by early 1991.8 The vast
majority worked for trading companies, in industry or as technical 
assistants in the French aid programme. The Lebanese population 
numbered 1,344 in 1951,9 over 2,000 in 1953 and 7,000 in
1965 .10 By 1970 there were around 20,000 Lebanese.11 Estimates 
after this vary enormously, from 60,000 (1990)12 to 300,000 
(1 9 8 9 ) .13 The lack of accurate statistics was probably due to
political reasons and/or the frequency with which many entered 
and left the country. The most accurate guess one can make from 
the sources available that there were between 85,000 and 
120,000 by the late 1980s.14
3 K.C.Zachariah and J.Conde, M igration in West Africa (World Bank, New  
York, 1981), pp.35-37.
4 EIU, P ro fi1 e l9 9 3 -9 4 . p.9.
5 AOF, Recensement de la population non-autochtone de l'AQF en juin 1951 
(Service de la Statistique, Dakar, 1951), p.9.
6 AOF, Annuaire statistique de l'AQF. 5, 1 (Direction des Services de la 
Statistique General et de la Mecanographie, Paris, 1956), p.45.
7 P.Lubeck, 'The African Bourgeoisie: Debates, Methods and Units o f  
Analysis'. In P.Lubeck (ed.), The African Bourgeoisie (Lynne Rienner, 
Boulder, 1987), p.21.
8 AR B (Political Series), 28, 4 (April 1991), p. 10103.
9 AOF, R ecensem ent. p.9.
^  D.Bigo, ‘The Lebanese Community in the Ivory Coast: a Non-native 
Network at the Heart o f Power?’ In A.Hourani and N.Shehadi (eds.), T h e  
Lebanese in the World: a Century o f Emigration (Centre for Lebanese 
Studies, 1992), pp.513-514.
11 R.J.Mundt, Historical Dictionary o f the Ivorv Coast. (Scarecrow Press, 
Metuchen, 1987) p.96.
12 Bigo, ‘Network’, p.516. Figure given by the Union Libanaise Mondiale en 
Cote d ’Ivoire.
13 EIU, Profile 1989-1990. p.8. Originally quoted in Le Monde newspaper.
14 Bigo, ‘Network’; EIU, Cote d'Ivoire Country Report. (No. 1, 1990). The
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T h e other  m ain  fac tor  a f fe c t in g  p o ten tia l  m ark et  s iz e  is  in c o m e .  
F igu re  6 s h o w s  the e v o lu t io n  o f  gross  d o m e s t ic  p rod u ct  in 1 9 7 7  
c o n s ta n t  v a lu e s  and in d ic a te s  an im p r e s s iv e  g r o w th  rate up to  
1 9 8 0 .  D e s p ite  a d e c l in e  o v er  the p er iod  1 9 8 5  to 1 9 9 0 ,  the e x te n t
o f  p u r c h a s in g  p o w e r  for  the e c o n o m y  as a w h o le  in real term s
s t i l l  c o m f o r ta b ly  e x c e e d e d  that o f  the b o o m  y e a r s  d u r in g  the  
1 9 7 0 s .
FIGURE 6: IVORY COAST GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1950-90
G R O S S  DOM ESTIC P R O D U C T  (1 9 7 7  co n sta n t v a lu e s)
2 0 0 0  
1 5 0 0  
C F A b n s 1 0 0 0  
5 0 0  
0
Sources: World Bank, W orld T ables 1 9 8 3 . vol 1, pp.94-95: W orld  T a b les____1 9 8 8 -8 9 .
p p .2 12-213; EIU, R eport  (N o.3 , 1991), p.3.
T h e pattern o f  G D P  per cap ita  grow th  w a s  rather le s s  c o n s is ta n t ,
d u e  p artly  to the p o p u la t io n  in c r e a s e s  i l lu s tr a te d  in F ig u r e  5.
W h ils t  in c o m e  per head rose , in con stan t  term s, from  C F A  1 2 0 ,6 0 0  
in 1 9 5 0  to 1 4 9 ,0 8 0  in 1 990 , this latter f igure  w a s  le s s  than that o f
1955  and a far cry from  the rou gh ly  C F A  2 0 0 ,0 0 0  o f  1 9 8 0 .15
latter figure was also g iven  to Mr M .Cheriaux (D A N A F C O  general m anager 
until 1989) by a L ebanese aquaintance w ith contacts at the em bassy . 
F ie ld w o rk : c o n v e r sa tio n .
15 Calculated from: W orld Bank, W orld Tables 1983 . vol 1, pp.94-95: vol 2, 
p.47; World Bank, W orld Tables 1 988-89 . pp.212-213; EIU, R eport (N o .3 , 1991), 
p .3 .
2 1 6
19
90
FIGURE 7: IVORY COAST GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA, 1950-90
G D P  P E R  CAPITA (1 9 7 7  co n sta n t)
2 5 0 0 0 0  
2 0 0 0 0 0  
1 5 0 0 0 0
CFA
1 0 0 0 0 0  
5 0 0 0 0  
0
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Sources: Calculated from: World Bank, World Tables 1983. vol 1, pp.94-95: vol 2, p.47:  
World Tables 1 9 8 8 -8 9 . pp .212-213; EIU, R ep ort (N o.3 , 1991), p.3.
W h ils t  in c re a se s  in G D P  and p opu la t ion  do  n ot  a u to m a t ica l ly  lead  
to  an i n c r e a s e  in p r o c e s s e d  f o o d  c o n s u m p t i o n ,  the  f i g u r e s  
s u g g e s t e d  a p o te n t ia l ly  g r o w in g  m ark et  for  p r o c e s s e d  f o o d s ,  at 
lea s t  up to 19 8 0 .  From  1 9 8 0  to 1 9 9 0 ,  the p o p u la t ion  c o n t in u e d  to  
in c r e a s e  and so  too , for  a w h i le ,  d id G D P , a lso  s u g g e s t in g  an 
e x p a n d in g  m ark et  d e s p i te  a d e c r e a s e  in in c o m e  per head . A f te r  
1 9 8 5 ,  G D P  d e c l i n e d  an d , d e s p i t e  th e  c o n t in u in g  p o p u la t io n  
in c r e a s e ,  p r o c e s s e d  f o o d  c o n s u m p t io n  p r o b a b ly  fe l l  or at b e s t  
r em a in ed  stagnant. O ne  w a y  o f  v e r ify in g  th e se  a s su m p tio n s  is  to  
lo o k  at im ports  and im ports  per head.
F igu res  presen ted  in Chapter 5 sh o w e d  that the v a lu e  o f  p r o c e ss e d  
fo o d  im ports rose  from  U S $  9 ,3 1 9 ,0 0 0  in 1965  to U S $  2 6 0 ,8 4 7 ,0 0 0  
in 1 9 8 5 ,  e v id e n c e  o f  a su b stan tia l  in c r e a se  in c o n s u m p t io n  e v e n  
a c c o u n t in g  for f lu c tu a t in g  e x c h a n g e  rates and r is in g  p r ice s .  T a b le  
2 6  b e lo w ,  u s in g  w e ig h t  rather than v a lu e ,  c o n f ir m s  th is  trend and  
s h o w s  a d e c l in e  or s tagn ation  in im p orts  o v e r  part or all o f  the  
1 9 8 0 s .
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TABLE 26: AVERAGE ANNUAL IMPORTS IN TONNES OF SELECTED PROCESSED 
FOODS
PERIOD BUTTER TINNED HONEY PRESERVED CONCENTRATED
SARDINES MEAT MILK
1956-60 273 881 386 2989
1961-65 488 767 6 451 5629
1966-70 1530 910 12 634 11022
1971-75 1404 1208 13 783 16776
1976-80 3004 2278 16 1066 38337
1981-85 1808 2550 16 804 40818
1986-88 2316 2306 18 45317
Sources: RCI, Statistiques Douaniers: UN, Commodity Trade Statistics: AOF, B u lle tin  
m ensuel de statistique d'outre-mer (1959); FAO, Trade Y earbook: UN, Yearbook of 
International Trade Statistics.
Given that the population increased, the above data would suggest 
that imports after 1980 were affected not only by declining 
income per head but also by the decline in Ivory Coast’s GDP. 
Table 27 shows the level of imports in Kgs per thousand of 
population for selected products.
TABLE 27: AVERAGE ANNUAL IMPORTS IN KILOS PER THOUSAND OF 
POPULATION OF SELECTED PROCESSED FOODS
PERIOD CONCENTRATED PRESERVED PRESERVED JAM & BLACK
MILK MEAT VEGETABLES MARMALADE TEA
1956-60 941 117 29 7
1961-65 1482 119 710 34 13
1966-70 2348 135 885 42 13
1971-75 2807 131 992 36 9
1976-80 4985 142 1177 37 14
1981-85 4378 88 1128 25 12
1986-88 4201 21 9
Sources: UN, Demoeranhic Yearbook: Historical Supplement (1979); World Bank, W orld
Tables 1987. pp.l 12-113; EIU, Report (No.3, 1991), p.2; RCI, Statistiques D ouaniers:
UN, Commodity Trade Statistics: AOF, Bulletin mensuel: FAO, Trade Yearbook; UN, 
Yearbook : RCI, Recensement 1988.
Assuming imports to be an accurate reflection of consumption, 
this table reinforces the evidence that changes in consumer 
purchasing power do influence the consumption of processed 
foods. In the words of Jones and Merat,
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Consumer goods can probably be arranged in a progression or 
hierachy, with a basic set that is purchased by most persons, and 
progressively  higher-ranking com m odities which are purchased  
with each increase in income, or which becom e a part o f the 
standard, if not the level, of living as income rises.16
Imports per head generally rose between 1956-60 and 1976-80. 
After 1980, all five products show a decline. These trends mirror 
those of income per capita. Further, the data enable a tentative 
model of a hierachy of goods. The product with the widest 
distribution, concentrated milk, showed the least decline whilst 
the one with the narrowest distribution, jam, showed the greatest. 
In between these products came tea, preserved vegetables and 
preserved meat.
It remains only to assess the validity of using imports as an 
accurate indicator of consumption. Imports may be distorted by 
false declarations and cross border smuggling. European 
companies have long accused Lebanese importers of bribing 
customs officials but there is little hard evidence.17 It seems 
unlikely though that basic processed foods such as milk products, 
tomato puree and sardines were falsely declared as import duties 
on these items were very low.
On smuggling, Garlick asserted that fairly large quantities of goods 
passed both ways over the Ivory Coast - Ghana border in the late 
1950s but none of the products mentioned were processed 
f o o d s .18 In 1985 the Ivorian government announced an anti­
smuggling drive but the goods were in-coming clothes and 
sh o es .19 Also in 1985, attempts by one company to sell tea across 
the Ghana border were unsuccessful as there was no demand. 
However, unknown quantities of chocolate drinks and Quaker oats 
did pass into Ghana in the early to mid 1980s20 despite the border
16 Jones and Merat, ‘Exotic’, p.44.
17 Interview: Mr. Claude Assouan, Directeur d'Achats at CDCI, (Abidjan, 
December 4 1990); ARB (Political series), 27, 5 (June 1990), p.9694; SCIMPEX, 
M.Esmail, 'Rapport de la commission 9 "Grandes surfaces" ' (Abidjan, 1985).
18 P.Garlick, T he French Trade de Nouveau", Econom ic Bulletin o f  Ghana 
(1st series), 3, 2 (Feb 1959). pp.16-26.
19 ARB (Economic series), 22, 5 (June 1985), pp.7758-7759.
20 Personal experience: discussions with traders in Abidjan, Aboisso and
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being closed by Ghana at various times to combat smuggling.2 1 
Generally, though, goods could be smuggled into Ghana cheaper 
from Togo than from Ivory Coast.22
The products in Tables 26 and 27 were selected on the likelihood 
of their having been smuggled or declared falsely at customs. 
Some were low duty items and others high priced luxuries for 
which there was limited market whilst butter, with its need for 
cold storage, would be very difficult to smuggle. The figures may 
not be perfect but the evidence there is suggests that they are a 
reasonably accurate reflection of actual consumption within the 
borders of Ivory Coast.
The extent to which processed foods were used in 1982 compared 
to more traditional foods is illustrated by Figure 8 based on a 
survey conducted by Ajanohoun of 45,266 products which were 
found to be used in the preparation of dishes.23 He outlined three 
types of products. Type 1, modern, are those which were part of 
the European diet and not in decline in the west. Type 2, 
traditional, are those traditionally consumed in Ivory Coast and 
which did not undergo major changes and did not involve the use 
of a significant proportion of modern or transitional products. 
Type 3, transitional, consists of all other products.
Agnibilekro (1985): observation of goods in Accra (1986).
21 ARB (Political Series), 19, 10 (Oct 1982) p.6612: 20, 12 (Jan 1984), p.7065.
22 Personal experience: discussions with J.Ayirebi, DANAFCO General 
Manager in Togo (1986), E.Bosteen, Chairman o f DANAFCO, and P.Toxvaerd, 
DANAFCO Director o f Marketing (1984-85). All future references to Personal 
experience are for all o f the periods 1983-85 and 1986 unless otherwise 
stated.
23 G.A.Ajanohoun, 'Developpement de la marchandise alimentaire en Cote 
d'Ivoire' (M emoire pour l'obtention du diplome d'etudes approfondies en 
developpem ent et commerce international, Faculte Sciences Econom iques, 
Universite d'Abidjan, 1982), p p .5 3 -5 4 .
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FIGURE 8
T Y P E S O F P R O D U C T S U SE D  IN D ISH E S (1982 )  
4 . 2 6 %
H  M od ern  
□  T r a n s it io n a l  
H T r a d it io n a l
Source: G .A .A janohoun, 'D evelopm ent de la Marchandise alimentaire en C ote  d'Ivoire' 
(M em oire  pour l'obtention du d ip lom e d'etudes approfondies  en d e v e lo p p e m e n t  et 
co m m erc e  international,  Faculte S c ie n c e s  E co n om iq u es ,  U n iv ers i te  d'Abidjan, 1982 ) ,  
p p . 5 3 - 5 4 .
D e s p i t e  the  o f t  m e n t io n e d  fe a r s  o f  the  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  the  
w id e s p r e a d  a d o p t io n  o f  w e s te r n  c o n s u m p t io n  p a t te r n s ,  c h a n g e  
tow ard s  fo o d s  o f  the p r o c e sse d  and p a c k a g e d  var ie ty  w a s  s l o w . 24 
A j a n o h o u n  ( 1 9 8 2 )  has  c h a r a c te r is e d  the  Iv o r ia n  c o n s u m e r  as  
b e in g  at the b e g in n in g  o f  the tra n s it io n a l  p h a s e  and R e q u ie r -  
D e sja rd in s  has argued that p r o c e sse d  fo o d  d em an d  in Ivory  C o a s t  
w a s  s tr o n g ly  l in k ed  to c o n su m p tio n  o u ts id e  the h o m e  and to the  
in teg ra t io n  o f  p rod u cts  in to  lo c a l  f o o d  p r e p a r a tio n s .25 B o th  th e se  
trends are e x a m in e d  later. W h ils t  in c o m e  and p o p u la t io n  w ere  the  
m ain  d e term in an ts  o f  the e x te n t  o f  the c o n s u m p tio n  i l lu s tra ted  in  
T a b les  26  and 27  and in F igure 8, dem an d  for  in d iv id u a l  products  
varied  sh arp ly  a c c o r d in g  to in c o m e  d is tr ib u t io n ,  u rb a n isa t io n  and  
a h o s t  o f  o th er  e x o g e n o u s  fa c to rs  w h ic h  w i l l  n o w  be  e x a m in e d  
m o re  c lo s e ly .
24 W .W eek es-V ag lian i, Actors and Institutions in the Food Chain: the C ase o f  
the Ivorv Coast (O ECD, Paris, 1985), pp.53-55 .
25 D .R eq u ier-D esjard in s, ‘Industrie agro-a lim entaire et m odes de 
c o n so m m a tio n ’ , E con om ie et H um anism e. 296 (1 9 8 7 ), p .32-33; D .R equier- 
D esjard ins, L ’a lim entation  en A frique (Karthala, Paris, 1989), p. 103.
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6.2 URBANISATION, INCOM E DISTRIBUTION AND DEM AND
Income per capita in Third World towns is mostly higher than in 
rural areas and this has generally led to a greater proportion of 
income being spent on processed foods. Further, there is 
substantial evidence to support the view that, worldwide, urban 
populations are more likely to consume processed foods than rural 
ones. The adoption of new foods such as sweet spices and hot 
drinks in Europe between 1680 and 1770 occured first in towns26 
whilst in Rumania, French fashion and culinary influence in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was for a long time 
restricted to the urban upper classes.27 In northern Canada, 
changes in local economic conditions led to the Dene Indians 
settling in permanent communities where they became reliant on 
white Canadian products.28 In the Third World, Santos cited 
several examples of higher consumption in urban than in rural 
areas of, for example, milk products.29 Den Hartog found that 
m igrants in Accra used new foods w hilst retaining their 
traditional culniary techniques.30
From the evidence cited above, urbanisation is an important 
indicator of growing market potential. In Ivory Coast, the rate of 
urbanisation was dramatic, as illustrated in Figure 9 and Table 28. 
The growth of Ivorian towns has resulted from foreign imigrants, 
internal migration of Ivorians, and natural growth. In 1975, 
around half the African immigrants and about 30% of Ivorians 
lived in cities31 whilst 81.9% of non-Africans were in Abidjan.32
26 H.J.Teuteberg, 'A Preliminary Outline o f Problems and Methods’. In 
A.Fenton and E.Kisban (eds.), Food in Change (John Donald, Edinburgh, 
1986), pp. 19-20.
27 O.Vaduva, 'Popular Rumanian Food in the Late Eighteenth and Early 
Nineteenth Centuries: Traditional and Incoming Elements'. In Fenton and 
Kisban (eds.), C hange, pp.99-103.
28 P.Fieldhouse, Food and Nutrition: Customs and Culture (Croom Helm,
1986), p.9.
29 M.Santos, 'L'alimentation des populations urbaines des pays sous- 
developpes', RTM . 8, 31 (1967), pp.605-629.
30 A.P.den Hartog and W.A.van Staveren, Manual for Social Surveys on Food 
Habits and Consumption in Developing Countries (Pudoc, W ageningen,
1983), p .16.
31 Zachariah and Conde, M igration , p.36.
32 RCI, Population de la Cote d'Ivoire (Ministere de l'Economie et des
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FIGURE 9
ALL URBAN AND ABIDJAN AGGLOMERATION POPULATIONS AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION
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Sources: UN, H istorical Supplem ent: World Bank, 1 9 8 8 -8 9 . pp.212-213; EIU, R eport. 
Nr 4 (1992), p.3; AOF, Annuaire Statistique de l'AQF. 5, 1 (Paris, 1956), p.45; RCI, 
Eflpulation de la CQte-d'lYQire (1984); UN, Prospects for World Urbanisation 1988 
(1989), p. 104; D.Bollinger, Le marketing en Afriaue. tome 1: la Cote d'Ivoire (CEDA, 
Abidjan, 1977), p.66; R.J.Mundt, Historical Dictionary of the Ivorv Coast (Scarecrow  
Press, Metuchen, 1987), p.xix.
TABLE 28: EVOLUTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE 15 LARGEST TOWNS IN 1988
RANK TOWN REGION 1955 1965 1975 1988
1988
1 A b id jan 125,000 330,000 951,216 1,934,342
2 B ouake C 42,000 85,000 175,264 332,999
3 Daloa CW 17,600 35,000 60,837 122,933
4 Y am ou ssou k ro C 8,000 37,253 110,013
5 K o rh ogo N 13,200 24,000 45 ,250 109,655
6 M an W 7,400 30,000 50,288 88,294
7 G agnoa CW 15,300 21,000 42,285 85,094
8 D ivo CW 18,000 35,610 72,494
9 San Pedro sw 31,606 70,601
10 A b en g o u r o u E 3,100 17,000 30,028 58,974
11 A n y a m a SE 11,200 26,406 57,065
12 A g b o v ille SE 17,500 26,914 46 ,359
13 Grand Bassam SE 16,500 27,273 41,825
14 Dabou SE 11,000 23,134 39,494
15 D im bokro C 3,800 15,000 31,073 38,183
Sources: AOF, Annuaire statistique de l'AQF 1955: RCI, Population de la Cote d'Ivoire 
1275  (1984); RCI, Recensement 1988.
In 1973, urban dwellers' income was on average an estimated
Finances, Abidjan, 1984), p.58.
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four and half times higher than that of rural dwellers.33 In Table 
29, the three regions with the highest average annual income per 
head were also the ones with the highest proportion of urban 
inhabitants in 1975.34 However, large numbers of shanty town 
residents were unemployed or underemployed and had less 
disposable income than many rural people. Thus, whilst there was 
a large disparity in income between rural and urban populations, 
the figures conceal a probably even larger difference between rich 
and poor urban inhabitants.
TABLE 29: AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME PER CAPITA BY REGION IN CFA
REGION 1971 - 73 
m ea n
1975 % increase
south east 21,105 32,400 53.5
south west 8,810 12,000 36.2
c e n tr e 13,770 21,340 55.0
centre west 19,170 30,500 59.0
centre north 4,210 5,000 18.8
n o r th 4,970 6,000 20.7
Source: Bollinger, M arketing, p.75.
Figures on income distribution are not only limited but subject to 
error given the informal way in which many people aquire their 
income. Further, comparing income distribution patterns over 
time poses problems as different methods of data collection and 
presentation have been used.35 The large disparities in income 
distribution hinted at above are also evident in Tables 30 and 31.
TABLE 30: INCOME DISTRIBUTION PER CAPITA IN 1970 AND 1973-74
INCOME GROUP 1970 1973-74
lowest 40% 10.8 19.7
middle 40% 32.1 28.7
top 20% 57.1 51.6
Source: B. A. den Tuinder, Ivorv Coast: the Challenge o f Success (John Hopkins, New  
York, 1978), p.135.
33 A.Dubresson, Villes et industries en Cote dTvoire (Karthala, Paris, 1989), 
p .251.
34 RCI, P op u lation .
35 World Bank, World Development Report 1992. p.301.
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TABLE 31: PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE, 1986
INCOME GROUP 1986
lowest 40% 13.0
middle 40% 34.4
top 20% 52.7
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1990 (OUP, 1990), pp.236-237.
There are also figures for 1978 and 1985-86 but these are 
expressed in terms of households and use different percentage 
categories making comparisons with the data virtually impossible. 
Further, "households with low per capita incomes frequently are 
large households, whose total income may be high, and conversely 
many households with low household incomes may be small 
households with high per capita incomes".36 They would appear to 
present an even less equitable distribution of resources than 
Tables 30 and 31 show but also that there was little change in 
distribution over time.
TABLE 32: INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY HOUSEHOLD GROUP IN 1978 AND 1985-86
H O U SEH O L D  INCO M E % SHARE 1978 % SHARE 1985 - 86
GROUP
top 10% 42 43.7
middle 30% 40 36.8
lower 60% 18 19.5
Source: A .Dubresson, V illes et industries en Cote d ’Ivo ire  (Karthala, Paris, 1989),
p.252; World Bank, World Development Report 1988 (OUP, 1988), p.272.
The figures presented in Tables 30, 31 and 32 are further 
distorted as at least some were based on cash incomes;37 thus no 
account was taken of subsistance in rural areas. However, there 
has evidently been a substantial inequality in purchasing power 
since at least 1970. Dubresson has estimated that purchasing 
power of the average Abidjan household between 1963 and 1978 
rose marginally but that per capita purchasing power declined 
marginally as the size of households increased over the period.
36 World Bank, Report 1988. p.301.
37 Dubresson, V ille s . p.251.
225
Since 1978, this per capita decline has continued.38
Europeans were high wage earners. In the private sector senior 
managers in the mid 1980s were earning in excess of one million 
CFA per month, and often much more.39 In 1978 Europeans 
earned an estimated 13.9% of national income, more than four 
times the amount of the entire rural population of the savannah 
reg io n .40 Whilst many Lebanese were poor on arrival and lived 
frugally once settled during the inter-war years41 and were thus 
initially indisposed towards spending large sums on luxury food, 
this was less true of more recent times. The Lebanese were 
amongst the highest earners in the country, their share of income 
in 1978 being an estimated 10.6%.42 However, this hides a great 
diversity in income. Bigo, presumably referring to the late 1980s, 
estimated that 85% of Lebanese, whilst well off compared to most 
Ivorians, did not have the resources to “live on the Plateau, with 
villa, luxury car and gaudy clothes as status symbols.”43
Evidence of links between urbanisation and income levels on the 
one hand and demand for processed foods on the other comes 
from a variety of consumer surveys. The 1956 household budget 
surveys for Abidjan and Bongouanou subdivision44 deal with 
salaried workers and planters respectively. Only 0.025% of total 
household food and drink expenditure was on processed foods in 
Bongouanou subdivision and between 2% and 2.8% in Abidjan. 
These figures must, of course, be treated with a good deal of 
caution. But the general message is clear: processed foods in 1956 
were all but insignificant as far as the average Ivorian consumer 
was concerned.
38 Ib id .
39 Personal experience: discussions with DANAFCO acountants (1983-85).
40 Dubresson, V ille s . p.247.
41 Bigo, ‘Network’, pp.511-512.
42 Dubresson, V ille s . p.247.
43 Bigo, ‘Network’, p.523.
44 AOF, Les budgets familiaux des salaries africains en Abidjan (aout- 
septem bre 1956^ (Service de la Statistique et de la Mecanographie, Paris, 
1958), pp .102-103; AOF, Enquete nutrition-niveau de vie subdivision de 
Bongouanou 1955-56 (Service de la Statistique et de la Mecanographie, 
Paris, 1958), pp.123, 132.
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Figures from four 1963 surveys indicated an increase in processed 
food consumption in Abidjan and much lower consumption rates 
in other areas of Ivory Coast. Processed foods as a percentage of 
the total food and drink budget (including subsistance) amounted 
to 3.5% in Abidjan, 1.3% in the south east region and 0.6% in both 
the Seguela-Odienne and Korhogo regions, all figures being 
approximate. Of the Abidjan data, 2.2% was in milk products.45 As 
the Abidjan figures for 1956 were for salaried workers only and 
the 1963 ones for all inhabitants, the increase in consumption is 
likely to have been greater than the statistics indicate, the reasons 
for which are elaborated upon later.
The final set of figures is the most satisfactory as all the data 
come from the same source and distinctions are made between 
rural and urban areas. Table 33 shows the the value of processed 
foods consumed per head as a percentage of total food and drink 
expenditure in 1979.
TABLE 33: SHARE OF PROCESSED FOOD CONSUMPTION IN TOTAL FOOD AND  
DRINK EXPENDITURE, 1979
AREA %
A b id jan  10.6
other towns 7.6
rural forest east 3.7
rural forest west 3.2
rural savannah 4.5
all Ivory Coast 6.5
Source: RCI, Enquete budget consom m ation 1979 (Direction de la Statistique, Abidjan,
1984), p p .1 7 2 -n 9 .
The above data confirm not only the difference in consumption 
between rural and urban areas but also that increased income 
levels have been accompanied, in Abidjan at least, by increased 
consumption levels. Between 1956 and 1979, rises in urbanisation 
levels and in income per head correlate with increased 
consumption of processed foods, whether measured by total
45 Requier-Desjardins, A lim en ta tion , p.96.
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imports or by consumption per head. Additionally, the figures 
showing the south east to be the most wealthy region of the 
country are matched by this same region having the highest 
consumption rate for processed foods. The rest of this chapter will 
attempt to explain these patterns in more depth with particular 
attention given to urbanisation related factors and to ways in 
which marketeers have attempted to exploit the environment.
6.3 CONSUMPTION IN URBAN AND RURAL ENVIRONMENTS
The reasons for higher consumption of processed foods in urban 
areas were many and varied. It has already been shown that 
incomes were higher in urban areas, a factor related to education 
levels and employment status. In Ivory Coast, many school 
teachers were French and some textbooks were the same as those 
used in French schools. Perhaps more importantly, schooling 
meant literacy and literacy meant consumers could read labels on 
products.46 The enrolment rate in schools in Ivory Coast rose over 
the years (see Table 34) but schools in rural areas were less 
common and parents were on average poorer so their children 
were more likely to be illiterate.47
TABLE 34: SCHOOL ENROLMENT, PERCENT OF CHILDREN
YEAR PRIMARY SECONDARY
1965-66 35 3
1970 58 9
1975 62 13
1979 72 20
1982 82 19
1984 78 20
Sources: World Bank, World Tahles 1987: R.Clignet and P.Foster, ‘Convergence and 
Divergence in Educational Development in Ghana and the Ivory Coast’. In P.Foster and 
A.R.Zolberg (eds.), Ghana and the Ivorv Coast (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1971), p .273.
46 Ajanohoun, ‘Marchandise’, p.81; Fieldwork: observation (1990). All 
future references to Fieldwork are for all the period July to December 1990 
unless otherwise stated.
47 D.Bollinger, Le marketing en Afrique. tome 1: La Cote dTvoire (CEDA, 
Abidjan, 1977), pp.70-74; RCI, Population, pp.251-253.
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Education levels, cruicially, also determined job opportunities and 
therefore conditioned income. The Ivorian elite48 which came to 
power at independence were all graduates of the Ecole Ponty in 
Dakar and/or had been educated in France. The same was also 
true of many party and government officials through to 199049 as 
well as the c a d re s  employed in European companies. Thus 
Western influences were acquired through the labour market 
where they come into daily contact with Europeans, sometimes 
eating at their homes or at restaurants with them.50 As Goody 
observed in Ghana, “for formal occasions . . . people will repair to 
restaurants . . . Formal occasions require formal food, which tends 
to be defined as European.”51 Almost all of these firms were 
situated in Abidjan or Bouake..52 However, the statistical evidence 
on different levels of processed food consumption according to 
socio-professional categories is patchy.
This process of adopting the "norms and values of an alien 
culture" is refered to as 'acculturation' although eating habits may 
not be so readily influenced as they are a "more private affair".53 
Some Africans worked for companies which either imported, 
wholesaled or manufactured processed foods and were not only 
influenced themselves but also influenced their families and 
friends.54 One study has shown that young children may be more 
inclined to adopt new eating habits if they see adults using 
th em .55 Consumption of the products of a company one worked 
for was often facilitated by price reductions for staff. Employees, 
both private and state, were also the most likely to be affected by
48 For a definition o f ‘The Ivorian elite’ see T.Bakary, ‘Elite Transformation 
and Political Succession’. In I.W.Zartman and C.Delgado (eds.), The Political 
Economy o f Ivorv Coast (Praeger, New York, 1984), pp.21-55.
49 Bakary, ‘Elite’, pp.25-46; PDCI, PDCI-RDA annuaire 1985-1990: annuaire 
h isto r ico -p o litq u e  (Fratemite-Hebdo, Abidjan, 1987), pp. 11-180.
50 Bakary, ‘E lite’, p .65; Ajanohoun, ‘Marchandise’, pp.80-84; Personal 
experience: observation.
51 J.Goody, Cooking. Cuisine and Class (CUP, Cambridge, 1982), p.178.
52 Dubresson, V ille s . pp. 119-122.
53 Fieldhouse, N utrition, p.8; Goody, C ook in g , pp.176-177.
54 Ajanohoun, ‘M archandise’, pp.80-84; Personal experience: observation.
55 Fieldhouse, N u trition , p.6.
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the  'd e m o n str a t io n  e f f e c t ' ,  that is  the d e s ir e  to e m u la t e  e l i t e  
c o n su m p tio n  patterns for  r eason s  o f  p r e s t ig e  and h e a lth .56
F ig u r e  10 b e lo w  r e v e a l s  s o m e  c o n f l i c t i n g  e v i d e n c e  r e g a r d in g  
c o n s u m p tio n  o f  p r o c e sse d  fo o d s  by  d if fe r en t  l e v e l s  o f  c o n s u m e r s .  
O f  the s ix  p rod u cts  s h o w n ,  m eat  p r e ser v e s  c o n s u m p t io n  w a s  too  
l o w  to be o f  v a lu e  w h il s t ,  o f  the r e m a in in g  f iv e ,  three s h o w e d  
m a n a g e rs  to be the h ig h e s t  c o n s u m e r s .  O f  the other  tw o ,  t inn ed  
m ilk  w a s  m o r e  h e a v i ly  c o n s u m e d  b y  u n q u a l i f i e d  e m p l o y e e s  
( w h ic h  w a s  n o t  su r p r is in g  g iv e n  that it w a s  a m a s s  m a rk et  
p r o d u c t )  w h i l s t  th e  p a t te r n  o f  c o n s u m p t i o n  o f  p r e s e r v e d  
v e g e ta b le s  is rather m ore  d i f f ic u lt  to e xp la in .
FIGURE 10
CO NSU M PTIO N IN GR A M S PER HEAD PER YEAR, ABIDJAN, 1979
YOG & CHE 
TIN MILK 
PR E S MEAT 
PRESVEG  
TOM PASTE  
MACARONI
Key: Yog & Che =  Yoghurt and Cheese, Pres = Preserved, Tom = Tomato.
Source: RCI, C onsom m ation  . pp.64-80.
O n e p ro b lem  with the so u rce  is  that the p r o c e sse d  fo o d s  presen ted  
are la r g e ly  b ig  s e l l in g  i te m s  w h ic h  m a n y  u n q u a l i f ie d  e m p lo y e e s  
c o u ld  afford  and w h ic h  m an agers  w e r e  l ik e ly  to sp en d  a sm a ller  
p rop ort ion  o f  their  in c o m e  on . T h e  r e su lt  is  that, the p ro d u cts  
taken c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  the graph g iv e s  the im p r e s s io n  that there  w a s
56 A janohoun, ‘M archandise’, p .82; B o llin ger , M a r k e t in g , p .65; M .Behar, 
'European D iet Versus Traditional Foods', Food P o lic y . 1, 5 (N ov 1976), p.432; 
G oody, C o o k in g , p. 181.
MANAGERS
□  QUALIFIED EMPLOYEES
■  UNQUALIFIED EMPLOYEES
1 0 0 0  2 0 0 0  3 0 0 0  4 0 0 0
2 3 0
little difference between the two groups. The second problem 
concerns the socio-professional categories. Apart from the ones 
shown on the graph, the following were also given: people without 
an activity, proprietors and independants, exploitants agricoles , 
agricultural labourers, and traders. The problem with the 
agricultural labourers category is that they did not reside in cities 
which means that these poorly paid people are excluded from the 
graph whilst unqualified labourers, who are among the best paid 
of low level consumers, are included. This results in a 
consumption level for the representatives of unqualified 
employees being higher than the probable mean.
The problem with the other socio-professional categories is that 
they contain all income groups as well as comprising both rural 
and urban dwellers. The categories 'proprietors and independents' 
and 'traders' include the wealthy formal sector Ivorian proprietor 
as well as the small artisan often not knowing where his next 
meal will come from, and the same could be said for the exploitant  
agricole .  Most problematic of all though are those classified as 
sans act iv i te , the large majority of whom are presumably 
unemployed. However, according to the survey, their wine 
consumption per head (excluding the traditional palm wine) was 
four and half times that of the managerial category!
One likely explanation for the smaller than expected differences in 
processed food consumption between managers and labourers 
concerns the distance to work many workers had to travel. In 
Abidjan, most formal sector businesses were located in the 
districts south of the lagoon or just north of it whilst the largest 
non-elite residential areas were on the outskirts of the city and 
involved between an hour and an hour and a half of travel.57 This 
effectively meant that many workers could not return home for 
lunch and, if they started early or worked late, it was likely if not 
necessary that they ate outside the home. Whilst many had lunch 
at roadside 'restaurants' serving traditional food, others 
breakfasted or suppered at kiosks which served western type
57 Dubresson, V i l le s . pp.424-430; Personal experience: observation: 
discussions with em ployees.
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foods like coffee with (condensed) milk, sandwiches, oat porridge 
and tea. This not only meant they may have been substituting a 
meal using more traditional ingrediants but also familiarised them 
with non-traditional products which, especially in the long run, 
could lead them to purchasing such products for the home.58 Den 
hartog and van Staveren neatly summarised the urban situation 
when they stated:
The supply o f local traditional comm odities is often inadequate 
and there is not alw ays su ffic ien t tim e for lengthy food  
preparation. . . . these factors make townsfolk receptive to new 
foods that are quick and easy to prepare . . . and attractively 
packaged. Most will be preserved foods. 59
Thus, as Goody observed in Ghana,60 the mobility and 
employment of urban consumers makes conveniance an important 
factor in determining demand. Guyer estimated that in Africa 
generally, ten to 25% of the urban population used “urban
gardening” to supply their needs.61 Further, in 1920s Dar es 
Salam, she stated that men “often depended on the food parcels 
that a wife or visiting relative brought them from farms in the
home areas”.62 The same was also true to an extent in Abidjan in
the 1980s.63 Nonetheless, access to indigenous foods is easier in 
the interior whilst shops in the distribution network, the primary 
vendors of processed foods, are more numerous and larger in 
urban areas.64 Chapter 4 showed that supermarkets and grocery
stores were only found in urban areas and that they carried a far 
wider range of products than small stores. Further, transport of 
goods was much easier within and between urban areas. This 
suggests that demand for processed foods in urban areas is both 
greater and involves a wider range of products.
58 Ajanohoun, ‘M archandise’, p.73; Personal experience: observation 
(1 9 8 3 -8 4 ).
59 Den Hartog and van Staveren, M anual, p. 15.
60 Goody, C ooking, pp. 176-180.
61 J.Guyer, ‘Introduction’. In J.Guyer (ed.), Feeding African Cities 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1987), p. 13.
62 Ib id . pp.64-65.
63 Personal experience: observation, discussions with salesm en and 
friends; Fieldworkwith: discussions with passengers on buses.
64 Requier-Desjardins, ‘Industrie’, p .32.
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Other factors which discourage consumption of processed foods in 
rural areas are the lack of household facilities such as cooking 
appliances and refridgeration.65 No fridge means no frozen foods 
and more limited preservation periods for some other products. In 
1973, just 2% of households in villages had cooling facilities 
compared to 37% in Abidjan and 29% in other urban areas.66
As well as restricted access to goods, rural consumers also had less 
access to the media. Media exposure to western cultural influences 
is seen by many as a major way in which habits are changed for 
"as communication over vast distances has become simpler, so too 
has the ability of one culture to influence another".67 Warner Bros. 
Television boasted that its product "appears in 104 countries in 24 
languages, from Ecuador, Iceland and Qatar to the Ivory Coast, 
Barbados and Thailand".68 It is almost impossible to gauge 
empirically the importance of "long-term but constant exposure . .
to certain kinds of 'messages' "69 but Powdermaker, an 
anthropologist, claimed that "All entertainment is education in 
some way, many times more effective than schools because of the 
appeal to the emotions rather than to the intellect."70 Television, 
like film, can be "considered a great medium of information and 
persuasion, which not only selectively presented certain traits and 
ideals but also glamorised them".71 It was long ago recognised 
that American films were influential on the American trade 
balance in goods (besides films) and the immediate post-war U.S. 
government regarded the media as vital to promoting the 
'American way of life'.72 As Jowett and Linton observe on movies, 
televisual and other images can become
65 Ajanohoun, ‘M archandise’, pp.81-82.
66 Bollinger, M ark etin g , p.75.
67 Warner Communications, Inc. Annual Report 1982. Reprinted in T.Balio 
(ed.), The American Film Industry (University o f  W isconsin Press, Madison, 
revised ed. 1985), p.595.
68 Ibid. p.597.
69 G.Jowett and J.M.Linton, M ovies as Mass Communication (SAGE, Beverly 
Hills, 1980), p. 106.
70 H.Powdermaker, Hollywood: the Dream Factory (Little, Brown and Co, 
Boston, 1950), p. 14.
71 T.H.Guback, 'Hollywood's International Market'. In Balio, F ilm , p.468.
72 Ibid. pp.466, 473.
233
a quasi-encyclopedia in which one finds the visual repository o f  
much o f our culture. This can easily  be demonstrated if  one 
closes one’s eyes and tries to visualize in as much detail as
possible a historical figure such as the Roman centurion. Think. 
Where did this image originate ? In most cases it would be either 
the movies or television. 7 3
Finally, it is worth considering the statement that "Some  people 
are influenced by s o m e  media, at s o m e  time" as being "a 
commonly held belief by social scientists".74 The more vexing
problem is 'how many  by how much and how often. It is likely
that advertisements are important in establishing an 'image', 
especially visual, which can serve to draw consumers' attention on 
seeing the product when shopping. Evidence from Ivory Coast
might be cited from the success of the Quaker campaign, the 
dominance of heavily advertised Nestle products (both of which 
are examined later) and the case study of the cube trade 
presented in the following chapter. However, in each of these 
cases, there were other variables but many traders regarded 
advertising as an important pre-requisite for stocking certain 
products.75
Ivorian radio and television constantly emit images and sounds of 
the way of life in the most developed countries of the world, 
through either advertising or foreign programs.76 Bollinger 
referred to the Ivorian as having "une double appartenance socio- 
culturelle" , that he is part European and part traditional African.77 
The sources of the influences are many, and contact with all of 
them is more likely in urban areas than in more isolated rural 
dwellings. It is therefore at least concievable that western 'media 
materials' have also influenced the Ivorian trade balance, and 
therefore consumption, through entertainment, education and 
advertising.
73 Jowett and Linton, M ass. p . l l l .
74 Ib id . p.74.
75 Personal experience: discussions with traders.
76 Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation.
77 Bollinger, M arketing , p.63.
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In rural areas, television sets are less common, partly due to no 
electricity. Introduced in mid 1963, television could be received 
by only a quarter of the country by the end of 1964.78 In August 
1966 five to six hours of programs per day could be watched by 
two thirds of the country79 and by mid 1973 this had increased to 
four fifths of the country.80 However, in 1973, whilst 61% of 
households in Abidjan and 43% in other towns had electricity, 
only 2% of households in villages had this facility. The distribution 
of radios is more even, 30% compared to 86% in Abidjan and 71% 
in other towns.81 Thus, despite rural-urban differences, Africans 
have increasingly come into contact with outside influences.
TABLE 35: RADIO AND TELEVISION SETS PER THOUSAND OF POPULATION
YEAR TELEVISION RADIO
1965 1.4 14
1970 14.0 N.A.
1975 16.0 44
1980 36.0 120
1985 49.0 127
1988 54.0 128
N.A. = Not Available.
Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook.
Whilst the proportion of income spent on basic food declines as 
income rises, as stated in Engel's law, there is a tendency for 
consumers to buy more high priced foods with increased income. 
This implies that more expensive, or less essential, processed 
foods have a higher income elesticity.82 There may thus be an 
increasing tendency towards consumption emulation with a rise in 
income whilst the proportion spent on conveniance foods remains 
the same. There are many isolated examples of consumers 
emulating something they see. For example, in America Veronica
78 ARB (Political series), 2, 1 (Jan 1965), p.234.
79 Ibid. 3, 8 (Aug 1966), p.604.
80 IMd, 10, 6 (June 1973), p.2904.
81 Bollinger, M ark etin g , p.75.
82 Den Hartog and van Staveren, M an u al, p.23; Jones and Merat, ‘Exotic’, 
p.52; R.Lawson, ‘The Supply Response o f Retail Trading Services to Urban 
Population Growth in Ghana’. In C.M eillassoux (ed.), The Developm ent o f  
Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa (OUP, 1971), p.379.
235
Lake and Carmen Miranda popularised particular hair and clothes 
fashions through 1940s Hollywood films.83 However, these remain 
isolated examples. In Ivory Coast, emulation in food consumption 
for prestige is probably more likely to occur through personal 
contacts and the long-term and constant media 'messages', 
especially if the consumer is exposed from childhood.84
The final factor in higher urban consumption is that most 
Europeans, from the earliest days of colonialisation, have sought to 
maintain a diet similar to back home. After the final lifting of 
rationing in 1950, this became increasingly possible. In 1956 the 
Printania supermarket opened, followed by others and then Nour 
A1 Hayat 1967 which specialised in imported goods. By 1972, 
these numbered some 2,200 items of preserved food alone (out of 
4,000 items in all).85 From these early years up to 1990, 90% of 
Nour A1 Hayat's clients were Europeans.86 Even for Europeans 
living in the interior (few in number and declining)87 there were 
few restraints as most towns have had a grocery store stocking 
hundreds of processed foods since at least the early 1960s.88
The majority of the Lebanese population was also urban based. 
Lebanese food was widely available, not only in the home but also 
in Lebanese restaurants of which there were at least a dozen in 
Abidjan in the mid 1980s.89 However, they were major 
purchasers of certain western foods, amongst which were cheese, 
concentrated squash, luxury biscuits and jam but appeared not to 
consume in any great quantity such products as concentrated milk 
or bouillon cubes.
83 'Star Power'. In M.Webb (ed.), Hollywood: Legend and Reality (Little, 
Brown and Company, Boston, 1986), p. 191.
84 Jowett and Linton, M ass. p. 106. Fieldhouse, N utrition, pp.4-8.
85 A.Maurel, 'Les societes de distribution alimentaire en Cote d'Ivoire’,
A frica  [now Africa International!. 68 (Dakar, 1974), p.43.
86 Interview: Mr. P.Paoli, Manager o f  Champion Supermarket (Abidjan, 
November, 1990).
87 There were 309 French citizens in 1990 in Korhogo prefecture, a fall o f  
40 on the previous year. Fieldwork: discussion with French Consul, Korhogo 
(Nov 1990).
88 See, for example, SEDES, 'Region du sud-est. Etude socio-economique’ 
(Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, 1967).
89 Personal experience.
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In summary, there were two forms of differences in rural-urban 
processed food demand, these being quantity consumed per head 
and types of products consumed. The main factors which 
influenced these consumption differences were employment 
status (income), work environment, education, media access, 
transport, product access or the distribution network and the 
location of most Europeans in Abidjan and Bouake.
6.4 INDUCED CONSUM ER DEM AND: PRO D UCTS, PRO M O TIO N AND  
P U B L IC IT Y
Most marketing in Ivory Coast, as elsewhere, has sought to induce 
increased consumption of processed foods in two ways, by 
exploiting the attributes of their products and the environment in 
which they were marketed. For any one item, product attributes 
may have included price, packing, conveniance, nutrition, novelty, 
status and taste. The tools with which these attributes could be 
exploited were media advertising, field promotions, sponsoring 
and point of sale persuasion.90
The promotion of processed foods is a fairly recent phenomena in 
Ivory Coast, still practiced only by a few. Point of sale was used in 
colonial times although whether the potential for word of mouth 
publicity was fully realised is debateable. In field promotion 
marketing, Blohorn and Nestle led the way in the 1960s. This 
technique has been used nationwide for only a few products but 
tastings in selected locations became a common practice in the 
1980s. Of the different kinds of media advertising, by far the 
oldest is that through newspapers and journals which can be 
dated back to the end of the last century.91 However, even in 
more recent times the number of Ivorians that read a newspaper
90 Interview: Mr.Merhouet, Junior Partner o f SABIMEX (Abidjan, November 
13 1990): Assouan; Personal experience: observation: discussions with 
commercial sector em ployees and managers.
91 A.Assande, 'Le marketing en Cote d'Ivoire: mythes ou realites’, R e v u e  
Ivoirienne de Marketing. 1 (1987), pp.31-39, 43-45, 48; O.S.Savane, De la 
publicite en Cote d'Ivoire (CEDA, Abidjan, 1986), pp.34-42.
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was limited (44% of the population in 1976 read the then sole 
daily paper Fraternite Matin at least several times a month)92 and 
before the 1960s it was unlikely to have been more than the few 
who made up the elite. Radio and television advertising were 
products of the early and late 1970s respectively93 and it was also 
during this decade that advertising agencies first opened for 
b u s in e ss .94 Sponsoring activities, be they of sporting events or 
television programs, appeared to mushroom during the 1980s. 
The costs of media advertising in particular meant that the 
overwhelming majority of television commercials were for the 
multinationals Nestle and Blohorn. Due to the comparative lack of 
marketing activities prior to the late 1970s, the bulk of this 
section draws upon activities in the 1980s.
The exploitation of patterns of demand for processed foods in 
Ivory Coast has usually depended on the actual or perceived 
attributes of the product being marketed. Product attributes 
might change in importance over time. With the decline in 
incomes during the 1980s, price became increasingly significant. 
The novelty aatribute of the Jumbo stock cube declined in 
importance over time, as would be expected by the very 
definition of 'novelty'.
One of the most easily identifiable attributes exploited by 
marketing is convenience, one strongly related to urbanisation 
and work. The necessity for many urban workers to eat outside 
the home95 manifested itself most visibly through the growth in 
road-side restaurants, coffee tables and kiosks. Between 1984 and 
1987 DANAFCO decided to target kiosks, where many Ivorians 
stopped for breakfast on their way to work, by doing Quaker oat 
porridge tastings and encouraging kiosk owners to add the 
product to their menu at a retail price of CFA 125 per portion. 
Instruction leaflets were also handed out. Porridge afforded a 
generous margin and, as an added inducement, Kiosks were
92 Bollinger, M arketing, p .172.
93 I b id . p. 181; Savane, P u b l i c i t e . p.91.
94 Bollinger, M a r k e t i n g , p p .166-169; Savane, P u b l i c i t e . p p .9 5 -1 1 1 .
95 See also Goody, C o o k i n g , pp. 179-180.
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offered free Quaker T-shirts and plastic bags for every carton of 
empty cans accumulated. By the time the promotion period ended, 
around 50 kiosks in Abidjan and a further 20 in the interior were 
buying the oats from the nearest wholesaler and serving it as 
porridge.96 These field promotions were periodically backed up by 
television advertising to further encourage Ivorians to consume 
the product at home as well and, whilst sales of most processed 
foods declined in the 1980s because of the economic climate, 
Quaker oats turnover increased during the promotion period.
TABLE 36: SALES OF QUAKER OATS IN CARTONS AND MILLIONS OF CFA
YEAR SALES IN AVERAGE MONTHLY
CARTONS SALES CFA mil
1981 5.5
1982 10.3
1983 8.9
1984 10,933 13.8
1985 13,897 17.8
1986 14,557
1987 17,143
1988 16,904
1989 16,788
1990 *14,640
* Estimate.
Source: DSA: stock ledger: Quaker Special Markets Division, untitled (May 1985).
The decline in sales after the period of heavy promotion is telling 
and reinforces a point that will be argued in the following chapter: 
that, in times of economic hardship, Ivorians return to using more 
traditional foods. In fact, by 1990, some kiosks which previously 
sold oat porridge were using a kind of maize flour for the 
porridge, a product which is both cheaper and local.97 Thus, in this 
instance at least, during times of economic hardship, the 
promotion effect was short term.
96 Interview: Mr. Bemadin Doh Gilles, Salesman at Blohorn and DANAFCO  
(Abidjan, 1st. interview, September 20 1990); Personal experience: I was 
involved in the promotion( 1984-86); DSA: memo, I.Trier (Quaker Special 
Markets Division, hereafter QSMD), 'Meeting with Peter Toxvaerd - DANAFCO  
- Eton 31 August 1984': letter, P.Toxvaerd (DANAFCO) to I.Trier (QSMD) 
(November 25 1986).
97 Fieldwork: observation: discussion with Doh G illes, Salesman at Blohorn 
and DANAFCO.
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The Quaker promotion, although initiated by the agent and based 
on a similar effort by Nescafe,98 fell very much within the general 
Quaker marketing philosophy which had relied  upon 
demonstrations on preparation and samplings throughout the 
w orld .99 Quaker also proved adaptable in promoting the product 
according to local customs. In France for example, as to an extent 
in Ivory Coast, oats were advertised for general cooking purposes. 
The product was also advertised with the label (the Quaker man) 
always prominant,100 again following tradition as "the label was 
an important line of communication in foreign markets".101
There were many products which exploited convenience or ease of 
use. Advertisement messages in Ivory Coast were for the most 
part simple and designed to inform, a reflection of the the high 
illiteracy rate and low education level. Television and radio 
advertisements were usually broadcast in French but sometimes 
in Dioula, Baoule and Bete, the most widely spoken indigenous 
languages .102 The simplicity of the message is well illustrated by 
the four sketches overleaf which outline a 1988 Quaker oats 
advertisement ’storyline': the method of preparation and the
necessary ingrediants and utensils are all that were shown (see 
Figure l l a - d ) 103 and other products tended to follow similar 
principles. From 1983 to 1986 (and after), amongst the most 
frequently advertised processed foods were Maggi cubes, Jumbo 
cubes, Tanti cubes, Cerelac, Arome Maggi, Nescao, Quaker oats, 
Lipton teabags, Chocodi and Nescafe.104 All of these items were 
easy to use widely distributed products.
98 Personal experience: discussion with Doh Gilles (1984).
99 A.F.Marquette, Brands. Trademarks and Good Will: The Storv o f the 
Quaker Oats Company (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967), pp.220-221.
100 Personal experience: observation.
101 Marquette, Q uaker, p.222.
102 Ib id . Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation.
103 DSA: telefax, DANAFCO to I.Trier (QSMD) ( March 24 1988).
104 Savane, P u b lic ity , pp.95-111; Personal experience: observation; 
Fieldwork: discussion with Ivoire Media official (Sept 1990); DSA: telex, 
I.Trier (QSMD) to E.Bosteen (DANAFCO) (25 Febuary 1988).
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FIGURES 11A-D: OUTLINE OF QUAKER TELEVISION ADVERTISEMENT.
No.  31 10 4 2 0 4 6 7 3  2 4 . 0 3 . 0 8  1 4 : l u  F . 01 ^  ^
Source: DSA: telefax. D A N A F C O  to I.Trier (Q SM D) (March 24 1988).
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Media advertsiers also attempted to attract consumers through 
messages relating to health and nutritional value (Quaker, Nescao, 
Chocodi), newness (Chocodi, stock cubes), cost and value for 
money (Quaker), hygiene (Chocodi), pack size (Jumbo, Nescafe), 
status (Liptons, Nescafe), taste (Nescafe) and as a refreshing 
antidote to heat and exhaustion (Liptons).105
Sponsoring sporting events was an effective way of implying that 
a product had nutritional value, combated exhaustion or provided
energy. Quaker oats was one of the sponsoring products for the
Abidjan half-marathon in 1989. For one million CFA, Quaker oats 
appeared on all official signs and Quaker representatives were 
present on the organising committee and at the prize giving 
ceremony. During the race, promoters gave samples to passers by 
and served portions to the general public from a kiosk designed 
like a giant Quaker oats can. Further, the event was covered 
extensively on television.106 Other sporting sponsorships have 
involved Ovaltine,107 Lipton tea and Yoplait yoghurt and others 
keen to promote the health aspects of their products.108
Sponsoring television programs, allowing marketeers to target 
particular consumers, such as housewives, or consumers in 
general was also popular in the 1980s.109 It was a market which 
Nestle appeared to have have cornered in 1990 as far as 
processed foods were concerned.110 To sponsor a television 
program, a company contributed towards its production costs and 
in return was either allowed to broadcast a message at both the
beginning and the end of the programme (eg Lipton tea and the
105 Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation. See also 
adverts placed in local magazines and newspapers, for example: R IM . 1 
(avril 1987), between pages 8-9, p.28; Fraternity M atin. (10 October 1990), 
p.7; Fieldhouse, N u trition , p. 13.
106 Interview: Mr. Frederick Attoh, DANAFCO General Manager (Abidjan, 
September 1990); DSA: letter, F6d6ration Ivoirienne d’Athldtisme (FIA) to 
DANAFCO (29 August 1989): telex, DANAFCO to Quaker (27 October 1988).
107 Fraternity Matin (fev 1988).
108 Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation.
109 A.Kassi, ’Le sponsoring: un outil de developpement', R IM . 4 (1990), p.31. 
Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation.
110 Fieldwork: observation.
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Sunday evening movie in 1990) or else the product or its name 
was evident throughout the programme (eg Maggi cubes and a 
cookery programme in 1986).111
Particular consumer groups such as the young, rural inhabitants 
or early morning shoppers could also be targeted through 
animations using films and product messages interspersed with 
music from megaphones and loud speakers. This tactic was 
possibly inspired by the example of the music company which 
sold recordings in villages through public demonstrations.112 The 
method was first used in Ivory Coast by Blohorn for the 
promotion of Belivoir soap in 1966.113 A van travelled around the 
country with a film projector, speakers and two animators who 
showed publicity spots followed by a film (western, Kung Fu or 
such like).114 Since then megaphones became part of the standard 
equipment of the salesvan, broadcasting specific messages playing 
music very loudly, drawing attention to a lorry which was usually 
decorated with product messages and designs.115
Field promotions also allowed targeting. Tastings allowed the 
exploitation of a product’s taste attribute and familiarised 
consumers with a novelty product, hopefully prompting word of 
mouth recommendations in the process. Tastings were an essential 
part of the field promotions for the Maggi cube from 1965116 
(detailed in Chapter 7). Limited distribution processed food 
tastingss were almost always in supermarkets and grocery stores 
and thus targeted Europeans and other high income consumers. 
Tastings were often accompanied by special brand displays, 
intercom announcements, price reductions, free gifts on purchase, 
leaflet distribution and/or prize draws.117 Such promotions were
111 Ibid; Personal experience; observation.
112 Warner, A n n u a l, p.602.
113 Bollinger, M arketing, p. 190-191.
114 Ib id : Interview: Doh Gilles (1st.).
115 Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation.
116 J.Masini, M.Ikonocoff, C.Jedlicki and M.Lanzarotti, M ultinationals and 
Development in Black Africa: a Case Study in the Ivorv Coast (Saxon House, 
Farnborough, 1979), p .133; Interview: Doh Gilles (1st.).
117 Fieldwork: discussion with Mme R.Theze, Chargds des Supermarches at 
DANAFCO, previously at Abinader (Dec 1990): observation; Interview: Paoli:
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used since at least the early 1970s in the Nour A1 Hayat 
supermarket and became a regular feature of all supermarkets.118 
Products promoted by these methods included Yoplait yoghurt, 
Ducros spices, Quaker cereals, Ovaltine, Nescao, Nescafe, Planters’ 
snacks and Kelloggs cereals.119
There were generally fewer in-store promotions during the rainy 
season when many Europeans were on holiday. Some products 
were promoted to coincide with certain events. Ovaltine had 
pencils, pencilsharpners, rulers and rubbers attached to tins every 
year in September when the children returned to school whilst 
processed foods like Planters' snacks were often promoted around 
Christmas time.120 Sometimes groups of products like all cheeses 
or a selection of products from a particular country were 
prom oted .121
Whilst tasting may have been the most effective means of getting 
consumers to try a product, they were expensive to operate over a 
long period of time. Consequently, few companies did this on a 
large scale, prefering instead to use publicity material such as 
stickers, plastic bowls, T-shirts, caps, key rings etc. For the
average African, publicity materials (and other forms of
promotional activity) were virtually non-existant in the 1950s 
and the early 1960s.122 By the early 1970s this had changed
though and shops had their doors and walls covered with stickers 
and posters for many products, exploiting any one or more of half 
a dozen product attributes.123 Stickers tended to find their way
Mr. M.Anthony, Director o f  the Score group (Abidjan, November 1990); 
Personal experience: observation; E.Aka and G.Amangoua, ‘Recontre avec . . 
. Sultan Ali Esmail, Directeur General du Supermarchd Nour A1 Hayat’, R IM .
1 (1987), p. 17; DSA: memo, R.Theze (DANAFCO), 'Resume du meeting avec Mr 
David Trewin [QSMD] le 30 mars 1984 a Abidjan concernant les
supermarches': memo, '31 August 1984’.
118 Maurel, ‘Alimentaire’, p.43; Aka and Amangoua, ‘Esm ail’, p .17.
Fieldwork: discussion with Theze.
119 Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: discussion with Theze. See  
also the advertisement in R IM . 1 (1987), p. 14.
120 Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation.
121 Ibid; Aka and Amangoua, ‘Esmail’, p. 17.
122 Interview: Mr. Seydou Drabo, Storekeeper and Nightwatchman at 
DANAFCO (Abidjan, July 24 1990).
123 Interview: Mr. Bernadin Doh Gilles, Salesman at Blohorn and DANAFCO
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onto most forms of transport as well as lamp posts, gates, traffic 
lights, market stalls, restaurant tables and kiosk stools but many 
were poorly made and either faded or un-glued in the hot sun. T- 
shirts and caps were popular gifts with traders as were plastic
bags which were often sold on the market and used until they fell 
ap a rt .124
Many of the above items thus had hidden benefits, in a sense
giving the consumer or trader more for the same price. This was 
often also be true of packing. Products sold in tins or other re­
usable packing saved consumers money as they did not have to
buy storage containers. Thus the Jumbo cube was deliberately
marketed in hard cardboard drums which traders and market
women re-used for other produce. Similarly, Nescao tins, Sunquick 
squash bottles and mayonnaise jars were all re-used for storage 
or as drinking mugs.125 With low incomes more obviously in mind, 
price reductions were also used but were expensive and often 
jeopardised market stability. The aims of price cutting varied 
from encouraging trader loyalty to inducing cash strapped 
consumers to try a new product. A fuller discussions of these 
objectives appears in Chapter 7. Price reductions were also used 
by retailers to gain extra customers. For example, the Nour A1 
Hayat supermarket cut prices on Yoplait yoghurt, Nesquick
chocolate drink, tinned tomatoes and Lu biscuits amongst other 
items in October 1990.126
Finally, the influence of the salesman should not be ignored. Direct 
selling was an important source of word of mouth communication. 
When traders needed convincing that they should purchase a 
product, the salesman usually pointed out the advantages of the 
product and generally provided information about it. At the same
time, customers were likely to pause and listen to him as were
(Abidjan, 2nd. interview, October 2 1990); RCI, Le Programme d'Action 
C om m ercia le  (Ministere de l'Economie et des Finances, n.d. circa 1971), 
from a photograph.
124 Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation.
125 Ibid.
126 Fieldwork: PROSUMA publicity leaflet (October 1990).
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other passers by.127 The mere presence of the salesman and his 
van was in itself a form of promotion and some companies 
realised this long ago, as is illustrated by the practice of the 
company Afrilait who used to drive their (decorated) lorries 
around the streets of Abidjan on Saturdays in the 1960s,128 using 
them as a kind of mobile billboard. In a country like Ivory Coast 
where media access was limited for many, exploiting word of 
mouth was a vital part of marketing.
6.5 CONCLUSION
Within the elements of population and income, the level of 
demand for basic foods was a function largely of urbanisation. 
Urban residents often required conveniance products and were 
more exposed to supplier advertising. Luxury items were mostly 
consumed by Europeans, some Lebanese and high ranking private 
and public sector Ivorians. Mostly Abidjan based, media images 
and other western cultural influences as well as convenience and 
advertising served to stimulate demand amongst these top income 
earners.
Faced by a market with restricted media access and generally low 
incomes, marketeers up to the late 1970s relied heavily on field 
promotions to stimulate demand for existing products or introduce 
new ones. With the increase in urbanisation, the exploitation of 
conveniance, out of the home consumption became increasingly 
common for cheaper products. Media advertising also played an 
increasingly important part in stimulating demand by exploiting, 
through simple messages, conveniance, nutritious value, economy 
and taste. Meanwhile, luxury product marketing mostly involved 
targeting consumers in the shops they frequented most, 
supermarkets and grocery stores.
The demand for processed foods in Ivory Coast 1956-90 was 
influenced by many factors, over most of which suppliers and
127 Ibid; Personal experience: observation.
128 Interview: Drabo.
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distributors had no control. From 1956 to the late 1970s, rapid 
population growth and rising national income led to large 
increases in imports. During the 1980s, population growth 
continued but incomes stagnated and then declined, slowing or 
reversing the growth in the market for most processed foods. 
However, wide disparities in income meant that consumption of 
many items was restricted to a few wealthy, mostly urban, 
residents even during periods of rapid economic growth. Whilst 
condensed milk, cubes, tomato puree and a small number of other 
products were widely consumed, inadequate distribution and 
cheaper, more familiar local produce in rural areas imposed limits 
upon the demand even for these basic items.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCENTRATED M ILK AND STOCK CUBES: TW O CASE 
STUDIES OF COMPETITION AND DEPENDENCE
Whilst concentrated milk and stock cubes are both mass m arket 
products consumed by all bu t a small minority of Ivorians, the ir  
respective beginnings, sales evolution and m arketing history  are 
qu ite  d if fe ren t.  Im p o rts  by w e ig h t of co n c e n tra ted  milk 
outstripped those of cubes by almost ten to one in the mid 1980s 
whilst sales by value w ere approxim ately  th ree  tim es as h igh .1 
Concentrated milk is the older product bu t it was cubes tha t w ere  
first m anufactured locally and for most of the 1980s it was cubes 
tha t had the higher marketing profile. The chapter will show: first, 
how com petition in the two m arkets  has differed, second, the 
consequences of local manufacturing and, third, the effects these 
have had on consumers, dependence on foreign inputs and the  
relationships betw een  trade rs  and suppliers. Different historical 
backgrounds and competitve and evolutionary patterns mean tha t 
the milk and cubes case studies, whilst com plem entary, cover a 
wide range of issues. Consequently, the sections are organised 
slightly differently.
Despite the recent in tense activity in yoghurt promotions, it is 
concentated milk which provides the bulk of the tu rnover in dairy 
products. In sharp contrast to the cube trade, the m arketing of 
concentrated milk has been fairly low key. The concentrated milk 
section starts  by examing the pre 1956 years  and th en  moves 
onto the period 1956 to 1988 w hen imports reigned suprem e and 
two brands dominated the market. The final section examines the 
effects of local manufacturing and im port restrictions.
The stock cube is the only processed food product in Ivory Coast 
which has achieved mass distribution, by which it is m eant th a t  
the product is found widely on m arket tables alongside the most 
basic consumer products. A detailed study of the product throw s
1 RCI, S tatistiaues Douaniers: DSA: sa les ledger (1 9 8 4 -8 5 ):  report by  the  
advertsing agency Agence Aujourd'hui, Jumbo: re leve  des achats' (1 9 8 5 ).
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light on many other areas of the processed food trade  as well as 
clearly  displaying the f ingerp rin ts  of Ivorian  economic policy 
tow ards foreign interests. The heavy countryw ide prom otion of 
cubes and their marketing up-country  from the mid 1970s was 
the im m ediate forerunner to the sudden expansion in m arketing 
activity which, until then, had only been developing slowly since 
Nestle began marketing coffee in the early 1960s.2 The section on 
the cube trade starts w ith  a look at the uses and background of 
cubes before assessing how Nestle created a mass m arket for the 
product. The third section examines the switch from a monopoly 
to an oligpoly m arket w ith the introduction of the Jumbo cube and 
the fouth Nestle s response to tha t competition. Lastly, the reasons 
for the re -asse rt ion  of Nestle s primacy and the failings of the 
competion are assessed.
7.1 CONCENTRATED MILK
7.1.1 Defin it ion,  Composit ion and Early D e v e lo p m e n ts  in the  
Market
The history of im ported dairy products in Ivory Coast goes back to 
around the tu rn  of the century. Concentrated milk appeared  in 
Ivory Coast less than  50 years after its introduction in the United 
States in 1856. Developed in response to the distancing of m arket 
areas  from  production  locations, condensed  milk had w a te r  
rem oved to lessen transport costs. It kep t longer than  fresh  milk 
and included a sw eetener. Evaporated milk, developed slightly 
later, came unsweetened and often with vitam in e n r i c h m e n t  .3
At least two brands of concentrated milk, Nestle and Ours, w ere  
available in Ivory Coast by 19 144 bu t im ports declined on the  
o u tb rea k  of w ar as m anufacturing  resources  w ere  d iv e r te d
2 Interview : Mr. Bernadin Doh Gilles, Salesm an at Blohorn and DANAFCO 
(Abidjan, 1 st. in terv iew , Septem ber 20 1990).
3 L.A.Maynard, T h e D evelopm ent of Dairy Products’. In I.Galdston (ed.), 
Human Nutrition Historic and Scientific. (In ternational U n iversities Press, 
New York, 1960), p p .2 0 0 -2 0 1.
4 ANCI, carton 1QQ11 /  file  V -3 3 -3 3 : letter, A ffaires Econom iques to 
Inspection  des Douanes (January 27 1914).
2 4 9
elsew here and sea tran sp o rt became s c a r c e . 5 Between the w ars 
concentrated milk seems to have been fairly w idely available in 
the  te r r i to ry 6 and it was during the 1930s th a t  the dom inant 
b rand  of unsw eetened milk, Bonnet Rouge, f irs t appeared .7 The 
ou tb reak  of the Second World War led to a d ram atic  fall in 
im ports in general (to one eighth of the p re-w ar level in 1940) 
and the imposition of strict rationing upon the blockading of Vichy 
territories in Francophone West Africa.8
Rationing continued under the Free French regime and after the 
w ar w ith  milk genera lly  re se rv ed  for p reg n an t w om en and 
infants: all forms of milk, concentrated  or pow dered, could be 
bought by most Europeans only upon presen tation  of a doctor s 
certif ica te9 and do not appear to have been available to African 
children at all. Elite Africans w ere affected more than anyone else 
and students even w ent on strike w hen  French style meals w ere  
s to p p e d .10 However, the Legion des Comabattants w ere  allowed 
processed foods which included tins of Rolust and Envoi b rands of 
sardines, Mont Blanc sweetened concentrated milk, and powdered 
m ilk .11 That concentrated  milk was more strictly rationed than  
most items seems apparen t from complaints by local officials in 
1946 and 1947 over limited supplies.12 The im port figures in 
Table 37 appear to confirm tha t milk in particular was in short 
supply. Note tha t concentrated milk was easily the largest item 
prior to the war, a position not regained until 1950.
5 ANCI, IQ Q 8/V -11-275: letter, AOF to Chambre de Commerce (July 31 1915).
6 See, for exam ple, ANCI, 5 2 9 4 /1  1 1 -28-25: court notes, d ivorce case Aka vs. 
Agba, Abidjan (N ovem ber 3 1928); ANCI, 1 4 5 7 /X -5 4 -1 4 : Fiches de 
R enseignem ents (1936 ).
7 In terv iew  (telephone): Mr. Kloostra, Export M anager for Africa at 
C.C.Friesland Froco (Rotterdam , May 3 1993).
8 P.M anning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1 8 8 0 -1 9 8 5  (CUP, Cambridge, 
1988), p .l 16; A.G.Hopkins, An Economic H istory of W est Africa (Longm an,
1973), pp .184-185 .
9 ANCI, 5 6 3 4 /X V -6 -4 5 /4 6 :  circular, A ffaires Econom iques, Arrete  
reg lem entant la consom m ation du lait' (Febuary 27 1948).
10 A.R.Zolberg, One Party G overnm ent in the Ivorv Coast. (Princeton  
U niversity  Press, Princeton, new  ed„ 1969), p.61.
11 ANCI, 5 8 7 4 /X V 1 1 -1 5 -1 5 : contents list from  a parcel to La Legion de la Cote 
d ’Ivoire (n.d., circa 1942): invoice, Ets. Charles Perinaud to Legion des  
Com battants (October 31 1942).
12 ANCI, 5 6 3 4 /X V -6 -4 5 /4 6 :  letter, Gouverneur General de AOF to G ouverneur  
de la Cote d ’Ivoire (Febuary 12 1947).
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TABLE 3 7 :  IM PORTS OF SELECTED PROCESSED FOODS, TONNES
CONCENTRATED PRESERVED PRESERVED
MILK VEGETABLES MEAT
1938 274 94 65
1939 304 142 99
1946 7 51 25
1947 90 401 111
1948 326 146 75
1949 256 277 133
1950 685 284 297
1951 885 407 311
1952 1047 551 293
N.B. Figures for 1940 to 1943 are not available. All figures include Upper Volta w hich  
accounted for about 10% of the total.
Sources: ANCI, carton 3 6 3 4  file X V -6 -4 5 /4 6 :  circular, Bureau de Statistique (April 22  
1948); AOF, Commerce Exterieur de la Cote d'Ivoire et de la Haute Volta de 1931 a 
1 934  (Service de la Statistique et de la Mecanographie, Dakar, 1955), PP-63, 65, 67.
It is possible tha t only milk from France was affected by  this 
extension, leaving Holland and Denmark as the principal suppliers. 
Milk rationing was finally abandoned in April 1950, six months 
after similar restrictions on other p r o d u c t s . By this time prices 
had risen steeply compared to their p re-w ar level, from CFA 5 50 
in 1938 to CFA 24 in March 1948 for a 410g t in .14 Price rises, 
although controlled, w ere  caused by shortages and inflation in 
France s devasta ted  economy and it is likely th a t  black m arke t 
activities resulted in many consumers paying substantially  more 
than the officially sanctioned r a t e . 15
13 V.Thom pson and R.Adloff. French W est Africa (A llen  and Unwin, 1958), 
pp.4 3 6 -4 3 7 ; ANCI, 5 6 3 4 /X V -6 -4 5 /4 6 :  letter, L A dm inistrateur des Colonies to 
Le G ouverneur de la Cote d'Ivoire (April 4 1950).
14 ANCI, 5 6 3 4 /X V -6 -4 5 /4 6 :  circular, Bureau de Statistique (A pril 22 1948).
^  M anning, Francophone, p .l 16; P.Anyang'Nyong'o, T he D evelopm ent of 
Agrarian Capitalist Classes in the Ivory Coast, 1945 -1975 '- In P.Lubeck (ed .)f 
The African Bourgeoisie (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1987), p . l 88.
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7 .1 .2  D ev e lo p m en ts  in  th e  M arket, 1 9 5 6 -1 9 8 8
The period  1 9 5 6 -8 8  saw huge in c re a se s  in im p o r ts  of 
concentrated milk but few changes in either methods of importing 
or principal countries of origin, except for the em ergence of West 
Germany and Czechoslovakia, largely at the expense of France 
whose concentrated milk prices have traditionally  been h ig h e r16 
(see Tables 38 and 39 below). Nearly half of the im porters  in 
1950 w ere  still involved in the 1980s. These characteristics of 
continuity  and growth are also largely true  of the sardine and 
tinned tomato trades, as are the surprising ra r ity  of promotional 
activities. Explanations for these similarities are not self-evident 
but are undoubtedly linked to the strictly controlled price margins 
for these  p ro d u c ts .17 In fact, none of the products subject to 
margins substantially  below the standard 50% in 198818 (that is, 
the public retail price may not be more than 50% higher than  the 
landed cost) w ere promoted other than through the media.
TABLE 38: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF SWEETENED CONCENTRATED MILK, 
PERCENTAGES
YEAR FRANCE HOLLAND CZECH'VAKIA OTHERS TOTAL IN 
TONNES
1961 71.1 28.6 0.3 2187
1972 83.2 14.7 2.1 4822
1982 43.0 34.2 20.1 2.7 18790
NB: 1961 is used because  figures w ere  not available for 1962. Figures for other ten  
year gaps (eg 1965, 75, 85)  w ere  also incomplete.
Source: RCI, Statistiaues Douaniers.
16 ANF-SOM, FIDES serie 2, carton 179: Comparison entre les  prix FOB 
Francais et etrangers d articles de consom m ation courante Outre-Mer'
(Bureau d 'A pprovisionnem ent, octobre 1957); CFCE, Le m arche des produits 
laitiers en Cote d lv o ir e ', (Direction des Produits A gro-A lim entaires, Paris, 
1981), p.39.
17 Price controls lim iting the margin b etw een  landed cost and the public 
retail price are im posed on products w hich  the state regards as basic  
n ecessities  for Ivorians.
18 RCI, A rrete No. 001 du 15 janvier 1988' (M inistre du Commerce, Abidjan).
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TABLE 39: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS OF UNSWEETENED CONCENTRATED MILK, 
PERCENTAGES
YEAR FRANCE HOLLAND W.GERMANY OTHERS TOTAL IN 
TONNES
1961 44.4 51.3 4.3 3429
1972 18.0 73.7 3.7 4.6 9786
1982 6.2 52.8 40.1 0.9 18737
NB: 1961 is used because figures w ere  not available for 1962. Figures for other ten  
year gaps (eg 1963, 75 , 85) w ere  also incomplete.
Source: RCI. Statistique Douaniers.
The rise in food imports generally has been dramatic and is amply 
illustrated  in Table 40 below for concentrated  milk and butte r. 
Local fresh  milk production amounted to just four million litres in 
1970 and was es tim ated  at nine to ten  million litres in 1980 
compared to an estim ated demand of 190 million litres .19 Im ports 
of concentrated milk increased five fold betw een 1960 and 1970, 
more than  doubled betw een 1970 and 1980 bu t increased only 
m arginally until 1985 before another large rise in tonnage in 
1986. This pa ttern  is fairly consistent w ith  the economic fortunes 
of the country. Between 1958 and 1974 unsw eetened  milk was 
the more popular bu t since then  there has been little difference 
betw een  the two. This would indicate a shift in use, perhaps w ith  
co n su m p tio n  by  in fa n ts  of u n sw e e te n e d  milk becom ing  
proportionately less important.
19 CFCE, 'Marche'.
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TABLE 4 0 :  IM PORTS OF CONCENTRATED M ILK, TONNES
DATE SWEETENED UNSWEETENED TOTAL MILK
CONCENTRATE
1956 1047
1957 1429
1958 1093 1386 247 9
1959
1960 305 0
1961 218 6 3429 5615
1962 1860 2200 406 0
1963
1964 2461 3549 601 0
1965 2976 4136 7 1 1 2
1966 3347 4716 8063
1967 3633 5494 9 1 2 7
1968 4179 6240 10419
1969 4865 707 2 11937
1970 633 7 9225 15562
1971 15676
1972 4822 978 7 14608
1973 19469
1974 6916 13148 2 0 0 8 5
1975 7 7 5 9 6283 14042
1976 2 4 7 6 0
1977
1978 18971 14199 3 3 2 8 4
1979
1980 19691 17609 3 7 5 7 2
1981 2 2 8 3 7 2 3 7 7 5 4 6 6 1 2
1982 18788 18737 3 7 7 0 6
1983 2 1 4 7 5 17826 39301
1984 21 7 2 2 17649 3 6 3 3 2
1985 22941 21191 4 4 1 3 2
1986 2 4 3 0 4 2 2 0 5 4 4 6 3 5 8
1987 2 2 7 1 7 2 3 2 5 6 4 5 9 7 3
1988 21 2 6 5 2 2 3 5 4 4 3 6 1 9
Sources: RCI. S ta t is t ia u es  Douaniers: AOF. Bulletin M ensuel  de S ta t is t iau e  d'Outre-
Mer: FAO, Trade Yearbook: UN, Yearbook of In te r n ationa l Trade Statist ics:  UN, 
Commodity Trade Statistics, series D.
W hilst much of the im ported  milk pow der w as used in the  
p ro d u c tio n  of o th e r  foods, e sp ec ia lly  in y o g h u r ts ,  m ost 
concentrated  milk e ither passed through the usual channels of 
distribution to the consumer or to kiosks, described by Akindes as 
"les principaux vecteurs extra-dom estiques de consommation des  
produits de l'industrie agro-alimentaire com m e le pain, le lait, le 
beurre, le cafe et le sucre The most popular dish served w as 
cafe com plet  which consisted of coffee, chocolate, concentrated  
milk, bread and butter. Other products used w ere  spaghetti, peas,
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sardines, im ported spices,20 Quaker oats and tea bags.21 Table 41 
shows the composition of foods served by kiosks in 1979.
TABLE 41: COMPOSITION OF FOODS SERVED BY KIOSKS, 1979
Source: F.A.Akindes, Urbanisation et d e v e lo p p e m e n t  du secteur  in form el en  Cote 
d'Ivoire: le x a m p le  d Abidjan', (These Doctorat, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en  Sciences  
Sociales, Paris, 1990).
Eating at kiosks was particularly  popular w ith  unm arried  men 
needing a quick, cheap b reakfas t on their  w ay  to work. Most 
clients w ere manual labourers, s tudents and b u reau cra ts22 who, 
as observed  in Chapter 6, tran sm itted  these  habits  to o thers  
around them, especially in the home. Table 42 shows tha t nearly  
all u rban  households in 1984 used milk in one form or another 
every  d a y . 23 Distribution was via im porters and wholesalers from 
whom retail stores, kiosks and tabliers bought.24
20 F.A.Akindes, U rbanisation et d evelop p em en t du secteur inform el en  Cote 
d'Ivoire: l exam ple d'A bidjan’, (These Doctorat, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en  
Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1990); Personal experience: observation . All 
su b seq u en t referen ces to personal experience are for all of the periods 
1 9 8 3 -8 5  and 1986 un less o therw ise indicated.
21 Personal experience: observation  during Quaker prom otion (1 9 8 4 -8 5 ) .
22 A kindes, Urbanisation'.
23 CFCE, Les habitudes de consom m ation et d'achat des fo y ers  urbains 
Ivoiriens en  m atiere de produits laitiers' (Direction des Produits A gro- 
A lim entaire, Paris, 1984).
24 CFCE, Marche', p.78; A kindes, 'Urbanisation'; Personal experience: 
observation; Fieldwork: observation . All su bsequent referen ces to 
fie ldw ork  are for all the period July-D ecem ber 1990 un less o therw ise  
indicated.
ITEM %
bread
con cen tra ted  milk
su g a r
c o ffe e
b u tter  and m argarine  
fre sh  m ilk
chocolate  drink pow der
47
26
12
8
4
2
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TABLE 42: PERCENT OF URBAN HOUSEHOLDS CONSUMING MILK. AND BUTTER, 
1984
CONSUMPTION FREQUENCY MILK BUTTER
consum e ev e ry d a y 63.5 36
consum e severa l tim es a w eek 15.4 8.3
consum e once a w eek 4.0 2.2
consum e less  than once a w eek 11.5 10.8
TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS CONSUMING 94.5 57.3
TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS NOT CONSUMING 5.5 42.7
Source: CFCE, Les habitudes de consom m ation e t  d'achat des  fo y ers  urbains Ivoiriens  
en m atiere  de produits  la itiers (Direction des Produits A gro-A lim en ta ire ,  Paris, 
1 9 8 4 ) .
Table 40 showed that, for the most part, im ports of sw eetened  
and u n sw ee ten ed  concen tra ted  milk w ere  fa ir ly  sim ilar in 
quantity. For reasons not entirely clear, the form er was the more 
popu lar in Abidjan and the  la tte r  the  more popular in the  
no r th e rn  and central areas of the country. One possible answ er 
may be found in Table 43 which shows tha t sw eetened milk was 
much more used on bread than unsweetened in urban  households. 
If this form of consumption w ere more common in Abidjan, this 
would explain the higher consumption of sw eetened milk in the 
capital.
TABLE 43: PRINCIPAL USES OF MILK BY PERCNTAGE OF URBAN HOUSEHOLDS, 
1984
% OF URBAN HOUSEHOLDS USING 
SWEETENED UNSWEETENED POWDER
c o ffe e 68.2 65.5 4.3
cocoa 13.2 10.2 0.6
on bread 30.2 1.6 0.2
Source: CFCE, Habitudes'.
This table clearly shows just how commonly used concentrated  
milk has become, especially com pared to pow dered  milk, and 
most of th is consum ption  took place at b reak fas t.  However, 
consum ption per head at 3.33 litres per year  rem ains v e ry  low 
com pared even  to the M editerranean  countries of Europe (186
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litres per y e a r ) . 2  ^ Of those not consuming, the main reason given 
in the survey was price,26 but, as will be shown later, price may 
not be the main reason in choosing brand. The w idespread  use of 
concentrated milk is greatly facilitated by the fact tha t consumers 
and stores do not requ ire  cooling facilities. These factors may 
partly  explain the lower consumption of b u tte r  even  though, in 
1990 at least, consumers often bought small portions daily from 
local stores.27
The inform ation so far presented  has illustrated tha t the m arket 
for concen tra ted  milk was not only subs tan tia l  b u t  also has 
consistantly  grown, the la tter years  excepting. The same is also 
largely true  for tinned tom atoes and sardines. Why, therefore, 
have there been few efforts at promotion of many of the brands 
available com pared to certain  o ther dairy  products, cubes and 
o ther  item s? The answ er most likely  lies in the im porting  
methods, the agency arrangem ents w ith  overseas suppliers and, 
as a lready  indicated, the margins allowed to im porte rs  by the 
governm ent. These im portant factors will now be tackled one by 
one af te r  w hich  some additiona l suggestions will be m ade 
regarding the lack of promotional activities for many brands.
Im porters  of concentrated  milk, since at least 1950, have been  
fairly num erous. In 1950 there w ere at least eleven, in 1980 at 
least nine and in 1990 at least ten, n e ither  of the la tte r  two 
figures including the superm arkets  which im ported only for their 
own stores. The Societe Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain (SCOA), 
the Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrique Occidentale (CFAO), the  
Societe Africain de Commerce et d ln d u s tr ie  (SACI) and the  
Compagnie Francaise de la Cote d 'Ivoire  (CFCI) w ere  the only 
1950-vintage suppliers still importing in 1980 and by 1990 SACI 
had also dropped out. Of the nine known im porters  in 1980, six 
w ere  still in the trad e  in 1990.28 The reasons for this high
2 5 A.Diaby, Dossier industrie laitiere: un jum elage d'in teret national', 
Fraternite Matin. (N ovem ber 6 1990) p.21.
26 CFCE, Habitudes'.
27 Fieldwork: observation.
28 ANCI, 5 6 3 4 /X V -6 -4 5 /4 6 :  circular, A ffaires Econom iques, Situation des  
laits a Abidjan' (October 21 1950); CFCE, Marche', pp.3 9 -4 4 , 61; Fieldwork:
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tu rnover in im porters relate to alleged fraudlen t competition' (on 
w hich  more la te r)  and the  dem ise of some of the  ea r l ie r  
im porters. These facts by them selves need not mitigate against 
companies promoting concentrated  milk as some, m aybe most, 
have been regular im porters for a considerable time period.
It is not clear how m any brands there  w ere  before 1980 bu t 
Bonnet Rouge, Mont Blanc, Ideal, Ours, Nestle, Tatra, Bebe 
Hollandaise, Coast, La Tour, Kraft, Gloria, Superlait, Farm and Le 
Geant w ere  all p resen t on the m arke t at one tim e or ano ther 
be tw een  1950 and 1980: at least 14 b rands  in all. For b rands 
existing in 1980, Superlait and Farm can be deducted from this 
list, leaving 12 in all. In 1990 the num ber had increased to at 
least 15 but less than half of the 1980 brands survived: Le Geant, 
La Tour, Coast, Tatra , Ideal, Ours, Mont Blanc all hav ing  
d isappeared . Another brand, B&B, came and w en t during the  
1980s. The new brands w ere  the three m anufactured locally by 
the Societe des industries  et des produits a lim entaires la itiers 
(SIALIM), Granlait, Geant and Aboki, plus the im ports: Polly, 
Quatre Vaches, Or Blanc, Anchor, Cow Bell, Carnation, Frico and 
Tina. It is possible tha t Carnation and one or two others existed 
prior to 1980 but no record has been found of them .29 As w ith the 
importers, there is nothing here which should make the promotion 
of some concentrated milk brands unlikely for at least six appear 
to have existed for some considerable time. That is, they  have 
brand name recognition.
The key point about im porters and brands is tha t few of the la tter 
w ere  exclusive to the form er and some of the fo rm er im port 
several of the latter.3° This was especially true of tinned tomatoes. 
Concentrated milk was one of the main products bought through 
the buying house system described in Chapter 5 and imports w ere 
often pooled, tha t is one buying house services and supplies more 
than  one im porter  for the same brand. Thus for some b ran d s
discussions w ith  L ebanese traders and DANAFCO salesm en; Interview : Mr. 
Claude A ssouan, Directeur d'Achats at CDCI (Abidjan, D ecem ber 4 1990).
29 Ibid; Interview : Mr. N Gozan, M anager at CDCI in zone 4 (Abidjan, 
Decem ber 12 1990).
3 °  Ib id .
2 5 8
th e re  w ere  no agency a g ree m en ts .  C C F rie s land  Froco, 
m anufacturers of Bonnet Rouge, had a gentlem en s ag reem en t1 in 
1981 w ith  SABIMEX giving the im porter the sole rights to their 
sw eetened milk. But for their unsw eetened milk there  w ere  no 
few er than  six im porters. Rather than  C C Friesland dealing w ith  
each of the six separately, unsweetened milk was exported by one 
buying house on behalf of the m anufactu rers^ i until the late 
1970s w hen Friesland decided to handle exports them selves.32
At the same time, some im porters dealt in more than  one brand of 
concentra ted  milk. In 1980 for example, CFAO im ported  both  
Bonnet Rouge and Le Geant unsw eetened milk. Further, many of 
the b rands im ported  have appeared  and d isappeared  w ith in  a 
short space of tim e.33 All these factors mitigate against the  
prom otion  of b rands  by agents, bu t this did not m ean the  
m anufactu rer  could not do so. One possible reason w hy  Bonnet 
Rouge did not was tha t its domination of the unsw eetened  milk 
market, an estim ated 91% in 1981,34 hardly  made it w orth  their 
while as long as com petitors w ere  not doing so. With increased 
com petition during the 1980s, Bonnet Rouge was advertised  on 
television and radio which also coincided w ith  Friesland taking 
control of exports itself .35 it  is interesting to note tha t Nestle, who 
w as bo th  m a n u fac tu re r  and sole d is tr ib u to r ,  p ro m o ted  its 
concen tra ted  milk. Tatra, also im ported  exclusively, was also 
prom oted .36 There is though another possible explanation for the 
lack of promotional effort: margins.
The maximum margin allowed on the v as t majority of products 
was 50%. This m eant tha t if the landed cost of an item was CFA 
100, its public retail price could not exceed CFA 150. For all milks, 
this margin in 1988 was 17.646%. In 1980 the maximum margin 
appears to have been  in the same region, the general principal
31 Ibid; Interview : Mr. Kobenan, Director of SCIMPEX (Abidjan, Decem ber  
10 1990).
32 Interview : Kloostra.
33 Ibid.
34 CFCE, 'Marche', p.42.
35 Interview : Kloostra.
36 CFCE, Marche', p.79; Personal experience: observation . I have seen  
te lev is ion  adverts for Nestle concentrated milk.
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being to keep  dow n the price of this w id e ly  used product .37 
Consequently ,  custom s duties have  also genera l ly  b een  less  on 
milks than on other products.38 Thus the im porters’ profit margins 
on concentrated milk and certain other products like sardines,  
w ere  extrem ely  low making heavy  promotion difficult to justify.
7 .1 .3  SIALIM, l e  Jumelage  and Responses  to the New Market  
Situation, 1988 Onwards
Whilst low margins, multiple importers and short- l ived  brands  
w ere  deterents  to the promotion of many concentrated milks, the  
im posi t ion  of a quota sy s tem  in January 1990  w a s  the  most  
c o m p u ls ive  reason  y e t  for abolishing the idea  of a public i ty  
budget. Le jumelage, as it was  known locally, w as  imposed for the  
benefit  of SIALIM, 60% of it private Ivorian owned. Since 1988,  
SIALIM has m anu factu red  con cen tra ted  milk loca l ly  us ing  
im ported  milk pow der  and local sugar to produce the brands  
Granlait, Geant and Aboki. Having captured only  25% of the  
market and rumoured to be staggering towards an ocean of red  
ink as imported brands competed by cutting prices, SIALIM w a s  
rescued by the state in the name of national interest . By this it 
meant protecting Ivorian jobs and the money invested  in SIALIM, 
maintaining d em and  for locally  produced sugar used in the  
sw e e t e n e d  milk and lessen ing  the depen d en ce  on imports. L e  
jumelage  obliged distributors to obtain 40% of their requirem ents  
from SIALIM meaning that if distributor X w an ted  to import 60  
cartons of brand Y he wou ld  first have  to b u y  40 cartons of  
SIALIM milk locally.39
Of the reasons g iven for le jumelage, only saving the in ves tm en ts  
already made seem s justifiable. The use of local sugar cut imports  
but it w as  produced at three t imes the world market price. The  
local manufacture of concentrated milk decreases imports of this
37 CFCE, M arche’, pp.46-48; RCI, 'Arrete No. 001'.
38 ANF-SOM, Affaires Economiques, carton 674: Cahier des Douanes, 'Tariffs' 
(March 15 1945): Cahier des Douanes, Tariffs' (December 5 1950); CFCE, 
'Marche', p.64.
39 Fieldwork: discussions w ith  traders and importers; Diaby, Jum elage’,
p p .2 0 -2 1.
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particularly product but increased imports  of po w dered  milk.  
Finally, import companies,  most of which e m p lo y  more Ivorians  
than foreigners, probably had to lay off workers. SIALIM, had just 
250 em p loyees  and not all of them w ere  Ivorians.40
N eed less  to say, le jum elage  proved none too popular w i th  
importers. More importantly, traders and consumers also resented  
it because  SIALIM products w e r e  poor quality  (the milk w e n t  
black quickly) and because prices w ere  forced up. So much for the  
g o v e r n m e n t  s concern at keep ing  basic products  as cheap as 
possib le  (see  above) .  Many traders w h o  did not  h a v e  Bonnet  
Rouge or Nestle milk said it w a s  because  they  could not obtain  
supplies.  Further, SIALIM was unable to keep  up w ith  dem and  
and w a s  p lagued w i th  b r e a k d o w n s  in m ach inery ,  techn ica l  
problems and inadequate  capacity.41 Table 44  be low shows the  
store coverage of the various brands in f ive  interior towns and  
two districts of Abidjan.
TABLE 44: PERCENTAGE OF STORES STOCKING CONCENTRATED MILK IN 1990,  
BY BRAND
BRAND ABOISSO LAKOTA GUIGLO FERKE MARCORY ATTIE
Nestle 66.7 90.2 72.6 84.4 82.8 81.0
B.Rouge 93.8 93.4 91.9 84.4 84.4 64.0
Gloria 29.7 29.5 1.6 5.2 10.8 10.0
4 vaches 20.3 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.5 8.0
Or Blanc 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 4.0
Cow Bell 6.3 19.7 0.0 0.0 1.1 4.0
A n c h o r 4.7 1.6 0.0 1.3 20.4 27.0
P o lly 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.0
Other im ports 1.6 3.3 0.0 1.3 0.5 0.0
Geant 71.9 55.7 46.8 67.5 64.0 63.0
Aboki 12.5 27.9 0.0 3.9 25.3 52.0
G ranlait 62.5 41.0 22.6 59.7 58.1 54.0
ANY BRAND 95.3 98.4 95.2 96.1 97.8 99.0
Source: Fieldwork: regional distribution survey  (1990) .
Given the quota sy s tem ,  a dvert i s in g  b y  B onnet  Rouge and  
probably Nestle since January 1990 would have  y ie lded  l imited
40 Diaby, Jumelage', p.20.
41 Interview: Kloostra; Fieldwork: discussions w ith  traders and w ith  
Frederick Attoh, DANAFCO General Manager.
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returns  g iven  that the form er had an e s t im a te d  91% of the  
unsw eetened  market share and the latter an est imated 32% of the  
s w e e te n e d  market share in 198 l . 42 In fact, import restrictions  
helped cut Bonnet Rouge s share of the u n sw ee ten ed  market to 
just 1 0 %,43 Whilst Table 44 shows that ne ither  brand had the  
entire  import allocation of their respect ive  markets, promotion  
was clearly e v en  less justifiable than before g iven that 40% of the  
market was  out of bounds.
7 .2  STOCK CUBES
7 .2 .1  Definition, Composition and Uses of Cubes
The cube is a v e g e ta b le  based  de h y d ra te d  sauce  f lavouring.  
A lth o u g h  th e re  are s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  v a r ie t i e s ,  the  bas ic  
ingrediants are similar - about 50% salt, around 40% v e g e ta b le  
extract and proteins plus som e sugar and var ious  f lavour ing  
ingrediants  depend ing  on the type  of cube. Other d i f ferences  
b e tw e e n  the cubes are the colour of the sauce produced and its 
s a l t i n e s s , 44 factors w h ic h  ha ve  p layed  a major part in the  
performance of various cubes. A further difference is size. Not all 
cubes are cube shaped but in the trade all dehydrated soups in a 
compressed form are referred to simply as c u b e s . 45
As in Europe today, the cube w as  used as a flavouring to the sauce  
of a main dish. The cube w as  created as a protein supp lem ent  for  
the urban labour forces  of European industr ia l  c it ies  in the  
n in eteen th  century to make up for the diminished quantit ies  of  
meat, and c o n s e q u e n t ly  meat proteins,  consum ed:  a l though
42 CFCE, 'Marche, pp.42,44.
43 Interview: Kloostra.
44 J.Masini, M.Ikonicoff, C.Jedlicki and M.Lanzarotti, Multinationals and 
D evelopm ent in Black Africa: a Case Study in the Ivorv Coast (Saxon House, 
Farnborough, 1979), pp. 133-134; Fieldwork: discussion w ith  Attoh; DSA: 
memo, Julian Perea, GB representative, to Marc Cheriaux, DANAFCO General 
Manager (Aug 1983 or 1984).
45 Personal experience: observation. Despite this, the rectangular shaped  
Jumbo w as forced by  Nestle to rem ove the word cube' from its wrapping.  
See DSA: memo, E.Bosteen to DANAFCO staff on discussion held in Barcelona  
(Febuary 8 and 9 1983).
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vegetable  proteins are not as nutritious as meat ones .46 However,  
the  c o n su m p t io n  of cu b es  n e v e r  w a s  e n c o u r a g ed  th ro u gh  
advertis ing on this basis and it seem s unlikely  that consum ers  
w e r e  aware of the nutritional benef i ts  of cube consu m ption .47 
Given that suppliers and manufacturers in the Ivorian m arket  
frequent ly  stressed the health properties of their products (ev e n  
w h e n  there  aren't any) ,48 it s e em s  odd that Nestle  and their  
c o m p et i to rs  did not also s tress  this angle, w h ic h  p rov ed  a 
powerful  selling tool for many products, but instead concentrated  
on taste. Adjeuvan, a dried and strongly f lavoured fish, w a s  the  
main flavouring used before the cube becam e w id esp red  and it 
cont inu ed  to be used, e ither  in addition to the cube  or by  
consumers w h o  either did not like or could not afford the cube.49
The cube w as  used in sauces of main dishes,  particularly  the  
traditional ones. These take severa l  forms, depending partly on  
the e thnic  group, the most popular being grain' w h ic h  has a 
red d ish  colour and is based  on palm oil. The sauce usua l ly  
contains chicken, f ish or mutton or a combination of tw o  of the  
three though in rural areas, biche (deer), agouti (water rat) and  
m onkey are som etim es used. The cereal or starch food which goes  
w ith  the m eat and sauce is usually  foutou (plantain banana)  
w hils t  rice, to (maize f lower) and placali (manioc f lower)  are also 
used. Other f lavourings added to the sauce, other than the cube,  
include oil, red peppers and tomatoes.  Most Ivorians prepare one  
of these  dishes for midday consum ption.50 In a 1983 su rv e y  of  
consumers, 90% said they  used cubes, 3.4% said they  did not and 
6.9% did not answer.51
46 Masini et al, Black, p p .1 3 3 -1 3 4 .
47 Personal experience: observation.
48 Personal experience: observation; Fieldwork: observation. One exam ple  
w as the Dinor cooking oil television  advertisem ent in Novem ber 1990.
49 DSA: report, untitled, probably prepared by Agence Aujourdhui, for 
DANAFCO and GB (n.d. circa 1983).
50 W .W eekes-Vagliani, Actors and Institutions in the Food Chain: the Case of 
the Ivorv Coast (OECD, Paris, 1985), p p .16-17 , 51 -55; D.Requier-Desjardins,
L alimentation en Afriaue. (Karthala, Paris, 1989), p p .93-104 .
51 DSA: report, untitled, by Agence Ajourd hui.
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7 .2 .2  Nestl6  and the  D e v e lo p m e n t  of the  Cube M arket, 1 9 6 5 - 1 9 7 8
The first cube to achieve mass distribution w a s  Maggi Ordinaire 
(henceforth  referred to as Ordinaire), launched in 1965  and 
k n ow n as ie to ile  or cube a le to ile  because  of the star sym bol  
which appears on the wrapping.52 Maggi products w ere  known to 
a restricted number of consumers since at least the 1 940s  in the 
form of bars po tages Maggi and ta b le t te s  po tages Maggi.53 
H ow ever ,  Maggi products  w e r e  probably  not familiar  to the  
average consumer and known only to a f e w  privileged indigenes  
w h o w ere  allowed rations of European imports during the years  to 
1950 by which t ime most rationing had been  abolished.54 Cubes 
w ere  also available in supermarkets prior to 1965 .55
O rdina ire  w a s  im ported and f irst  introduced to the genera l  
c o n su m e r  by N e s t l e s  Compagnie  Africain de P rep ara t ion s  
A lim en ta ires  (CAPRAL) through tast ings  near the  principal  
Abidjan market places. At CFA 10 a portion, little cups of rice with  
a sauce prepared using the cube w ere  sold. With this, a cube w as  
given free.  Despite this promotional activity, the market w o m e n  
w ere  difficult to persuade.  It w as  not until around 1970 that the 
cube appeared regularly throughout the Abidjan markets, a lways  
next to Adjeuvan, the local product it w as  intended to replace.56 
Even then  this w as  largely  because  of the continuing policy of 
extens ive  giving away of cubes and promotional aids, which  at the  
t ime consisted only of Maggi logo plastic bowls,  teaspoons and a 
l imited num ber  of T-shirts. Wholesale  and retail stores played  
virtually  no part in the sale and promotion of the cube at this  
stage, the former because  the market was  not y e t  big enough to 
in terest  them  and the latter because  CAPRAL saw  the market  
place as the natural selling point.57
52 Masini et al, Black, pp.l 3 0 -1 3 1 .
55 ANCI, 5 8 7 4 /X V - l  5-15: invoice, SCOA to Legion Francaise (Novem ber 11 
1942): invoice, SCOA to Legion Francaise (October 31 1942).
54 Thompson and Adloff, French, p p .436 -437 .
55 Interview: Doh Gilles (1st.).
56 Ibid; Masini et al, Black, p. 133. According to Doh Gilles, the price had 
risen to CFA 25 per portion by 1970.
57 Interview: Doh Gilles (1st.).
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From 1970, CAPRAL began to promote their cube in the interior of 
the country, starting with Bouake before moving into other towns,  
progress ing  from larger ones  like Man, Korhogo, Daloa and  
Abengourou to smaller ones, eventual ly  reaching into the villages.  
Each step w as  taken only once the cube had been  establ ished in 
the preceeding market. Throughout this period, tastings and gifts  
of free cubes and a limited range of publicity i tems w e re  used to 
promote the spread of the product. As the cube gained popularity,  
w holesa lers  w ere  set up in each town to cater for local dem and  
w h e n  the Maggi promoters w e re  e lsew h ere .  W holesalers  w e r e  
granted a credit  period of thirty to s ixty days  and a bonus or 
incentive at the end of the year  based on quantity sold.58
Until 1978, CAPRAL virtually had a free reign on the cube market  
(the exception being the Honic cube which  w a s  never  supported  
by ex te n s iv e  promotion)59 and profited from rapidly increasing  
sales through expansion of the market. B etw een  1973 and 1975  
sales increased from CFA 408  million to CFA 1,012 million. The 
economics of this scale of consumption, combined w ith  sales to  
neighbouring countries, led to Nestle establishing a n ew  company,  
Nouvel le  A l im entation  (NOVALIM), to m anufacture  the cubes  
locally. NOVALIM also took over  distr ibution and m arketing  
activities from CAPRAL. By 1977, cube consumption equalled two  
Ordinaire  cubes per household per day.60 In 1978 though, the  
situation began to change rapidly as the introduction of a n e w  
cube not only  revo lut ion ised  the trade but also led to Nestle  
loosing almost 50% of it s virtual  100% market share in the years  
upto 1978. The v i e w  expressed by Masini et al around 1977  that  
"the local establ ishment  of a unit by another corporation is highly  
unlikely . . . CAPRAL has some assurance of retaining a monopoly  
of sales of the product"61 was  about to be spectacularly disproved.
58 Ibid; Masini et al. Black, p. 133; Interview: Mr. Frederick Attoh, DANAFCO 
General Manager (Abidjan, Septem ber 1990): Benoit Yoboue, DANAFCO 
Salesm an (Abidjan, July 16 1990).
59 Fieldwork: discussion w ith  a MEFCO Manger (Septem ber 1990), the  
importer at the time.
60 Masini et al. Black, p. 131.
61 Ibid. p .132.
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7 .2 .3  T he  L a u n c h in g  o f  Ju m b o:  B r e a k in g  t h e  M o n o p o ly ,  1 9 7 8 -  
1 9 8 4
One of the minor cubes which appeared briefly on the market in 
the 1970s  w as  the Gallina Blanca cube, not much different  from  
Ordinaire in quality or wrapping and identical in size. This cube  
had limited success and w as  little promoted but the exper im en t  
by the Spanish co m p a n y  Gallina Blanca (GB)62 through their  
representat ives ,  the Danish Africa Company (DANAFCO),63 led to 
the introduction of a n ew  product in 1979, the design and shape  
of which  w ere  the innovative  ideas of the local representat ives .64 
The Jumbo cube w as  rectangular in shape, w e ig h e d  nine grams  
and w as  three t imes the size of Ordinaire w ith  a crown on the red 
and ye l low  wrapping.  It w as  marketed with  the slogan le roi des 
cubes ' and the aim was to establish its identity through the crown  
just as Maggi had exp lo i ted  the star on their  c u b e . 6 5 This  
rectangular cube proved such a success that, within two years  of it 
being launched, a manufacturing company, Societe Africain de  
Fabrication Alimentaire  (SAFA), w as  set  up w ith  the technical  
ass is tance  of GB.66 Nestle  responded in a d eq u ate ly  to the n e w  
product until 1984, a mistake which w as  to prove v e r y  costly, as 
the table below illustrates.
62 A subsiduary of the American multinational Borden. Gallina Blanca w as  
in fact the parent com pany of Broex which in turn w as the parent  
com pany of GB s Ivory Coast marketing arm, ESMISA, and its Spanish raw  
material manufacturer PASA. For clarity, all will be referred to as GB.
63 Part of the Jersey based West Africa Holdings (WAH).
64 Interview: Attoh; DSA: letter, E.Bosteen to GB (Barcelona) (Novem ber 19 
1980), p.4.
6 5 Personal experience: observation: discussions; Interview: Mr. Eric 
Bosteen, Chairman of W est Africa Holdings, parent com pany of SAFA and 
DANAFCO (Abidjan, 1st. interview , Novem ber 13 1990)
66 Interview: Attoh: E.Bosteen (1st.).
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TABLE 4 5 :  VOLUME OF CUBE SALES IN TONNES AND PERCENT MARKET SHARE
JUMBO MAGGI TANTI OTHERS ALL
YEAR vol % vol % vol % vol % vol
1973 250 ? ?
1974 275 ? ?
1975 600 ? ?
1976 1140 ? ?
1977 1500 ? ?
1978 268 12 2012 86 45 2 2325
1979 560 21 2076 78 31 1 2667
1980 625 21 2250 75 124 4 2999
1981 1225 38 1883 58 120 4 3228
1982 2026 43 2533 54 105 4 4664
1983 2049 45 2000 44 350 8 120 3 4519
1984 2351 52 1854 41 181 4 136 3 4521
1985 2109 44 2301 48 288 6 144 3 4793
1986 2061 40 2886 56 155 3 5153
1987 1875 40 2672 57 141 3 4688
Sources:  Est im at ed  from:  J.Masini ,  M.Ikonicof f ,  C.Jedlicki and M.Lanzarott i ,  
Multinationals and D eve lo pm ent  in Black Africa: a Case Study  in the Ivorv  Coast 
(Saxon House,  Farnborough,  1 9 7 9 ) ,  p p . 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 ;  DSA: i n t e r n a l  report ,  Bohan  
Internat ional ,  Resultats de 1 e tude  quant i tat ive  rea l isee en  avr i l - mai  1984': sales  
figures: internal report, Agence Aujourd'hui, Jumbo: re leve  des achats' (1985) .
The launching of Jumbo w a s  v e r y  d if ferent  to that of Maggi.  
DANAFCO intended to tap into the Dioula trading network and use  
w ord  of mouth to prom ote  the product.  As an in d u c em e n t ,  
margins exceeded  those of Ordinaire and im m ed ia te ly  attracted  
o p p o r tu n is t ic  L e b a n ese  w h o le s a l e r s  who,  looking for rapid  
turnover,  passed on much of the margin to sem i-w holesa lers  and 
market traders. Credit w as  only given to clients DANAFCO already  
knew . Others, mostly Lebanese,  w ere  sold to on cash.67 Further  
inducem ents  w e re  the re-usable  m etal-rimmed cardboard drums  
in which  the cubes w e re  sold, the quality of the product and the  
nove lty  of its size.
This launch strategy enabled DANAFCO to reduce the risk of bad  
debts w hils t  the use of word of mouth meant minimal publicity  
costs. The rapid turnover induced by the generous margins meant  
tem porary price instability but also gave Jumbo the reputation of 
a product  that  m oved .  Such an att itude,  e sp e c ia l ly  am ongst  
traders, is vital  if a product is to succeed because  African traders
67 Interview: Attoh.
2 6 7
tend not to be easily  persuaded otherwise once they  have gained  
an impression of a product, a point explored in more detail later.68 
As the sales of Jumbo expanded, an increasing num ber of s e m i­
w h o le sa le r s  w h o  had p r e v io u s ly  bought from the  Lebanese ,  
principal ly  Malien Malinkes and Guineans, cam e direct ly  to 
DANAFCO and, after a trial period, were  adopted as regular Jumbo  
credit  clients. Thus the market situation gradually  stabil ised as 
m any Lebanese  w e re  increasingly  cut out in favour  of African  
w h o le s a l e r s  w h o  w e r e  more inclined to o b s e r v e  su p p l ie r -  
stipulated sem i-wholesa le  and retail prices.69
Once Jumbo w a s  establ ished ,  margins for traders  w e r e  cut to 
around the level  of Ordinaire and by 1983 they  w ere  substantially  
less at all levels  of the trade as Table 46 be low shows.70
TABLE 46: MARGINS ON VARIOUS CUBES IN 1983
TRADE LEVEL JUMBO SUPER MAGGI MAGGI ORDINAIRE
retail 8.57% 10% 16%
sem i-w holesa le 3.125% 3.7% 6.8% (a)
w holesa le 4% (b) (c) 5% (d)
(a) 2 percentage  points of this g iven monthly in produce,  (b) 2 percentage points of 
this g ive n annually in produce,  (c) At this time, Maggi Super w a s  only  distributed  
through reta i lers  and s e m i- w h o le s a le r s ,  (d) 3 pe rcent age  points in produce  on 
purchase and 2 percentage points in produce per trimestre.
Sources: DSA: internal  report,  u n k n o w n  author, Comparison s tructure  de prix e t  
profit par produit  et par intermediare'  (n.d., circa 1984):  internal  report,  un kno w n  
author, Etude commerciale Jumbo , p5.
Two main factors, also vital  in the launch phase, enabled Jumbo to 
increase  its market share be tw een  1978 and 1984  w hils t  cutting  
trader margins. The first concerned hidden benefits ,  principally  
the re-usable  drum. Many authors have noted the w a y  in w hich  
product containers are re-used time and t ime again. Quaker Oats, 
Milo and Chocodi are only a f e w  products which  have  benef i t ted  
from this habit  which,  apart from being an added incent ive  to
68 Personal experience: discusions w ith  salesm en and traders.
69 Interview: Attoh.
70 Ibid; DSA: internal report, Comparison structure de prix et  profit par 
produit et par intermediare'(n.d. circa 1984): report, 'Etude comm erciale  
Jumbo' (1 9 8 3 ) ,  p.5-
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buy, provides free  advertis ing as many containers are used in 
public, especially  on market stalls. The drum became popular with  
all levels  of traders. Market w o m e n  put local produce in them  and 
Lebanese wholesalers had rows of drums in front of their counters  
containing machetes, rolled up carpets, rice, salt and other items.71
The other main factor related to the product itself, its size, quality,  
and the sauce colour it produced. There being little sp en t  on  
public ity ,  the principal transm itt ing  agent  of t h e s e  product  
advantages  w as  word of mouth. Word of mouth invo lved  relying  
on traders to speak favourably of the cube to relatives and friends  
as w e l l  as other traders. Traders w ere  also substantial  consum ers  
because of their close contact w ith products and their considerable  
num bers .  Given the low n ew spap er  circulation, low n u m b e r  of 
te lev is ion  and radio sets  and other comm unication defic iencies  
co m p a re d  to more d e v e lo p e d  e c o n o m ie s ,72 w o rd  of mouth  
rep resen ts  a crucial aspect of information diffusion in markets  
like Ivory Coast, especially  g iven the Dioula network.  Thus, word  
of mouth has rem ained  a principal  characterist ic  of informal  
sector manufacturers  and distr ibutors w h i l s t  being o n ly  ha l f ­
hearted ly  accepted by many in the formal sector. This is despite  
stud ies  show ing  that, e v e n  in industr ia l  e con om ies ,  personal  
recom m endat ion  of products is not only v e r y  com m on but also 
often more effective  than less personal media campaigns 73
The size w as  important for two reasons.  First, c o n su m ers  and 
traders gained the (false) im press ion  that  Jumbo w a s  cheaper  
than Ordinaire because  it looked more than three t im es  the size 
but cost only three t imes as much (CFA 15 to Ordinaire 's CFA 5). 
Second, Ju m b o ’s size g ave  it a n o v e l t y  a sp ec t  w h ic h  got it 
noticed.74
71 Personal experience: observation.
72 D.Bollinger, Le marketing en Afriaue. tom e 1: La Cote d'Ivoire (CEDA, 
Abidjan, 1977), pp .171 -189 .
73 See, for example, E.Dichter, ‘How w ord-o f-m outh  advertising w o r k s ’, 
Harvard Business Review. 44  (Novem ber-Decem ber 1966), p p .1 4 7 -1 6 6 .
74 Personal experience: discussions w ith  E.Bosteen, Chairman of DANAFCO, 
and DANAFCO salesmen; Interview: Attoh.
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On quality, the Jumbo cube w as  superior in both wrapping  and 
taste, points conceded in private even  by most Maggi sa lesm en .7  ^
Wrapping is v e r y  important in a hot and humid climate for, if 
exposed to the sun, the cube deteriorates  rapidly. The high salt 
content of the product also means that the cube absorbs moisture  
from the air and goes soft. Ordinaire cubes so m et im es  appeared  
on the m arket  w i th  the w rapp in g  undone,  lead ing  to rapid  
deterioration.  Jumbo also produced a darker, richer sauce which  
was preferred by  the consumer,  especially  in the north 76
Finally, despite decreasing margins, Jumbo never  lost its image as 
a profitable product to handle. The re-usable  drums, which  could 
also be sold back to DANAFCO, and, later, public i ty  material,  
provided hidden benefits. Additionally selling Jumbo w as  low risk 
compared to Maggi because  the Jumbo market w a s  more stable  
(on which more later) and because of less spoilt stock.77
The success of Jumbo was  probably instrumental in the decision to 
launch a third brand of cube in 1983. Preparations Alimentaires  
(PREPAL), an Ivorian com pany,  m anufactured,  m ark eted  and 
distributed the Tanti cube from their factory in Bouake. Tanti was  
the same shape, size and price as Jumbo but that w a s  there the  
similarities ended. The cube produced a w ea k  sauce and w a s  so 
poorly wrapped  that many appeared on market tables dirty and 
oozing liquid. That it achieved an 8% market share in 1983, its 
highest, was  largely due to the giving away of large quantities of 
cubes to market traders. It failed to achieve  dominance in any  
region of the country or amongst any group of consumers.78
7 5 Personal experience: discussions w ith  DANAFCO and Maggi salesm en . On 
up-country trips it is not uncommon for sa lesm en from rival com panies to 
congregate at the sam e hotels.
76 Interview: Attoh; Personal experience: discussions w ith  DANAFCO 
sa lesm en and Abdoul Mourad, DANAFCO Jumbo Marketing Manager (1 9 8 4 -  
85).
77 Ibid; Personal experience: observation.
78 DSA: memo, Perea to Cheriaux (August 1983 or 1984): report, Bohan 
International (parent com pany of Agence Aujourd’hui), 'Resultats de 
l'etude quantitative realisee en avril-m ai 1984': memo, Jean-Francis Amavi, 
DANAFCO Marketing Manager, to M.Cheriaux titled 'Objet: augm entation de 
prix Jumbo' (October 20 1982), p.7; Personal experience: discussions w ith  
salesmen: observation.
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TABLE 4 7 :  MARKET SHARE OF CUBES IN INTERIOR TOWNS, M I D  1 9 8 3
TOWN ETHNIC GROUPS MAGGI JUMBO TANTI OTHER
O dienne M alinke 17.4 80.6 1.4 0.4
T in g r e la M alinke 30.0 52.0 18.0 0.0
Ferke S e n o u fo 39.3 57.9 2.2 0.2
Man Yacouba, M alinke 27.6 64.0 6.0 3.0
Guiglo We 27.2 72.0 0.3 0.0
Touba M akinke 71.0 25.0 0.2 3.6
B ouafle Gouro 49.8 49.7 0.2 0.0
S e g u e la M alinke 43.5 55.6 0.7 0.0
Gagnoa Bete, Baoule 83.2 16.3 0.5 0.0
Divo Dida 61.2 38.8 0.0 0.0
San Pedro Krou 59.8 39.0 0.7 0.3
Soubre Bete 64.6 29.2 6.2 0.0
Bouake Baoule, Dioula 46.0 46.7 1.6 5.0
Daoukro Baoule 37.0 63.0 0.0 0.0
Yam a Baoule 52.1 47.2 0.4 0.0
Bondoukou Abron, Koulango 32.8 62.7 4.3 0.0
A g n ib i le k r o A g n i 75.0 23.2 1.6 0.0
A b en g o u r o u A g n i 55.4 40.9 0.5 0.0
Tiassale Agni, Baoule 74.4 25.5 0.0 0.0
Adzope Attie 54.1 45.9 0.1 0.0
A boisso A g n i 83.3 12.1 0.0 4.5
Sources: RCI, Population de la Cote d ' l v o i r e l Q y s  (Ministere de l 'Economie, Abidjan,  
1984);  DSA: in tern al  report ,  J.Ayirebi ,  Market  S u r v e y  on Ju m b o  Cubes and  
Competitive Brands in the Interior of the Ivory Coast' (May-July 1983).
Table 47 above and other sources show that the Jumbo and Maggi 
brands each had their strengths and w ea k n esses  relating to ethnic  
groups and rural-urban areas. Jumbo w as  more popular amongst  
Muslims in both rural and urban areas, most of w h o m  are in the 
north and are from the Malinke, Senoufo and Koulango ethnic  
groups, plus many Maliens, Burkinabes and Guineans. Jumbo w a s  
also b iggest  selling cube in Abidjan by 54.4% to M aggis  38.3% 
(compared to 51.8% to 43.1% in all rural areas) in late 1 9 8 4 .79 
Maggi w as  much favoured by the Agni and the Bete in rural and 
urban areas and by most non-Muslims in all rural areas.80 Finally, 
m arket  research  in 1 9 8 4  sh o w e d  that  there  w e r e  no major 
differences in cube preferences according to age, income group or
79 DSA: internal report, Agence Aujourd'hui, Jumbo: re leve  des achats’ 
(1985).
80 DSA: internal report, J.Ayirebi, Market Survey of the Abidjan Area' 
(1983).
271
household size except that Jumbo, inexplicably, w as  preferred by  
the over 5 5s .81
The r e a so n s  for the  a f o r e m e n t io n e d  cube  s t r e n g t h s  and  
w e a k n esse s  are mostly not difficult to discern. Maggi's strength in 
most rural areas w a s  due to Jumbo s poor rural d is tr ibut ion  
n e tw o r k  caused  in part by  the low  m argins  w h ic h  m ade  
transportation of Jumbo by traders from wholesa lers  in towns to 
the villages an unprofitable exercise. Jumbo s w e ak n ess  in some of 
the Agni and Bete towns, and N est le ’s in locales like Man, w a s  
partly due to problem s w i th  w h o le sa le r s82 but in other areas  
there is no ready explanation. In most towns, Jumbo s superior  
quality and solid distribution w ere  enough to give it the edge. Its 
strength  in the rural north w a s  most  l ike ly  due to the high  
proportion of muslims w h o  w ere  traders or w h o  kn ew  traders.
The acceptance of Ordinaire by consumers had been  largely due  
to hard work on the part of CAPRAL sa le sm en  and promoters.  
Jumbo s challenge w as  to com pete  w ith  a w e l l  e s tab l ished  and 
popular cube, so w e l l  establ ished that in 1982,  of 110 Abidjan  
w o m e n  sh ow n  the Jumbo cube and asked Do you k n o w  this  
product?', 64  called it Maggi. On being quest ioned  further  and 
asked to nam e the product, only 42 answered  Jumbo w h i ls t  50  
said Maggi and 18 did not know. When asked the same quest ion  
about Maggi, all but three respondents  gave the right answ er .83 
That Jumbo took such a large share of the market desp ite  this  
identity problem, says much for the strengths of the product.
The different marketing strategies used by Nestle and DANAFCO, 
and general ly  adhered to by them in releasing future cubes,  are 
similar in their psychology and execution to slow and fast  release  
s tra teg ie s  used by  the  film industry .  S low re lea se  in v o lv e d  
showing fi lms on a limited number of screens to create favourable  
w ord-o f -m outh  publicity after which it w as  g iven a wider  release,  
s o m e t im e s  by  s tages .  This s tra teg y  w a s  o f ten  used  if the
81 DSA: Bohan International, avril-m ai 1984'.
82 Personal experience: discussions w ith  traders and sa lesm en  (1 9 8 3 -8 5 ) .
83 DSA: internal report, Agence Aujourd'hui, 'Etude sur le produit Jumbo' 
( 1 9 8 2 ) .
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distributor w as  unsure of the im m ed ia te  market  appeal  of a 
f i lm .84 This strategy w as  used by CAPRAL in the launching of 
Ordinaire w h en  the market for the product had to be created. The 
fast release strategy w as  mostly used w h ere  the distributor felt  
there w as  a "built-up demand" for a film, like, for example,  the  
James Bond fi lms w here  the earlier pictures had already created a 
007 m a rk e t .85 This strategy  w a s  used by Jumbo w h ic h  w a s  
launched into a market that had also already been  created. Using 
the wrong release strategy could kill any chance of a film being a 
hit and this, as is shown later, was  one of the reasons behind the  
failure of the Jumbo Fish cube.
7.2.4 Nestle Hits Back: 1984 Onwards
The most  l ike ly  explanation for N e s t le ’s s low resp onse  to the  
threat posed by Jumbo is that the company w as  unaware as to the  
extent  of the erosion of its market share. Table 45 shows that the  
market expanded e v e r y  year  b e tw e e n  1973 and 1982, allowing  
Ordinaire sales to increase until 1981 w h e n  they  declined sharply. 
By this t ime at the latest Nestle should have realised that Jumbo  
w a s  no tem porary  phen om en om  like so m any cubes  before  it. 
H ow ever ,  the  nat ional  econom ic  decl ine  from  around 19 7 9  
possibly  led to them believing the fall in sales to be inevitable .  
The substantial  rise in 1982 probably increased this fee l ing  of 
false security vis a vis  Jumbo. Not until a further decline occured  
in 1983, fo l lowed by another in 1984, did Nestle  take concerted  
action, part of which involved the sacking of most  of NOVALIM’s 
top m a nagem en t  by Nestle Switzerland in 1 9 8 4 .86 NOVALIM s 
policy response  had three major components .  Before going into 
details on these  three points it is necessary  to place them  in the  
context of the organisation and resources of the two main rivals  
sales' forces and distribution networks in the mid 1980s.
84 T.Balio, United Artists: the Company that Changed the Film Industry  
(U niversity of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1987), p p .2 0 7 -2 1 0 .
85 Ibid, p p .2 10-212.
86 Fieldwork: discussion w ith  E.Bosteen.
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NOVALIM divided the country into four zones, each supervised by  
a sales inspector with 22 vans stationed perm anently  in the main 
tow ns .  These  v a n s  d istr ibuted all Nest le  products  and w e r e  
supplem ented  by six promotion and publicity vans  and four v ans  
used exclusively  for tastings. In each of the main towns there w as  
a s to ck is t /w h o le sa le r  w h o  fetched  stock h im se l f  from Abidjan  
w h ic h  the NOVALIM v a n  then  sold. Special  price concess ions  
ranged from 2% to 9% on top of the usual margin. In addition,  
there  w e re  other w holesa lers  w h o  also had to fetch  stock from  
Abidjan but on less  favourab le  credit  term s  and w i th  o n ly  
occasional assistance in selling from NOVALIM.87
The DANAFCO sys tem  w as  rather less ambitious but e ffect ive  in 
the use of its more l imited resources. The country w a s  div ided  
into two zones, controlled by management in Abidjan and Bouake, 
of f ive  and six sectors respectively. Every major town w as  v is i ted  
once a month by one of two lorries w h o se  main purpose w as  to 
del iver  to the wholesa lers  on strict credit  conditions of 30 days  
date of invoice.  In addition there w e re  three  promotion v a n s  
w h o s e  trips w e re  t imed to coincide w ith  those  of the d e l ivery  
lorries so that the de l ivery  salesman doubled up as a promoter,  
selling from the promoters' van  to sem i-w holesa lers  and market  
w o m e n  w h ere  distribution links w ere  weak.  The promotion vans  
w e r e  also respons ib le  for supplying small  tow ns  and v i l lages  
w h er e  there w ere  no wholesalers . Most wholesalers  in the Abidjan  
zone w e r e  Lebanese,  the capital itself  excepted .  In the Bouake  
zone most wholesa lers  w ere  African, usually Malinke from Mali, 
partly because  there w e re  few er  Lebanese in the north and w e s t  
and partly  because  of greater  em p h a s is  on w ork ing  through  
traditional channels of distribution by the Bouake management. In 
all, there w e re  ten vans  working on the Jumbo cube. In addition,  
both Jumbo and Maggi cubes w ere  wholesa led  by  23 CFCI outlets  
situated in major commercial towns throughout the country.88
87 DSA: memo, untitled, notes on a leaked NOVALIM report (1985).
88 Interview: Attoh; Personal experience: discussions Attoh, Mourad and 
salesm en: observation.
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The f irst  e le m e n t  of NOVALIM's policy response ,  introducing  
further  cubes  into the market,  gained extra space on market  
tables and tied up trader resources at all leve ls  so that th ey  had 
less  to in v e s t  in rival  cubes.  More im portant  though w a s  the  
attem pt  to usurp Jum bo’s benef i ts  of size and n o v e l ty  by the  
introduction of the Maggi Super cube in late 1981. The appearance  
of this cube, at f irst cheaper than Jumbo, initial ly had serious  
effects on DANAFCO sales (a decline of around 30%) but NOVALIM 
w e re  unable to consolidate the good start made because  of the  
poorer quality of the cube both in taste and wrapping and because  
they  w e re  unable to maintain the lower price. After the first f ew  
months,  Super ended  up taking market share from Ordinaire  
instead.89
NOVALIM apparently had failed to grasp all of the e lem ents  of the  
reasons for the success of the Jumbo cube, the most important of 
w h ich  w a s  quality. Other cubes introduced by NOVALIM w e r e  
beef  and chicken in 1985,  both shaped like Super, and a larger 
vers ion  of Ordinaire called Maggi Grotto in 1986 .90 None of these  
cubes made substantial  inroads into the market but they  did give  
the  Maggi range a much greater  v isu a l  presen ce  on m arket  
tables.91
The second com ponent  of NOVALIM's policy had mixed results.  
Selling on more generous terms to e v er y  wholesaler  of the Jumbo  
cube proved effect ive  in tying up their f inancial  resources  and 
limited the amount of stock DANAFCO could safely advance many  
clients. Thus DANAFCO w as  forced to look for n ew  clients, mainly  
Lebanese,  that they  had previously  rejected as less eff icient and 
reliable regarding price cutting and credit risk. In towns w h er e  
the distribution of Jumbo w as  in the hands of these  n e w  clients,
89 DSA: internal report, Rene Oulai, DANAFCO Salesman, untitled (July 29  
1982): internal report, Agence Aujourdhui, 'Synthese et  conclusions du 
sondage sur les sem i-grossistes  et  detaillants au sujet de 1'evolution du 
marche du grande cube depuis le lancem ent de super Maggi' (Jan 1984);  
Interview , Benoit Yoboue, DANAFCO salesm an 1 9 8 0 -9 2  (1 9 -9 -1 9 9 0 ) ;  Personal 
experience: discussions w ith  sa lesm en (1 9 8 4 -8 5 ) .
90 Interview: Doh Gilles (1st.).
91 Interview: Yoboue; DSA: internal report, Agence Aujourdhui, Etude 
marche Jumbo' (July 1987).
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the cube s market share was  usually weaker. The strategy did not  
a lw a y s  work,  though, for the Jumbo s trang leho ld  on som e  
markets, like Odienne, Man, Anayama and Abidjan-Koumassi  w as  
achieved by building up African sem i-wholesalers  of local produce  
into Jumbo wholesalers .  The n ew  status b estow ed  on them  made  
them  v e r y  loyal  to the brand behind their success .  Also, the  
deliberate destabilisation of the Maggi market came at a cost for it 
caused problems for the established wholesa lers  w h o  either had 
to cut prices to compete or be satisfied with  a slower turnover.92
NOVALIM also became more flexible in the granting of credit and 
in the prices they  sold at in areas w h er e  distribution w a s  weak.  
This proved effect ive  in maintaining adequate  market coverage  
but often led to price cutting and instabili ty  w h e n  a wholesa ler  
being granted such favours  in one sector decided to increase  
turnover  by transporting stock to areas w h er e  w holesa lers  w e re  
granted less  favourable  c o n d i t i o n s . 93 In sum m ary,  NOVALIM's 
more flexible  policy regarding wholesalers did cause problems for 
DANAFCO but also disrupted their own markets.
The third e lem ent  of NOVALIM's policy led to an intensification of 
the tactic of selling w holesa ler ’s stock to retail stores and market  
traders .  The b e n e f i t s  to Maggi w h e r e  l inks in the  chain of  
distr ibution w ere  w ea k  w as  se l f -e v id e n t  but the tactic w as  also 
used e lsew here .  A substantial  edge in coverage at the shop leve l  
would  have  been  of little benefit  as turnover  from this type  of 
outlet  w as  v e ry  limited unless the shop retailer w a s  in a vi l lage  
w ith  no wholesa lers  or w as  placed near a market and acted as a 
sem i-w h o lesa ler  to the market w om en .  Even then,  it w a s  l ikely  
that an exist ing w h o le sa ler  a lready had a n e tw o r k  of s e m i ­
wholesalers  selling to the market w o m en .94
92 Interview: Attoh; DSA: credit client sheets  (1 9 8 0 -8 6 );  Personal  
experience: discussions w ith  traders (1 9 8 3 -8 5 ) .
93 Interview: Attoh; Personal experience: discussions w ith  sa lesm en  and 
traders (1 9 8 3 -8 5 ) .
94 DSA: J.Ayirebi, Abidjan Area': memo, untitled, leaked NOVALIM: internal  
report, J.Ayirebi, Jumbo Cube Promotion' (October 1983); Personal  
experience: observation: discussions w ith  Mourad.
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9However, most NOVALIM vans  also sold other Nestle  products,  
some of which did not have a comprehensive  wholesa le  network.  
By offering to sell Maggi cubes on behalf of the wholesaler, Nestle  
w as able to convince them to stock their other products w h ich  
they  also sold on their behalf,  thereby making the link b e t w e e n  
the wholesaler  and retail stores which was  previously missing and 
hampering extensive  distribution of non-Maggi products. In effect,  
the w holesa ler  became little more than a stockist,  as his contact  
w ith  retai lers w as  limited and he provided no services  to them,  
only to the supplier. Whilst  the benef i t  to the Maggi cube w a s  
limited, to other Nestle products it w as  substantial.  A further aim 
was to monitor the space g iven on tables to Maggi or to discourage 
traders from displaying Jumbo altogether. In this, promoters used  
free  cubes and publicity materials but neither had much affect. 
There w e re  many incidences w here  free cubes induced traders to 
continue stocking a product e v e n  though th e y  w e r e  u n h a p p y  
about the speed of its m o vem en t  off the tables,  but f e w  w e r e  
persuaded to stop trading in Jumbo. Wholesalers  and retai lers  
usually sold the cubes for extra profit or som etim es  cut the price 
of all of their stock to induce faster turnover, thereby  disrupting  
the market. At the wholesale  level, free cubes w e re  rarely passed  
on to the retailers as usually intended and market w o m e n  w ere  in 
a poor position to insist  on their free goods because  most bought  
on credit from the wholesalers.  Other than to ensure  the presence  
of Maggi cubes, it is not clear w h y  NOVALIM continued w ith  this  
policy for DANAFCO tried it and found the e ffects  to be more  
disruptive than beneficial 95
Publicity materials, g iven  mostly at the t ime and point of sale, 
w e r e  an essent ia l  backup to other activit ies in the field.  They  
included the Maggi logo plastic sheet  which market w o m e n  used  
to cover their tables. But w h en  cubes of all variet ies  w e re  in place, 
the logo w as  usually no longer visible. Other publicity items, such  
as T-shirts and plastic carrier bags, w ere  probably more effect ive  
because  th ey  w e re  exposed  to the public e y e  and a lw ays  used
Interview: Doh Gilles (1st.): Yoboue; DSA: internal report, Ayirebi,  
Promotion'; Personal experience: discussions w ith  market traders (1 9 8 3 -
85).
2 7 7
until no longer serviceable .  Plastic bags, mainly distributed for 
Jumbo, w e r e  o f ten  sold and provided  h id d e n  benef i t s .  Both  
NOVALIM and DANAFCO used bowls made of e ither  plastic  or 
metal which  w ere  popular w ith  w o m e n  traders but these  w e re  
rarely seen outside the hom e.96
Televis ion and radio advertisem ents  w ere  also v e r y  popular w ith  
traders as promotional aids because they gave them confidence in 
a product. NOVALIM had an advantage  in both qual ity  and  
quantity  in this area: their combination of s imple story lines,  
happy  families  and catchy tunes  proved more popular than the  
rather convoluted Jumbo advertisem ents  which consumers found  
diff icult  to fo l low. The b enef i ts  of advertis ing ,  d iscu ssed  in 
Chapter Six, are difficult to assess given the loyalty of consmers to 
their chosen brands.97 That the cube market continued to expand  
until 1 9 8 7  desp ite  declining incom es m ay h ave  b e e n  due to 
advertis ing as consumer oriented promotions had largely  ceased  
b y  then.  The v o lu m e  of te lev is ion  commercia ls  w a s  such th e y  
could not have  passed unnoticed by e v e n  the ocassional  v iew er ,  
especial ly  given the increase in the number of te lev is ion sets  per 
thousand of population (see Chapter 6). Seven ty  30 second spots  
for Jumbo alone w ere  bought for the last three months of 1983, at 
a cost of nearly CFA 28 million.98 Maggi had approximately  double  
this number for most of 1 9 8 5 ."
7 .2 .5  J u m b o  and  T anti:  R e s p o n s e s  to  t h e  N e w  M a r k e t  S i tu a t io n ,  
1 9 8 5  Onwards
On Tanti, there is little to say other than that the quality  of the  
cube and its wrapping fatally undermined any chances of success  
desp ite ,  as sh o w n  below,  sound advert is ing  and h e a v y  f ie ld  
promotion. For Jumbo, the case is less clear cut but it is ev id en t
96 Ibid.
97 DSA: internal report, Agence Aujourd hui, Post-test  de la campagne  
te lev isee  "Jumbo Cube" ’ (March 1983).
98 DSA: memo, Agence Aujour'hui to SAFA, Espace te lev is ion  - octobre, 
novem bre, decem bre 8 5'  (Septem ber 13 1 9 8 5 ) .
99 Personal experience: discussions w ith  Marc Cheriaux, DANAFCO General 
Manager, later at Ducros (Cote d'Ivoire) and Mourad (1985).
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that sev en  factors besides the Nestle onslaught contributed to its 
decline. First, Jumbo’s size, initially a novelty,  lost that advantage  
and also had drawbacks.  The introduction of Tanti and Super in 
1983 and other large Nestle cubes later rem oved Jumbo’s nove lty  
va lue  which, over time, would  have lessened  anyw ay .  Size also 
meant a price three t imes the outlay for one Ordinaire and poorer  
consumers,  used to buying everyday,  w ere  not a lways prepared to 
make this financial comm itm ent at one given moment. Nor did the  
size suit the smaller fam ily  unit; one Jumbo made enough  sauce  
for f iv e  people  w h i l s t  O rdinaire  could be used more f lex ib ly  
without having bits of cube left over .100
Jumbo s size also meant less flexibil ity w h e n  the price rose. With 
the CFA 5 piece the smallest  coin in circulation, DANAFCO had to 
raise the price (in 1983)  from CFA 15 per unit to CFA 35 for two  
units as CFA 20 per unit would have been  too large an increase.  
The disadvantage w ith  the new  price w as  the size of the outlay  
and the large quantity  aquired at one moment.  Some traders  
c o n se q u e n t ly  retai led at CFA 20 per unit, leading to m arket  
instability, although DANAFCO did withhold stocks causing prices 
to rise and facil itating the real increase .101 Ordinaire, being in 
smaller units, had more flexibil ity in this respect.
The second factor w as  the failure to introduce a backup product  
quickly enough. One idea put forward by DANAFCO w as  to provide  
a powder for use in restaurants but, largely due to GB’s lack of 
interest, this was  never  introduced.102 Thus the only backup item  
m arketed by 1984  w a s  a packet of ten  cubes in tab le tte  form  
exclus ive ly  for sale in retail outlets. DANAFCO first proposed the  
idea  in Febuary  1 9 8 2 , 103 GB took tw o  y e a r s  to approve  it. 
However,  this was  neither  a new  product nor one for the mass
100 Interview: Doh Gilles (1st.): Yoboue: E.Bosteen (1st.); Personal  
experience: observation.
101 DSA: internal report, J.Amavi, Defin ition/orientation des actions  
prom otionelles et  publicitaires 1 9 8 4 /1 9 8 5 '  (June 1984): minutes, m eetings  
on 8 and 13 Novem ber 1982 b etw een  DANAFCO and GB.
102 Personal experience: discussion w ith  Mourad who's idea it w as  (1 984 ) .
103 DSA: memo, M.Cheriaux (DANAFCO) to GB, Commentaires sur le rapport 
etabli par MM.Aliaga, Perea et Carisey au sujet v isite  de marches sur la Cote 
d'Ivoire.' (December 2 1983). p.3.
2 7 9
market. Superm arkets ,  catering m ainly  for Europeans,  w e r e  
marginal to the cube trade though some effort w a s  expended  in 
their direction because any cube stocked by a supermarket  gained 
more of a quality image. The innovation generated f e w  extra sales  
as most small African shops refused to take the product due to it 
b e in g  m ore  e x p e n s i v e  per cube  and b e c a u s e  E u ro p ea n  
consum ption  of cubes w as  marginal.104 Further, com peti t ion  in 
supermarkets  w as  stiffer as brands such as Knorr, Leibig, Samba  
and Oxo w e re  better kn ow n to Europeans. NOVALIM w e r e  more  
adventurous,  deve lop ing  a cube shaped packet of thirty  Maggi 
O rdina ire  cubes  and supply ing  tins of f i f ty  cubes  as w e l l  as 
smaller packages of their larger beef  and chicken c u b e s . 1Q5
A 1988 ORSTOM report noted that,
La fabrication des cubes a connu un essor fulgurant: le succes du 
produit e t  la concurrence en tre  les deux principaux fabricants  
(Nestle , Jumbo) les am en e a amorcer depuis un an un processus  
de diversification du produit.1
In fact, product backup did not take until 1987  to arrive e v e n  for 
Jumbo but it w as  not until that year  GB and DANAFCO came up 
with  a sound product. The introduction of Jumbo Chicken in 1987  
fo l lowed the disastrous attempt at marketing a f ish cube in 1985  
(detailed below).  This badly needed  product enabled  the Jumbo  
brand to halt the decline in market share w ith  40% in 1987, the  
sam e as the previous year.  However,  the l imited market  data  
available  indicates that most of Chicken’s sales cam e from the  
original Jumbo rather than from Maggi.107
The third factor was  the poor quality of Jumbo advertising. Whilst  
rem edying this factor alone might have made little difference (one
104 DSA: stock ledger (1 9 8 4 -8 8 ) :  invoices (1 9 8 4 -8 8 ) ;  Personal experience:  
discussion w ith  Mme Roselyn Theze, Charges des Superm arches at DANAFCO, 
previously  at Abinader.
105 Fieldwork: brand range su rvey  (1990).
106 G.Courade, I.Droy and D.Harre, 'Evaluation des habitudes a la 
consom m ation des produits alim entaires en Cote d'Ivoire: rapport principal 
2' (ORSTOM, 1988).
107 DSA: internal report, Agence Aujourdhui, Etude marche Jum bo’ (July 
1987): letter, E.Bosteen to GB (March 16 1987): sales ledger (1 9 8 6 -8 7 ) .
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of the most popular advert i sem en ts  w as  for the Tanti cube),  a 
clearer message might w el l  have h e lp ed .108 Poor advertis ing also 
played a part in the fourth Jumbo w eakness ,  the marketing and 
v e r y  concept of the Jumbo Fish cube. Whilst generally  accepted as 
a high qual i ty  product, Jumbo Fish w a s  a lm ost  u n iv e r sa l ly  
r ejec ted  by  both traders  and c o n su m e r s  at all soc ial  and  
professional  levels .  The reasons for this are not e a sy  to assess  
from  the  c o n su m er  point of v i e w  but  t h e y  m ay  w e l l  be  
summarised as poor quality media advertising and a lack of need  
for a cube that could only be used in f ish  sauces.  At the all 
important trader level,  consumer rejection w as  partly a cause and 
partly a consequence  of trader rejection. Trader pess im ism  w as  
quick to set in once sales s lowed after the initial launch and from  
that point on there w a s  v irtually  no turning back. The n o ve l ty  
value  of a larger cube was  no longer there .109
Further, the marketing w as  badly planned and executed. The Fish 
cube w as  launched throughout the country at all leve ls  of trade in 
one go, a fast  release  stategy for a product which, because  it w as  
f i sh  f lavoured ,  w a s  radically  d i f ferent  from the b e e f  cubes.  
Moreover,  at the same time as wholesalers  w e re  being del ivered  
across the country, over 20 promoters and sa lesm en w e r e  selling  
directly to market w om e n  and giving away large quantities  of free  
cubes. Consequently, the wholesalers' stock did not m ove  and they  
beca m e  pessimist ic ,  a pess im ism  fu e led  by shop and market  
retailers w h o  encountered widespread consumer ignorance of the  
product because  the te lev is ion  and radio advertis ing  campaign  
started a month after the launch. Consequently, retailers sold the  
stock they  had and did not go back to the wholesaler  for more.110
If the above is compared to the methods used in the launching of 
Maggi Super (the relative lack of success of which has been  almost  
ent ire ly  due to the quality of the product rather than marketing
108 DSA: Agence Aujourdhui, Post-test  de la campagne te lev isee  "Jumbo 
cube" ' (March 1987).
109 DSA: memo, M.Cheriaux, untitled (October 1985): internal report,
Agence Aujourdhui, Argumentaire: Jumbo Poisson' (1985); Interview:
Yoboue; Personal experience: discussions w ith  traders (1985 ).
110 DSA: credit client sheets (1985 -86 ):  minutes, J.Perea, meeting b e tw een  
DANAFCO and GB (May 22 1985); Personal experience: observation.
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strategy), some telling insights can be learnt into the w a y  in which  
products become accepted by traders. Maggi Super w a s  launched  
in stages and by market rather than at all leve ls  of trade across  
the country. NOVALIM started by  tastings and by  placing the  
product on tables in selected, wealth ier  markets w h ere  they  had  
the  b e s t  contacts  w i th  traders .  Only w h e n  the  cube  w a s  
establ ished at this leve l  did they  set up sem i-w holesa lers  before  
moving onto other markets, and only w h e n  the sem i-w ho lesa lers  
w ere  established did they  sell at the wholesale  level.  This avoided  
the pess im ism  factor for a cube which, despite  being of rather  
poor quality, nonetheless  gained the reputation of being a product 
that sold.111
Regarding publicity, NOVALIM started adverts before the product  
w a s  readily  available  throughout  the country. This created a 
consumer demand that was not initially satisfied, the consequence  
of which  w as  that traders and consumers had the impression that  
the product w as  selling so wel l  that supply could not keep up with  
demand. Admittedly ,  there w ere  also negat ive  consequences  for  
the market  becam e unstable  and w holesa lers ,  over  opt im ist ic  
about sales potential, overstocked. Further, w h en  NOVALIM raised  
the price to the leve l  of that of Jumbo, sales dropped off because  
of the poor quality of the cube. Nonetheless,  Maggi Super sett led  
down to a market share of around 15% whils t  Jumbo Fish never  
surpassed 1 %.112
The f ifth factor in Jumbo’s decline, and its Achil les’ hee l  e v e n  in 
1 9 8 3 - 8 4 ,  w a s  DANAFCO’s fa i lure  to s t im u la te  d i s tr ib u t io n  
channels  in most rural and some urban areas. The one area in 
w h ich  the retail  store w a s  v i ta l  to cube  d istr ibut ion  w a s  in 
vi l lages .  Jumbo suffered  considerably  from failing to ach ieve  
adequate  coverage in this type  of store and this accounts for a
111 DSA: internal report, J.Ayirebi, Market Survey on Jumbo Cubes and 
Competitive Brands in the Interior of the Ivory Coast* (May-July 1983):  
internal report, Agence Aujourd hui, ‘Sondage*: memo, D.Aliaga, GB 
representative , to DANAFCO (October 2 1981); Personal experience:  
observation and discussions w ith sa lesm en (1 9 8 3 -8 5 ) .
112 DSA: minutes, meeting b e tw een  DANAFCO and GB (July 13 1983): internal
report, Agence Aujourdhui, Jumbo: re leve  des achats* (1985): sales ledger
(1 9 8 3 -8 8 ) ;  Personal experience: discussions w ith sa lesm en (1 9 8 3 -8 5 ) .
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great deal of the cube's w e a k n ess  in rural districts. Most large 
villages with three to f ive  stores w ere  shown by many surveys  to 
be without  stocks of Jumbo to distribute to w o m e n  traders for the 
periodic markets. This lack of a permanent presence at store level  
meant that market traders either had to rely on supplies from the  
colporteurs  or journey into the nearest  town to purchase stock. 
Not surprisingly ,  w i th  the Maggi cubes readily  available  at all 
t im es and with  greater margins, traders w e r e  reluctant to go to 
such efforts to obtain a similar p r o d u c t . 115
There certainly existed some w e a k n esse s  in Jumbo s distribution  
at the wholesale  level.  Selling w h o lesa lers ’ stock to retailers could 
have strengthened distribution in rural areas. The poor links in 
the Jumbo distribution chain in some regions is w e l l  illustrated by  
the fact  that som e sem i-w h o le sa ler s  found it easier  to obtain  
stocks from Abidjan rather than the nearest  town because in some  
of these  towns a wholesa ler  either did not exist  or only stocked  
the product irregularly because of the lack of a regular clientele.  
However,  such anomalies  w e r e  also partly a function of s e m i ­
w h o le s a le r s  prefer ing to buy  stock from a close re la t iv e  in 
Abidjan rather  than a com p arat ive  stranger  in the  n e a r es t  
to w n .114
The sixth factor was  the failure to purchase the PREPAL plant in 
Bouake w h e n  it fo lded  in 1985.  PREPAL, l ike Nestle,  had an 
ECOWAS tax concession which lessened  manufacturing c o s ts .115 
SAFA first proposed a joint purchase with GB in June 1 9 8 5 116 and 
again som etim e in 1987  with  the Senegal and Mali agents but GB 
refused  for reasons never  made c lear .117 Purchasing PREPAL 
w ould  ha ve  al lowed Jumbo to be more com p et i t iv e  on trader
115 DSA: Ayirebi, ’Competitive Brands': internal report, Amavi, 
Defin ition /orientation’.
114 Ibid.
115 DSA: telex, E.Bosteen to Mr Puig (GB) (June 10 1985). The Taxe 
Commerciale Reduit (TCR) may be granted by the ECOWAS Ouagadougou 
com m ission to manufacturing companies which import a certain  
percentage of raw materials from m em ber states.
116 DSA: telex, E.Bosteen to Puig.
117 DSA: letter, COSEPRAL (Dakar), SIPAL (Bamako) and DANAFCO (Abidjan) 
to Jaime Thomas, President du Conseil d ‘Ad ministration, PASA /  GB,
Barcelona (Novem ber 6 1987), p.6.
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margins and would  have g iven DANAFCO and GB greater profits 
which would have allowed an increased publicity budget.
The final factor in Jum bo’s decline w a s  a deter ioration in the  
relat ionship b e tw e e n  the trade mark owner,  GB, and the local  
m anu factu rer /  distributer, SAFA/DANAFCO. Simply put, GB felt  
that DANAFCO w as  failing to put enough effort and expenditure  
into m arket ing Jumbo w h i l s t  DANAFCO b e c a m e  in c reas in g ly  
frustrated by GB’s broken promises and their ignorance of local 
condit ions .118 From the available correspondence, which  does not  
include internal GB memoranda, it would appear that GB w as  more 
guilty than DANAFCO. The Spanish company al legedly  had a long 
record of concealing its activities outside of Ivory Coast from its 
agent despite  SAFA's export role to neighbouring countries .119 By 
1987, DANAFCO/SAFA and the GB agents in Mali and Senegal w ere  
concerned enough about the destabil ising effects  of contraband  
goods and over-pr iced  raw materials to detail  their v i e w s  in a 
joint letter to GB. For example, in 1987  GB w as  charging SAFA 
more for the raw materials to manufacture the cube than it w as  
for the f in ished product .120 Concerning DANAFCO s marketing  
efforts, f e w  of the criticisms w e re  fair in v i e w  of the analysis  of 
Jumbo s failings, w ith  three exceptions. These w ere  the Fish cube  
debacle, the lack of control exercised over  the cubes marketing  
manager in 1984 which led to his dismissal  for em bezze lm ent  that 
sam e y e a r 121 and, as noted above, the failure a d e q u a te ly  to 
service rural areas.
In the face of NOVALIM's three pronged attack, responses by both  
PREPAL and DANAFCO/GB w ere  inadequate. PREPAL did not have  
the resources  to f ight  such a battle and w e n t  under in May  
1985  122 whils t  the Jumbo distributors DANAFCO w e re  unable to
118 For exam ple, DSA: letter, E.Bosteen to GB (March 16 1987): memo, 
M.Cheriaux to GB, Commentaires': memo, D.Aliaga (GB) to DANAFCO,
Subject: Abidjan market' (October 2 1981): minutes, Perea, m eeting b e tw een  
DANAFCO and GB.
119 DSA: letter, E.Bosteen to GB (November 19 1980).
120 DSA: letter, COSEPRAL et al.
121 Personal experience. I w as  involved in uncovering the fraud. This 
individual w as not  Mourad.
122 DSA: memo, untitled, (May 1985). The official closure date w a s  7 - 5 -1 9 8 5 .
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persuade their suppliers GB to match the Nestle effort though the 
publicity budget  was increased to a not insignificant 15% of 
turnover  in 1983.123 Not surprisingly, Jumbo sales fell in quanti ty  
by just over 20% between 1984 and 1987.124 This still left Jumbo 
as the single largest selling cube. But with a change in distributors 
in May 1988 from DANAFCO to CICA123 (at the time, Commerce et 
Industr ie  de la Cote d ’Afrique, now Compagnie In ternational de 
Com m erce  e t  d 'A p p ro v i s io n n e m e n t )  b e c a u s e  of policy  
d isag reem en ts  the Jumbo brand  lost fu r th e r  g ro u n d .126 The 
reason for this is not hard to detect for, of the DANAFCO clients 
accepted as wholesalers by CICA, few were  the loyal, local food 
traders  which the former had built up in markets  such as Odienne 
and Anyama.127
7.3 COMPARISON AND CONTRAST: CONCLUSIONS ON MILK AND
CUBES
Whilst the cube and milk markets  in 1990 appeared ,  at f i rs t  
glance, to be very  different, they were  rem arkab ly  similar in a 
n u m b e r  of im p o r ta n t  ways. Both m arke ts  showed clear,  if 
d ifferent,  pa t te rn s  of im perfec t  competi tion. For cubes, the  
dominance and resources of a multinational corporation, Nestle, 
meant that to launch a new product and develop a market would 
require large financial resources. This effectively meant tha t  only 
a few large multinationals were likely to succeed. Jumbo showed 
that the rewards  for success were considerable, given the size of 
the market,  but tha t  the costs of maintaining a strong presence 
could be p roh ib i t ive .  For c o n cen t ra ted  milk, g o v e r n m e n t  
in t e rv e n t io n  w i th  im p o r t  r e s t r ic t io n s  pu t  im p o r te r s  and  
consumers in a poor position. Competition was limited and any
123 DSA: minutes, meeting (1 3 -7 -1 9 8 3 ) .
124 DSA: sales ledger 1 984 -87 .
123 Fieldwork: discussion w ith  CICA Marketing Manager (Novem ber 16 
1990).
126 Interview: E.Bosteen (1st.); Attoh; DSA: letter, COSEPAL et  al.
127 DSA: Liste des clients DANAFCO acceptes par CICA pour distribution  
Jumbo cube* (n.d., circa 1 988 -89 ).
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effort  by importers  to expand the marke t  would likely benefi t  
SIALIM more than the promoter.
A second similarity was the advantage of local manufacturing, 
though  again the  c i rcum stances  w ere  v e r y  d i f fe ren t .  For 
con cen tra ted  milk, im por t  res tr ic t ions  g u a ra n te e  the  local 
manufacturer  a large share of the market, an artificial situation. 
In fact, in a free market SIALIM s existance would be seriously 
jeopardised. For cubes, local manufacturing with TCR guaranteed  
high profits which, because of the extra amount which could be 
invested in promotion, could reinforce a brand s dominance. Hence 
Nestle s advantage over Jumbo. A third similarity was that  most of 
the inputs for the local manufacture of both cubes and milk had to 
be imported. The benefits of these enterprises,  which w ere  also 
capital intensive with few employees,  are thus limited for the 
local economy.
Perhaps the most im portan t  similarity was tha t  both products  
have created a dependence on foreign products. Further,  Nestle 
was not requ ired  to t ransfe r  any of its cube manufactur ing  
technology. The change in consumer habits concerning flavouring 
of sauce has been  at the expense of local produce and many 
instances of this have been observed in o ther  countries.  Milk 
became an addition to the diet ra the r  than  replacing anything 
(breastfeeding excepted), but it still involved expenditure  on an 
imported product. However, there is some tentative evidence tha t  
Ivorian  consum ers  r ev e r te d  to cheaper,  usually  trad it ional ,  
consumption patterns under conditions of economic hardship. But 
this is of small comfort given that  such conditions are the opposite 
of what  developing countries are trying to achieve.
The final major similarity was the important,  at times dominant, 
role played by Non-Western Style Enterprises. Distribution from 
the wholesaler  downwards  was v ir tua l ly  monopolised by this 
sector: Western Style Enterprise wholesaling and retailing did not 
generatee significant turnover. Indeed, formal sector participation 
in distribution decreased relatively over the years. The question 
then arises as to w hethe r  the informal sector s relationship w ith
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the formal sector manufacturers  and suppliers was benign or 
subordinate. Traders large and small alike undoubtedly benefi tted 
financially from the cube and milk trades bu t  there  may be a 
question as to how d ependen t  they  are becoming on a large 
num ber  of big selling products supplied by a few companies. In 
1990, there  were  few outlets which did not stock Maggi cubes, 
Nescafe, Nescao, Nido, Cerelac, Arome Maggi and Nestle 
concentrated milk. At the same time, many other big selling items 
at the store retail level were either supplied or manufactured by 
Blohorn. For milk, this increasingly included importers  as well as 
wholesalers and retailers.
In sum m ary ,  competit ion in the cube m arke t  was relentless, 
especially since the early  1980s, so much so tha t  two brands  
prevented any others entering the market. For concentrated milk, 
the marke t  was long dominated by one sweetened brand and one 
u n s w e e te n e d  b rand .  Com pete t ion  w as  sporadic ,  and  the  
in troduc t ion  of im por t  quotas  in 1990 d iscouraged  b ra n d  
promotion expenditure  even more. In their  different ways, the 
cube and milk markets  are examples of imperfect  competi tion 
with both benefits and costs for the consumer. In both cases, local 
m anufactur ing  played a key  role as well  as confirming the 
increasing dependence on these non-indigenous products which 
relied on foreign inputs and western  technology.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
The period 1956 to 1990 in Ivory Coast was characterised by the 
governm en t  s pursu i t  of economic growth through the  export  
economy. It was in tended  tha t  export  earn ings  and foreign 
in v e s tm e n t  would f inance a degree of im por t  subs t i tu t ion  
industrialisation. Until 1979-80, the economy grew rapidly  and 
GDP rose almost every  year. So too did GDP per head, despite a 
rapid population growth fuelled by heavy migration from poorer 
neighbouring countries. After 1980, the ‘miracle’ became a wide 
and deep recession which saw incomes fall, industries close and 
unem ploym ent  rise. Whilst the governm ent  was unasham edly  
p ro-w es te rn  and pro-capitalist in approach, private indigenous 
en te rp r i s e  and, to a lesser  extent,  foreign in te res ts ,  w e re  
subordinated to state-led capitalism.
For internal trade the thesis has sought to describe and explain 
the  two th em es  h ighlighted  by the  tit le.  On d is t r ib u t io n  
techniques, store trading originated with the European trading 
posts and spread with the growth in Lebanese and later African- 
owned establishments.  Non-Western Style Enterprise (NSE) stores 
had evolved into their  contemporary  form by the early  1960s: 
flexible t rad ing  practices,  low overheads ,  s imple  physical  
s t ruc tu re ,  family  em ploym ent ,  small capital  and no formal 
accounts. Over time, these characteristics enabled NSE stores to 
become the dominant force in both wholesaling and retailing. At 
the same time, the non-store NSE sector remained a major source 
of distribution, as illustrated by the case study on the cube trade.
The history  of Western  Style Enterprise (WSE) until the early  
1950s was one of near unchallenged supremacy. Possessing large 
financial resources, the biggest firms not only survived economic 
downturns but swallowed smaller, less secure, competitors along 
the way. Vertically integrated, they held the advantage through 
overseas contacts which vir tually ensured a demand for exports 
and the regular  supply  of imports .  Whilst WSEs a t te m p te d
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continually to adapt to the changing trading environment after the 
early 1950s, the philosophy of these adaptations remained rooted 
in western  trading theories. This dogged refusal to adopt at least 
some NSE characteristics led by 1984 to the disappearance of both 
state and private WSE retail chain operations. By 1991 most WSE 
wholesale interests, as well as many importers, had followed the 
retail chains into oblivion.
The second theme, foreign domination, took three different forms, 
all linked in one way or another. The domination of Lebanese and 
foreign Africans in NSE trading had its origins in the precolonial 
years  from the sixteenth century  onwards. A combination of a 
re la t ive ly  small volume of m arke t  activity,  the presence of 
organised Muslim traders (the mostly non-indigenous Dioula), the 
hosti l i ty  of the coastline and the domineering behav iour  of 
neighbouring empires all militated against the deve lopm ent of 
ind igenous  Ivor ian  e n t r e p re n e u r s .  In the  colonial period 
indigenous traders  were further  hindered by the demands of the 
sett ler  economy and measures aimed at discouraging Ivorian 
competi t ion  to European in terests .  From 1956 to 1980, the 
booming economy provided substantia l  economic options for 
Ivorians, especially in agriculture rela ted activities. Many also 
gained stable, salaried em ploym ent  w ith  the  state or foreign 
in te res ts .  At the same time, foreign migrants  from poorer  
surrounding countries took the low paid agricultural labourer jobs 
or, failing even that, ended up in the unpredictable and unstable 
occupation of full-time trading, often aided by family or ethnic 
contacts. Thus most Ivorians had neither the need nor the contacts 
to succeed in trade. From 1980 to 1990, the need for alternative 
sources of income grew as the economy w en t  into recession. 
However, Ivorians remained disadvantaged in contacts and, as the 
n u m b ers  of Lebanese and Mauritanian migrants continued to 
increase, competition in this tertiary sector greatly intensified.
A second form of foreign domination was European enterprises in 
the WSE and im port /manufac turing  sectors. This dated from the 
late n in e teen th  cen tu ry  but, as mentioned above, WSE store 
interests have all but disappeared. Thus this form of domination
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existed more in theory than in practice, a point re tu rned  to later. 
Europeans dominated  importing even  longer than  they  did 
in te rn a l  WSE d is t r ibu t ion ,  but  the  1 980s  saw inc reased  
competition from the Lebanese who operated with lower costs and 
sought out cheaper  sources of supply. Manufacturing, led by 
Nestle and Blohorn, rem ained  p redom inant ly  in the hands  of 
European firms with minor Ivorian share holdings; the only group 
likely to disturb this pattern was the Lebanese.
The th ird  form of foreign domination was in the supply  of 
processed food products to the Ivorian market. Whilst the balance 
increasingly shifted from importing to manufacturing, most local 
m anufac tu rers  were  subsidiaries of foreign companies an d /o r  
used imported inputs. The cubes case study illustrated the large 
resources needed to capture  enough of a p ro d u c t ’s m arke t  to 
make setting up local manufacturing viable in terms of economies 
of scale. Further, inputs for milk products, by far the largest 
product  group even excluding the rapidly  expanding yoghur t  
m arke t ,1 were not available locally.
8.1 FOREIGN DOMINATION: SUPPLIERS, PRODUCTS AND CULTURE
In Third  World coun tr ies ,  it is com m on for im p o r te rs ,  
m anufac tu re rs  and b rands  of goods to be p redom inan t ly  of 
foreign origin or ownership. However, in Ivory Coast 1956-90 this 
foreign dominance, especially amongst processed food importers, 
was extreme even by Third World standards.
The domination of foreign suppliers was virtually unchallenged by 
Ivorian interests since processed food imports first came into the 
country but foreign companies competed vigorously against each 
other.  Whilst European firms held sway until the late 1970s, 
L ebanese  bus inessm en ,  exploit ing cheaper  supp ly  sources,  
seriously underm ined  this European dominance in the 1980s.
1 See F.Capelli, R.Inze and D.Toure, Yoplait: un marketing du leader.  
Interview de Monsieur Basseto, Responsable Commercial de la societe  
Nandjelait-Yoplait',  RIM. 3 (1989) ,  p .2 1.
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Given that processed foods were foreign, virtually all those sold in 
Ivory Coast were either imported or else manufactured by foreign 
companies locally, the most prominent example being Nestle. The 
only exceptions were  from the few companies w ith  majority 
Ivorian share holding. Even local production of the few processed, 
packaged indigenous foods such as Foutou was done by foreign 
owned companies.
In view of the dominance in foreign origin of processed foods, 
taste  t ransfe r  had serious implications for the t rade  balance. 
However, the inroads made by foreign foods were not as extensive 
as some writers have implied and indigenous food sources remain 
p redom inan t .  As Kobrin stated, the question is one of need 
satisfaction or want creation.2 Cubes were  one example of w ant  
crea t ion  and to an ex ten t  replaced some locally p roduced  
ingredients  in the everyday  diet. Concentrated milk, yoghurt  and 
tinned tomatoes, all imported or requiring imported inputs, were 
other  processed foods which achieved significant consumption 
levels but the former two did not displace local products so much 
as supplem ent them. Coffee was the other main processed food 
but, whils t  processing was largely in the hands  of foreign 
interests, the basic ingredient was local.
The demand-side influences on the spread of foreign consumption 
habi ts  (and thus also, to a degree, on the power of foreign 
commercial and industrial concerns) are complex and need to be 
discussed in some detail. Three variables are considered in order 
of d iminishing contr ibu t ions  to the g rowth  of d em an d  for 
processed foods: income per capita, product promotion and income 
distribution. The level of imports of processed foods, the most 
accurate proxy for consumption available, was closely related to 
income per capita. Imports per capita for most processed foods 
over the period 1956-60 to 1986-88 increased up to 1980 and 
stagnated or declined therafter,  as did income per capita. What
2 S.J.Kobrin, Multinational Corporations, Sociocultural Dependence and 
Industrialisation: Need Satisfaction or Want Creation ?’. In P.K.Ghosh (ed), 
Multinational Corporations and Third World Development (Greenwood  
Press, Westport,  1984) , pp.195-201 .
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evidence there is indicates that income per capita was the decisive 
factor in determining consumption levels.
By contrast, there is no evidence to support Anderson's assertion 
th a t  d ev e lo p m e n ts  in re ta i l ing  would  inc rease  levels  of 
c o n s u m p t i o n . 3 Improvements in retailing techniques or extensive 
promotional activity for a product appear to have had, at best, 
sh o r t - te rm  effects on consumption  p a t te rn s .4 The one major 
exception was the stock cube, the consumption of which rose 
dramatically from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s. But even for 
this convenience product,  consumption  per head even tua l ly  
dec l ined  w i th  income per capita .  This w as  d esp i te  an 
unpreceden ted  level of promotional activity, the ne t  effect of 
which was to increase or decrease the market shares of competing 
brands  ra th e r  than  increase overall sales. Thus inappropr ia te  
pat terns  of demand, in which consumers spend money on items 
they do not need to the detr iment of their diet, do not necessarily 
result  from extensive marketing. However, there remains the fact 
tha t  high income groups did consume many imported products  
which meant a draining of foreign exchange r e s e r v e s . 5 To an 
extent  criticisms of Third World governm ents  for being lax in 
controlling luxury imports  apply to Ivory Coast though import  
controls are not necessarily the most efficient response.
The growth of average incomes seems to have been the main 
source of inc reased  consum ption .  However,  the  u n e q u a l  
distribution of income was probably the most important factor in 
limiting increases in processed food demand. Whilst income per 
capita rose rapidly  during the boom years, the distribution of 
income was very inequitable which may well have been the prime 
factor in dealing a fatal blow to the hopes of achieving economic 
take off'. As Mytelka observed, ' The slow growth of the domestic
3 E.Anderson, ' "Retail Pull": a Source of Economic Stability and Growth for 
Developing Nations', Tournal of Retailing. 46, 4 (Winter 1970 - 71).
4 Evidently more researched is needed in this area. Long-term increases  
through marketing or distribution initiatives are more difficult to detect  
for steady  increases  in consumption over an extended period could be due  
to rising or changing income and population patterns.
5 T.l.Biersteker. Distortion or Development ? (Massachusetts  Insti tute of 
Technology,  Cambridge, Massachusetts , 1978) ,  pp .16-17 .
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m ark e t  tha t  this implied th rea ten e d  to u n d e rm in e  im por t -  
subst i tuting industries".6 For the large majority of Ivorians, the 
ability to purchase non-luxury processed foods of the type which 
economies of scale could justify local manufacturing was less than 
it would have been had incomes been more evenly distributed.
8.2 DISTRIBUTION TECHNIQUES: STRENGTHS. WEAKNESSES AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT
C urren t ly  available l i te ra tu re ,  the Ivor ian  s ta te  and the i r  
consultants  have mostly em phasised  the negative  aspects of 
informal sector activities at the same time as ignoring weaknesses 
of w e s te rn  style distr ibution techniques. Of the two types  of 
foreign domination in distribution, western  interests  s tarted from 
a position of strength, having come from countries which w ere  
more technologically advanced and, in strictly economic terms, far 
be t ter  off. On the other hand, non-western  foreign in terests  for 
the most part arrived from areas less well off and/or,  in the case 
of the Lebanese and the Mauritanians,  from areas which were  
politically and economically unstable. Whereas w estern  interests 
dominated the WSE sector, non-western interests  prevailed in the 
NSE sector.
With the benefit of hindsight it can be seen tha t  the WSE sector 
held only two significant advantages. These were more capital and 
the ability to keep proper accounts. Most of the l iterature covering 
en terpr ises  and marketing in the Third World would add other 
advantages to this very  short list: organisational skills, access to 
retail and advertising technologies and larger scale of operations 
leading to oligopolistic or even monopolistic markets. However, all 
of these commonly stated advantages ei ther  d isappeared  over 
time or w ere  never  actually advantages in the f irs t  place. The 
advantage of knowledge of overseas suppliers and of advertising 
technologies was only re levant to importers  and manufacturers.
6 L.K.Mytelka, Foreign Business and Economic Development'.  In 
I.W.Zartman and C Delgado, The Political Economy of Ivorv Coast (Praeger,  
New York, 1984) ,  p .153.
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Access to retail  technologies only proved significant in the 
superm arke t  sector. Monopolistic and /o r  oligopolistic dominance 
in retailing and wholesaling never even happened. The large scale 
of operation in the case of retail chains entailed inflexibility. The 
failure of the chains was despite Goldman s assertion tha t  "such 
stores can achieve cost reductions and quality im provem ents  
through a chain form of organisation and through more modern 
operating methods".7
Even the two clear advantages held by the WSE sector became less 
significant over time. Capital was all important under the two-way 
system of t rade tha t  existed to the early 1950s but after then  
investments  had to be redirected into other activities. The new 
reality was that however many Avion stores SCOA could afford to 
open, there was no guarantee that  the consumer would use them. 
An additional, rarely mentioned, factor in this may well have been 
tha t  "low income consumers in developing countries. . . shy away 
f rom  u n fam il ia r  [re tail ing] e n v i ro n m e n t s " .8 In short,  the 
advantage of financial muscle was underm ined  by a failure to 
know how best to use it and by a host of advantages held by the 
NSE retailers. The advantage of proper accounting methods was 
also undermined. Whilst they enabled close monitoring of stock 
ro ta t ions ,  p ro f i tab i l i ty  and l iqu id i ty ,  th e se  fac to rs  w e re  
o u tw e ig h ed  by o rgan isa t iona l  in f lex ib i l i ty  and excess ive  
overheads. Thus, as Best noted in Botswana, "Traders claim tha t  
the co-ops have made no inroads into their  established markets 
and offer no savings to the buyer."9 Nor, at least as far as stores 
w ere  concerned, was there  any evidence to suppor t  for Ivory 
Coast the proposition which Kennedy put forward for Ghana that
7 A.Goldman, Outreach of Consumers and the Modernization of Urban Food 
Retailing in Developing Countries', journal of Marketing. 38 (October 1974) ,  
p .14.
8 Ibid. p. l 1; Personal experience: discussions with NSE small retail store 
customers ( 1 9 83 -86 ) .
9 A.C.G.Best, General Trading in Botswana, 1890-1968 ' ,  Economic Geography  
46, 4 (1970),  p.609.
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"the dynamism of the modern sector" was an important factor in 
hindering the informal sector.10
WSE initiatives failed to grasp the importance of the environment 
not just in general te rms (Ivory Coast as a whole) but  also in 
specific te rm s (at the regional level), as i l lus tra ted  by their  
uniform stocking policy. As Alexander rem arked  on retailing in 
industrial revolution England:
the kind of distribution service required is a function of the size and 
distribution of the population,  the structure of production units  and 
the l eve l  of indiv idual  and local se lf -suf f ic iency ,  the avai labi l i ty  of 
transport  and communication services ,  the size and d is tr ibut ion of 
income, and many other factors .1 1
Regional data on income and population for Ivory Coast indicate a 
diverse country. Rural areas and many small towns w ere  more 
self-sufficient than  Abidjan. Transport ing  goods to s tores  in 
villages or in no r the rn  u rban  areas was more expensive than  
supplying those near Abidjan. Income per capita in the south east 
in 1975 was nearly three times that  of the south west, over five 
times that of the north and over six times that of the centre north. 
Climate, migrant se t t lem ents  and religion fu r th e r  influenced 
consumption patterns. None of these factors were  fully accounted 
for by the WSE retail chains in, for example, the range of products 
they stocked.
In sharp contrast  to the WSE sector, the s trengths  of the NSE 
sector increased ra ther  than diminished. Their advantages were  
an abili ty to adapt to rapidly  changing circumstances,  be t te r  
knowledge of consumer trends,  more appropr ia te  location of 
stores, lower overheads ,  closer contacts w ith  o ther  t rade rs ,  
evasion or avoidance of most forms of taxation and, for the 
Lebanese, informal political contacts. In short, they  opera ted  
according to their environment ra ther  than, as in the case of the 
WSEs, according to theoretical assumptions based on experience in
10 P.Kennedy, Cultural Factors Affecting Entrepreneurship and 
Development  in the Informal Economy in Ghana', IDS Bulletin. 8 , 2  (1976) .  
p. 17.
11 D.Alexander. Retailing in England During the Industrial  Revolution  
(Athlone Press, University of London, 1970) , p.3.
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a different environment.  Thus, as Bienefeld found in Tanzania, 
"this sector is re la t ively  immune to competi tion from highly 
centralised, capital intensive operations, at least at present  levels 
of consumption and mobility".12
Whilst kinship may impose bu rdens  on t rade rs ,  it also had 
advantages which served to lessen those of the WSEs. As Cohen 
found amongst the Hausa, ethnicity and religion played important 
par ts  in t rade  ne tw orks  which w ere  the source of financial 
assistance and market k n o w l e d g e . T h a t  there were  "limitations 
and constraints that result  from prevailing arrangements  in social 
s t ruc tu re  and culture", as Kennedy observed in Ghana,14 was 
undoubted ly  true  for many Ivorians though less t rue  for most 
foreign trading groups. Conversely, however,  the success of the 
Mauritanians and Lebanese clearly owed much to their tight social 
o rgan isa t ion .  Indeed ,  Kennedy does note tha t ,  as far  as 
en trepreneuria l  skills are concerned, "some kinds of social origins 
and some sorts of life experience are more likely to produce these 
skills".15
The NSE s to r e s ’ aw a ren ess  of consum er  p re fe ren ce s  w as  
illustrated most clearly by the marked regional variations in types 
of products they stocked. Product range and reserve stocks were  
monitored daily according to consumer outreach and the ease with 
which depleted lines could be restocked at a nearby  wholesaler.
Goldman s observation that  Third World retailing systems evolve 
"mainly in response to certain behavioural  pa t te rns  and only 
w hen  these change can a more developed system a p p e a r " 16 
perhaps explains why the number of stores increased whilst their  
basic functions and methods of operation remained essentially the 
same over  the years .  Developments  in re ta i l ing  alone, as
12 M.Bienefeld, The  Informal Sector and Peripheral  Capitalism: the Case of  
Tanzania', IDS Bulletin. 6, 3 (1 9 7 4  /  75) ,  p.65.
A.Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1969), pp.7-20.
14 Kennedy,  ‘Cultural Factors’, p. 17.
1 5 Ibid. p. 19.
16 Goldman. 'Outreach', p .13.
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envisaged by Anderson, and by the Ivorian state and their French 
consultants, were only a part of increasing consumption.
Finally, it remains to determine the validity of Mittendorf's three 
stage model illustrating the changing patterns of retailing during 
the course of economic development.  At stage one, public markets 
and neighbourhood shops are of equal importance. At stage two 
superm arket  chains gain from public markets with the importance 
of neighbourhood shops unchanged. At stage three, hyperm arke ts  
and the chains are dominant, neighbourhood shops in decline and 
public markets of little significance.17 Ivory Coast, throughout the 
35  year  period under study, by and large remained in the first 
stage. Only briefly during the 1970s did more developed' patterns 
begin to emerge and these were  in the form of retail  chains 
(intended as neighbourhood shops) which are not mentioned by 
Mittendorf. Supermarkets  gaining at the expense of public retail 
markets  was never  likely to happen for the two retail  sectors 
se rved  almost en t i re ly  d ifferent products to almost en t i re ly  
d i f fe ren t  consum ers .  What p robab ly  did h ap p e n  was  th a t  
superm arke ts  and grocery stores gained at the expense of small 
reta ilers in certain locations but even this appears to have been 
minimal.
8.3 DISTRIBUTION TECHNIQUES AND THE FOREIGN DOMINATION OF 
IVOR I AN IS AT ION
Ivorianisation in the commercial sector saw little if any progress 
during the years  1956 to 1990. Ivorians in t rade  have been 
h indered  by a var ie ty  of factors since the precolonial era. The 
sta te  effectively added more barr iers  to the em ergence  of a 
genuinely Ivorian commercial class, one tha t  operated according 
to its en v i ro n m en t  r a th e r  than  being based  on non-Afr ican  
trading techniques. In fact, the state sought the advice of foreign
17 As explained in E.Kaynak and S.T.Cavusgil, The  Evolution of Food 
Retailing Systems: Contrasting the Experience of Developed and Developing  
Countries’, lournal of the Association of Marketing Studies . 10, 3 (Summer  
1 9 8 2 )  and E.Kaynak, Marketing and Development (Praegar, New York, 
1 9 8 6 ) ,  pp.1 0 0 - 1 0 2 .
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consultants, implemented foreign distribution techniques through 
the Programme d'Action Commerciale (PAC), supported  foreign 
distribution companies and, unofficially, the Lebanese, and did 
nothing to assist Ivorian traders  already established in in ternal 
trade. The so-called promotion of indigenous interests thus had a 
distinctly foreign flavour and, as the following paragraphs show, 
was intended to favour an el i te18 strongly westernised in outlook.
Three factors affected established or would-be Ivorian traders  in 
the NSE sector: the existence of the retail and multiple chains of 
foreign companies, the state s PAC initiative, and the presence of 
large num bers  of non-Ivor ian  Africans and a large Lebanese 
community. Although foreign chain stores ult imately failed, they  
were  in competition with NSE sector traders and thus a barr ier  to 
this sector's advancement.  As Boone and Campbell observed,  
whilst  most were non-Ivorians,  Ivorians would also have been 
affec ted .19 These companies employed or assisted Ivorians but  
th ey  also encouraged them to adopt  in ap p ro p r ia te  t rad ing  
techniques.
As with  the distribution chains of the foreign companies, PAC, 
which existed from 1970 to 1980, provided another barr ier  to the 
development of the NSE sector. The reason w hy the state set up a 
chain which competed with western  interests was that  it was part  
of a political strategy of playing off one interest  against another, 
th e reb y  prevent ing  any one group becoming a th rea t  to elite 
in terests ,  i.e. divide and rule. This a t tem pt '  at Ivorianisation 
favoured those of a certain educational standard, many of whom 
would have been relatives of members of the elite. Also, members 
of the elite, as r e n t i e r s  and managers  in s ta te  companies,  
benefit ted financially.20 This became particularly apparen t  w hen
18 For a definition of the Ivorian ‘eli te’, see T.Bakary, ‘Elite Transformation  
and Political Succession'. In Zartman and Delgado (eds.), Political Economy.  
p p .2 1-55.
19 C.Boone, ‘Commerce in Cote d’Ivoire: Ivorianisation without  Ivorian 
Traders’. 1MAS. 31. 1 (1993) ,  p.83; B.Campbell, T h e  Social, Political and 
Economic Consequences of French Private Investm ent  in the Ivory Coast’ 
(University of Sussex Ph.D., Brighton, 1973) ,  p.332.
20 Boone, ‘Commerce’, p.91. Members of an elite benefiting from 
commercial activities through the public offices they held seem s  to be a
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ram pan t  corruption set in during the latter years  of its existence. 
Further, the PAC retail chain was a vehicle for promoting foreign 
distribution techniques geared to selling products which w ere  
mostly e i ther  im por ted  or m anufac tu red  locally by  foreign 
companies. This confirms Campbell's observation tha t  "the process 
of Ivorianisation remained particularly weak in the commercial 
sector during the 1970s ",21 and these foreign influences remained 
in evidence through the Programme National d 'assistance aux 
Commercants Ivoiriens (PNCI). Finally, the state allowed PAC to 
fold in 1980 for the simple reason that  it became too expensive to 
m a in ta in  at a t ime w h en  sta te  resources  w e re  becoming 
increasingly stretched.
The large number of Lebanese and foreign Africans in Ivory Coast 
has o b s t ru c ted  Ivor ians  in t r a d e  since precolonial  times. 
Akeredolu-Ale’s observation that the Ijebu in Nigeria benefit ted 
from cumulative advantages (trade links and being brought up in 
a bus iness  en v i ro n m e n t )  and economic n ecess i ty  (lack of 
al ternative means of making a living)22 also worked in favour of 
foreign traders  in Ivory Coast. These continued to be im portan t  
factors throughout the period 1956-90. Despite publicly attacking 
foreign Africans in trade, the state did nothing to discourage them 
which did not also affect Ivorian NSE traders.  The presence of 
foreigners performing this vital economic function helped prevent 
the em ergence  of an Ivorian commercial class w ith  in te res ts  
which might compete with those of the elite. Boone argued tha t  
northerners ,  who were the most numerous Ivorian traders ,  were  
targeted by the regime in the 1960s as, along with the Bete, they 
w ere  among Houphouet-Boigny’s political rivals implicated in the 
1963 coup a t tem p t .23 Foreigners had no political leverage and
t ime honoured tradition. See, for example,  R.J.Hopper, Trade and Industry  
in Classical Greece (Thames and Hudson, 1979) ,  pp. l  13 -117 .
21 B.Campbell, State and Capitalist Development in the Ivory Coast'. In P 
Lubeck (ed.). The African Bourgeoisie (Lvnne Rienner, Colorado, 1987) ,  
p.292.
22 E.O.Akeredolu-Ale, ‘A Sociohistorical Study of the Development of 
Entrepreneurship among the Ijebu of Western Nigeria’, ASR. 1 6 , 3  (1973) ,  
pp.347-364 .
23 Boone, ‘Commerce’, p.76-77.
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thus posed no such th rea t  as was observed by Cruise O'Brien on 
the Lebanese in Senegal.2^
The distributive trade in the 1970s was one area where  the sta te’s 
a t tem pt at harnessing financial benfits for the elite met with little 
success. The politically powerless foreign Africans and Lebanese 
hindered the growth of an Ivorian commercial class. The Lebanese 
s t reng th  in in te rna l  t rade  f inanced the ir  expansion  into the 
previously  French dominated im port-expor t  sector. In public, 
government policy on internal trade, as with other sectors of the 
economy, consistently sought to increase Ivorian participation. In 
practice, the state did nothing to n u r tu re  Ivorians  a l ready  
established in trade.
8 .4  THE WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PROCESSED FOOD TRADE IN IVORY COAST
The elite's protection of foreign in te res ts  in the economy in 
genera l  has been much criticised by Campbell and o t h e r s . 25 
However, from the evidence above, radical critics have not been 
entirely correct in linking the local elite to a foreign metropole for, 
in reality, the elite cleverly played the Lebanese off against 
metropol i tan  in te re s t s26 which, if too powerful, could limit the 
elite’s political power: as they already did to an extent. This was 
fu r ther  evident in the lessening of the reliance for cocoa sales on 
the French company Sucden in favour of other brokers (Phibro of 
the US and Moutafian of the UK).27
The lack of private Ivorian participation in vir tual ly  all areas of 
the economy did not, though, extend to the state to the extent that  
Campbell, Amin and Mytelka implied. The state was the largest
24 R.Cruise O’Brien, Lebanese Entrepreneurs in Senegal: Economic 
Integration and the Politics of Protection'. CEA. 57, 57 (1975) .
2 5 See Campbell, ‘Capitalist Deve lopment’.
26 See also Boone, ‘Commerce’, pp.91 -92.
27 EIU, Cote d ’Ivoire Country Report (various issues 1989 - 91).
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shareholder in industry ,28 a reality which led Lubeck to consider 
that,
b e c a u s e  H o u p h o u e t -B o ig n y  d o m in a te s  po l i t ical  l ife and  
manip ula tes  his c l ients  so skil ful ly ,  one must  ask w h e t h e r  
the Ivorian state r e se m b les  a Bonapartist  state w h e r e b y  a 
s in g le  p e r s o n a l i t y  e m p o w e r e d  by  his  contro l  o v e r  the  
ex te ns ive  state apparatus dominates  a civil  soc iety to such a 
d e g r e e  th a t  i n s u f f i c i e n t  s pace  r e m a i n s  for f l e d g l i n g  
capitalist c lasses to expand into manufacturing.29
The failure  of the fledgling capitalist  classes to expand into 
manufacturing* may well be at least in part  due to the fact tha t  
many such capitalists would be expected to emerge from the 
commercial sector first and Ivorian private participation here was 
very  limited. However, despite the substantial foreign presence, it 
was state interests which were of param ount importance to the 
lack of deve lopm ent  of Ivorian private  en terprise .  No clearer 
indicator of this can be found than Houphouet-Boigny’s s tatements 
that  “What the Ivory Coast will not know and must not know, in 
its own interest, is Ivorian capitalism” and “The only capitalism 
th a t  we must construct  is tha t  of the Ivorian state."30 The 
f in g e rp r in t s  of this ideology w ere  ev id en t  th ro u g h o u t  the 
economy, including developments in both trading enterprises and 
processed  food supply .  Thus, Faure and M e d a rd ’s l ibe ra l  
in te rp re ta t io n  tha t  foreign capital  did not necessar i ly  take  
precedence  over Ivorian in te re s t s31 is correct bu t  only with  
regard  to state in terests .  It is im por tan t  to note this w h en  
considering the place of the Ivorian development strategy in the 
comparative history of the emergence of African capitalism.32
Looking at retailing across a wider range of developing countries, 
many of the factors already mentioned are re levent to other low
28 P.Lubeck, The  African Bourgeoisie: Debates, Methods and Units of 
Analysis'. In Lubeck (ed.) African Bourgeois ie , p.22.
29 Ibid. p.23.
30 Quoted in J.Iliffe, The Emergence of African Capitalism (University of 
Minnesota Press, Mineapolis,  1983) ,  p.80.
31 J-A.Faure and J-F.Medard, ‘Classe dominante ou classe dirigeante ?’. In J- 
A. Faure and J-F.Medard (eds), Etat et bourgeoisie en Cote d ’Ivoire (Karthala,  
Paris, 1982) , pp .139-140.
32 See the articles in Lubeck (ed.), Bougeoisie: Iliffe, Emergence.
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income economies. Low consum er outreach,  f lexibi l i ty  and 
overheads  are not uniquely Ivorian problems but issues to be 
faced in any economy with limited t ran sp o r t  networks,  poor 
income distribution and highly competi tive non-W estern  store 
types with low overheads. It is also time tha t  more notice was 
taken of the strengths and importance of indigenous enterprises, 
their ability to meet rapidly changing demand and to operate with 
few resources  w hils t  employing or suppor t ing  f r iends  and 
relatives in countries with virtually no social security network.
Attempts to stimulate greater  efficiency in any economic sector 
are of course highly desirable but the belief tha t  a particular  
technology can function  w ith  the  same efficiency in any 
env ironm ent  is often misguided. Import  subst i tution industries 
have provided many examples, the most recent  in Ivory Coast 
being the a t tem pt  to save foreign exchange by manufacturing 
concentrated milk locally since 1990. In addition to the cost of 
importing the necessary capital goods, most of the raw materials 
also had to be imported and the end product costs more than the 
b e t te r  qual i ty  im por ts .33 In Nigeria, the Kano River Project 
initiated in 1971 is one of many examples of irrigation schemes 
consuming vas t  sums of deve lopm ent  aid w ith  few positive 
re su l t s .34 Generally, capita l-intensive and technically complex 
irrigation and other agricultural developments  have caused as 
many problems as they have solved in developing c o u n t r i e s . 33 
Whilst technology can provide substantial benefits in many areas 
of an economy, development initiatives in the distribution sector 
as well as other areas of national economies have all too often 
failed to take sufficient account of local environments.  The ability 
of NSE traders  in Ivory Coast to survive in a hostile environment,  
in contrast to the failure of the WSE sector, must be the starting 
point of any future initiatives in developing internal distribution.
33 A.Diaby, ‘Dossier industrie laitiere: un jumelage d’interet  national’, 
Fraternite Matin (November 6 1990),  p.21; Fieldwork: discussions with  
traders and importers  (July-December 1.990).
34 C.Barrow, Water Resources and Agricultural Deve lopment in the Tropics 
(Longman,  Harlow, 1987) , pp .310-31 1.
33 P.Richards. Indigenous Agricultural Revolution (Hutchinson. 1985) ,  
pp.l 17-141.
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d'Ivoire (April 4 1950).
circular, Bureau de Statistique (April 22 1948).
circular, Affaires Economiques, 'Situation des laits a Abidjan' 
(October 21 1950).
5874 /X V 11 -1 5-1 5;
contents list from a parcel to La Legion de la Cote d'Ivoire (n.d., 
circa 1943).
invoice, Ets. Charles Perinaud to Legion des Combattants (October 
31 1942).
invoice, SCOA to Legion Francaise (November 11 1942): invoice, 
SCOA to Legion Francaise (October 31 1942).
10 0 2 /V -4 -2 1 1:
letter from Compagnie Bordelaise des Comptoirs Africains (1910). 
letter from Seguier et Goux (1910).
letter from Compagnie Commerciale de la Cote d'Afrique (1910). 
letter, CFAO to Lt.Gov of Ivory Coast (January 5 1910). 
invoice, CFAO to Le Service des Travaux Publics (March 1909).
I O Q 7 /V -3 7 -8 1 :
AOF, 'Cahier des charges speciales' (1909).
1 0 0 8 /V - l  1 -275:
Chambre de Commerce, Proces-verbal de la ler seance du 13 
fevrier 1911.
letter, AOF to Chambre de Commerce (July 31 1915).
1QQ1 l /V-33 -33 :
letter, Affaires Economiques to Inspection des Douanes (January 
27 1914).
1QQ82/XX1-12-4:
report, 'Cercle de Kong’ (1923).
b) Archives  National  de France - Sect ion O utre-Mer (ANF-SO M )
Affaires Economiques. carton 674:
Cahier des Douanes, 'Tariffs' (March 15 1945).
Cahier des Douanes, 'Tariffs' (December 5 1950).
FIDES serie 2. carton 179:
'Comparison entre les prix FOB Francais et etrangers d’articles de 
consommation courante Outre-Mer' (Bureau d’Approvisionnement, 
octobre 1957).
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c) West  Africa Holdings  Archives (WAHA)  
telex to Wander, Berne (Febuary 1992).
d) Danish Africa Company [DANAFCO] Archives  (DSA)
Internal Reports
Agence Aujourdhui, 'Augumentaire: Jumbo Poisson' (1985).
Agence Aujourdhui, 'Etude marche Jumbo' (July 1987).
Agence Aujourd'hui, 'Etude sur le produit Jumbo' (1982).
Agence Aujourd'hui, 'Jumbo: releve des achats' (1985).
Agence Aujourd'hui, 'Post-test de la campagne televisee ''Jumbo 
Cube" ’ (March 1983).
Agence Aujourdhui, 'Synthese et conclusions du sondage sur les 
semi-grossistes et detaillants au sujet de 1'evolution du marche du 
grande cube depuis le lancement de super Maggi' (Jan 1984).
Amavi, J-F., 'Definition/orientation des actions promotionelles et 
publicitaires 1984/1985' (June 1984).
Ayirebi, J., 'Jumbo Cube Promotion' (October 1983).
Ayirebi, J., 'Market Survey on Jumbo Cubes and Competitive 
Brands in the Interior of the Ivory Coast' (May-July 1983).
Ayirebi, J., 'Market Survey of the Abidjan Area' (1983).
Ayrebi, J., 'Survey of Distribution Outlets, Abidjan' (1983).
Ayrebi, J., 'Survey of Distribution Outlets, Bouake' (1984).
Bohan International, 'Resultats de l'etude quantitative realisee en 
avril-mai 1984'.
Bosteen, L., 'Survey of Distribution Outlets and Ethnic/National 
Groups, Abidjan Town' (1985).
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Bosteen, L., 'Survey of Distribution Outlets and Ethnic/National 
Groups - Bush Sector of Abidjan' (1985).
Oulai, R., untitled (July 29 1982).
(unknown), 'Comparison structure de prix et profit par produit et 
par intermediare'(n.d. circa 1984).
(Unknown), 'Etude commerciale Jumbo' (1983).
(Unknown), untitled, probably prepared by Agence Aujourd'hui, 
for DANAFCO and GB (n.d. circa 1983).
Letters
E.Bosteen to GB (Barcelona) (November 19 1980), p.4.
E.Bosteen to GB (March 16 1987).
COSEPRAL (Dakar), SIPAL (Bamako) and DANAFCO to Jaime 
Thomas, President du Conseil d'Administration, GB, Barcelona 
(November 6 1987).
Federation Ivoirienne d'Athletisme to DANAFCO (29 August 1989). 
P.Toxvaerd to I.Trier (November 25 1986).
Memos
Agence Aujour'hui to SAFA, 'Espace television - octobre, 
novembre, decembre 85' (September 13 1985).
D.Aliaga to DANAFCO, 'Subject: Abidjan Market' (October 2 1981).
D.Aliaga to DANAFCO (October 2 1981).
Jean-Francis Amavi to M.Cheriaux titled 'Objet: augmentation de 
prix Jumbo' (October 20 1982).
E.Bosteen to DANAFCO staff on discussion held in Barcelona 
(Febuary 8 and 9 1983).
M.Cheriaux to GB, 'Commentaires sur le rapport etabli par 
MM.Aliaga, Perea et Carisey au sujet visite de marches sur la Cote 
d'Ivoire.' (December 2 1983).
M.Cheriaux, untitled (October 1985).
Julian Perea to M.Cheriaux (Aug 1983 or 1984).
R.Theze, 'Resume du meeting avec Mr David Trewin [QSMD] le 30 
mars 1984 a Abidjan concernant les supermarches'.
Ian Trier, 'Meeting with Peter Toxvaerd - DANAFCO - Eton 31 
August 1984'.
unknown, 'Entretien avec le Directeur General et le Directeur 
Commercial de la Societe CFCI ce matin a nos bureaux' (n.d., circa 
1984).
untitled, notes on a leaked NOVALIM report (1985). 
untitled, QSMD (May 1985).
Minutes of meetings
between DANAFCO and GB (8 and 13 November 1982). 
between DANAFCO and GB (July 13 1983).
J.Perea, meeting between DANAFCO and GB (May 22 1985).
Telexes
Telexes between DANAFCO and United Biscuits (1985).
E.Bosteen to Mr Puig (GB) (June 10 1985).
I.Trier to E.Bosteen (25 Febuary 1988).
DANAFCO to Quaker (27 October 1988).
Other documents
Credit client sheets (1980-90).
File, ’Dossier sur l'affaire Taleb'.
Handwritten list of JOK outlets (1985).
Import licenses (1979).
Invoices (1980-90).
Legal document, 'Extraits des minutes du Greffe du Tribunal de 
Premiere Instance d'Abidjan' (April 23 1986).
'Liste des clients DANAFCO acceptes par CICA pour distribution 
Jumbo cube' (n.d., circa 1988-89).
Sales ledger (1983-86).
Stock ledger (1979-90).
Telefax, DANAFCO to I.Trier (24 March 88).
5: INTERVIEWS
Anthony, Mr. - French, Director of the Score group (Abidjan, 
November 1990).
Assouan, Claude - Ivorian, Directeur d'Achats at CDCI, (Abidjan, 
December 4 1990).
Attoh, Frederick - Ghanaian, DANAFCO General Manager (Abidjan, 
September 1990).
Bosteen, Erik - Danish, Chairman of West Africa Holdings, parent 
company of SAFA and DANAFCO (Abidjan, 1st. interview, 
November 15 1990).
Bosteen, Erik - Danish, Chairman of West Africa Holdings, parent 
company of SAFA and DANAFCO (Cahors, France, 2nd. interview, 
Febuary 9 1992).
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Boubakar, El Jilani Ould - Mauritanian wholesaler at Koumassi 
since 1970 (Abidjan, December 8 1990).
CNCI Director (Korhogo, November 20 1990).
Doh Gilles, Bernadin - Ivorian Baoule, Salesman at Blohorn and 
DANAFCO (Abidjan, 1st. interview, September 20 1990).
Doh Gilles, Bernadin - Ivorian Baoule, Salesman at Blohorn and 
DANAFCO (Abidjan, 2nd. interview, October 2 1990).
Drabo, Seydou - Burkinabe Mossi, Storekeeper and 
Nightwatchman at DANAFCO (Abidjan, July 24 1990).
Fakhry, Reda - Lebanese wholesaler (Lakota, November 24 1990).
Fofana, Coulibaly - Ivorian, Director of the Ecole de Commerce 
(Abidjan, December 4 1990).
Kloostra, Mr. - Dutch, Export Manager for Africa at C C Friesland 
Froco (Rotterdam, Telephone interview, May 3 1993).
Kobenan, Mr. - Ivorian, Director of SCIMPEX (Abidjan, December 
10 1990).
Konan, Mr. - Ivorian, Manager of IVODIS gros store (Aboisso, 
November 8, 1990).
Kouakou, Nestor Kouassi - Ivorian Baoule, former Chaine Avion 
Manager (Abidjan, August 20 and 21 1990).
La Rue, Jacques - French, Chef de Mission PNCI (Abidjan,
December 10 1990).
Merhouet, Mr. - Lebanese, Junior Partner of SABIMEX (Abidjan, 
November 13 1990).
Mohamed, Ould - Mauritanian retailer at Attiecoube (Abidjan, 
interviewed by Mr. Raymond Guei, July 1990).
Mourad, Abdoul Karim - Ivorian-Saudi, freelance marketeer, 
Abidjan. Previously Marketing Manager at DANAFCO 1984-86, 
Wonder Batteries and Marlborough.
N'Gozan, Mr. - Ivorian, Manager at CDCI in zone 4 (Abidjan, 
December 12 1990).
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Paoli, P. - French, Manager of the Champion Supermarket 
(Abidjan, November 1990).
Said, Mme. - Lebanese, Senior Secretary at CODIS (Abidjan,
October 1990).
Yace, Mr. - Ivorian, SCOA Service d'Achats (Abidjan, December 15 
1990).
Yoboue, Benoit - Ivorian Baoule, DANAFCO Salesman (Abidjan, July 
16 1990).
Zamble, Henri - Ivorian Gouro, Chef du Personel at DANAFCO and 
independant candidate for deputy in the 1990 elections (Abidjan, 
December 1990).
6: FIELDWORK
a) S u r v e y s  
Brand range survey.
Product range survey.
Questionnaires (September-November 1990). 
Regional distribution survey.
Unpublished survey by the PNCI (1989-90).
b) D i s c u s s i o n s
Most discussions with traders happened during the questionnaires 
survey when, for reasons of anonymity, names were not 
requested. The list below is therefore incomplete.
Adou Brou, Alexandre - Ivorian Agni, Salesman at DANAFCO, 
Abidjan.
Ahmadou, Dramera - Senegalese, Retailer, Lakota (November 23 
1990).
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Attoh, Frederick - Ghanaian, DANAFCO General Manager, Abidjan.
Ballo, Abdoulaye - Malian Malinke, Wholesaler, Grand Bassam.
Cheriaux, Marc - French, Ducros General Manager, Abidjan. 
Previously General Manger at DANAFCO 1974-89, Abidjan.
Chour, Abbas - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Abidjan Marcory.
Chour, Abdoul Karim - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Abidjan Koumassi.
Chour, Riad - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Grand Bassam.
Chour, Salah - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Abidjan Treichville.
CICA Marketing Manager, Abidjan (November 1990).
Commercial Attache at the Bristish Embassy, Abidjan (Nov 1990).
Cunningham, Pasteur F.J. - British, Director of the Camp Alpin des 
Missions Protestantes, Man.
Doh Gilles, Bernadin - Ivorian Baoule, Salesman at DANAFCO, 
Abidjan. Previously at Blohorn.
Drabo, Seydou - Burkinabe Mossi, Storekeeper and Watchman at 
DANAFCO, Abidjan. Previously at Afrilait.
Esmail, Sultan Ali - Pakistani, General Manager of PROSUMA, 
Abidjan (October 1990).
French Consul, Korhogo (Nov 1990).
Ivoire Media official, Abidjan (Sept 1990).
IVODIS Manager, Korhogo (November 1990).
Jaber, Abdel - Lebanese, Cosmetics Retailer, Aboisso.
Khoury, Mikhail - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Divo.
MEFCO Manger, Abidjan (September 1990).
Merhoueh, Ali - Lebanese, Semi-Wholesaler, Abidjan Port Bouet 
(October 1990).
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Ministry of Transport Official, Abidjan (August 1990).
Patentes office official, Abidjan (July 1990).
SACI Store Manager, Abidjan Plateau (1990).
Sehi, Prosper - Ivorian Senoufo, DANAFCO Storekeeper, Abidjan. 
Previously Storekeeper at SAFA and Union representative.
Sika, Jean Desire - Ivorian Attie, Perfume Salesman for 
Ets.SIBOCOR, Abidjan Plateau. Previously Salesman at DANAFCO 
1981-86, Abidjan.
Theze, Roselyn - French, Charges des Supermarches at DANAFCO, 
Abidjan. Previously at Abinader.
Tonga, Vincent - Ivorian Dan, Ducros Salesman, Abidjan. 
Previously Salesman at DANAFCO, Abidjan and a Storekeeper for 
Lebanese Wholesaler Elias Gabriel, Man.
Yedo, Benoit - Ivorian, SNEM Salesman. Previously Salesman at 
DANAFCO, and NOVALIM, Abidjan.
Yeo, Kamagate - Ivorian Senoufo, unemployed, Abobogare. 
Previously Storekeeper at DANAFCO, Abidjan.
Yoboue, Benoit - Ivorian Baoule, Salesman at DANAFCO, Abidjan.
Zabad, Hassan - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Dabou.
Zamble, Henri - Ivorian Gouro, Chef du Personnel at DANAFCO, 
Abidjan.
c) Var ious
Notes taken from Mme R.Theze who kept records of meetings 
during weekly sales visits to Abidjan supermarkets (1983).
PNCI, 'Produits de base pour magasins type 1 et 2'.
PROSUMA publicity leaflet (October 1990).
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7: PERSONAL EXPERIENCE
Discussions or conversations were held with countless traders, 
salesmen and others involved either directly or indirectly in 
commercial activities during the periods 1983 to 1985 and 1986. 
Below is a list of the principal 'informants’ during these years. The 
individual's name is followed by his/her nationality and/or ethnic 
origin and then their occupation and location at the time. This is 
followed by previous occupations, if relevent. Finally, ccupation 
and location in 1990, if known, are given underneath the source in 
brackets but not all individuals were checked.
Aboa, Gerard - Ivorian, Directeur Administratif et Financier at 
SIREIME, Abidjan.
(unknown)
Adji, Desire - Ivorian Bete, Commissaire de Police du 4^me 
arrondissement, Abidjan.
(unknown)
Adnan, Ajami - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Lakota.
(produce buyer)
Adou Brou, Alexandre - Ivorian Agni, Salesman at DANAFCO, 
Abidjan. Previously at SIFCODI.
(unchanged)
Alimou, Barry - Guinean, Wholesaler, Abidjan Adjame.
(bankrupt, unknown)
Amavi, Jean-Francis - Ivorian, Marketing Manager at DANAFCO 
1981-84, Abidjan.
(unknown)
Ankamah, Kwabena - Ghanaian, Director of Ets.Justice (import- 
export), Abidjan.
(unknown)
Aouley, Mathurin - Ivorian Bete, Salesman at DANAFCO, Abidjan. 
Previously at Seward (Cosmetics and Soaps).
(Salesman for SNEM)
Assoh, Kramoh - Ivorian Baoule, Chauffeur at DANAFCO, Abidjan. 
Previously worked for a Lebanese wholesaler.
(retired, Dimbokro)
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Attoh, Frederick - Ghanaian, Regional Manager at DANAFCO 1981- 
88, Bouake, General Manager at DANAFCO 1988-91, Abidjan.
(1993: Manager at SOCOCE)
Aguer, Bruno J. - French, Assisant Manager, Citibank, Abidjan, 
(unknown)
Ayirebi, Joseph - Ghanaian, Market Researcher at DANAFCO 1983- 
84. Previously DANAFCO Manager in Ghana.
(DANAFCO General Manager in Togo)
Baalbaki, Salim - Lebanese, Manager of Le Gourmet Alimentation, 
San Pedro.
(unknown)
Bakaloga, Paul - Burkinabe Mossi, Wholesaler, Anyama. 
(unchanged)
Ballo, Abdoulaye - Malian Malinke, Wholesaler, Grand Bassam. 
(unchanged)
Bamba, Siaka - Ivorian, Manager at Ivoiro-Canadien Import- 
Export, Abidjan.
(unknown)
Barry, Jean - Ivorian, Attache de Direction at the Societe 
Ivoirienne de Banque, Bouake.
(unknown)
Bdeiri, Imad - Lebanese, Owner of Studio La Joconde, San Pedros 
(unknown)
Bejjani, Antoine - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Divo.
(returned to Lebanon in 1985)
Bosteen, Erik - Danish, DANAFCO Chairman.
(unchanged)
Bosteen, Vivien - Danish, Accountant at DANAFCO 1981-83, 
Abidjan.
(Ministry of Culture, Seychelles).
Boubakar, El Jilani Ould - Mauritanian, Wholesaler, Kouma.<ssi. 
(unchanged)
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Boye, John - Ghanaian, Storekeeper at DANAFCO 1983-84, Abidjan, 
(unknown)
Chaoky, Sahly - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Agnibilekro.
(assassinated in 1985)
Cheriaux, Chantal - French, Researcher at Agence Aujourd’hui, 
Abidjan.
(unchanged)
Cheriaux, Marc - French, General Manger at DANAFCO 1974-89, 
Abidjan. Previously at Societe commerciale de diffusion (CODIF). 
(Ducros General Manager, Abidjan)
Chouman, Abbas - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Agnibilekro.
(unchanged)
Chouman, Kamal - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Bondoukou and Bouna. 
(unchanged)
Chouman, Rafic - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Abidjan Abobogare. 
(unchanged)
Chour, Abbas - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Abidjan Marcory. 
(unchanged)
Chour, Abdoul Karim - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Abidjan Marcory. 
(Abidjan Koumassi)
Chour, Riad - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Abidjan Marcory.
(Grand Bassam)
Chour, Salah - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Abidjan Treichville. 
(unchanged)
Chour, Salman - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Abidjan Koumassi.
(Central African Republic)
Cunningham, Pasteur F.J. - British, Director of the Camp Alpin des 
Missions Protestantes, Man.
(unchanged)
Dacoury Tabley, Celestine - Ivorian Dan, Wholesaler, Abidjan Port 
Bouet.
(senior figure in the Front Populaire Ivoirien - FPI)
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Dandy, Pascal - French, Superviser at Supermarche Trade Center, 
Abidjan.
(unknown)
Diabate, Tambagnaye - Ivorian Senoufo, Salesman at DANAFCO, 
Abidjan.
(unknown)
Diarra, Samba - Burkinabe Mossi, Wholesaler, Abidjan Yopougon. 
(unknown)
Doh Gilles, Bernadin - Ivorian Baoule, Salesman at DANAFCO, 
Abidjan. Previously at Blohorn.
(unchanged)
Doukoure, Aboubakar - Burkinabe Mossi, Wholesaler, Gagnoa. 
(bankrupt, still at Gagnoa)
Drabo, Seydou - Burkinabe Mossi, Storekeeper and Watchman at 
DANAFCO, Abidjan. Previously at Afrilait.
(unchanged)
Ette, Jean - Ivorian Agni, Wholesaler, Aboisso.
(bankrupt, reportedly jailed for smuggling)
Ezzedine, Hatif - Lebanese, Directeur Commercial at SHAFIPA, 
Abidjan.
(unknown)
Fakhry, Reda - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Lakota. Previously a 
university lecturer in Beirut.
(unchanged)
Fofana, Tidiane - Malian Malinke, Wholesaler, Abidjan Abobogare. 
(unchanged)
Gabriel, Elias - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Man.
(unknown, last seen in Guinea in 1984)
Hankard, Andre - French, Director of the Agence Aujourd'hui, 
Abidjan.
(unknown)
Hoballah, Youssef - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Danane.
(unknown)
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Iboudou, Ablasse - Burkinabe Mossi, Wholesaler, Abidjan Adjame. 
(unchanged)
Issany, N. - Chef de Rayon Vivres Frais at PROSUMA, Abidjan 
Plateau.
(unknown)
Jaber, Abdel - Lebanese, Retailer, Abengourou.
(perfume store, Aboisso)
Jomaa, Galeb - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Abidjan Treichville. 
(unknown)
Jouhair, Talal - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Bondoukou.
(unchanged)
Kabbani, Bassam - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Abidjan Treichville. 
(Guinea)
Kabore, Adama - Guinean, Wholesaler, Abidjan Adjame. 
(unchanged)
Kamara, Kadialy - Malien Malinke, Wholesaler, San Pedro, 
(unknown)
Keita, Fanta - Dioula, Semi-Wholesaler, Abidjan Koumassi market, 
(unknown)
Khoury, Mikhail - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Divo.
(unchanged)
Kingsberger, Peter - Swiss, Regional Manger at Wander, 1984-85. 
(unchanged)
Kouao, Assiedou - Ivorian, Responsable de la Comptabilite des 
Cheques Postaux at Ministere des Postes et Telecommunications, 
Abidjan.
(unknown)
Kouakou, Kouassi - Ivorian Agni, Salesman at DANAFCO, Abidjan 
(unknown).
Kouakou, Therese - Ivorian Agni, Secretary at DANAFCO, Abidjan, 
(unemployed, Adjame)
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Lia, Martin - Ivorian Bete, Chauffeur at DANAFCO, Abidjan, 
(unknown)
Malali, Bayo - Ghanaian, Wholesaler, Agnibilekro 
(unknown)
Melki, Georges M. - Lebanese, Grocery Store Manager, Abidjan, 
(unknown)
Meroueh, Ali - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Abidjan Port Bouet. 
(unchanged)
Meroueh, Assan - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Tiassale.
(unchanged)
Meroueh, Hassan Ayoub - Lebanese, Director of Ivoirien de 
distribution et d'importation (IDIM), Abidjan Treichville. 
(unchanged)
Merhoueh, Mohamed - Lebanese, Wholesaler, N'Douci.
(left Ivory Coast, now unknown)
Merhouet, Ali - Lebanese, Wholesaler, N'Douci.
(unchanged)
Mingle, Charles - Ghanaian, General Manager of SAFA, Abidjan. 
Previously a lecturer in chemistry in Kumasi, Ghana.
(Ducros, Togo)
Mobio, Akre Augustin - Ivorian, Chef d'Atelier at Africatainers 
SNT.
(unknown)
Modi, Mohamed Ould - Mauritanian, Wholesaler, Abidjan Adjame. 
(unknown)
Mourad, Abdoul Karim - Ivorian-Saudi, Jumbo Marketing Manager 
at DANAFCO 1984-86, Abidjan. Previously at Wonder (batteries), 
(freelance, Abidjan)
N'Diaye, Brigette - French, Credit Controller at DANAFCO 1985-90, 
Abidjan.
(Ducros, Abidjan).
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N'Diaye, Y.Salif - Senegalese, Chef du Departement Ventes Cargo at 
Air Afrique, Abidjan.
(unchanged)
N'Guessan, Mangoua - Ivorian Baoule, Chauffeur at DANAFCO, 
Bouake.
(now at Abidjan)
Ouattara, Sine - Ivorian Malinke, Senoir Accountant at DANAFCO, 
Abidjan.
(Abinader, Abidjan)
Oulai, Rene - Ivorian Bete, Salesman at DANAFCO 1982-84, 
Abidjan.
(unknown)
Perea, Julian - Spanish, Assistant Regional Manager at Gallina 
Blanca.
(Europe)
Rek, Michel - Lebanese/French, Wholesaler, Duekoue.
(unchanged)
Sawadogo, Poko - Burkinabe Mossi, Wholesaler, Abidjan Koumassi. 
(tailor)
Sehi, Prosper - Ivorian Senoufo, Storekeeper at SAFA and Union 
representative.
(DANAFCO Storekeeper)
Sika, Jean Desire - Ivorian Attie, Salesman at DANAFCO 1981-86, 
Abidjan.
(Perfume Salesman for Ets.SIBOCOR, Abidjan Plateau).
Souley, Seini - Hausa {Niger}, Wholesaler, Aboisso.
(sometimes also at Abidjan Marcory).
Stratton, Chris - British, Regional Manager at Beechams.
(unknown)
Sylla, Mariam - Malian Malinke, Wholesaler, Agboville. 
(unchanged)
Taleb, Mohamed Ould - Mauritanian, Wholesaler, San Pedro, 
(deceased 1989)
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Tarraf, Sleyman (or Samy) - Lebanese, Retailer, Issia.
(unchanged)
Tchi oi Tchi, Juliette - Ivorian Agni, Secretary at DANAFCO . 
(unknown)
Tchi oi Tchi, N'Da - Ivorian Agni, Salesman at DANAFCO, Bouake. 
(self employed, Bouake)
Theze, Roselyn - French, Charges des Supermarches at DANAFCO, 
Abidjan. Previously at Abinader.
(unchanged)
Tonga, Vincent - Ivorian Dan, Salesman at DANAFCO, Abidjan. 
Previously a Storekeeper for Lebanese Wholesaler Elias Gabriel, 
Man.
(Ducros Salesman, Abidjan)
Toure, Vagama - Ivorian Malinke, Wholesaler, Man.
(unchanged)
Toxvaerd, Peter - Danish, Director of Marketing at DANAFCO 1984- 
87, Abidjan. Previously Danish Ambassador to Ivory Coast. 
(Copenhagen, Denmark)
Traore, Mammadou - Ivorian Malinke, Salesman at DANAFCO 
1983-85, Abidjan. Previously at NOV ALIM and PREPAL.
(deceased 1987)
Trier, Ian - British, Regional Manager at Quaker Special Markets 
Division.
(Guiness, Park Royal NW10).
Vadel, Mohamed - Mauritanian, Wholesaler, Man.
(Abidjan Adjame)
Winter, Simon - British, Service Clientele at Barclays Bank 
International, Abidjan.
(unknown)
Yacouba, Oumarou - Hausa {Niger}, Wholesaler, Abidjan Adjame. 
(unchanged)
Yaw, Offori - Ghanaian, Semi-Wholesaler, Hire-Watta.
(unknown)
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Yedo, Benoit - Ivorian, Salesman at DANAFCO, Abidjan. Previously 
at NOVALIM.
(SNEM Salesman)
Yeo, Kamagate - Ivorian Senoufo, Storekeeper at DANAFCO, 
Abidjan.
(unemployed, Abobogare)
Yoboue, Benoit - Ivorian Baoule, Salesman at DANAFCO, Bouake. 
(Abidjan)
Zabad, Habib - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Dabou.
(unchanged)
Zabad, Hassan - Lebanese, Wholesaler, Dabou.
(unchanged)
Zakour, Michael J. - Lebanese, Wholesale Manager at John. M. 
Zakour & Sons , Accra.
(unknown)
Zamble, Henri - Ivorian Gouro, Chef du Personnel at DANAFCO, 
Abidjan. Stood as an independent candidate for Deputy in the 
1990 elections.
(unchanged)
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CORRIGENDA
p .19, fn .4 ,1.6 Bourgeoisie 
p.25, 1.2 later
p.30, 1.4 change both 'establishments' to 'enterprises' 
p.47, 1.10 change 'stores' to 'traders ' ; 1.-9 determ ined 
p.51,1.-10 subsistence 
p.54, 1.-2 stifling
p.59,1.6 delete 'As can be seen from the map'
p.60,1.3 significantly
p .61,1.12 kola
p.72, 1.-4 set back
p.75, 1.-7 delete 'of'
p .7 6 ,1.-3 adm inistration
p.77, 1.-2 crossroad
p.89, 1.10 in se rt 'o f '
p .9 0 ,1.-1 opportunities
p.93,1.4 insert 'o f ' ; 1.-13 colonial
p.95,1.2 Enterprise
p.96,1.5 change 'final' to 'fifth'
p.96, 1.8 add 'whilst the sixth looks at Ivorian NSE traders '
p.97, 1.13 impossible ; insert 'to'
p. 102,1.9 discrepancy
p. 103, 1.-12 occurred
p. 112,1.-5 hypocrisy
p. 119,1.-4 purchasing
p. 121, fn .1 0 9 ,1.6 beyond
p. 123, 1.12 consistent
p. 126,1.5 occurred
p. 134,1.2 in terests
p. 137,1.6 exchange ; fn .l 87 patents
p .139, 1.4 which ; 1.9 racist
p. 140,1.5 in se rt 'o f '
p .141,1.-9 commercial
p. 142,1.4 financial
p .144,1.15 acquired ; l.-l acquire
p. 145,1.-6 existence ; 1.-3 determining
p .149,1.3 headquarters
p .165,1.6 unavoidable ; 1.10 omit 2 n d 'f ro m '; fn.120 equivalent
p. 167, l . - l  Economie
p. 174, 1.12 financial
p .177, 1.-5 premises
p .181,1.14 premises
p. 182,1.-15 registered
p .186,1.3 dominated
p. 190, l.-l subsidiary
p. 191,1.9 subsidiary 
p .192,1.-4 found
p. 198,1.7 change ’th e ’ to ’these' ; delete ’11 
p.206,1.-12 delete be' 
p.208,1.4 subsidiaries 
p.210,1.3 would
p .2 1 1 ,1.-18 existence ; 1.-17 occurred ; 1.-3
p.212,1.10 derivatives ; 1.-6 sweeteners
p.213,1.9 en trep reneurs
p.214, l.-l in sert 'im m ig ran t '
p.224,1.-5 acquire
p.225,1.-6 subsistence
p.229,1.1 crucially ; 1.-10 referred
p.232,1.-16 convenience
p.234,1.-4 conceivable
p.235,1.-3 convenience
p.237,1.-15 convenience
p.238,1.-14 attribute
p.240,1.-7 ingredients
p.242,1.1 advertisers
p.243,1.-5 tastings
p.246, 1.12,1.-9 & 1.-6 convenience
p.248, l.-l 1 concentrated ; 1.-8 examining
p.249,1.12 fourth
p.257,1.11 consistently
p.258,1.1 fraudulen t
p.260,1.9 deterren ts
p.262,1.13 & 1.15 ingredients
p.265,1.6 preceding
p.279,1.17 acquired ; fn. 102 whose
p.284,1.-7 embezzlem ent
p.286,1.-3 generate
p.287,1.-8 competition
p.292,fn .4  research
p.304, Anyang ref. Bourgeoisie
likelihood
